The Kalobeyei Model: Towards Self-Reliance for Refugees?

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Credit: N. Omata
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Cover photo: Kitchen gardens at Kalobeyei Primary School. Credit: A. Betts.
Executive Summary

- The Kalobeyei settlement was opened in Turkana County in Kenya in 2016 with the intention of promoting the self-reliance of refugees and the host population and delivering integrated services to both. Its development is guided by the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDP), led by the Government of Kenya (GoK), the Turkana County Government, UNHCR, and partners. The Kalobeyei settlement was designed to offer integrated, market-based opportunities to both refugees and the host community, and to support self-reliance for refugees. Its assistance model differs from that of the nearby Kakuma camp in a range of ways. For example, it offers cash-based interventions to meet housing, nutritional, and other material needs, specific training to support the entrepreneurial potential of refugees and hosts, and agricultural projects to promote dryland farming and household ‘kitchen gardens’. Since 2018, the KISEDP has expanded in scope to serve as a development plan for the entire sub-country of Turkana West, based on eight interconnected components: health; education; water, sanitation, and hygiene; protection; spatial planning and infrastructure; agriculture, livestock, and resources; sustainable energy; and private sector development and entrepreneurship.

- This report is based upon the midline findings of a 3-year study following newly arrived refugees integrated into the new Kalobeyei settlement and the old Kakuma refugee camp since 2016. The newly arrived refugees were allocated between the two contexts based on their date of arrival. In the study, we follow newly arrived South Sudanese refugees in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma in order to compare outcomes over time, and identify what difference the Kalobeyei settlement makes in comparison to the Kakuma model. We also follow newly arrived Ethiopian and Burundian refugees within Kalobeyei. The report covers two waves of data collection with the same randomly sampled respondent population, carried out in 2017 and 2018.

- Our overall study has three main aims. First, to create baseline indicators for monitoring refugees’ self-reliance and socio-economic conditions in Kalobeyei. Second, to assess changes over time in those indicators. Third, to compare the trajectory of change with a comparable cohort of recently arrived refugees in Kakuma. Through these aims, we seek to inform government interventions, as well as the policies and practices of relevant international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in Kalobeyei on specific KISEDP goals, including the formation of a ‘hybrid’ community of refugees and the local host population, the formation of new markets, and the promotion of self-reliance.

- In order to develop baselines and assess progress towards self-reliance, we draw upon the self-reliance framework developed by Betts, Omata, and Sterck.1 The framework is based upon UNHCR’s definition of self-reliance, and outlines indicators for both self-reliance outcomes and self-reliance enabling factors relevant to the individual, household, and community levels. It understands self-reliance as a bi-dimensional concept, comprising both the attainment of essential socio-economic needs and the capacity to meet such needs independently from aid.

- Our comparison of outcomes between Kalobeyei and Kakuma is based on the assumption that refugees’ distribution across the settlement and camp is quasi-random. Indeed, selection was based mostly upon their date of arrival. However, our 2017 and 2018 surveys reveal that the cohorts newly arrived refugees in the South Sudanese households in Kalobeyei are younger, have a lower proportion of adults, and a higher number of single female-headed households. These demographic differences suggest that new arrivals in Kalobeyei may come from different parts of South Sudan and have fled different circumstances than those in Kakuma. Consequently, any comparison of outcomes for newly arrived South Sudanese in Kalobeyei and Kakuma must also take into account these differences. This report includes the results of regression analysis, which aims at controlling for some of these factors.

- Generally, indicators for self-reliance outcomes for newly arrived refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei are similarly poor: most refugees are dissatisfied with their lives, food insecurity is highly prevalent, dietary variety is low, access to healthcare remains limited, and most refugees report being completely or mostly dependent on food.

- Interestingly, Kalobeyei residents have achieved slightly higher levels of dietary diversity, food consumption, calorie intake, and food security. These outcomes correlate with possessing a (harvested) kitchen garden. Kalobeyei also offers higher levels of interaction between the refugee and host communities, although participation in sports and community associations is greater in Kakuma.

- In terms of self-reliance enabling factors, our analysis suggests that, despite gradual improvement, enabling factors are currently too weak to offer a realistic prospect of refugee self-reliance in the short run. One of the biggest socio-economic challenges relates to employment. Employment levels for refugees are extremely low, especially among South Sudanese. For those who are employed, most are ‘incentive workers’ with NGOs, which are generally low pay positions that are exempt from the protections provided by national labour regulations. Economic activities...

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are hampered by the environmental and geographical context, and by the legal barriers to refugees’ employment and mobility. Asset ownership and access to capital and remittances remain low. Public goods provision is mixed but fairly consistent across both camps, with relatively good access to education, some mild improvements in access to water and security, and limited access to healthcare and electricity.

- There are some encouraging patterns of progressive change across both the Kalobeyei and Kakuma contexts. For example, subjective wellbeing has improved significantly in both sites since 2017. There are also slight improvements in terms of indicators of social cohesion and refugee-host community interactions. Perceptions of water access and security are gradually improving. Across both contexts, a significant proportion of adults are enrolled in education programmes. For indicators related to agriculture and animal husbandry, improvements are only observed in Kalobeyei. The percentage of households engaged in small-scale agriculture has also increased in Kalobeyei, while it has declined for recently arrived South Sudanese in Kakuma. There is increased animal ownership in Kalobeyei following a livestock distribution programme.

- One way that KISEDP aims to increase employment opportunities is by fostering the growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Kakuma. WFP’s Retail Engagement Initiative, for example, aims to promote business, especially among food retailers, including through business training and supply chain development. Furthermore, the IFC’s Kakuma-Kalobeyei Challenge Fund aims to encourage businesses and entrepreneurs from elsewhere to invest in Kakuma. These efforts may increase opportunities for employment.

- The Bamba Chakula (BC) model of food distribution in Kalobeyei has been broadly effective as a transition arrangement between in-kind assistance and unrestricted cash assistance. It has, for example, offered refugees greater choice, reduced the need for beneficiaries to sell food rations at discounted prices, created business opportunities, and injected money into the local economy. The model has been popular with refugees in Kalobeyei, and points to the benefits of using cash-based rather than in-kind assistance. Meanwhile, the kitchen gardens are associated with better food security outcomes.

- Overall, however, it is clear that refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei remain a long way from achieving self-reliance. Despite some progress, most refugees are unable to meet their basic socio-economic needs. Furthermore, even for refugees that do meet some of those needs, they are unable to do so independently of aid. This is because, despite a range of progressive market-based interventions, the economies of both Kakuma and Kalobeyei remain based almost entirely on international assistance.

- Self-reliance ultimately relies upon fostering economic growth and connecting Kakuma, Kalobeyei, and Turkana County to the national and global economies. Retail markets currently add limited value to sectors that are not dependent on international assistance. Consequently, although some refugees are able to meet their basic socio-economic needs, they cannot yet be considered to do so independently of aid. To achieve self-reliance at a community level requires that Kakuma and Kalobeyei become capable of producing goods or services that can be exported beyond the local economy. Self-reliance in relation to food, for example, will only occur if revenue from other sectors increases and people spend the additional revenue on food. The most viable means for international actors to promote this is by investing in self-reliance enabling factors, such as better public goods provision, improved social cohesion between refugees and hosts, and improved market regulation.
1. Introduction

The refugee camp in Kakuma was established in 1992. South Sudanese and Somali refugees constitute the largest proportion of camp residents, with significant numbers of Congolese, Sudanese, Burundian, and Ethiopian refugees. Over time, the Kakuma camp became associated with long-term aid dependency, particularly given regulatory restrictions on freedom of movement and the right to work. In 2015, the Kalobeyei settlement was conceived based on a collaboration between UNHCR and the Turkana County Government. Located about 15km west of Kakuma Town, it was designed to transition refugee assistance from an aid-based to a self-reliance model, and to promote increased opportunities for interaction between refugees and the host community.

As a market-based settlement, designed from scratch to support sustainable economic opportunities for refugees and the host community, Kalobeyei represents the first refugee settlement of its kind in Kenya, and builds upon a history of similar settlements in Uganda and elsewhere in East Africa. The first refugees were settled in Kalobeyei in 2016, most of them new arrivals from South Sudan, Burundi, and Ethiopia, and a small number of transfers from the Dadaab refugee camps. Before the establishment of the settlement, the area served as a wet season pasture for Turkana pastoralists. All of the constructed shelters were required for the emergency influx from South Sudan, and many of the former Turkana occupants relocated after the arrival of the refugees. Hosts have since been encouraged to move into the settlement, although the vast majority of residents are still refugees.

The Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDp) offers a strategic roadmap for the evolution of the settlement over its first 15 years. Based on commitments from the Government of Kenya (GoK), the Turkana County Government, UNHCR, and a range of partner organisations, its initial five-year strategy is funded by the European Union as well as other bilateral donors. It covers eight key components: health; education; WASH; protection; spatial planning and infrastructure; agriculture, livestock, and resources; sustainable energy; and private sector development and entrepreneurship. It is being implemented in coordination with the broader County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) in Turkana, and represents an integral part of Kenya’s implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).

Although it is early in the development of the Kalobeyei settlement, a number of innovative programmes have already been implemented that diverge from the aid model in Kakuma.

First, the Bamba Chakula (hereafter referred to as ‘BC’) programme is a restricted cash-based intervention designed by WFP as an alternative to in-kind food assistance. It began in 2015. By providing refugees with mobile currency (supplied through Safaricom), it allows recipients to choose the food items that suit their preferences while supporting the growth of local markets. The currency is only redeemable at shops that are contracted by WFP, which were selected through a competitive application process. In Kalobeyei, refugees receive 95% of food assistance through BC. In Kakuma, only 30% of food assistance is distributed through BC while about 70% of food assistance is still in-kind. The roll-out of BC has been accompanied by WFP’s Retail Engagement Initiative, designed to support food retailers through, for example, business training and supply chain development. It aims to improve retail efficiency in order to provide value for money to beneficiaries and improve livelihoods for traders.

Second, since 2016 a series of programmes have been launched by development actors to support dryland agriculture within Kalobeyei, notably through the promotion of ‘kitchen gardens’. Each household is allocated enough space to construct a garden outside their shelter. They are supported with training in a range of dryland agricultural techniques, and through the distribution of tools, seeds, and gardening materials. From 2018, FAO provided livestock to the host community, while the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) provided livestock to refugee households. WFP and FAO are also developing larger scale dryland farming schemes along the two seasonal streams that run through the settlement.

Third, UNHCR is implementing two unrestricted cash-assistance programmes in the settlement. The ‘cash-for-shelter’ was piloted by UNHCR for 82 households (414 individuals) in 2018, before being scaled to include 800 households. 2

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2 The remaining 5% is a corn soya blend (CSB), a type of fortified blended food that aims to prevent wasting, growth faltering and to treat moderate malnutrition. In Kalobeyei, CSB is distributed in-kind by Turkana BC retailers. In Kakuma, it is part of the in-kind food ration.
households. Rather than being allocated a pre-designed shelter, households are instead given money to commission the design and construction of their shelter. Around 1400 USD was allocated per household. During the pilot, compound representatives worked together and collectively bargained with local contractors and materials suppliers, and participants were allowed to keep any surplus. UNHCR also provides monthly cash assistance for non-food ‘core relief items’ (CRI) through Equity Bank and MasterCard. Premenopausal women receive a higher amount so that they can purchase feminine hygiene products.

Immediately following the creation of Kalobeyei, we embarked on a three-year study, funded by WFP, in order to understand what difference the Kalobeyei settlement makes to refugee self-reliance and socio-economic outcomes. The study has three core objectives. First, to create baseline indicators for monitoring refugees’ self-reliance in Kalobeyei. Second, to assess changes over time in those indicators. Third, to compare the trajectory of change with a comparable group of recently arrived refugees in Kakuma. Through these aims, we seek to inform government interventions, as well as the policies and practices of relevant international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in Kalobeyei on specific KISED goals, including the formation of a ‘hybrid’ community of refugees and the local host population, the formation of new markets, and the promotion of refugee self-reliance. The research involves following a representative cohort of newly arrived refugees (post-March 2016) in both the Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma. Given that newly arrived refugees are allocated between the two contexts based mostly on their date of arrival, we were able to assume that distribution was quasi-random, and so use the cohorts in order to make comparisons between outcomes for newly arrived South Sudanese refugees across the two contexts. In addition, we collected data from newly arrived Burundian and Ethiopian refugees in Kalobeyei.

A key component of the study involves following the same cohort of refugees over time, with waves of data collection envisaged for 2017, 2018, and 2019. In this midline report, we summarise the findings of the second wave of data collection and compare our data with findings from the first wave of data collection. The cohort for the first wave of data collection, collected in August and September 2017, was 2,560 adults from 1,397 households. Within the second wave of data collection, collected between July and August 2018, there was a 24.9% household attrition rate. It is possible that this level of attrition may have some influence on the changes we observe between 2017 and 2018. Still, our sample size remained relatively stable between 2017 and 2018 because we not only interviewed adults who were already interviewed in 2017, but also adults who joined households that were interviewed in 2017. Our total sample size in 2018 is constituted of 2,357 adults (1,048 in Kakuma camps and 1,309 in the Kalobeyei settlement).

Given Kalobeyei’s objective of promoting self-reliance, the structure of our report is based around Betts, Omata, and Sterck’s conceptual framework for understanding and measuring self-reliance (Figure 1). The framework begins from UNHCR’s definition of self-reliance, which is “the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity”, recognising that this can be supported by “developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance”.

This definition has four main components: (1) the list of needs or socio-economic outcomes, (2) the objectives of sustainability and independence, (3) the concept of ability, and (4) a role for external assistance, which are organised in a diagram (Figure 1). Within the framework, self-reliance is conceptualised as a process through which a series of enabling factors shape individuals’, households’, and communities’ ability to achieve acceptable socio-economic outcomes independently.

The right-hand side of the diagram illustrates the outcomes of self-reliance, in terms of socio-economic welfare (access to food, water, shelter, protection and personal safety, health, and education) and autonomy (independence from aid). To be fully self-reliant, individuals, households, or communities need both acceptable socio-economic outcomes and autonomy from aid. People cannot be characterised as self-reliant if they achieve a high standard of living but are fully reliant on aid. Nor are they self-reliant if they do not benefit from aid, but are materially deprived.

The left-hand side of the diagram illustrates two categories of self-reliance inputs. On the one hand, self-reliance enabling factors shape people’s ability to meet their needs autonomously. Enabling factors are not explicitly listed in UNHCR’s definition. However, the toolkits provided in the Self-Reliance Handbook provide an extensive list of factors...
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Enabling factors are classified into five categories of enabling factors: the environment (regulation, refugee-host interaction, physical environment, and natural resources), assets (human capital, physical capital, and identity), access to networks (remittances, informal credit and insurance, and nepotism), access to markets (labour markets, markets for goods and services, and capital markets including banking), and access to public goods (healthcare, education provision, water and sanitation, roads, and security). The enabling factors contribute to socio-economic outcomes by enabling the economic activities of individuals, households, and communities, including through income-generating activities.

Aid has an ambivalent effect on self-reliance outcomes. While humanitarian aid aims at providing refugees’ immediate needs, especially in emergency contexts, development aid aims at setting up and strengthening enabling factors, and thereby fostering socio-economic welfare in the medium or long run. But aid also reduces refugees’ autonomy, at least in the short run. Aid therefore has the ambivalent effect of directly and indirectly enhancing socio-economic outcomes but potentially reducing autonomy. The effect of aid on self-reliance is therefore ambiguous, improving socio-economic outcomes, one of its two components, while reducing autonomy, its second component. The policy challenge is to design interventions that enhance socio-economic outcomes and promote autonomy in the long run. As a consequence, positive socio-economic outcomes for individuals involved in self-reliance programming do not necessarily translate into self-reliance as an outcome or a decreased need for aid funding.

The diagram also emphasises that feedback loops exist between socio-economic outcomes and enabling factors: individuals, households and communities can invest or contribute to strengthen enabling factors (individually, in association, or through the state) and thereby encourage long-run sustainable development.

For each dimension described in the conceptual framework for self-reliance, we compare the situation of recent arrivals in Kalobeyei settlement and Kakuma camp, and study how this situation evolved between 2017 and 2018. Based on this analysis and on the identification of gaps and opportunities, we will explore the following three questions: (1) Who, if anyone, can be characterised as self-reliant in Kakuma and Kalobeyei? (2) Should humanitarian assistance, and in particular food assistance, be reduced for refugees who are self-reliant? (3) What can be done to further enhance self-reliance and encourage the formation of a hybrid community between refugee and host populations? Answers to these questions will guide our discussion of policy implications.

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**Fig. 1:** Conceptual framework for self-reliance, from Betts et al. (2019). Green arrows represent positive contributions. The red arrow represents a negative relationship.
2. Methodology

Our research is based on a mixed-methods approach that includes survey questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and a review of the relevant academic and grey literature. The quantitative survey data is based on panel data collected in two waves from a) August and September 2017 and b) July and August 2018. We complemented this with qualitative and ethnographic data collection immediately following each of these survey periods, conducted in November 2017 and December 2018.

We collected panel data based on a representative sample of households whose members arrived in Kakuma and Kalobeyei after March 2015. In Kalobeyei, we focused on South Sudanese, Burundian and Ethiopian households. These nationalities were selected as the most sizeable communities living in Kalobeyei in 2017 (comprising 93% of the population of the settlement). In Kakuma, we focused on South Sudanese recent arrivals, based on the justification that they constitute a relevant control group through which to compare Kakuma and Kalobeyei.

Given that newly arrived South Sudanese refugees were allocated between Kakuma and Kalobeyei based exclusively on their date of arrival, our starting assumption was that we could meaningfully compare outcomes across the two contexts and attribute differences in those outcomes to the different institutional designs of Kakuma and Kalobeyei. However, it is worth noting that our findings suggest a slightly different demographic profile for South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei compared to those in Kakuma. In particular, those in Kalobeyei have a lower proportion of adults, a higher proportion of female-headed households, a higher proportion of female adults, a higher proportion of adults, and a higher proportion of widows (Figs. 2–7). This, combined with insights from our qualitative research, suggests that they may have fled from different regions of South Sudan based on different configurations of violence at the time of flight.
We adopted slightly different sampling strategies for the first wave of data collection in Kalobeyei compared to Kakuma. In Kalobeyei, we randomly selected 10% of shelters using a satellite image of the settlement. In Kakuma, we randomly selected households that arrived after March 2015 from UNHCR’s registration lists. In total, we interviewed 2,560 adults from 1,397 households. In Kalobeyei, we interviewed 927 South Sudanese adults from 509 households. In Kakuma, we interviewed 1,106 South Sudanese adults from 509 households. In addition, and for cross-national comparison, we interviewed 250 Burundian adults from 131 households and 277 Ethiopians from 128 households. In order to study intra-household dynamics and provide a full picture of the situation in the settlement, we not only interviewed household heads, but also the persons preparing the food and one additional adult randomly selected in each household.

For the second wave of data collection, our objective was to re-interview all households that were interviewed in the first wave. Household attrition is equal to 24.9%, which is quite high. When households could not be found, we asked neighbours and community leaders in order to understand the basis of attrition. Household attrition was mainly due to migration: 30% of such households moved back to their country of origin, 14% moved within Kakuma or Kalobeyei and could not be located, 5% moved elsewhere in Kenya, 7% moved to Uganda, and 6% moved to an unknown location. For 29% of household attrition, the reason for movement was unknown. Households are significantly more likely to have moved if they had better diets at baseline, if the household size was small, and if they were living in Kakuma rather than Kalobeyei.

Our report also draws upon a supplementary business survey, undertaken with food retailers in October 2018. For that complementary survey, we examined three strata of food retailers: retailers who have a BC contract with WFP (labelled “BC” thereafter), interviewees who applied to get a BC contract but were unsuccessful (labelled “applied” thereafter), and food retailers who have never applied to the BC scheme (labelled “never applied” thereafter). For the first two strata we targeted applicants to the Bamba Chakula scheme using WFP’s registry. For the third strata, we selected a random sample of food retailers who had never applied to BC, from a recent census by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (Aug-Sept 2018). The final sample includes 730 respondents, out of which 101 have at least one shop.

For both the household and business surveys, we hired and trained enumerators from the refugee and host communities, covering 7 nationalities and several languages used by different ethnicities. The questionnaire was administered in English as well as the following 6 languages: Kirundi, Dinka, Juba Arabic, Nuer, and Somali.

As part of this research, we also reviewed the relevant literature and analysed secondary data and policy documents provided by WFP, including, but not limited to, the Kisedp socio-economic baseline survey and mapping report, the Kisedp Kalobeyei new settlement advisory local spatial plan, WFP’s country strategic plan, WFP’s data on the content of monthly food baskets and prices, and data related to WFP’s Kenya Retail Engagement Initiative (KREI), IFC’s study ‘Kakuma as a Marketplace’, Kimetrica’s ‘Refugee Household Vulnerability Study’, and the World Bank report ‘Yes in my backyard! The economics of refugees and their social dynamics in Kakuma, Kenya’.  

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3. Self-Reliance Outcomes

Our self-reliance conceptual framework emphasises that self-reliance is a bi-dimensional concept: to be self-reliant, individuals, households, and communities have to (1) meet essential socio-economic needs and do so (2) independently from aid. In this section, we show that refugees living in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei cannot yet be characterised as self-reliant. On the one hand, levels of food security and subjective wellbeing are low. On the other hand, most refugees living in Kakuma and Kalobeyei feel dependent and disempowered, as very few have an economic activity, and the entire economy is dependent on aid.

Subjective wellbeing
Most refugees are dissatisfied with their lives. Still subjective wellbeing has significantly improved in Kalobeyei and Kakuma since 2017 for all surveyed groups. This suggests that, from refugees’ perspective, quality of life in Kakuma and Kalobeyei is improving, although perspectives remain towards the negative end of the overall spectrum. It is worth noting that the most vehement complaints during qualitative interviews came from those refugees who had been transferred from the Dadaab camps, many of whom described Kalobeyei as a dramatically worse place to live:

When I was living in Dadaab I worked in a butchery. I used to buy goats from the market to slaughter to feed my children... We had cheaper milk, cheaper sugar, cheaper vegetables and cheaper clothes. I was getting everything cheaper... The Somali people who are there were also helping me. Here [in Kalobeyei] there is no income. There is hunger because the food provided is little. We don't even have shoes. Life is difficult for us. Before [in Dadaab] we had a better life. My husband used to work in the market selling livestock.

Socio-Economic Needs
We consider four categories of socio-economic indicators: (1) subjective wellbeing, (2) indicators of food security, (3) physical and mental health indicators, and (4) measures of participation in social activities. Refugees who recently arrived in Kalobeyei or Kakuma are the mostly dissatisfied with their lives, even if the situation has been gradually improving since 2017. Food security remains a huge challenge across both contexts, and weather conditions in 2018 contributed to worse outcomes than the previous year. Food security outcomes are slightly better (i.e. less bad) for recent arrivals in Kalobeyei than Kakuma, for reasons partly attributable to the kitchen garden and BC programmes. Health indicators are comparable across Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Participation in sport and leisure activities remains considerably higher in Kakuma than Kalobeyei.

Food security
In terms of food security, the results were mixed. As in 2017, diets in Kalobeyei continue to be better (less bad) than those in Kakuma in 2018 in terms of dietary diversity, food consumption, daily calorie intake, and food (in)security (Figs 8-11). And these differences can be attributed partly to the kitchen garden programmes in Kalobeyei (Table 1) and, possibly, to the largest extent of Bamba Chakula in Kalobeyei. However, this assessment needs several qualifications.

First, changes between 2017 and 2018 are small, and not necessarily positive for Kalobeyei. While the situation has slightly improved in Kakuma, there is some indication that food insecurity and daily calorie intake may have stagnated.
or possibly worsened in Kalobeyei over the course of the year. The average daily calorie intake of South Sudanese recent arrivals has not changed in Kakuma, while it has significantly reduced for South Sudanese and Ethiopians in Kalobeyei (Fig. 8).

Second, the measure of food insecurity is particularly worrying. Severe food insecurity remains prevalent: 88% of South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma and 83% of South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kalobeyei are severely food insecure (Fig. 9). This is despite the fact that food insecurity has slightly improved for South Sudanese in Kakuma and slightly worsened for South Sudanese in Kalobeyei. On the other hand, measures of calories intake and food consumption are more encouraging: 65% of our sample have an acceptable food consumption score. This suggests that food insecurity and dietary variety are influenced by different factors.

Third, diets are not very diverse: only 31% of our 2018 sample had eaten vegetables in the week before the survey, 6% had eaten fruits, 17% had eaten meat, and 30% had eaten fish. Fish consumption is much more prevalent for the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei. The diets of the South Sudanese in Kalobeyei and Kakuma are significantly more diverse in 2018 compared to 2017. We observe no significant change for Burundians and Ethiopians in Kalobeyei. Dietary variety is overall better in Kalobeyei (Fig. 10). For the food consumption score, we observe a significant improvement for South Sudanese in Kakuma and Burundians in Kalobeyei, a slight reduction for South Sudanese in Kalobeyei, and no significant change for Ethiopians in Kalobeyei (Fig. 11).

Some refugees complained that certain food items – especially meat, fruits, and drinks – are often unavailable at BC shops. As one Dinka refugee in Kalobeyei explained:

> What is missing in Bamba Chakula is meat. You know, we love meat. But to change the diet is not easy with them [the Bamba Chakula traders]. Even if you give them 100 shillings, you are just buying sukuma9 such as beans, yellow peas, or the little dried fish [known colloquially by the Dholuo word ‘omena’ across Kenya]. Meat and fresh fish are not available in Bamba Chakula.

WFP has taken steps to make meat available for purchase by Bamba Chakula. They are also building trading sheds to improve hygienic handling of fish, although fish products present a greater health hazard due to the risk of spreading cholera. Aside from improving the diversity of foods available to refugees, these efforts are also facilitating access to the refugee market for producers across the county, including

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9 The Food Consumption Score (FCS), is a composite score that aggregates information on dietary diversity, food frequency, and relative nutritional importance. Household consumption is then categorised as poor when the score is below 21, borderline when the score is between 21 and 35, and acceptable when the score is above 35.
both pastoralists and fishermen living at Lake Turkana.

The lack of preferred foods in BC shops forces many refugees to seek what they need in non-BC shops, which do not accept Bamba Chakula as currency. Refugees must therefore acquire cash by other means, sometimes by selling other food rations at a loss, or by urging shopowners to make illegal exchanges of BC credit for cash. As one refugee from the Gambella region of Ethiopia explained in Kalobeyei, “In the Bamba Chakula shops, there is no meat, cabbage, lemon, or fruit like mango, and so on. These are the things we buy after we sell off some of the Bamba Chakula items for cash.” Some refugees also complained that certain food items also become unavailable on the BC distribution days, when BC shops become very busy and stocks of certain items are depleted.

Health and wellbeing

Although the provision of ‘healthcare’, as a public good, can be regarded as a self-reliance enabling factor, we regard ‘health’ itself as a self-reliance outcome. As with many other outcome variables, it is still too early to comparatively assess the impact of Kalobeyei on health outcomes. Nevertheless, we show below the status and trajectory of two health-related indictors. Fig. 12 shows the health score for recently arrived refugees in the two camps, constructed using six questions from the 12-item WHO-DAS scale. Overall results are fairly inconclusive with respect to either variation across the camps or changes between 2017 and 2018, because there is variation in the direction of change for different nationality groups in the same camps. However, it does appear that there is a significant improvement in health for South Sudanese in Kalobeyei between 2017 and 2018.

Fig. 13 further suggests that mental health outcomes for South Sudanese refugees seem to have improved, especially in Kalobeyei. But the situation may be stagnating or deteriorating for minority groups such as Burundians and Ethiopians in Kalobeyei. Indeed, in our qualitative interviews with Ethiopians, many complained that their situation was better in the Dadaab camps from which they were transferred.
Leisure and social participation

Participation in community-based associations remains low in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, and especially so for Burundians and Ethiopians in Kalobeyei (Fig. 14). Participation within sports activities is stable and remains much higher in Kakuma than Kalobeyei (Fig. 15). Indeed, while the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) actively promotes sports participation, and provides facilities and equipment across Kakuma, extra-curricular sports activities in Kalobeyei remain mainly focused on basic physical education with schools. There is much greater scope to facilitate sports participation and improve sports facilities within Kalobeyei. One of the flagship projects for the first five-years of KISEDP is the intention to construct a multi-purpose sports complex in the settlement.

Autonomy

Despite a general sense of improved wellbeing, most refugees in Kalobeyei and Kakuma still perceive themselves to be mainly dependent upon aid (Fig. 16). This perception is particularly salient for South Sudanese refugees in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, who see themselves as almost completely dependent upon aid, as exemplified by the following story:

Anne is a Dinka woman living as a single mother in Kalobeyei. She has lost communication with her husband, who remained behind to fight as a soldier in South Sudan. She now lives in a single household with her own six children, as well as her late brother’s five children. When asked how she provides for such a large household, she responded, “I have no job. It is only by Bamba Chakula that I am living with my children. When that finishes, I go to the shop to take goods on credit.”

However, it is striking that many refugees expressed a desire to live in a more self-sufficient way, even if they have doubts about the prospects for self-reliance in Kalobeyei. In the words of a Burundian man living in Kalobeyei:

I eat, I sleep, but I don’t see any future for tomorrow. I don’t see the future of my children. What will my situation be tomorrow? What I ask, if I may, is that I may be in a place where I can do a job, where I can earn money. If possible, I would like to be in a place where the children that I will produce will have access to school, so that they can prepare for their own futures.

The lack of livelihood opportunities in Kalobeyei has left many feeling dependent and disempowered. As another Dinka woman explained: “A beggar has no choice. If the UN increases the amount of Bamba Chakula to at least 1,500, that will be well and good with me. But there is nothing much we can say”. Although UNHCR rightly aims to involve refugees in planning and participatory decision-making, refugees dependent on aid do not feel that they are in a position to exercise this kind of agency.

Fig. 16: Perception of independence from aid

Fried fish for sale in Kalobeyei
4. Self-Reliance Enabling Factors

Self-reliance enabling factors are the factors that shape the ability of individuals, households, and communities to meet their socio-economic needs independently, including through income-generating activities. We classify enabling factors into five broad categories: legal and social environment, assets, networks, markets, and public goods. Our analysis suggests that, despite gradual improvement, these enabling factors are currently too weak to offer a realistic prospect of refugee self-reliance in the short run.

Legal and Social Environment

Despite being conceived as an integrated settlement, refugees in Kalobeyei face the same regulatory restrictions as those in Kakuma. The Refugee Act requires that refugees live within designated areas. And although, legally, refugees have the same employment rights as other non-citizens, in practice they have to obtain a special so-called Class M permit in order to be allowed to work. These permits, issued by the Director of Immigration Services, are usually only available in Nairobi and difficult for refugees to obtain. Consequently, refugees in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma continue to face important mobility and employment restrictions.

The relationship between refugees and the host Turkana population is complicated, with subjective assessments varying according to the scale at which relations are conceived. At the broad level of inter-communal relations between groups, there is persistent distrust. Across both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, refugees tend to disagree with the statements that the Turkana are "friendly and good people", "trustworthy", and that "refugees are well integrated with the Turkana" (Figs. 17-19). Our qualitative research reveals that the greatest sources of tension relate to security issues and conflict over resources. Most violent encounters between
refugees and the Turkana occur over the issue of forest resources in the areas that surround the settlement and camp. As one Lotuko woman explained, “Things are not good. When you go out from here, just outside [the settlement], looking for firewood in the bush, you will be chased. You fear that you could even be raped.” The collection of firewood by refugees has been a persistent basis of conflict with the host community, who complain of both environmental degradation and the loss of economic opportunities. Many Turkana locals derive a substantial proportion of their sustenance from the sale of firewood to refugees. In order to reduce collection of firewood by refugees, UNHCR has contracted the local NGO, Lokado, to distribute bi-monthly rations of firewood in ways that create income-generating opportunities for the host community. However, the quantity provided is insufficient for most families. Where the direct purchase of firewood from Turkana hosts can contribute to mutually beneficial relationships, lack of disposable wealth forces refugees to continue collecting their own firewood.

Aside from resource conflicts, there have also been accusations of inter-communal violence of an apparently random nature, usually occurring at night when people are commuting by foot to or from their homes. Another Lotuko woman explained, “Turkanas are our neighbours, yes. But they are not good brothers. Sometimes, they rape women, at roadsides or in the bush... There was a Didinga woman who was raped when she was on her way from Kakuma to Kalobeyei.”

However, despite these inter-communal tensions, there is evidence of increasing interaction between individual refugees and hosts. In 2017, refugees were already significantly more likely to share a meal, have a business exchange or conversation with a member of the host community in Kalobeyei than Kakuma (Figs. 20-22). And these indicators have improved in 2018 compared to 2017. A related and striking quantitative finding is that refugees report a significant increase in Turkana participation in mosque, church, and temple life since 2017, especially in Kalobeyei (Fig. 23). Evidence of Turkana participation in refugees’ leisure activities is more mixed but consistent with improvement (Fig. 24). This data could be interpreted as a sign that Kalobeyei’s attempt to increase interaction between refugees and hosts has been to some degree effective, and that programmes such as WFP putting Turkana traders in charge of the distribution of corn-soya blend (CSB) ration supplements are contributing to greater levels of interaction.

However, not all interactions contribute to positive relations and social cohesion. Delivery of integrated services such as healthcare, education, and water to refugees and hosts is intended as a means of forming community, but this has become a source of tension. Some Turkana people living in the vicinity of the settlement complained that refugees have priority over Kenyan locals in terms of access to water within the settlement. Others complained that they are reticent to send their children to the mixed schools due to over-crowding. Part of the problem seems to be the public messaging that many Turkana people have been receiving about the ‘benefits’ that the settlement would bring to them. While the official plan is for integrated service delivery, many Turkana people had expectations that they would
receive their own dedicated services and infrastructure. A related source of tension is the exclusive provision of Bamba Chakula to refugees, despite the sense among many hosts that their level of food insecurity is just as great. One Burundian refugee in Kalobeyei expressed concern that this could be a recipe for conflict:

Do you think you will live in peace with the Turkanas when you have money and they don’t? They will come and take everything. You know, they don’t like us; as they see it, we came to occupy their land. And they have been fighting this for a long time.

Nonetheless, there is also some slight indication that perceptions may be changing across both Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Despite the problem of over-crowding in many of Kalobeyei’s schools, Turkana parents whose children attend explained that they play together with refugee peers. Likewise, in our qualitative interviews with refugees in Kalobeyei, many described an improvement in relations over time, as refugees and hosts have become accustomed to one another and developed growing mutual understanding across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. One Burundian man explained that “now they [hosts and refugees] are okay, but at the start, they were fighting with one another”. One Lotuko South Sudanese woman in Kalobeyei explained how economic interaction can even lead to more amicable relations: “Turkana people come to buy what they want. We also buy what they bring to us. I have even had some friends who are Turkana”. A Somali-Ethiopian BC trader living in Kalobeyei joked:

At first, we were told they [the hosts] would be eating us [smiling]. But until now, we haven’t had anyone trying to eat us. We have met very nice people who are just nomadic. They buy what they want, and you can sell to them. We have interacted a lot.

Some of the most positive interactions seem to occur through economic transactions. Different kinds of businesses entail different levels of interaction between refugees and hosts. BC traders rely primarily on refugee clients, as refugees are the only recipients of BC transfers. One Turkana trader described the positive relations that she has developed with refugee customers in the settlement: “I prefer working in Kalobeyei... At least I have interacted with refugees, and they recognise me here”. Meanwhile, non-BC refugee traders are more likely to have host clients. When asked why so many of his clients were hosts, one non-BC Congolese trader explained: “It is only because I am not using a BC contract. As you know, all refugees have the BC lines for the food. So they go to the shop where they use BC.”

A non-BC Congolese trader explained that this dynamic is unique to Kalobeyei:

In Kalobeyei, refugees are receiving more money on their lines than Kakuma. This is a profit for the BC traders... But even for the non-BC traders like us, the advantage is there. We live near the host community, who are among our best customers.

Shop-owners from different national and ethnic groups also interact with one another, sometimes cooperatively. Stocks are sometimes depleted during the busy business days after Bamba Chakula distribution. Shop-owners who run out of stock may borrow goods from other stocks so that they can continue with their business during this time, such that stock-keeping has become somewhat distributed across multiple shops. As explained by one Kenyan BC trader, these working relationships extend across the host and refugee communities:

With the refugee traders, we have a relationship whereby, when I am lacking something in my shop, I can go to them and ask for assistance. And when they don’t have something, they come to my shop. We exchange just like that.

Furthermore, some refugees described coordinating business activities with hosts. One Somali business man operating in Kalobeyei explained:

One of the host community, we are supporting him. When we purchase materials, he adds his money to our pool of capital, and we send our orders together. And one of the hosts here, he is my neighbour... we used to send him to Kitale. But now we are showing the way [ordering remotely by phone].

Refugees and hosts also employ one another in their shops. One Kenyan BC trader described how his refugee employees...
help him to deal with language barriers during business transactions:

I have this person here who knows their [South Sudanese refugees’] languages right? I decided to employ him to work in my shop because they will understand each other. I don’t have any problem [with communication], because he knows Arabic.

Some Kenyan hosts had even begun to learn new language skills from their employees, so that they can do some of the transactions themselves. These relationships seem to be fostering personal bonds as well as cross-cultural learning that may contribute to the development of stronger inter-communal ties.

Aside from the business interactions that take place in shops, many refugees in Kalobeyei purchase firewood and charcoal from Turkana. As has long been the case in Kakuma, those who do not have cash instead pay with food goods. One Somali-Ethiopian refugee in Kalobeyei explained, “We give them 4 to 3 kg of wheat flour. The amount depends on how we negotiate”.

There are also plans for farming schemes at the rivers running through the settlements, as detailed below in the section on Agriculture. At the time of research, the water-pan fed cultivation was still under development and only flood-fed sorghum plots had been cultivated in 2018. Therefore, there were few insights about refugee-host interactions on the schemes. However, one Burundian refugee in Kalobeyei complained that livestock damage to crops was a source of tension:

You see, my garden has no fence. During the night I don’t sleep, because the donkeys come in big numbers and they can devastate my crops. I have to wake up to chase them. And then during the daytime, the Turkanas bring their goats. They don’t care about my garden – they just let goats eat the crops. If you dare to throw a stone to chase the goats, they might even kill you. They value their flocks but not than our crops.

The innovation of the farming schemes is that refugees and hosts farm side by side, reducing competition and the likelihood that Turkana herders will graze their animals on refugee crops.

**Assets**

Refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei generally have few personal assets of substantial material value. One exception is mobile phones, which were possessed by 47% of surveyed households. However, there is variation across the context and community. South Sudanese recent arrivals in Kakuma are more likely to own a mobile phone than those in Kalobeyei, where mobile phone ownership is much more prevalent among Burundian and Ethiopian refugees (Fig. 25). Mobile phone ownership in Kalobeyei may be increasing, although the increases between 2017 and 2018 are only statistically significant for Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei. The ‘gap’ in mobile phone ownership among South Sudanese in Kalobeyei represents a particular challenge given the
reliance of the Bamba Chakula aid distribution system upon the transfer of mobile credit.

Overall, however, only 5% of households have a radio, 1% have a television, 0.6% have a computer, and 0.07% have a refrigerator. In terms of transportation, 2% have a bicycle, 0.7% have a motorcycle, and 0.5% have a car. The absence of transportation options makes mobility between Kalobeyei and Kakuma challenging in the lack of alternative sources of public transport.

Between 2017 and 2018, the proportion of households owning small animals has sharply increased for South Sudanese and Burundian households in Kalobeyei (Fig. 26). While refugees are prohibited from owning livestock that would compete with Turkana livestock for grazing (cattle, camels, goats, sheep), they may raise poultry around their shelters. The increase in poultry ownership may be attributable to FAO’s new poultry husbandry programme, through which chickens were distributed to beneficiaries in Kalobeyei. Furthermore, UNHCR reports that some refugees were able to use savings from the Cash-for-Shelter programme to purchase chickens and ducks.

Networks

Access to remittances are low among recent arrivals in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma, albeit slightly higher in Kakuma (Fig. 27). 19% of recently arrived South Sudanese households in Kakuma have at least one adult who receives remittances, compared to 5% in Kalobeyei. Within Kalobeyei, Ethiopian refugees are most likely to receive remittances.

Low levels of remittances partly reflects the fact that few newly arrived refugees have family networks outside Africa (Fig. 28). Across all groups, refugees’ siblings tend to live in their country of origin or live in the same location in Kakuma or Kalobeyei. In fact, newly arrived refugees in Kakuma appear more likely to have siblings in Kakuma, and newly arrived refugees in Kalobeyei are more likely to have siblings in Kalobeyei. Some arrivals from South Sudan explained that they switched sites to be with relatives. We met one Nuer woman who was settled in 2016 in Kalobeyei but later moved to Kakuma. She explained: “I was new back then, and I only knew those few people with whom we lived (in Kalobeyei). My relatives were in Kakuma and in Kalobeyei I had no relative.”

Markets

Market-based approaches to service delivery are at the core of the Kalobeyei settlement model. This includes provision of food via retail traders under the Bamba Chakula programme, the construction of houses via local contractors under the Cash-for-Shelter programme, and cash-based provision of hygiene and sanitation goods through the Core Relief Items (CRI) programme. Due to the location of the settlement and the absence of existing markets, these programmes rely on the gradual emergence of new markets. While this presents a development opportunity to the Turkana County Government, the absence of robust markets also creates constraints on people’s ability to achieve self-reliance outcomes.

There are at least three kinds of markets that are especially important in this regard: markets for goods and services; markets for jobs; and markets for credit and financial services. The first of these is crucial to the success of refugee livelihoods. Refugees involved in retail businesses as well as primary production through farming and animal husbandry require a market through which to sell their products. The state of these markets is discussed in detail in the accompanying report ‘Doing Business in Kakuma’. Of particular relevance to self-reliance programming is that 1) access to market opportunities like Bamba Chakula is restricted to a limited number of contracted traders, 2) the supply of many goods into Kakuma is dominated by an oligopoly of wholesale businesses, and 3) access to stock from suppliers is highly reliant on credit arrangements.

Turning to the job market, both Kalobeyei and Kakuma have extremely high levels of unemployment for recently arrived refugees (around 94%). For South Sudanese recent arrivals the main opportunities come from incentive work with NGOs. Burundian and Ethiopian refugees in Kalobeyei are more likely to be engaged in entrepreneurial activity. Even for the few recent arrivals who have an income-generating activity, the median income is below the World Bank’s extreme poverty line. Lack of access to capital and credit continue to create major barriers to entrepreneurship.

One of the biggest challenges relates to lack of economic opportunity. Employment rates are very low for new arrivals in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei. This situation barely changed
between 2017 and 2018. The situation is especially dramatic for South Sudanese recent arrivals, of whom only 6% have an income-generating activity (Fig. 29). Employment rates are slightly higher for Burundian (25%) and Ethiopian households (14%) in Kalobeyei. For both South Sudanese and Ethiopians, the main source of employment is incentive work with NGOs, and the reliance upon incentive work is increasing (Fig. 30). However, access to these opportunities is highly restricted. When asked if she has ever attempted to find a job in Kalobeyei, one Dinka woman responded, “I have tried, but getting a job here is almost impossible. Even for those who have finished their secondary education, it is hard to get a job. People like us don’t get jobs.” She explained that she had finished her primary education but had not attended secondary school.

While her education level was one disadvantage in the search for work, she also complained that job opportunities are often distributed by gatekeepers: “It all about corruption and who you know. I am not known in Kalobeyei. Money talks here; not your CV or academic papers.” This concern was repeated by several other South Sudanese respondents in Kalobeyei. Strikingly, incentive work constitutes a growing proportion of overall employment in Kalobeyei, and entrepreneurship is a declining proportion of overall employment. But for Burundians, in contrast, self-employment and entrepreneurship are the most significant source of employment. Among the 51 Burundians with an economic activity in 2018, 14 (27%) were boda boda (motorbike taxi) drivers, and 12 (24%) had a shop. Part of the reason for higher levels of entrepreneurship among Burundians seems to be arriving with larger amounts of capital and also having greater collective organisation around rotating capital. For example, we met a group of 23 Burundian refugees who were operating a circular loan association called Twitezimbere. Every 10 days, each member contributes 4,000 KES, and the total pool is then provided to a single person. Many people joined so that they could purchase a motorbike, which is almost entirely covered by the 92,000 KES that a participant receives within a 10-day cycle. The association was initiated independently from any agencies, and requires that members have a source of capital. Although 22 of the members are men, the leader of the association is a woman. One member explained why they chose her to lead the organisation:

> Women are the ones who know how to keep money. We chose her because she would value our association. Men take to drinking, and they can use money for alcohol. But with her, from the time we began, we have never missed even ten shillings. The leader of the group reports that when it began, none of the members owned a motorbike, but since that time, the majority of members have purchased one.

The median monthly wage for new arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyei who have an income-generating activity is 6,000 KES, which is about 60 USD per month. This is actually the median monthly wage for incentive workers. These wages are very low; they are almost equal to the World Bank extreme poverty line of 1.9 USD per day or 58 USD per month. There is no sign that income levels have increased between 2017 and 2018, and although income levels may be slightly higher in Kalobeyei, they are not significantly higher.
From the business survey,\textsuperscript{10} we know that the most profitable businesses are the five main wholesale suppliers operating in Kakuma camp and Kakuma town. Moreover, the 248 food retailers with a Bamba Chakula contract with WFP benefit from the USD 1,000,000 of mobile money injected by WFP every month. The profit of food retailers is highly variable, and self-reported profit varies between 500 KES per month and 250,000 KES per month. Most shop owners employ others to help with their businesses, but more than half of them do not pay their employees. Among those that pay their employees, the median average salary paid per employee is even lower than among the incentive workers from the household survey, at 3,400 KES per month.

Only 32 respondents (or 1\% of new arrivals) reported having access to credit. Among these, a large majority (80\%) borrowed the money from a friend, a family member, or a private lender. Among those without credit, 46\% do not need it, while 40\% cannot obtain it, and 33\% do not know where and how to obtain it. Relatedly, very few recent arrivals have a bank account, although the percentage has been increasing since 2017 (Fig. 31) and UNHCR has significantly increased financial inclusion since our data collection, by providing approximately 7,500 households in Kalobeyei with bank accounts as part of the cash-for-shelter programme. 6.4\% have an M-Pesa account. Low access to financial services is likely to undermine business opportunities.

**Access to Public Goods**

Public good provision remains mixed but is fairly consistent across Kakuma and Kalobeyei. Educational enrolment, particularly at primary school level, is strong. A strikingly large number of adults are also enrolled in some form of educational programme. Water and security provision have notably improved between 2017 and 2018 in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma. However, electricity and healthcare provision remain inadequate in relation to demand.

**Education**

Kakuma camp has the highest concentration of primary and secondary schools in Turkana County, which has been renowned for having disproportionately low rates of enrolment and retention in childhood education. Furthermore, there is an emerging tertiary education system in Kakuma, with Musinde Muliro University opening a Kakuma branch in 2016 and Jesuit World Learning (JWL) starting a Bachelor’s Degree programme in 2017.

The proportion of households with at least one adult who completed at least 6 years of education is larger for South Sudanese in Kakuma (81.9\%) compared to South Sudanese in Kalobeyei (55.3\%) (Fig. 32). This is probably a reflection of the demographic background of the cohorts rather than differences in programmes. One striking finding is that the proportion of respondents enrolled in an educational programme is very large, especially in Kakuma (Fig. 33), and this is probably a result of the large number of adult education opportunities available in Kakuma and the high levels of unemployment among South Sudanese refugees.

\textsuperscript{10} Betts et al (2019), ‘Doing Business in Kakuma’
climate. We were taking our food rations, and our children were learning. But here there is lack of education.”

Another former resident of Dadaab, also Ethiopian, echoed this sentiment: “There are problems with schooling here. The school is far and the sun is scorching. My kids still go, but they need money [e.g. for uniforms], and I don’t have money to give them. They are complaining that the teacher beats them, and I don’t know what to do.” Some made comparisons with Kakuma, where host children have long schooled together with refugees. A Lotuko woman stated, “In Kakuma One, children go to school. But here in Kalobeyei, the education is not yet good for children.” However, others noted that the situation – while still unsatisfactory – is at least an improvement over the availability of education before the settlement was constructed. There is also a sense that the situation is gradually improving; an Ethiopian resident of Village Two commented, “We were having problem with access to education here, but now it is on the right track.”

Electricity

Electricity remains one of the biggest gaps in terms of public goods availability. Less than 10% of recent arrivals have access to electricity, whether in Kakuma or Kalobeyei, and there was no significant change between 2017 and 2018 (Fig. 38). Indeed, this reflects that no agency provides electricity to camp residents. Some refugees have purchased gas and kerosene fuelled generators, which they use to sell electricity to their neighbours. Most customers pay based on the number and types of appliances that they are operating in their homes or shops, with different prices for lightbulbs, charging sockets, and larger equipment. However, the electricity is distributed by crudely installed power lines, which present a fire hazard and do not reach all parts of the camp. A Burundian trader in Kakuma Two explained how this affects his business: “We need electric power here. There are things that we are not selling because of lack of power. We cannot operate refrigerators.” Furthermore, the electricity is only available for certain periods of the day, so that operators can let their generators cool and perform maintenance on them.

A few refugees have also purchased solar panels, but these are generally sufficient only for charging phones and lights. And most refugees simply do not have the means to purchase electricity, even on a small scale. This presents challenges in relation to, for example, mobile phone use, with a sizeable proportion of refugees needing to pay for mobile charging services.

Healthcare

Meanwhile, in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, people tend to disagree with the statement “I have access to affordable and good quality healthcare” (Fig. 39). A large majority of respondents did not see an improvement compared to 2017. The following is an excerpt from an interview with David, a Dinka man living with his family in Village Two:

Q: What needs do you see that are lacking in Kalobeyei?

David: If there is no hospital and you become seriously sick, you might die on your way to the Kakuma Hospital. So we need a hospital here. But not only a hospital; we need one with skilled personnel and stocks of medicine.
Q: Has the health care situation changed over time?

David: No, it never changed.

While dispensaries in Turkana are managed by the County government, the hospital in Kakuma town is operated by the Catholic Church, and the main hospital facility in the camp is operated by the International Rescue Committee. Indeed, refugees in Kalobeyei continue to report a lack of clinics, long queues to receive basic health care, and inadequately stocked dispensaries. One Ethiopian man who had been transferred from Dadaab described his frustrations with Kalobeyei’s health care facilities:

In Kakuma... even when they are sick, they can go to hospital immediately. But here, a person like myself will not be sent to hospital when sick. Recently, my wife was sick and her neck was swelling, but she hasn’t yet been sent to hospital for treatment. Last time, when we took her to Clinic 7, they responded that there is no budget.

Health infrastructure continued to be built during the time of our data collection. Health care is free for refugees and the host community, and will be available under the umbrella of Kenya’s Universal Health Care (UHC) scheme. Furthermore, the government and UNHCR plan to enroll a growing proportion of the host and refugee communities into the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) from 2019.’

Improvements in water and security

Nevertheless, there are positive improvements in some areas of public goods provision. The perception of access to water has improved between 2017 and 2018, both in Kakuma and Kalobeyei (Fig. 40). A majority of respondents from Kalobeyei agree with the claim that access to water has improved compared to 2017. This may be due to systematic efforts by UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council, the implementing partner in charge of WASH, to improve water provision across Kakuma and Kalobeyei, including the roll-out of infrastructure in Kalobeyei designed to ensure adequate water for both personal consumption and livelihoods activities. It is important to qualify this finding by pointing out that water availability was a particularly acute problem in Kalobeyei throughout the first year after it was opened, in part because infrastructure construction did not always keep up with resettlement. Improvements would therefore be expected. Moreover, many in Kalobeyei still identify a lack of reliable access to water as a major problem, with occasional lapses in availability. Lack of water is also one of the primary challenges for those cultivating kitchen gardens, as described below in the section on Agriculture.

Our quantitative data suggests that the perception of security has also improved in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei (Fig. 41). One explanation for the modest improvements in perceived security may be the expansion of the Lutheran World Federation’s promotion of Community Peace and Protection Teams (CPPTs), a refugee association that cooperates directly with the Kenyan police to manage crime and security and has over 400 refugees working across Kakuma and Kalobeyei. As one Ethiopian man in Kalobeyei explained, “Last time, we arrested one thief while he was stealing from a house at night.

We managed to arrest him at around 3 a.m, then we handed him over to our local community security in the morning. He was taken by police.”

Nonetheless, despite the improvements from the previous year, general insecurity remains a problem for many in Kalobeyei, especially in reference to refugee-host relations. Perceptions of the Turkana host community vary widely, often according to the character of particular personal encounters, many of which are amicable. But there remains a sense of vulnerability to the host community more broadly. Women are especially vulnerable when moving outside the camp. When asked why she rarely travels to Kakuma, one Dinka woman explained: “Turkana used to attack us on the way to Kakuma. Among them, there are rapists who attack women on the route. Because of this, we don’t go regularly”.

This sense of vulnerability among Kalobeyei residents was often conveyed in contrast to Kakuma. A Nuer woman, who had previously lived in Kalobeyei but then moved to Kakuma 2017, explained:

“When we were in Kalobeyei, it was known that one cannot walk alone, for they will be attacked. I don’t know if perhaps they [hosts] have changed the habit of attacking refugees or not. But then here, in Kakuma, the hosts do their business with the refugees, and so they have a good relationship. They [the hosts] know that if they do any harm to a refugee, then the same thing will be done to one of their own who comes to the camp.”
Indeed, conflicts in Kakuma have long been characterised by a tit-for-tat exchange of violence, both between refugees and hosts and between different groups of refugees. While such patterns of violence and retaliation have caused a great deal of harm, the potential to organise for their own protection gives refugees in Kakuma a sense of security.

Correlations

Using multivariate regression analysis, we explore whether the self-reliance enabling factors that we measure at the household or individual levels (e.g. education, being employed, having a kitchen garden, receiving remittances) are correlated with indicators of sustainable wellbeing (i.e. dietary diversity, food consumption score, and subjective wellbeing). In Table 1 below, we show the same regressions as we ran in last year’s report. The results are very similar for our 2017 and 2018 data.

The regressions show that personal characteristics are correlated with indicators of sustainable wellbeing (i.e. employment, having a kitchen garden, receiving remittances) are an important determinant of employment. The likelihood of having an income-generating activity increases with a refugee’s number of years of education. Similarly, refugees are more likely to have an economic activity if they have done some vocational training in the past, or if they speak Swahili. In contrast, education and language proficiency do not appear to affect the likelihood of being engaged in agricultural activities.

Refugees have a more varied diet if they are involved in agriculture or have a kitchen garden (provided they harvested something) and/or have an economic activity. Female refugees also tend to eat more types of food. The diet of Kalobeyei residents is significantly more diverse, especially for Ethiopian refugees. Food insecurity is more pronounced for those without an economic activity and those not involved in agriculture. South Sudanese refugees living in Kakuma are more food insecure compared with their counterparts living in Kalobeyei (but this relationship is not statistically significant, p-value = 0.13).

These correlations suggest that education, vocational training, and language training could potentially offer a means to increasing employment opportunities. They further suggest that encouraging participation in agriculture, including through kitchen gardens, is an effective means of improving food security and wellbeing. Future research should explore whether there relationships are causal or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Has a Job</th>
<th>(2) Kitchen garden</th>
<th>(3) Dietary diversity</th>
<th>(4) Food Consumption Score</th>
<th>(5) Food insecurity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.0276 (0.0188)</td>
<td>0.0279 (0.0253)</td>
<td>0.115 (0.115)</td>
<td>1.539 (1.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0243*** (0.00499)</td>
<td>-0.000458 (0.00704)</td>
<td>-0.00240 (0.0302)</td>
<td>-1.69 (0.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.000280*** (0.000683)</td>
<td>-0.00008084 (0.0000952)</td>
<td>0.0000230 (0.000405)</td>
<td>0.00164 (0.00404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education</td>
<td>0.0171*** (0.00321)</td>
<td>-0.00546 (0.00373)</td>
<td>0.0638*** (0.0185)</td>
<td>0.593*** (0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended vocational training</td>
<td>0.164*** (0.0465)</td>
<td>0.0636 (0.0387)</td>
<td>0.118 (0.197)</td>
<td>4.560** (1.783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can speak English well</td>
<td>-0.00648 (0.0240)</td>
<td>0.0397 (0.0401)</td>
<td>-0.347* (0.190)</td>
<td>-7.129*** (1.567)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can speak Swahili</td>
<td>0.0783* (0.0402)</td>
<td>-0.0277 (0.0379)</td>
<td>0.541** (0.247)</td>
<td>-0.00489 (1.676)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival date</td>
<td>-0.0000143 (0.0000102)</td>
<td>0.0000186 (0.0000132)</td>
<td>-0.0000954** (0.0000466)</td>
<td>-0.000739*** (0.000228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen garden (harvested)</td>
<td>0.572 (0.253)</td>
<td>1.329 (2.030)</td>
<td>-2.001** (0.810)</td>
<td>4.560** (1.880)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>0.585** (0.246)</td>
<td>4.560** (1.880)</td>
<td>-1.086 (1.055)</td>
<td>0.888 (0.584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDI Kakum</td>
<td>-0.0469*** (0.0158)</td>
<td>-0.256*** (0.0408)</td>
<td>-1.254*** (0.139)</td>
<td>-3.186*** (1.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDI Kalobeyei</td>
<td>0.100*** (0.0356)</td>
<td>-0.288*** (0.0526)</td>
<td>-0.692*** (0.226)</td>
<td>2.099 (1.527)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETH Kalobeyei</td>
<td>0.0207 (0.0259)</td>
<td>-0.438*** (0.0336)</td>
<td>1.089*** (0.268)</td>
<td>9.793*** (2.703)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.112 (0.240)</td>
<td>0.0455 (0.314)</td>
<td>7.488*** (1.150)</td>
<td>54.22*** (7.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1685</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Coefficients of OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 1: Multivariate regressions exploring correlations relating to sustainable wellbeing.
The effect of aid on self-reliance is ambiguous. Humanitarian aid improves short-run socio-economic outcomes but increases dependency. Development aid also reduces autonomy in the short-run. But, if it is effective, development aid can lead to improved long-run socio-economic outcomes and reduced dependency. Kalobeyei has a series of innovation programmes and projects that are not available to refugees on the same basis in Kakuma. Here we examine what difference they appear to make. Overall, there are positive signs that the innovative interventions being used in Kalobeyei lead to better socio-economic outcomes, although in each case the data also highlights lessons and areas for improvement.

Bamba Chakula

Bamba Chakula (BC) is a food assistance programme of WFP which relies on mobile money. The mobile currency can be used to buy food items at about 248 shops that have been contracted by WFP after a series of competitive selection processes. Its goals are the expansion of choice for refugees, support for small business development, and greater economic exchange between refugees and hosts. The BC programme is available in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei but on a different basis, with 95% of food assistance being provided through BC in Kalobeyei and only a small proportion (about 30% of nutritional energy requirements) provided through BC in Kakuma.

Our data shows that the BC programme has a massive impact on the food market in Kakuma and Kalobeyei for both traders and customers.

First, what difference does BC make to the traders? Data from our business survey shows that BC traders are much more successful in business than the other food retailers.11 They have higher sales and profits (Fig. 42), higher estimated value from assets, and are able to keep higher stock levels and offer a larger variety of goods to their customers. Shop owners who applied unsuccessfully to obtain a BC contract are generally doing better than those who never applied, indicating that applicants to the BC scheme already ran their business more successfully than non-applicants, irrespective of the outcome of the application. Importantly, the differences in business outcomes cannot solely be attributed to the BC contract, as the BC traders were inherently different in several aspects, such as nationality, gender, family background, education, training and prior work-, shop- and book-keeping experience. BC traders had also invested more start-up capital in their businesses before obtaining their BC contract. Nonetheless, it is evident that having a BC contract is associated with important advantages. Qualitative interviews suggest that several non-BC traders went out of business as a consequence of competition with BC shops.

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Furthermore, we found that shop owners score much higher than the respondents in the household survey with respect to food security (Figs 43-45). There is little difference between BC traders and unsuccessful applicants who still have a shop. However, unsuccessful BC applicants who do not currently have a shop consistently score better than respondents in the household survey, but worse off than the shop owners. Shop owners who never applied have almost as good dietary diversity and food consumption scores as BC traders and unsuccessful BC applicants, but are more food insecure. Overall, though, being a BC trader is associated with better outcomes in terms of both business and welfare.

Second, what does BC mean at the household level for consumers? Regression results presented in Table 1 suggest that South Sudanese recent arrivals living in Kalobeyei have better food security outcomes than those living in Kakuma, even after controlling for demographic characteristics, involvement in agriculture, and employment. These differences are possibly due to the higher proportion of food assistance given in the form of Bamba Chakula in Kalobeyei.

Interestingly, nearly all residents of Kalobeyei claim that they would prefer to continue to receive their food rations through BC (or cash) (Fig. 46). Meanwhile, a majority of residents in Kakuma claim they would prefer to continue to receive a proportion of assistance in in-kind food aid. In other words, the two refugee populations tend to prefer the system that they already have. Nevertheless, around 80% of respondents in Kakuma reported that they would like to have an increase in the share of Bamba Chakula compared to food ration. In fact, 19% of Kakuma respondents reported selling part of their food ration the month before the survey. Most of those selling their ration sold the wheat or the oil to other refugees in exchange for cash. Few reported selling the goods to Turkana hosts. The median reported selling price is very low: 20 KES per kilo of wheat while the median market price is around 70 KES per kilo; 100 KES per litre of oil while the median market price is around 170 KES per litre. This implies that households lose a lot by selling their food ration at a reduced price. For these households, it would be much better to receive the value of the food ration with BC.

Third, how does BC shape interactions between shopkeepers and customers? One unintended feature of the Bamba Chakula programme is the extensive use of credit. Refugees who have depleted their monthly Bamba Chakula allowance sometimes purchase food on debt, leaving their cards with shop-owners as assurance. When the next month’s payments are distributed, the shop-owners withdraw the amount required to pay off the debt. In more than half of interviewed households (57%), the BC sim card is kept by the shopkeeper (Fig. 47). This behaviour is particularly salient for South Sudanese and Burundian refugees in Kalobeyei.

Such arrangements are formally prohibited, but many traders have explained that it has become necessary for many refugees’ household economies:

*It can happen that a person needs food when the money is not yet distributed to their cards. In that case, we give them food and wait for the money to be sent. This is not allowed by UNHCR and WFP. But we do this in order to*
Traders face a number of problems when they give out money on credit. Some customers leave their lines with the shops and then obtain a new line from WFP. If their stock is depleted on credit, they may not have the back-up capital to re-stock, and suppliers may refuse to give goods on credit. One refugee trader explained:

“Ehh! This one affects me a lot. If the money delays to be transferred the first thing that must happen is to give many goods to our beneficiaries on credit. You may find the goods are finishing and the wholesalers don’t accept to give us goods when money is delaying.”

Agriculture

Kakuma and Kalobeyei lie on the arid plains that are characteristic of much of the interior of Turkana County, where daytime temperatures are often hot - and may reach as high as 40°C - and mean annual rainfall is only 180mm. Rainfall estimates are complicated by a great deal of variability in yearly rainfall, with severe droughts occurring irregularly but with increasing frequency. Turkana-speakers divide the year into a rainy season (akiporo) from April to May and a dry season (akamu) from August to March, with short rains around July. For those practicing rain-fed or flood-retreat agriculture, planting occurs in the early part of akiporo, with harvests in June and July. However, the increasing unpredictability in the timing and quantity of rainfall causes hardship for the majority of Turkana residents who rely on mobile livestock-based livelihoods and makes rain-fed sorghum farming increasingly difficult. The groundwater beneath the Tarach River is the primary source of water for the Kakuma camp and has made small farming schemes possible.

Farming has been more limited in Kalobeyei, and until now, most of the dryland agriculture in the settlement has focused on small household-level kitchen gardens. As one Burundian resident explained:

“The problem of agriculture is first of all water. Truly, the soil is fertile but the problem is water. There is no rain, and the difficulties of watering the crops limits you from cultivating over a large area. That is why we prefer the kitchen garden. At least you can struggle and water it. But with a big farm you will not manage.”

Efforts to drill boreholes in Kalobeyei have had limited success, and much of the water for the settlement is piped from the Tarach. However, as explained below, there are now efforts to harvest water from the seasonal streams that flow through the settlement, making larger scale farm schemes feasible.

Agricultural participation is significantly higher for newly
arrived South Sudanese in Kalobeyei than Kakuma. And while South Sudanese participation in Kakuma declined between 2017 and 2018 (from 24% to 19%), South Sudanese participation in Kalobeyei increased (from 36% to 46%). On the other hand, Burundian and Ethiopian participation in Kalobeyei is much lower and possibly declining (Fig. 48).

South Sudanese refugees tend to cultivate okra, leafy greens, and cowpeas. South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei tend to plant more types of plants compared to those in Kakuma. For those involved in agriculture who harvested recently, productivity seems similar in Kakuma and in Kalobeyei (Figs. 49 and 50). However, productivity was also much higher during the 3 months preceding the survey in 2017 compared to the 3 months preceding the survey in 2018, which, given that it affected both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, may simply reflect lower rainfall in the second year or slightly different timing of the two waves of data collection (September-October 2016 versus July-August 2017). Indeed, refugees report that water represents their biggest challenge relating to agriculture (Fig. 51).

The increased take-up of agriculture in Kalobeyei may reflect the number of agricultural initiatives being implemented by development actors, including kitchen gardens for households, sorghum farms built into trapezoidal bunds near the rivers, 5 water pan farms, and hydroponic projects. Along the two laagas (flood-prone seasonal rivers) that serve as boundaries between the three villages of Kalobeyei Settlement, there are about 400 hectares of available space, of which about 250 hectares are promising for agriculture.

The earliest attempts at large-scale farming in the refugee settlement were based on rain-fed agriculture, which was organised by WFP, FAO, and the county government. This began in early 2017, and there was only limited interest, especially among refugees. The organisers called a meeting, asked for expressions of interests in farming, and those who were interested would be allocated kitchen garden plots. They relied on both host representatives and refugee committees, which are constituted by representatives of various villages and nationalities. 790 farmers (40 percent host) participated, with farming taking place mostly on the north side of the settlement road. Plots were divided into quarter acre plots and farmers were there during allocation, marking their respective plot for themselves. However, the first harvest was impressive and so in October 2017 they found themselves with many more interested households. However, for this second round in 2018, there was little rain and the kitchen gardens have had a lower yield.

One important variable in the limited success of the rain-fed plots was that imported sorghum seeds were distributed. Meanwhile, many of the hosts used some of their local seed. These matured faster than the imported strain, such that it had tussled before the outbreak of locusts. The more slowly maturing imported variety was negatively impacted while the local variety made for a good harvest. This year, FAO is procuring local seed and distributing this, using seed from farms near the UNHCR compound as well as further afield in Turkana West. One complaint among Kalobeyei residents is that tilling of the dryland soils – which are normally covered by a hard surface layer – has resulted in loss of topsoil to
The Kalobeyei Model: Towards Self-Reliance for Refugees?

Wind, and the resulting dust sweeps across the settlement throughout the dry season.

Technical changes are being implemented in order to improve the yield. Rain-fed farms are now being replaced by trapezoidal bunds. There are about 391 of them, each farmed by both a host and a refugee household. To benefit from "spate irrigation", they are arranged so that gabion weirs (made of stones contained in nets) on the two streams or 'lagaas' running through the settlement (Esikiriait and Eilexa) direct water into a receiving bund. From that first bund, water then spills over into the others. The bunds contain water just long enough for it to soak into the soil, rather than running over the desiccated surface and back into the lagaas. Seeds are planted within the bund. Weirs are made of just compacted earth.

A plan currently garnering enthusiasm is to construct five water pans for year-round farming, the first of which was already under construction at the end of 2018. Each water pan will hold 30,000 cubic metres of water captured during the rains, when the two lagaas are flowing. It is calculated that after evaporation (the pans are uncovered), each will contain about 17,000 cubic metres of water for the associated farms, which should last about one full season of 4-5 months. Solar pumps will bring water into a raised tank, which will then flow to the drip irrigation systems of the connected farms. Farms for each pan will be about 3 hectares, divided into 38 units of 40x20 metres, which are then divided into 8 10x10m plots. Each of these will be covered by a shade-net house to prevent evaporation and farmed by one household, which will grow their preferred produce. Hydroponic growing techniques could be incorporated to increase productivity and are being piloted (Table 2).

- **Unit Type**: Institution
- **Size**: 8mx30m
- **Crops planted**: Tomatoes
- **Crops population**: 200
- **Yield (yearly in Kgs)**: 2000

Table 2: Hydroponics yields in Kalobeyei

Fifteen hectares across the 5 water pans will provide for about 1500 households, split between hosts and refugees. More specifically, each pan supports 304 farmers. In terms of their schedule, they expect the first pan to be ready by March to collect water. Procurement takes some time, maybe a month or so, and so paperwork for that is already underway.

The goal is to get contractors working on the construction of shade-net houses, raised tanks, solar panels, drip irrigation so that the whole farm is ready by June. They also need fencing to prevent livestock from feeding in the farms. Participants for cultivating the water pan-fed farms have not yet been selected.

There are also plans for two pans for Turkana livestock. They were originally planned to be constructed just at the border of the settlement, but they may be moved further abroad to benefit host farms downstream. There is also an earthen dam being built on the Kang'ura River to the west, which will have a pan for 100,000 cubic metres of water.
Cash-for-shelter

In 2018, UNHCR piloted the first cash-for-shelter programme in a refugee settlement. The programme involves provision of cash and guidance on designs that are compatible with SPHERE standards, enabling refugee households in Kalobeyei to commission construction from local suppliers and keep any surplus. For the pilot project, 82 households (414 individuals) were selected from designated neighbourhoods and compounds of Kalobeyei. Most of the shelters follow a model built from quarry stone, which is more durable and cooler than most shelters in Kakuma. There are two types: standard and double, which are allocated according to family size and protection considerations.

Cash is distributed to beneficiaries in three phases. Within each phase, there are no restrictions on how beneficiaries spend the money or the suppliers that they commission. However, UNHCR recommended a list of suppliers and offered technical guidance based on a series of designs. Furthermore, each phase concludes with an evaluation of progress on the shelter, which is required before distribution of the subsequent cash transfers. Following the pilot period, the programme was rolled out to a wider cohort of about 800 refugee households in Kalobeyei. The amounts allocated depend on household size as displayed in Table 3. The standard household shelter costs 140,000 KES (approximately 1,400 USD), considerably more than standard mud-brick shelters in Kakuma or Kalobeyei, which can be built for about 25,000 KES excluding labour costs. New shelters are however expected to be more durable, secure, and comfortable than mud-brick shelters.

One UNHCR employee explained that the organisation of materials and construction by refugees themselves provides two supplementary benefits. First, refugees can attempt to reduce the costs of the construction in order to save money for further investments in, for example, curtains, flooring, or household security. One monitoring study revealed that many households were able to save about 9,000 KES (about 90 USD) throughout the process, which they could reinvest in further modification of the shelter as well as livelihood activities such as poultry husbandry. The second extra benefit is that the shelter construction contributes to the local economy (this is also the case for mud-brick shelters). Refugees hire labour from the host community, and they purchase their goods from local businesses. Our UNHCR contact pointed out many hardware stores are emerging to meet the needs of the cash-for-shelter programme.

Evaluating whether the many benefits of this programme are worth its large cost would be interesting, but is beyond the scope of this research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size and Model</th>
<th>1st instalment</th>
<th>2nd instalment</th>
<th>3rd instalment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard + Timber</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>152,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>235,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Double + Timber</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>259,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double + Iron Sheet</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>249,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double + Timber + Iron Sheet</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>273,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Costs of cash-for-shelter

A South Soudanese refugee who graduated as an electrician at the Kalobeyei Vocational Training Centre.

DRC Vocational Training Centre
Self-reliance requires achieving acceptable socio-economic outcomes autonomously. By late 2018, refugees in Kalobeyei (and those in Kakuma) are a long way from self-reliance. Indicators across a whole range of welfare outcomes, including food security, health, social participation, and subjective wellbeing are extremely concerning. The local economy is highly dependent on aid. Unemployment levels are very high and the few who have a job are usually hired by IOs or NGOs as incentive workers. Businesses exist but are relatively rare. The most successful ones are the five main wholesalers who benefit from their oligopoly position and the 248 food retailers contracted by WFP as part of the Bamba Chakula programme.

Very few refugees living in Kalobeyei can be characterised as self-reliant. Based on the self-reliance framework used in this report, our research reveals that few refugees meet either the socio-economic needs or autonomy criteria required for self-reliance. Even relatively successful business people who benefit from BC contracts cannot be deemed self-reliant as their business models mostly rely on aid, and would likely collapse if WFP were to stop or significantly reduce their activities. Agriculture projects should be praised, as they are supporting socio-economic outcomes and autonomy at the same time, and are therefore fostering self-reliance. However, the difficult environment in which the Kalobeyei settlement was constructed implies that the scope for agriculture may remain limited. Overall, the self-reliance enabling factors within our framework remain weak in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma.

To be sure, the slightly grim picture presented in this report should not be interpreted as a criticism of the work of IOs and NGOs. Refugee self-reliance is a very ambitious goal which requires a series of conditions, or enabling factors, to be present. Creating these conditions can be expected to be challenging, to take time and to be costly in the context of Kalobeyei, not least because the settlement had to be built from scratch in a geographically remote and arid environment.

Nevertheless, despite the limitations, our data at least shows that some things in Kalobeyei are working better relative to Kakuma, and that there are some improvements over time. Kalobeyei continues to be associated with better subjective wellbeing, and better outcomes in terms of dietary diversity, calorie intake, and food security than Kakuma. These better outcomes appear to be associated with the kitchen garden scheme but may also be related to the role of Bamba Chakula.

Kalobeyei’s goal of enhancing interaction between refugees and the host community is partly effective. Refugees are significantly more likely to have a conversation or engage in a business exchange with the host community in Kalobeyei than Kakuma. Furthermore, these forms of interactions grew between 2017 and 2018. Refugees’ perceptions of the local Turkana also improved slightly between 2017 and 2018.

Furthermore (as for Kakuma), security and access to water improved in Kalobeyei between 2017 and 2018. There are also striking strengths across both Kalobeyei and Kakuma, such as the number of adults enrolled in education programmes. However, in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma there are serious gaps in terms of access to electricity, the adequacy of healthcare, and the availability of employment opportunities.
We summarise our findings relating to self-reliance at the individual and household levels (depending on the variable) in tables 4 and 5 below. For both ‘self-reliance outcomes’ and ‘self-reliance enabling factors’, the variables in our framework can be translated into indicators. In the tables, we estimate the proportion of people in Kalobeyei who have attained a given threshold for self-reliance in relation to each indicator. We also identify in the tables whether this proportion is significantly better or worse than for the previous year, and whether it is significantly better or worse than for recent arrivals in Kakuma. Each self-reliance percentage is calculated based on the construction of a dummy variable relating to each indicator. For example, for ‘food security’, we use the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), which categorises households into four levels of food insecurity: secure (1), mild (2), moderate (3), and severe (4). Our indicator is based on whether the household is in 4 or 1-3.

In addition, our data collection reveals insights into a number of areas in which policy interventions may be strengthened through KISDEP:

1) Sequencing Self-Reliance

In this report, we have outlined a conceptual and empirical basis for assessing refugee self-reliance. Although each of the components of self-reliance is quantitatively measured, we stop short of providing a single, aggregate measure of ‘self-reliance’. Nevertheless, it is clear that self-reliance is extremely limited at an individual, household, and community level. Based on income levels, the Kimetrica study on household vulnerability in Kakuma suggested that only 5.7% of refugees in Kakuma can meet their own food needs, and 4.2% can meet their own food and non-food item needs. Our research suggests it is unlikely to be much greater than this in Kalobeyei.

At this stage, it would not be reasonable to reduce food assistance to refugees who achieve better economic outcomes. Indeed, very few refugees are successful enough to be concerned, implying that the economic gain is expected to be marginal. Reducing assistance to these refugees is expected to generate tensions. Instead of reducing food rations, a better means to address equity considerations might be for beneficiaries from specific programmes to be asked to pay a contribution (e.g. pay a rent for BC contracts or a rent for access to agricultural land).

Self-reliance in Kalobeyei or Kakuma is likely to be extremely challenging to achieve. Even if essential socio-economic needs could be met, enabling refugees to achieve them autonomously is a remote prospect given that virtually the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Food security (HFIAS secure)</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and wellbeing</td>
<td>Physical health score</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mental health score (depression)</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure and social participation</td>
<td>Sports participation</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community associations</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Perceived independence from aid</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary table of self-reliance outcomes. (Indicators are based on the percentage of South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei attaining a given threshold of self-reliance, and comparison is with recently arrived South Sudanese in Kakuma).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal and social environment</td>
<td>Business interactions with hosts (monthly)</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>Mobile phone ownership</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>Remittance (receiving)</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bank account</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public goods</td>
<td>Water access (reliable)</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security (adequate)</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education (more than 6 years)</td>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electricity access (reliable)</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Summary table of self-reliance enabling factors. (Indicators are based on the percentage of South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei attaining a given threshold of self-reliance, and comparison is with recently arrived South Sudanese in Kakuma).

entire economy is based upon assistance. Without the aid system, most businesses in Kalobeyei and Kakuma would collapse. The only means to ensure long-term self-reliance will be to enable the region to export to the wider Kenyan, regional, and global economy. According to UNHCR, refugee entrepreneurship in Kakuma and Kalobeyei is growing and the approximately 2,700 businesses in the camp and settlement make up more than 30% of all businesses in Turkana County. However, given that Turkana County is in a remote area (which increases transportation costs), is in an arid area (which increases production costs), and has very little infrastructure, significant investment would be needed in physical and human capital in order to create sustainable opportunities for businesses.

With this in mind, the objective of attaining full self-reliance should probably be replaced by the more modest and realistic aim of “increasing self-reliance to the greatest possible extent”. In the short-term, aid cannot and should not be withdrawn, but it should instead be redirected towards activities that are based either on enhancing self-reliance enabling factors, or iteratively encouraging refugees’ own investment in self-reliance enabling factors, including strengthening access to public goods, markets, networks, and enhancing the regulatory and social environment.

Based on this logic, several steps are needed to work towards self-reliance in Kalobeyei and Kakuma. First, do not cut overall assistance in the short-term. Second, gradually redirect assistance towards market-based activities such as unrestricted cash assistance, alongside providing the necessary incentive structures and training opportunities to encourage the development of markets and investment in productive activities. Third, invest significantly in public goods and physical infrastructure that enhance self-reliance enabling factors. Fourth, work with the regional and national governments to reduce regulatory barriers to refugees’ economic activities including those relating to mobility and the right to work. Fifth, in alignment with the regional and national development plans, create a development plan for Kalobeyei and Kakuma which can offer sustainable ‘export’ opportunities to the wider economy, whether in sectors such as agriculture, solar energy, or ICT, for example.

2) Adapting Food Assistance Strategies for Self-Reliance

Food insecurity is extremely high across both Kakuma and Kalobeyei, and most people are highly dependent upon in-kind or cash-based food assistance. Agriculture has potential as a basis for enhanced food security, despite the climatic and environmental limitations of Turkana County. The introduction of dryland agricultural techniques in Kalobeyei, alongside the provision of appropriate training and equipment, seems to have contributed to improved food security outcomes. Having a kitchen garden is associated with significantly lower food insecurity and significantly higher dietary diversity. WFP and FAO should continue to promote dryland agriculture through the kitchen garden programme, and aim to increase the allocation of land available for agriculture. However, in order to be the basis for self-reliance, significant increases would be needed in yield, crop diversity, and crop resilience. Technology and innovation in areas such as irrigation, soil and water management, and climatic information systems have an important role to play alongside community-based adaptation schemes.

Indeed, according to a feasibility study conducted by FAO in 2017, crop production is possible in the allocated 438 ha in Kalobeyei settlement. Of these, 44 ha will be reserved as riverine buffer zones; 187 ha for rain-fed grain production; 55 ha for grain production through spate irrigation; 15 ha for intensive horticultural production; and 137 ha for pasture and fruit tree production. The study recommended construction of the following infrastructure to facilitate production; five water pans with a capacity of 30,000 m³ each and drip irrigation shed netted farms to support horticultural crops on 15 ha, two boreholes to complement rain water harvesting in the water pans; diversion structures to support grain production on 55 ha through flood irrigation; trapezoidal bunds on about 190 ha to support rain fed production of grains; roof water harvesting structures to support vegetable production in backyard gardens; two water pans 15,000 m³ each and one earth dam 100,000 m³ for livestock; 15 farm ponds and fencing of the 400ha farm and kitchen gardens. Our research shows that participation in agriculture increased significantly among South Sudanese refugees in Kalobeyei between 2017 and 2018 (from 36% to 46%), suggesting growing interest and uptake. However, it is important that food assistance is not phased out at this stage, even for households with access to kitchen gardens. The lack of rain water in 2018 reduced yields compared to 2017, and for refugees involved in agriculture, lack of water was a significant barrier to adequate yields. Reducing the availability of in-kind or cash-based assistance for those with kitchen gardens would risk creating a disincentive to engage in agriculture, and the evidence suggests that even those with relatively successful kitchen gardens are a long way from achieving self-reliance.

In developing food assistance strategies for self-reliance, WFP and its partners should therefore continue to provide food assistance while simultaneously working to improve the scale and quality of its kitchen gardens scheme. In relation to food assistance, it should gradually transition towards one that moves away from in-kind assistance towards unrestricted cash-assistance. The Bamba Chakula programme has offered an important transition arrangement for promoting the development of the food retail sector, particularly in Kalobeyei. It has allowed retailers to build their businesses with a guaranteed source of demand (due to WFP’s provision of BC), and a degree of protection from the entry of large wholesalers into the retail market. However, BC should best be seen as a transitional model towards unrestricted cash, or a model to be applied when there are regulatory or technological barriers to the distribution of unrestricted cash assistance. Relatedly, the food assistance strategy should also focus on building sustainable food markets in which refugees and hosts can progressively participate in all aspects of the supply chain: production, wholesale, and retail. This might be

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achieved, for example, by extending the ‘preferred wholesaler’
model to cooperatives of small-scale refugee producers.

However, it should be noted that at the moment, refugee-
led retail and production add relatively little value. The
size of the non-BC food retail market will only be able
to grow if other sectors of the economy simultaneously
grow in order to stimulate demand and people’s access to
purchasing power. Within this context WFP has two main
roles. First, it should encourage the development of efficient
food markets, including by minimising prices and ensuring
dietary diversity. Second, it should work with partners to
contribute towards the overall productivity of the Kalobeyei
and Kakuma economies, including through continuing to
courage the development of agriculture.

3) Designing Settlements for Market
Formation

Kalobeyei is serving as a de facto laboratory for piloting a
range of innovative market-based approaches to refugee
assistance. Site planning has been based on the aim of
creating an integrated, market-based settlement, in which
refugees and local Turkana can have shared access to
markets. Bamba Chakula, kitchen gardens, and cash-for-
specialty exemplify the range of market-based approaches
that have been piloted. Bamba Chakula has helped to gradually
develop a food market and contributed to greater choice for
refugees and improved business outcomes for BC retailers.
Kitchen gardens are associated with improved food security
outcomes. And cash-for-specialty, although expensive, has
contributed to a perception of greater choice for participating
refugees.

Gathering evidence relating to these pilots offers a basis for
learning, adaptation, and potential replication elsewhere.
But the pilots also highlight the challenges of designing a
settlement based on sustainable markets. None of these
interventions is an entirely free-market solution. Each one is,
rather, a particular institutional design for allocating scarce
resources, based on market principles. While the long-term
goal of Kalobeyei is to build a self-sustaining market-based
settlement for both refugees and hosts, achieving that goal
will rely upon a series of iterative transition arrangements.

Market imperfections remain in Kalobeyei. These include
restrictions on mobility and the right to work for refugees;
supply chains controlled by a small number of wholesalers;
the reliance upon aid as the main source of investment into
the economy; inadequate provision of key public goods such
as electricity, water, connectivity, and security; and lack of
access to capital, finance, and banking. Whether consciously
or not, international agencies are the de facto regulators
of markets in Kalobeyei and Kakuma; deliberate planning
is needed in order to create governance arrangements in
which markets can flourish. One of the biggest challenges
facing Kalobeyei is the absence of employment and other
income-generating activities. And there is little sign that
this is improving. Although Burundian and Ethiopian
refugees are more likely to be involved in entrepreneurial
activities, South Sudanese refugees are mainly dependent
upon ‘incentive’ work with NGOs and IOs, which lack
formal labour protections under Kenyan law. Similarly to
Kakuma, employment rates are just 6% for South Sudanese
refugees in Kalobeyei. Education, vocational training, and
speaking Swahili correlate with the likelihood of being
employed and should therefore be strengthened. However,
the challenge remains how to create sustainable, market-
based opportunities. Greater strategic thought needs to be
given to what Kalobeyei’s (and indeed Kakuma’s) long-
term comparative advantage can be. What can Kalobeyei
realistically export beyond the settlement? Agriculture can
make a contribution but, by itself, it is likely to be insufficient.
With training and improved broadband, for example, are
digital jobs an option worth investing in? Such considerations
will be crucial to the success of initiatives such as the IFC’s
Challenge Fund as they attempt to increase employment
opportunities through private sector engagement. Only by
building sources of employment and connecting Kakuma and
Kalobeyei to the wider Kenyan economy will it be possible
to generate adequate sources of income for self-reliance to
become a realistic goal.

Overall, measures that can be taken to improve market
formation include investing in entrepreneurship, providing
public goods, shifting to cash assistance, improving access to
finance and banking, advocating to reduce regulatory barriers
to economic inclusion, improving the quality of business
training, diversifying supply chains including by improving
refugee participation within value-chains using temporary
forms of protection for small start-ups in infant industries
like the food sector, and minimising market concentration.

4) Enhancing Social Cohesion

An explicit goal of KISDEP has been to create an integrated
settlement model in which refugees and members of the
host community live and work alongside one another,
sharing social services such as healthcare and education, and
achieving greater levels of social cohesion than in the camp
context. In practice, this has not happened as envisaged. Out
of a population of around 38,000 refugees, very few Kenyan
nationals are actually living inside the three villages of the
Kalobeyei settlement. Reflecting this, there is a need to
rethink some of the social objectives of the settlement. For
example, if the lack of co-residence reduces prospects for a
‘hybrid community’ of refugees and hosts, it may make sense
to shift emphasis toward promoting ‘peaceful co-existence’
and ‘social cohesion’ between different communities. These
are not dramatically different objectives from those pursued
in Kakuma.

Nonetheless, there are some indications that the Kalobeyei
Settlement has created new contexts for interaction between
hosts and refugees, especially through business activities
fuelled by the cash assistance programmes. Our study shows
that recently arrived refugees in Kalobeyei are significantly
more likely than those in Kakuma to have engaged in a
conversation or a business transaction with a Turkana local.
Furthermore, the frequency of these interactions is increasing
over time. Integrated farming schemes in Kalobeyei may
present further contexts for ties to develop between refugees.
and hosts, although these programmes were too new at the time of fieldwork to make conclusive assessments of refugee-host interactions at this time.

However, relations between refugees and Turkana hosts remain complicated in both Kalobeyei and Kakuma. Many refugees have positive personal relationships with Turkana friends or acquaintances, but they remain concerned about the potential for intercommunal tensions to culminate in violence from strangers. The most common concerns relate to security and conflict over resources. Agencies attempting to promote social cohesion should bear in mind that more interactions does not always result in better relations. Current plans to develop a multi-purpose sports complex in Kalobeyei – as outlined in the KISEDP Phase I document – should attend to the reality that athletic competitions can bring people together, but they can also spark violence, as has occurred in multiple instances between football teams from different refugee communities in Kakuma.

In order to mitigate potential sources of tension, programmes should be designed in ways that increase socio-economic opportunity for local Turkana. For example, preserving Turkana people’s exclusive rights to firewood distribution and large livestock cultivation represent important ways to ensure they maintain a comparative advantage in certain sectors of the local economy. Meanwhile, international organisations and NGOs should continue to identify creative ways of extending opportunities to the host community, such as WFP’s inclusion of local Turkana retailers within the Bamba Chakula scheme as the distributors of corn-soya blend supplements to refugees.

5) Transitioning to Cash Assistance

Many households in Kalobeyei enjoy the ability to choose their own food items under the Bamba Chakula programme, but they find the restriction against buying non-food items to be prohibitive.

Many respondents report selling some of their food rations – whether received in-kind or via Bamba Chakula – in exchange for cash that they can use for items like school uniforms, shoes, and other goods that are unavailable in BC shops. But in selling in-kind food rations or BC-listed items, they are forced to sell at a market price that is considerably below the original cost to WFP. From that point of view, transition to cash is likely to represent a significant efficiency gain and lead to an overall welfare improvement. However, transitioning to cash assistance is also likely to have redistributive consequences in at least three important ways.

First, it may have intra-household effects. Some refugees expressed concern that removing restrictions altogether may lead to money being spent by some men on alcohol. One solution may be to target women for the cash-based interventions. While this may bring some discontent from male household heads, it was pointed out that women are currently the primary customers for BC purchases. Second, it may lead to a redistribution from BC traders to non-BC food retailers. BC traders are likely to oppose the switch, which would remove their advantage, while non-BC traders are likely to see the switch to unrestricted cash as an opportunity for accessing the Bamba Chakula market that is currently dominated by BC traders. Third, there is a possibility that if BC is removed without alternative arrangements, a small number of Kenyan food wholesalers may move into the retail sector and open competing retail outlets, potentially pushing refugee retailers out of the market. On the one hand, this increased competition may reduce prices for consumers. On the other hand, it may have redistributive consequences from refugee retailers towards host community retailers, many of whom may enjoy ‘unfair advantages’ such as freedom of movement.

Overall, there is a strong efficiency case for moving from BC to unrestricted cash assistance within Kalobeyei and Kakuma; however, the transition needs to be managed with care and monitored. In particular, international organisations will need to a) mitigate tensions due to BC traders’ loss of entitlement; b) monitor how cash is spent (e.g. food, assets, transfers abroad, alcohol) and assess how cash transfers affect within-household dynamics; c) monitor the impact on wider market dynamics, including the potential entry of wholesalers into the food retail market.

6) Monitoring Changes in Baseline Data for Self-Reliance

Donors and international organisations have invested significant resources into the Kalobeyei experiment. Learning from the experience is essential, not only to plan future programmes in Kalobeyei, but also to inform activities elsewhere. This study offers some insights into the effectiveness of some programmes. However, rigorous impact evaluations should be systematically undertaken for all major Kalobeyei programmes, such as cash transfers, business training, and cash-for-shelter. Importantly, for all future programmes, impact evaluation should be designed at the same time as the implementation of the programmes and integrated within the programmes to make sure impact can be rigorously identified. Such an approach would allow randomised-control trial or intervention-based methods to be applied, rather than simply retrospective evaluations.

In this study, we have outlined changes in baseline data collected in Kalobeyei for the South Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Burundian populations, and benchmarked against a ‘control group’ of recently arrived South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma. Our baseline data comes from 2017 and our first round of follow-up data collection took place in 2018. The data offers an important opportunity to continue to monitor changes in Kalobeyei against the baseline data over time. Although it is currently too early to make definitive judgements about the success or otherwise of the Kalobeyei model, the baseline data will enable ongoing monitoring and later assessment of progress against key indicators of self-reliance. WFP and other international organisations should continue to invest in ongoing monitoring and evaluation, and should do so based on coherent, inter-agency assessment of research, evidence, and data.
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