Governance gone wrong? A preliminary critique of UNHCR’s Executive Committee

Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Russia. This disparate group of states have two things in common. On the one hand, they have all been responsible for the displacement of millions of people in recent years.

On the other hand, they are all members of UNHCR’s supervisory body, the Executive Committee (Excom), supposedly appointed on the basis of their “demonstrated interest in, and devotion to, the resolution of the refugee problem.” Another Excom member, the USA, has recently demonstrated its interest in the problem by announcing its intention to dismantle the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and curtail UNHCR’s activities.

ExCom's Structure and purpose

Established in 1958, Excom‘s primary purpose is to advise UNHCR on its mandated responsibilities and to approve the agency’s budget. It holds a week-long meeting in Geneva once a year, with an additional four annual gatherings (known as the Standing Committee) to discuss “protection, programme and financial issues, as well as complex questions that cut across these categories.” Excom functions by consensus, without taking votes, and has the ability to issue authoritative statements on key protection and policy issues known as ‘Conclusions’.

In an article published in 1999, Elisa Mason observed that “very little has been written about Excom.” Despite the rapid expansion of Refugee Studies since that time, that remains the case today. The following observations constitute an initial attempt to fill that gap in the literature.

Membership criteria and size

First, as indicated already, the criteria for membership are extremely vague and are not applied in practice. There is no mechanism for removing an Excom member, with the result that the body established to oversee UNHCR’s work includes states that are responsible for creating and sustaining the very problem that the organisation is intended to address. Significantly, states are not obliged to be signatories to the Refugee Convention to qualify for Excom membership.

Second, Excom has grown exponentially, expanding from 25 members in 1959 to 110 in 2026. It is not clear why some states (Fiji and Madagascar, for example) were admitted to Excom, while others (Benin, Iceland and Lesotho) have a limited engagement with the refugee issue. Despite the regular interchange of refugees between the two countries, Rwanda is a member of Excom but neighbouring Burundi is not. 

Before he left office in 2015, High Commissioner Antonio Guterres privately complained that as a result of its expansion, Excom had become increasingly like the UN General Assembly. It had, he suggested, become unwieldy and characterised by the same divisions that are to be found within the latter body.

Funding shortfalls and policy guidance

Third, Excom’s ability to discharge its primary responsibilities has become increasingly compromised. In terms of financing, Excom approves UNHCR’s annual budget, but has no obligation to provide the resources for its programme to be implemented. As a result of recent cuts in the contributions made by donor states, the organisation  is certain to be confronted with a growing funding shortfall.

With respect to protection and policy, UNHCR has found it increasingly difficult to negotiate Excom Conclusions with member states, with the result that they have appeared less frequently and focused on issues that are deemed to be uncontroversial in nature. No attempt has been made to assess the use and impact of Excom Conclusions since 2008, when a critical review of this issue was published. 

Underrepresentation of refugees and NGOs

Fourth, Excom consists solely of states, with other actors (such as regional organisations and UN agencies) having observer status. The NGO community is formally represented by a single organisation (the Geneva-based International Council of Voluntary Agencies) which has a close and comfortable relationship with UNHCR.

While a small number of states include refugees in the delegations they send to Excom, UNHCR’s supervisory body has not changed in response to the growing voice and visibility of Refugee-Led Organisations.

Unfulfilled commitments

Fifth, the annual Excom meeting is highly (some would say painfully) choreographed, consisting primarily of a carefully worded tour d’horizon by the High Commissioner and a ‘general debate’ in which a long stream of delegates from Excom member states read their contributions from prepared texts.

In the course of these statements, Excom members frequently make commitments to refugee protection and solutions that they have little intention of respecting in practice. The discourse is generally conducted in polite diplomatic language, with states that have generated large-scale displacements or violated the rights of refugees rarely being held to public account.

Proliferation of meetings

Finally, since Excom’s establishment, the number of meetings held in Geneva under UNHCR’s auspices has proliferated, eating up scarce resources in terms of flights, travel expenses and organisational costs.

One of those meetings, the annual Dialogue on Protection Challenges, was initiated by Guterres in 2007 as a specific means of substituting for the absence of interactive and inclusive discussion at Excom. As James Hathaway has observed, moreover, the Global Compact on Refugees, established in 2016, has led to “lots and lots of meetings… a bureaucrat’s dream perhaps, but nothing that comes even close to dependably addressing the operational deficits of the refugee regime.”

An alternative view

There is, of course, another side to this story. Some UNHCR insiders would undoubtedly argue that, for all its faults, Excom brings the agency together with a wide range of states in a neutral forum where the refugee issue can be discussed in a depoliticised manner. They would also point out that Excom provides an opportunity for a multitude of bilateral meetings behind closed doors, as well as broader gatherings between actors with an interest in specific issues and refugee situations.

In UNHCR’s defence, the organization’s management of Excom is clearly constrained by the diplomatic and state-centric norms that govern all UN activities. In that respect, any attempt to modify the body’s composition or way of working would almost certainly meet with strong resistance from its member states. 

Even so, it is disappointing to note that UNHCR, as well as the academic community, have shown little interest in taking a critical look at Excom and in forging constructive proposals with respect to the ways in which its legitimacy and effectiveness might be enhanced. This preliminary critique will hopefully contribute to such an effort.

Dr Jeff Crisp is a Visiting Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre and was formerly Head of Policy Development and Evaluation at UNHCR.