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**Displacement, Resistance and the
Critique of Development:
From the grass-roots to the global**

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BACKGROUND

This paper is an abridged version of a desk study completed in September 2001. This study was produced as part of a wider research programme on Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement organized by the Refugee Studies Centre and coordinated by Prof. Chris de Wet, Department of Anthropology, Rhodes University, South Africa. The coordinators are grateful to the United Kingdom Department for International Development for their generous support of these projects.

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DISPLACEMENT, RESISTANCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM THE GRASS ROOTS TO THE GLOBAL

I. INTRODUCTION: RESISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

The final third of the twentieth century saw the weakening and eventual collapse of one challenge to the dominant Western model of development and almost simultaneously the emergence of another based not on class conflict, although in some sense including it, but on the discourses of the environment and human rights. Challenging dominant current neo-liberal policies, voices articulating alternative approaches to development have appeared in the many regions of the world that have been forced to confront a wide variety of losses, costs and calamities brought about by the dominant models of development

One of the voices increasingly heard today is that of people displaced and resettled by development projects. Uprooting and displacement have been among the central experiences of modernity. In many ways, the experience of development has meant for millions of people around the world a separation of local life from a sense of place. Development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) is, in many ways, a clear expression of the ambitious engineering projects of a state with its monopoly on the management of force, relatively unconstrained by other forms of non-political power or institutions of social self-management, and able to exert control over the location of people and objects within its territory (Bauman 1989: xiii). Conversely, to be resettled is one of the most acute expressions of powerlessness because it constitutes a loss of control over one's physical space. In the face of efforts to displace them, the poor, indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups are increasingly choosing to resist to DIDR in the hope it will prove more effective in protecting their long term interests than cooperation (Fisher, W.F. 1999).

The uprooted and the social movements and organizations that have taken up their cause under the various banners of human rights, environment, indigenous peoples, and other related issues are now in the forefront of what some have referred to as an emerging transnational civil society (e.g. Fox and Brown 1998). Posited as an increasingly common feature of world politics, transnational civil society is composed mainly of nongovernmental organizations and social movements from the entire world that focus on a broad spectrum of issues such as trade, democratization, human rights, indigenous peoples, gender, security, and the environment often in opposition to the state and private capital (Khagram 1999). Development projects have increasingly become the contexts in which these interests and issues are contested and played out through different models of development by local and non-local individuals and groups. Thus, the people and organizations that resist DIDR include many more than the populations that will be or have been displaced and/or resettled. The uprooted and the resettled have been joined by allies at national and international levels from communities of activists from human rights, environment, gender and indigenous peoples organizations around the world. Indeed, corresponding to the wide array of activities undertaken in the name of development around the world, many of these issues interweave with resistance to development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), involving an extremely wide range of peoples, organizations, levels, contexts, and relationships that call for greater democratization and more participation of local populations in the decisions and projects affecting them.

The purpose of the present effort is to explore the ways the rights, claims and visions of the development process that are expressed in the complex and multidimensional forms of resistance to DIDR become not only means to refuse relocation or claim compensation or better conditions, but also help to initiate and become part of a multi-level and multi-sectoral effort to critique and reconceptualize the development process.

Development and Democracy

Although in the last decade there have been calls for including social, cultural and political elements, development, as it has been generally and broadly conceived and applied, is the process through which the productive forces of economies and supporting infrastructures are improved through public and private investment. While the paths that this process follows at the ground level are numerous and varied, at the institutional level they can generally be subsumed into the two large scale transformative trajectories of increased integration into the state and the market. People who remain outside or only partially within the threshold of these institutions are considered underdeveloped, or, at best, undeveloped.

The transformative processes entailed by development do not occur without considerable cultural and social discontinuity and quite often conflict (Moore 1966; Wolf 1982). The discussion surrounding these necessary transformations has included a questioning that probes the democratic character of certain forms of development. Democratic regimes are said to be subject to pressures to allocate resources for consumption needs at the expense of investment for growth and development. For this reason, authoritarian regimes have been argued by some to be more efficient in allocating resources for growth since they are unhampered by pressures to distribute surpluses for immediate consumption needs. Authoritarian regimes are also freer to restrict the activities of opponents to their ideologies and policies (Khagram 1999; Haggard 1990). Conversely, democratic regimes have been considered more favorable for other approaches to development such as those that favor public investment in human capital. Education, training, and health were often grouped under consumption by approaches favoring investment in infrastructure, but are now seen as important for development, even when narrowly defined in terms of economic growth (Khagram 1999: 36). However, powerful interest groups within democratic societies have frequently been able to direct the development process toward ends that compete with immediate public needs. The process of DIDR when undertaken despite the opposition of affected peoples, or when accomplished without participation and benefits for affected peoples, calls into question the entire relationship between this form of development and democracy. Furthermore, the capacity of people to protest, resist and influence DIDR policy may constitute an important test of the democratic character of a particular regime.

As previously noted, the expansion of infrastructure is considered virtually coterminous with development and a paramount goal of nations past and present seeking economic growth. Until quite recently, infrastructural and productive development has been considered to produce benefits that far outweigh any costs that such processes might entail. In many ways, any costs occasioned by infrastructural and productive development have been externalized, to be absorbed either by the environment in terms of resource exploitation and waste processing or by the general population when social, cultural and economic disadvantages occur. DIDR resistance and other alternative forms of development discourse question the fundamental social, cultural and economic assumptions of development and purport to offer alternative conceptualizations that produce benefits and reduce

costs at specific local levels as opposed to larger scale efforts for more generalized beneficiary populations who assume fewer risks and costs.

Global Norms and Transnational Civil Society

These critiques have been interpreted by some as constituting a shift in world politics away from struggles over power and wealth toward struggles over normative issues (Wilmer 1993: 40). Since the end of World War II, there has been a relatively continuous spread and institutionalization of global norms and principles of various types: regulatory, constitutive, practical and evaluative (Khagram 1999:23). Three domains in particular, human rights, the environment, and the rights of indigenous peoples, all directly related to DIDR, have seen particularly extensive growth and diffusion to many nations around the world. The 20th century saw a major increase in the number of states formally committed to ensuring a broad set of human rights. Internationally, human rights norms were among the formative principles behind the organization of the United Nations (Khagram 1999:27). The diffusion of international human rights norms is critically linked to the establishment and sustainability of networks among transnational actors who can connect with international regimes to alert public opinion, particularly in the West (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 5). Similarly, a global normative framework of principles and organizations has taken shape around the issue of the environment. Since the 1970s national environmental legislation and agencies, including ministries, have been forming rapidly around the world. Internationally, environmental norms have seen a similar expansion (Khagram 1999: 25).

Organizations promoting the rights of indigenous peoples are far from new in specific nations, but the worldwide expansion of an indigenous movement only began in the 1960s. The enormous challenges and problems faced by indigenous peoples around the world, including discrimination, confiscation of territory, violation of treaties, and exploitation and extraction of resources have given rise to literally thousands of national and international organizations, particularly in the post-war period of decolonization (Gray 1996: 113). Consequently, it is in this broader context of an emerging transnational civil society addressing development from the perspective of human rights, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples that the people and organizations resisting DIDR act and in which the conflictive and cooperative relations they engage in are played out.

Research on DIDR Resistance

An extremely wide array of participants, movements, forms, strategies tactics, and goals has emerged in resistance to development-induced resettlement over the last three decades. Moreover, the sites, actions and people involved in DIDR resistance are extremely diverse. However, resettlement studies have focused largely on dams in particular because of their widespread social and environmental impacts as well as their powerful expression of the Western, technological driven form of development. It is in opposition to dams that a formidable set of multilevel alliances has organized, creating institutions that challenge governments and multilateral development institutions. The most detailed analyses of resistance movements focus on those confronting dam related DIDR in India and Southeast Asia (Parasuraman 1999; Fisher, W.F. 1995; McCully 1996). Elsewhere the discussion of DIDR resistance to dams is most developed in Latin America. Some documentation exists for Europe and Africa, but the volume of materials in these sites does not

compare with either India or Latin America (McCully 1996; Bartolomé and Barabas 1990; Rothman and Oliver 1999).

Other forms of DIDR (conservation, tourism development, urban renewal, mining, transportation, pipelines, etc), and resistance to them, have received less attention, although urban renewal in the developed world has been closely examined since the 1950s (Smith, N. 1996; Gans 1962; Fried 1963). Recently, conservation driven resettlement has received considerable attention (Brechtin et al in press), but more analysis of resistance is still needed (Acselrad and Da Silva 2000). Special effort will be made to include other forms of DIDR and resistance. Privately funded DIDR development projects are increasing and the resistance movements that confront them face new and different challenges. The significance of such research will only increase in the coming decade as privatization of previously publicly provided service increases.

The literature on environmental movements, NGOs and social movements in general offers a context in which to analyze DIDR resistance movements within the broader framework of human rights and environment based mobilization and democratization (Melucci 1988; Tarrow 1994; Mueller 1992; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Fisher, J. 1996; Fisher W.F. 1997; Welch 2001). Organizational publications (electronic and print newsletters, bulletins, manifestos, and internal reports) are also a rich source of information and perspective on DIDR resistance.

The Politics of DIDR Resistance Research

One of the more difficult questions of social research involves the use of information that is gathered and compiled on the activities of individuals and groups. Social research with any group frequently has the potential of endangering informant communities with legal sanctions or worse. Such risks must also be recognized for research among resistance movements of various kinds, particularly DIDR resistance. Disclosure of movement formation, leadership, and strategizing carries with it the potential of both compromising specific individuals as well as providing information useful in co-opting, preempting or disarming DIDR resistance movements. Although most resistance movements are strategically public in their activities and transparent in their goals, in part to contrast with the often more covert agendas of projects, which frequently are unwilling to disclose important information relating to planning and schedules, great care must be taken in the analysis of DIDR resistance movements to avoid disclosures that could compromise individuals and organizations. The danger of these kinds of disclosures should always be framed in the context of the importance of disseminating the important information and perspectives for improving development policy and practice that DIDR resistance movements represent.

DIDR resistance research displays and analyzes the important perspectives and critiques that are provided by resistance for a reworking of a development agenda that has deep and abiding problems. Resistance brings into high relief the serious defects and shortcomings in policy frameworks, legal options, assessment and evaluation methodologies, and lack of expertise in implementation that plague much of the development effort. However, the question of how we can explain movements without compromising them remains difficult and should be in the forefront of research concerns.

The perception that many of the most vulnerable are forced to share an unfair burden of the costs of development as constituting violations of basic human and environmental rights is the core substance of resistance. In that sense, this effort, rather than being a simple inventory of causes, forms and contexts of DIDR resistance, aims to address the cultural politics of resettlement policy and practice as constructed by its various participants. Moreover, it is not accepted as given that development that displaces people is both necessary and inevitable. Neither is it accepted that all people faced with displacement and resettlement necessarily resist. The chapter does, however, assert, the fundamentally political nature of decisions to undertake such projects as result in displacement and resettlement and that, in addressing the politics of DIDR and resistance to it, the report is inextricable from the discourse that has emerged surrounding the core issues.

II. THE PROBLEMATICS AND POLITICS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

Despite the fact that population displacement and removal have been the focus of social scientific research and discussion for more than 50 years, there is still, particularly in the contemporary context, considerable ambiguity regarding a number of its basic conceptual features. This continuing ambiguity bears some significance for how the phenomenon of DIDR resistance is framed. Several other chapters broach these conceptual problems also, but these issues are worth exploring again in the context of resistance.

The Right to Develop and the Right to Development

It is only in the last half of the twentieth century that development emerged, fundamentally as an ideological debate between the capitalist and socialist worlds to become a central theme in national and international political and economic discourse. Out of this ideological struggle emerged a moral obligation to develop post-colonial societies in ways that would enhance and develop human rights, particularly those privileged by each model. The capitalist model of development is now clearly ascendant with its agenda of transformation toward modern industrial market economies justified morally as the best means to combat poverty and raise standards of living on a global scale.

The moral agenda involves now not just the obligation to develop, but the right to develop as well. Both the obligation and the right to develop have been discourses that have been heartily embraced by the vast majority, if not in fact the entirety, of post-colonial elites. Post-colonial nations have worked assiduously to expand the influence of both the state and the market through major investments in infrastructure addressing national priorities based on the ideological constructions of a utilitarian nature, private property and a mass society based primarily on the identity of national citizenship. As a citizen of the nation one has the right to development through these institutions. Alternative constructions of the right to development stress smaller scale undertakings with lower environmental impact that address local priorities and respect local cultural autonomy and rights. As a citizen, one's rights include participation in the decision-making that impacts one's life and community under this model.

At some fundamental level, DIDR resistance is a discourse about rights. DIDR pits the rights of the state and increasingly, private capital to develop against the rights of specific peoples targeted for resettlement. Article 1, Clause 3 of the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the

Right to Development (adopted by General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of December 4, 1986) established that “States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population of individuals” (as quoted in Dhagamwar, Thukral and Singh 1995). There is an assumption that such development will produce benefits for all, not just a particular community or sector within the society. There is also an implicit expectation in these assertions that the state in activating its right to develop will act in an ethical fashion that respects the principles of democracy and the human rights of the people involved

While the rhetoric that accompanies large-scale development projects frequently makes references to national purpose and proposes benefits for a general public, those who must suffer the costs that these projects entail tend to be quite specific communities. The costs that these communities are required to bear are often overwhelmingly heavy, at times, given current levels of expertise and competence, virtually unmitigatable. It is fundamentally the failure of the state and increasingly the private sector to undertake these projects in an ethical and competent fashion that produces conditions generating major forms of resistance. Human rights groups have challenged the idea that development policy arrived at through techno-managerial forms of Cost-Benefit analysis should set priorities rather than other standards of judgment such as distributive justice, the right to adequate livelihood, or the right to human dignity (Colchester 1999: 13). The distinction between development defined in terms of economic growth as opposed to development defined in terms of the expansion of social, cultural and political rights and power to broader sectors of the population lies at the core of DIDR resistance. The nature of a given development undertaking is inextricably entwined with the voluntary or involuntary nature of the displacement and migration.

Voluntary and Involuntary Migration

The displacement from publicly funded projects is both voluntary in some cases and involuntary in others. When the public sector requires land or other resources for public purposes, it is conventionally bound by law to compensate or otherwise provide for those whose land and other resources are taken through eminent domain. The acceptance of compensation for losses does not necessarily warrant any conclusion about voluntary resettlement. The increasing involvement of private capital shifts the goal of projects from improving social and economic conditions to enhancing the reproduction of capital in the form of profit, which is also considered to enhance the well-being of the society. Private capital and public administration have on occasion acted together to force the displacement of populations. As land occupied by low-income communities increases in value because of surrounding development, the tax rates increase forcing cash poor individual owners to forfeit their land or sell to developers at reduced prices and resettle (CBS News 1991).

Generally, people displaced by private development are considered to be voluntary migrants, having accepted a sum of money in exchange for their land. In the dominant ideology, market transactions are seen as entered into voluntarily by free economic actors. Market transactions have the effect of disguising the difference between voluntary migration and involuntary displacement. Many factors may influence such a decision to accept payment or other forms of compensation for land, not the least of which in both public and privately driven displacement are various forms of coercion. Private enterprise projects, with or without government assistance or collusion, may, without legal sanction, withhold crucial information from rural dwellers, depriving them of making

informed economic decisions regarding their land. Also not infrequent are various forms of violence and other coercive measures that are inflicted by private interests, often with the collusion or willful ignorance of governments, on individuals and communities that display reluctance to surrender their land and resources to these private undertakings. The fate of the displaced in these cases is often identical to those displaced by publicly funded projects with little or inadequate resettlement components. Other government organized resettlement projects, although generally better funded than involuntary projects (Cernea 1999; Eriksen 1999), also reveal a variation of degree in regard to the voluntary nature of resettlement. Major questions have arisen regarding the “voluntary” nature of the transmigration project in Indonesia. The U.S. organized and funded Zero Option project in Bolivia to combat coca production called for the voluntary resettlement of the peasant population of the Chapare region to other parts of the country, the complete eradication of all coca fields and the closing of the region to any further colonization (Sanabria 1993:190). In response, a national march was organized in 1994 by the five tropical federations of Cochabamba from Villa Tunari in the Chapare to the center of La Paz to protest the Zero Option Project (Contreras 1995:22). Clearly, resistance movements call into question the voluntary nature of much of this “voluntary” displacement.

Resistance and Protest

The forms of resistance undertaken by communities constitute one measure by which the voluntary or involuntary nature of the displacement process may be assessed. The conceptual issue to be addressed here is how resistance is to be defined. Resistance involves a continuum of forms, ranging from passive foot-dragging, non-appearance at official sites and times, inability to understand instructions and other “weapons of the weak” so ably described by Scott (1985) to protest meetings, civil disobedience to outright rebellion and warfare. Between the poles of no resistance and active resistance a variety of motivations, goals, and actions may be present. The lack of overt resistance does not indicate that displacement is voluntary. Where governments have a history of abuse and coercion, displacement may be accepted as the only survivable alternative, but it is hardly voluntary. By the same token, there are instances in which active resistance does not always indicate a primary agenda of reluctance to relocate. In these instances, resistance becomes a tool of negotiation to increase the levels of compensation.

III. DIDR RESISTANCE: DIVERSITY, COMPLEXITY AND DYNAMISM

Variation by Cause

The involuntary resettlement of individuals, groups and entire communities of people who occupy land where physical infrastructure and production facilities are numerous and varied. The dams, industries, mining, commercial agriculture and mariculture, communication networks, irrigation systems, pipelines, road building, urban renewal, public use facilities (sports complexes, shopping malls, parks, museums, performing arts centers, etc) tourist resorts and gentrification as well as conservation measures like national parks and wildlife preserves that constitute the goals, infrastructure and outcomes of development, all generate the displacement of large numbers of people from their environments and their livelihoods.

The nature of the impact of each of these and other causes of resettlement will vary a great deal, each eliciting different kinds of responses and resistance goals, strategies and outcomes. For example, environmental impacts of projects will differ, and those impacts will affect different populations and subgroups of those populations differently producing different degrees and forms of resistance. Moreover, the same resettlement project may affect tribal peoples and peasants in different ways, eliciting varied responses of acceptance or resistance from each, depending on their experience of the project, their prior experience with the state, and the nature of the losses that each group suffers. Resistance to DIDR frequently becomes the lead issue for the expression of protest over a complex of issues. The struggle against resettlement becomes a complex of struggles against losses of productive resources, against inadequate compensation, against changed relationships with the environment, against non-compliance with commitments made by project authorities, against violence from host populations, and against disrespect for local culture and knowledge (Acsehrad and Da Silva 2000:11).

Although the state has been largely responsible and perhaps the most visible implementer of projects involving resettlement, private interests are taking a greater role in financing and developing large-scale infrastructural projects. The involvement of the private sector in DIDR projects parallels its role in industrial pollution and environmental degradation as side effects of industrial and agricultural development that also are increasingly displacing people (Eriksen 1994; Edelstein 1988; Levine 1982; Hewitt 1997). In the case of mining, for example, relocation is often necessitated because of the contamination caused by the operations as much as the actual construction of the mine itself. In the vast majority of cases of displacement by environmental causes, little assistance in the form of resettlement is offered and this lack frequently elicits considerable resistance. Much displacement also takes place as a form of indirect effect of public and private development, often in combination. For example, the construction of the Kariba dam in Zambia increased investment in commercial fishing along the northern shoreline of the lake, displacing local fishermen. Further, a large irrigation farm enabled by the dam displaced more than 1600 people (Johnston 2000:9-10).

The Diversity of the Displaced

Although the pattern is not uniform, a significant percentage of those who face removal, whatever the cause, frequently come from the most disadvantaged and marginalized sectors of society. The privileged or powerful of a society are rarely obliged to abandon their homes and communities. Since dislocation resulting from development projects occurs first at the level of local community, the variety of peoples around the world facing this challenge is extremely wide, ranging from remote tribal groups, to peasants whose linkages with the state and market have considerable longevity, to the citizens of regional towns and large cities. Furthermore, the communities that face displacement are themselves internally diverse often along class, ethnic, and religious lines.

Resistance to resettlement, however, is not limited to people whose lives are directly impacted by projects. In the last three decades, the cause of peoples threatened with or actually impacted by resettlement has been taken up on numerous levels by a wide variety of groups and organizations around the world. Local, regional, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements with a wide variety of missions and agendas have joined and assisted in the struggle of peoples around the world to resist development-induced displacement and resettlement.

Complex Responses

Since resettlement is a “totalizing” experience, impacting virtually every domain of individual and community life, the responses and motivations for acceptance or resistance are complex and diverse, ranging from purely material considerations to the most deeply felt ideological beliefs and concerns (Oliver-Smith 1996). Equally as diverse, protests and resistance to resettlement by development projects and practices have taken many forms and expressions, including passive obstruction, spontaneous protest, sabotage, rallies, sit-ins, construction site occupations, teach-ins, courses, films, videos, folk dramas, stories, puppet shows, media campaigns, training programs, list-serves and web pages, hunger strikes, suicide squads, road blocks, guerrilla warfare, fliers, law suits, restraining orders, lobbying, political party action, conferences and seminars, declarations and many other strategies and tactics. Such actions take place in villages and towns, at project sites, in state and national capitals, at the offices of multilateral institutions and international organizations, in cyberspace, and at conferences and seminars in schools and universities around the world. Resistance to DIDR involves a diverse array of political forms, processes and actions of individuals, groups, communities, regions, nations and international organizations.

Resistance to DIDR also produces a complex array of purposes and initiatives blending environmental, social, cultural and economic concerns that may focus on resisting specific issues or general models of development. Disentangling resistance to resettlement from resistance to other specific project impacts as well as from a more general form of resistance to development as currently practiced is a major challenge, but it may also be a false goal since resistance to resettlement often constitutes a first stage in the evolution of a broader offensive against development practice. DIDR is just one of the insults that people must endure when certain forms of development are imposed upon them. By the same token, as will become apparent, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between people displaced by development projects like dams that alter or destroy environments and those displaced by environmental degradation caused by private sector development (Liederman 1995, 1997). DIDR resistance may contain or overlap with multiple agendas and priorities that embrace issues of national security, sovereignty, indigenous and other minority affairs, environmental destruction, human rights, land and property rights, religion and spirituality, cultural heritage and economic development, to name just a sample of the issues involved.

DIDR Resistance Dynamics

Resistance to DIDR is also extremely dynamic, both changing with conditions itself and influencing as well those individuals, groups and institutions with which it intersects. The relationship with a displacing development project is long-term and evolves over a long period of time. Resistance, in fact, has been known to appear often decades after displacement and resettlement have been accomplished (Jing 1999). When resistance organizations encounter development projects, agencies and national policies, all participants may initiate a process of co-evolution, possibly altering the identities, definitions, categories, strategies and policies associated with resettlement primarily and ultimately the development project itself (Dwivedi 1998; Rapp 2000). During DIDR resistance may provoke changes in resettlement policy and practice and ultimately a reframing of fundamental questions in development. In effect, communities and

organizations in resistance evolve in response to and in turn oblige national governments and multilateral agencies to evolve. By the same token, these struggles in themselves contain and express all the complexities, contradictions and dilemmas that development presents in their emergence and evolution as they interact with both allies and opposing interests at a variety of levels.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS IN DIDR RESISTANCE

Resistance to DIDR in its most contemporary forms must be seen as taking place in an era in which an extraordinary growth of organized social action of a wide variety of identities and forms has evolved. There has been a virtual organizational explosion on a global scale that brings together in alliances and collaborations the widest possible varieties of peoples at differing scales and contexts, contending with a wide array of challenges and problems. This extraordinary expansion of activism has been in part a response by people to needs or challenges not met or presented by government. The expansion has unquestionably been facilitated by greater access to both transportation and communications technology. Resistance to resettlement in its contemporary forms takes its place as one aspect of an increasing grass roots activism in collaboration with non-local allies around the world. Resistance to resettlement thus occurs in multiple contexts and environments, ranging from the local project site to regional, national and international venues in which the issues of development, displacement, environment and human rights are debated as issues of policy and practice, culture and identity. The complexity of linkages and relations among collaborating and occasionally opposing parties brings to the fore problems of coherence, consistency, representativeness and competing agendas among cooperating entities.

The efforts to resist resettlement thus involve people in pursuit of specific goals in organized action in multi-tiered levels or spheres of political action. While most social actors will have some kind of presence at some point on the site of the development project that relocates people, all of them will establish links to other social actors at the national and international levels. Outcomes of specific actions to further local interests taken in one sphere or level may resonate in sites very distant from the local context. The levels are linked in complex relationships generating both cooperation and conflict within and among them, involving participants of widely differing identities and organizational forms. Generally these connections across levels of the social scale enable local resistance groups to access assistance in the form of financial resources, media campaigns, political pressure or other forms of aid.

Employing the term “fractal” to describe them, Little indicates that these linkages are not organized or mobilized in any orderly fashion, but are most frequently irregular and volatile, varying by the historical moment relating to the issue and the strength and density of contacts (1999: 10). The term “fractal” has come to stand for a way to describe and think about shapes that are irregular, fragmented, jagged and broken up, but with an organizing structure that lies hidden within the complications of the shapes themselves (Gleick 1987: 113-4). The relationships that are established among social actors in struggles to resist resettlement do in fact take on an irregular and unpredictable character, but they are also joined by the effort to further the common interests involving human rights and the environment of the groups articulated across the different levels of scale. In that sense, while the relationships may be irregular and unpredictable, the compatibility of

those interests, whether involved in halting displacement, improving resettlement or urging more sustainable forms of development, helps to organize their interactions and channel their efforts toward goals that are similar or compatible. This compatibility is not inevitable, however. One of the challenges facing these interconnected organizations is articulating a coherent and consistent set of interests with such diverse constituencies. Notwithstanding the irregularity and unpredictability of activation of such linkages, resistance to DIDR joins local people to each other in grass-roots organizations (GROs) and to others in many other institutional formats such as social movements, NGOS, regional and national governments, multilateral organizations (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, etc), and international organizations (United Nations, European Economic Community, etc).

Resistance to development-induced resettlement in most cases takes place outside the context of formally constituted governmental or party structures in the organized collective action of people in communities and/or in groups both locally and extra-locally. Such organized activities involving a relative degree of continuity over time are designed to achieve a particular goal or set of goals and are manifested in four major forms that have played important roles in the various forms of expression that resistance to resettlement has taken. These forms are Social Movements, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Grass-Roots Organizations (GRO) and Transnational Networks.

Social Movements

Over the past four decades, social movements have become a particularly important form of collective action for people to engage in to promote or resist change as they act on behalf of common interests or values to which they strongly adhere (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988). However, the term social movement must be employed with caution. There are many kinds of organizational activity of a neighborly or communal character that do not automatically qualify as social movements, although in some cases they may form the base or provide the pre-conditions for the formation of a social movement. Social movements must develop a sense of collective purpose and the kind of political goals that involve interaction with other political actors. The political goals of social movements are expressed as claims to rights or on the extension and exercise of rights. The demands of social movements in specific situations thus call upon a common language of rights that contributes to the establishment of alliances among them. This language of rights provides the means to organize the elements of social struggle and has found broad application, providing a form of 'master frame' for social mobilization (Foweraker 2001: 4). Since in the modern era, the power to grant or withhold rights is vested primarily in the state, social movements make demands on the state.

Basically two approaches to social movements focusing on individual motivations for participation have predominated in the analysis. The earlier theoretical approach to social movements, the Resource Mobilization school, based on rational choice theory (Hechter 1987), holds that it is irrational, or at best non-rational, for an individual to contribute to a collective cause from which he or she will derive no benefit, either material or non-material. However, any understanding of the power of expressed affect, such as common identity, to motivate people collectively to action is not apprehended by such approaches. A recognition of this lack was

reflected in the shift toward “social constructionist” approaches which emphasize meaning, affect, cultural content and social context in research on social movements (Mueller 1992: 5).

In many contemporary social movements, including resistance to DIDR, it is more than evident that some attempt at synthesis of these two approaches was needed. Material or practical issues mobilize people, but so do concerns of identity and affect. Hilhorst, recognizing the internal diversity of most social movements, sees a difficulty in assuming a unitary collective identity for everyone in a social movement. She suggests that identification with a social movement is constructed around a shared set of meanings. Social movements carry, transmit, mobilize and produce meanings for participants, antagonists and observers. In “collective action frames” social movements structure campaigns in terms of meanings that have the power to mobilize because they are based on the multiple forms of experience of participants such as the economic costs, environmental destruction, and cultural losses that people experience in DIDR. These collectively held meanings, framed in a language of rights, serve to dignify and justify the movement (Snow and Benford 1988: 37). Movement leaders choose symbols that will resonate with the cultural values of the diverse groups they appeal to as well as the sources of official culture (Tarrow 1994: 122). Those issues and concepts that provide meaningful symbols and actions to participants are best drawn from the narratives that peers exchange in understanding their situation, and, according to Scott (1990), provide the basis for much of the action undertaken by individuals and groups in political contexts (Hilhorst 2000: 37).

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

Many of the specific aspects of social movements in fact may take the form of what has been termed a “non-governmental organization” (NGO). NGOs, which are not generally social movements, but may become allies or parts of social movements, have become an integral feature of contemporary development policy and practice. NGOs have frequently been seen as catalysts through which local people could become participants in rather than objects of development efforts. NGOs are generally beholden to two fundamental constituencies: donors and communities. They depend on donors for funding and they justify their roles and actions by the claim that, as less bureaucratically constrained, NGOs can eliminate many of the problems of inefficiency and corruption inherent in governmental agencies. NGOs depend on communities for legitimacy. Since their fundamental model is participatory, without the active involvement of local people, they lose their *raison d’etre* and become simply top-down development professionals.

NGOs take different roles in resettlement work. Some NGOs work for the entity promoting the development project in the planning of resettlement communities. Others, like Arch Vahini, work to improve the conditions of those communities that have accepted or have already been resettled by the Sardar Sarovar dam project in India (Dwivedi 1998: 150). And still others, such as the International Rivers Network, work to assist those communities that have chosen to resist resettlement, providing information, media assistance, organizational capacity, networking and financial resources (Williams 1997). The expansion of the number of NGOs working in DIDR resistance is largely among those devoted to environmental and human rights issues. The linkage of these two global movements with DIDR resistance entails a critique not only of the model of development that accepts the necessity of relocating people for national priorities, but also a

questioning of the scale of development interventions that create major disruption for both people and environment.

Grass-Roots Organizations (GRO)

Grass-roots organizations (GROs), also called “base groups,” “people’s organizations,” and “local organizations,” are membership organizations dedicated to the improvement of their own communities (Fisher, J. 1996: 60). GROs have deep social and cultural roots, many evolving from village councils, burial associations, water boards, religious brotherhoods and other traditional local organizations. In the last three decades tens of thousands of such groups over the world have emerged in response to worsening social conditions (Fisher, J 1996: 60). Frequently, new GROs are formed due to the inability of government to provide basic services. In recent years some successful GROs have expand their agendas to include larger, extra local concerns as well. Important in the development of new GROs is the increase in numbers of migrants who acquire education and experience in larger contexts, and either return to home communities to advise or work in GROs. Often referred to as “Gramscian organic intellectuals,” these individuals play key roles as brokers or bridge people between local organizations and outside sources of support (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 43).

The increasing availability of outside support from national and international NGOs and social movements has also supported the growth of local organizations. With outside support GRO leaders and members are able to participate in international conferences and meetings about the problems of development around the world. The spread of computers has made it possible for local organizations to communicate what they have learned with each other throughout nations and across borders and oceans. Thus, DIDR affected people around the world can now share knowledge gained in land and resource disputes with provincial and national governments over the internet and their websites. Communication technology and support for travel have enabled regional networks of individual GROs to form. In some cases, such as the aforementioned MAB (Dam Victims Movement) in Brazil, these networks coalesce and form NGOs or national social movements (McDonald 1993; Rothman and Oliver 1999). In turn, the new NGOs and social movements become parts of transnational networks, which constitute a fourth organizational form in which DIDR resistance is carried out.

Transnational Networks

In the most recent DIDR resistance organizational form to emerge, networks are composed of dynamic, multiple, reticulated transnational linkages. The term “reticulated” is key here. A reticulum, deriving from Latin for network, is a biological term, referring to cells that form an intricate interstitial network, ramifying through other tissues and organs, connecting any point to any other point, not necessarily of similar identity (Kearney 1996: 127). Facilitated by the rapid expansion of information technology, networks include individuals, NGOs, GROs and social movements, and often blur the distinctions between the sub-national, international and transnational (Kumar 1996: 42). Networks are most easily formed on the internet and when they cluster around political issues, in effect, politics acquires a new theatre (Kumar 1996). The internet is a global “network of networks” and has become both means and context for non-state organizations to pursue their goals. According to Rosenau (1991), the internet has helped to change the world system from a

traditional “state-centric” world to a “multicentric” world in which governments no longer entirely control specialized information nor entirely set the political agenda.

To a certain extent, networks resemble social movements in their abilities to mobilize large numbers of people on behalf of their goals. However, networks may include formal organizations and sometimes members of governments. Networks are composed of horizontal linkages between their members, with no one node in the network having decision-making power over any other. Networks share information and strategies among many people. When a policy debate arises, networks undertake campaigns to address the issues, but the network changes with the issue. Thus, networks cannot be defined solely as issue areas since issues also change (Kumar 1996: 23).

Two different kinds of activists stand out in their participation in networks. First, networks draw upon a community of scholars and experts who employ the scientific and technical knowledge base to broaden the existing discourse on particular problems. Secondly, networks depend on grass-roots activists, often members of social movements, NGOs or GROs, who take more challenging stands on issues and confront power-holders more directly (Kumar 1996: 32). These two groups definitely overlap, with members from each taking on the roles and functions of the other not infrequently.

Still following Kumar (1996), it may be best to define a network in terms of what its constituents are able to do politically. First, network constituents can develop information technology options to transmit information rapidly throughout the network. Second, network constituents can develop media visibility and policy relevance for their issues. Third, network constituents can maintain a coherent structure despite the lack of a hierarchical system of organization. Fourth, network constituents can promote agenda related changes in the discourses on key issues. And finally, network constituents can promote linkages among diverse issues nationally and internationally to build momentum toward their goals (Kumar 1996: 26-27).

V. A POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO DIDR RESISTANCE

In the sense that DIDR resistance involves conflicts over the complex relationships, involving sets of rights and risks that people have with a physical environment, this effort falls under the rubric of political ecology. Political ecology blends a focus on the relationship that people have with their environment with attention to the political economic forces characteristic of the society in which they live that shape and condition that relationship. Political ecology largely focuses on the conflicts that emerge over rights to access, ownership and disposition of resources and environments for which different social groups, often characterized by widely differing socio-cultural identities and economic adaptational forms, contend. In DIDR resistance, although the stakes may be expressed in economic, social and/or cultural terms, the fundamental issue is the political contestation over rights to a place or the resources of a place.

Vulnerability and Risk

Within the framework of political ecology, the core concepts of vulnerability and risk offer means to both identify and analyze the participants, scales and action levels as well as strategies and

goal structures of DIDR resistance. Vulnerability has been employed in disaster research to understand the vast differences among societies in disaster impact from similar agents. This perspective, emphasizing the role of human interventions in generating and distributing disaster risk and impact, found that these sets of relations coalesced in the concept of vulnerability (Hewitt 1983).

Vulnerability and risk, therefore, refer to the relationships among people, the environment and the sociopolitical structures that frame the conditions in which people live. The concept of vulnerability thus integrates political economic and environmental forces in terms of both biophysical and socially constructed risk. This understanding of vulnerability enabled researchers to conceptualize how social systems generate the conditions that place different kinds of people, often differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender or age, at different levels of risk (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992, 1995). Among these conditions, development policy and practice must be considered as generating and distributing risk and vulnerability differentially.

Risk Calculation in DIDR

At roughly the same time as the discussion of vulnerability in disasters was going on, Cernea began to speak of the risks of poverty resulting from population displacement from water projects (1990). He subsequently developed his well-known “Risks and Reconstruction” approach to understanding (and mitigating) the major adverse effects of displacement in which he outlines eight basic risks to which people are subjected by displacement (1997; Cernea and McDowell 2000). Cernea suggests that the hardship of resettlement may be less responsible for resistance than the fact that policy and legal vacuums leave people little alternative (1997).

People facing DIDR suffer from uncertainty and a lack of appropriate information seriously hampers their ability to assess conditions and act. Recently, Dwivedi has asserted that uncertainty and the lack of predictability heighten the perception of risk because without adequate information no calculations of losses and benefits are possible (1999: 47). Most mandated resettlement projects deprive people of control and generally do not provide accurate information on which people can reassert satisfactory control and understanding over the resettlement process. The often extremely negative concrete impacts of resettlement projects on affected peoples compound the disorientation generated by the loss of control and understanding as motivations for resistance. Resistance is a reassertion of both a logic and a sense of control (Oliver-Smith 1996).

Mediating institutions, such as NGOs, also frame and may politicize uncertainties and risks, and may be pivotal in the way people construct risk as well. Dwivedi asserts that when people feel that the risks associated with displacement and resettlement exceed cultural norms or when compensation is deemed inadequate, resistance will be forthcoming. Dwivedi's approach permits a disaggregation of populations facing DIDR according to the differential risks they perceive and their likelihood of resisting on the basis of those perceptions. The approach also disaggregates risk into project performance risks in terms of costs and benefits, financial risks in terms of adequate funds for implementation, environmental risks, such as reservoir induced seismicity, insect plagues or waterborne diseases, and distributional risks in which benefits, for example, are captured by the rich (Dwivedi 1999:45). Informed largely by rational choice model approaches, his analysis of the responses of the various populations affected by the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam points

primarily to risks associated with the loss of economic resources as key in the development of resistance movements (1999).

Rights and Risks

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) links risk with the concept of rights in advocating that an “approach based on 'recognition of rights' and 'assessment of risks' (particularly rights at risk)” be elaborated to guide future planning and decision-making on dams (2000: 206). Rights relevant in large dam projects included constitutional rights, customary rights, legislated rights, property rights (of both landholders and developers and investors). These rights can be grouped by their legal status, spatial or temporal reach or their purpose. In the case of spatial or temporal dimensions, rights of local, regional or national entities or the rights of present or future generations can be perceived. In terms of purpose, rights pertaining to material resources such as land, water, forests, or pasture are cited as well as to spiritual, moral or cultural resources such as religion, dignity, and identity (WCD 2000: 206).

In terms of risk analysis, the contribution of the WCD global review lies in distinguishing between risk takers and risk bearers or the voluntary and involuntary assumption of risk. Criticizing the traditional interpretation of risk as being born solely by developers and investors in terms of return on capital invested, the WCD highlights the differences between these risk takers and those who have risks imposed upon them by others. By combining the consideration of rights and risks, the inadequacies and simplifications of traditional cost-benefit analysis can be avoided and better planning and decision-making can result, based on the complexity of the considerations involved and the values that societies place on different options (WCD 2000: 206).

The importance of a rights and risks approach to DIDR is that it allows for the inclusion not just of material concerns, but of the issues of the symbolic and affective domains as well. As such, it provides not only an approach to improving planning and decision-making for dam projects, but also the template for an approach to understanding and analyzing resistance to DIDR in general. A “rights and risk” approach to DIDR resistance may be developed through three possible methodological perspectives: advocacy, stakeholder analysis and political ecology ethnography (Little 1999).

Advocacy Anthropology

An advocacy anthropology approach is characterized by an activist stance that privileges a particular group’s perspective over competing or contesting positions. This approach has been shown to be particularly appropriate in situations where groups may be facing acute socio-political forces that may amount to ethnocide (Bartolomé and Barabas 1973) or even genocide. Little suggests that one limitation of an advocacy approach is that only one point of view of the many that may be present in resettlement issues is presented, eclipsing the possibility of presenting the view that each contesting social actor may have their own sources of legitimacy. Thus, advocacy anthropology may forfeit the analysis of positions taken, for example, by anthropologists within the World Bank on behalf of peoples affected by DIDR. Conversely, it can be equally argued that advocacy anthropology often articulates a view that otherwise might not be heard, thus promoting dialogue and negotiation.

Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder analysis is an approach to environmental conflict that has emerged recently to resolve conflicts to reduce levels of environmentally destructive activities and processes. Stakeholder analysis employs methods of conciliation, negotiation and mediation for reducing levels of conflict and managing disputes. Such efforts at establishing truly effective methods for cross-cultural negotiation in DIDR could play meaningful roles in enhancing the capacity of local peoples to effectively represent their interests. On the other hand, stakeholder analysis frequently assumes that all actors have equal or symmetrical stakes in the conflict, something that is rarely the case. Moreover, stakeholder approaches also assume that all participants in the disputes hold and have the abilities to employ the rights of citizenship within the larger political space of the nation. Again, assumptions of this sort are far from warranted, especially in the case of ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples, whose position in national social and cultural hierarchies generally eliminates the exercise of such basic rights (Little 1999).

Political Ecology Ethnography

Political ecology ethnography, by focusing on environmental conflict, generates a social scientific approach that incorporates multiple perspectives to explore not only the political dimensions of these conflicts, but also to bring new participants into the political frame of action and initiate new approaches to viewing power relationships across multiple social and natural scales (Little 1999: 4). Importantly, this approach has the potential of creating concepts that may be adopted by the new participants to question established public policy and generate new alternatives for action. This approach focuses on the identification of all the different participants in the conflicts, a task that can be challenging in light not only of their numbers, but the diverse historical and cultural traditions that have helped to situate them in the dispute. Most essentially, the task must reveal the basic claims to resources and territory that are made by participant social actors and analyze the forms by which such claims are promoted and defended within broader political spheres such that the competing discourses of cultural and political legitimacy are displayed (Little 1999:5).

All three of these perspectives have advantages and disadvantages in approaching resistance to resettlement. Unlike Little, I tend to see them as nested, interacting and complementary rather than as exclusive. Each approach roughly corresponds to a level of action in resettlement politics. As in all research conceptual frameworks and methodologies, there are moments and places of inconsistency or less than perfect fit, even contradiction. In that sense, the methodological approaches reflect the tensions and inconsistencies of relations within and among the various levels of resettlement politics. Advocacy research, stakeholder analysis and political ecology ethnography focusing on the rights and risks in DIDR resistance roughly correspond to the levels or scales of interaction and conflict. Advocacy anthropology is appropriate for work at the level of the community to be resettled. In some instances, applied social scientists have found themselves carrying out research in the midst of the crisis of resettlement when people are facing a virtually life-threatening process (Colson 1971; Oliver-Smith 1986). In these contexts, researchers adopting an advocacy stance fulfill a necessary function in assisting communities in their efforts to deal with the crisis and in articulating their views in non-local contexts.

Similarly, when communities employ resistance to enhance their bargaining position in negotiating the terms and conditions of specific resettlement projects with planners and other authorities, stakeholder analysis can prove useful both in assisting people in the negotiation process as well as in demarcating the issues and limits that are “in play” in the process. Enlightened stakeholder analysis can reveal the differentials in value positions that are being negotiated among very disparate participants. Stakeholder analysis that is culturally sensitive can frame the issues in ways that help to balance those situations where, as one historian put it, one party has “a continent to exchange and the other, glass beads.”

Finally, a political ecology ethnography of resistance helps to place resistance in the context of global conversations about development. The political ecological perspective reveals the commonalities that local resistance movements share with similar struggles elsewhere, contributing to the emergence of new forms of discourse in the shaping of alternative approaches to development that are less destructive to environments and human rights. By revealing the interplay of multiple interests across scales and levels, political ecology ethnography informs resistance movements of the dimensions and scale of their struggle and their role in the larger conversations, and may enable them to expand their agendas, calling for more sustainable forms of development.

VI. WHO RESISTS? THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

When a development project of whatever stripe confronts a community with the prospect of dislocation, local responses will vary considerably. In resistance people are distinguished by their interests as well as their identities, although in many cases the two may be virtually the same. Identifying resisters basically constitutes identifying the interests and identities of those affected peoples who feel that their rights have been infringed upon and who feel that they are being forced to suffer unacceptable risks. Responses will also vary over time as the project and the struggle against it evolve, each in response to the other. Responses also vary because not everyone in a community, much less a region, will be impacted in the same way at the same time by either resettlement or the environmental alterations the project will enact. Moreover, many DIDR projects are large and their impacts are felt over a variety of environments and among widely varying populations. Such large projects are inherently heterogeneous, although elite constructions of impacts and impacted populations often assume an unwarranted homogeneity.

A variety of factors have proven to be significant in the development of DIDR resistance movements, including the social identity of individuals and the identity and organization of groups within the impacted population. Further, political variables such as the general political climate of the nation and the history of state-local relations, economic features such as degree of market integration or land tenure patterns, and cultural issues focusing around language, religion and identity may influence who participates in resistance movements. Each of these sets of factors are interpenetrating and mutually constitutive of the identities and interests of individuals and groups that will be impacted by a project and by resettlement, which are themselves factors that will influence in different ways the decisions to accept or resist resettlement.

Neither rural communities, whether tribal, peasant or assimilated members of the national society, nor urban neighborhoods of minority or majority identity are ever entirely homogeneous.

There are always differences of social, cultural, political or economic character. Thus, the degree of internal diversity, patterns of conflict and consensus, social racial, ethnic and class factors in an impacted population will play an important role in the development of and participation of local people in DIDR resistance movements. Within even small communities, some will resist while others may simply acquiesce and still others will willingly accept resettlement. Levels and forms of social solidarity and internal conflict may be changed. Such differences in response to both resettlement and resistance may have longer-term implications for the social organization of a community threatened or affected by DIDR.

Risks and Losses as Indicators

In a series of recent articles Dwivedi addresses the question, “Why do some resist resettlement and others do not?” (1997; 1998; 1999). The question may be rephrased as “Who resists resettlement and who does not?” Internal differentiation, a multi-faceted relationship to the immediate environment and the state, the availability of local and non-local allies and the quality of the resettlement process itself are crucial factors in assessing why people resist DIDR (Oliver-Smith 1991; 1994). Dwivedi considers resettlement policies and implementation, action-group mediation, and internal differentiation as crucial to the formation of different perceptions and reactions to the risks of displacement and resettlement that underlie the formation of resistance. Dwivedi contends that those who resist will come from the sectors of the affected populations who perceive that they are placed at greatest risk by the prospect of displacement, the resettlement plan and its implementation, or both. He asserts that risks will be perceived differentially by men, women, the young or elderly, rich farmers, landless laborers, indigenous peoples, peasants, outcast groups, and other minorities.

However, actually predicting or establishing who resists resettlement is extremely complex. In general, human motivations are rarely unidimensional and the decision to resist DIDR is no exception. Furthermore, the task is made even more complex by the introduction of the factor of time. Resettlement projects evolve over time in interaction with mediating action groups and policy adjustments, both of which have the potential of changing the decision-making frameworks of people facing and/or resisting resettlement. In the context of the Sardar Sarovar project in India's Narmada Valley, Dwivedi largely frames the choices made by people in terms of risks of potential losses of economic resources, namely, loss of lands and livelihoods related to agriculture. In terms of displacement risks not all individuals or villages will lose the same amounts of land or the same kinds of land. Government criteria for reimbursement, not only vary from state to state, but often crudely skew the distribution of impacts among differently vulnerable groups. Pressures, however, from action groups, can change these outcomes and improve policies, thereby altering the basis for decision making about resistance. The resistance dynamic, thus emerges as a “trialectic” among the people to be resettled, action group intervention and policy and project authorities.

Dwivedi either discounts or ignores non-economic considerations as motivations for resistance or as a means of distinguishing resisters. The fact that the many groups have both a history of resistance to state intervention and little or no history of reciprocity with the state is recognized, but not seen as determining. Cultural discourses around issues of loss of identity, place attachment, and loss of cultural heritage resources are also not seen as significant in Dwivedi's approach for distinguishing or predicting resistance.

Resistance, Social Solidarity, and Internal Conflict

From the standpoint of social organization, the need to organize for resistance will exert a new form of pressure on the internal organization of a community. The organization of a resistance movement may sharpen both internal and external pre-existing conflicts. Patterns of internal differentiation based on ethnicity, caste or class may inhibit the formation of necessary levels of solidarity and cooperation for effective resistance and may require efforts to alter local social structural patterns to enable the formation of a movement by isolating or banishing dissidents (Lawrence 1986). In addition, governments and project authorities may attempt to exploit or even create internal divisions within communities to reduce their capacity to organize and negotiate (Parasuraman 1999: 244). On the other hand, a successful record in defending local interests, usually based on a long history of internal coherence and solidarity, effective political structure, leadership and previously existing community organizations that may backstop a resistance movement, may also affect the community's ability to mount and ultimately institutionalize serious resistance efforts (Bartolomé 1992; Wali 1989; Waldram 1980). In some cases, the threat of resettlement creates a culture of solidarity far more intense than what had existed prior to the project (Rapp 2000). In terms of external relationships, resistance, on one hand, requires the intensification of relationships with traditional allies and, on the other hand, the development of new relationships with others, often completely foreign to the local context (Magee 1989).

Particular groups, whether defined by class and class alliances, race, ethnicity, religion or another differentiating factor, may find their interests furthered by certain features of a resettlement project while other groups will see themselves suffering great disadvantage. Furthermore, the state has been known to use the distribution of resettlement benefits to influence community opinion, channeling resources to village heads. This strategy may backfire when not everyone receives similar quantities or qualities of benefits. In the Sardar Sarovar project, “resettlement friends,” targeted for benefits for a demonstration effect, became known as “dalals” (stooges) when benefit distribution to the majority proved unsatisfactory (Dwivedi 1997: 20). Land compensation may be seen by some to be an economic opportunity to some while formal sector housing, particularly in urban resettlement may draw interested people into a project area. Differential costs and benefits from resettlement projects may vary according to land and labor factor markets, social differentiation, or other local features, predisposing some groups to favor resettlement and others to oppose it. Indeed, policy changes by project authorities as well as what Dwivedi refers to as “resistance fatigue” (often due to state violence and oppression) may split villages into contesting factions (1997: 19). Therefore, some caution must be exercised in ascertaining whose interests are indeed being represented in resistance movements (Partridge 1993; Nachowitz 1988). Communities threatened with resettlement cannot be assumed to be homogeneous. In resistance movements all players have specific agendas that they attempt to further.

Participation

One of the primary goals that many resistance movements seek to achieve is the greater participation of the affected people in the decision-making, planning and implementation of a development project that affects them directly or indirectly. The same requirement of full participation holds also for DIDR projects necessitated by the development project. The goal of participation is consistent with the emphasis on the recognition and restoration of the rights of

affected peoples. Participation is a particularly thorny issue in many cases because if authentic participation is achieved, it tends to violate many if not all of the traditional forms of power relations and social interaction in most societies. Projects of whatever sort are characteristically initiated, planned and implemented by people from various strata of elite groups within the society. Although not without exceptions, those affected tend to be members of subaltern groups who are generally not considered by elites to have the social and cultural tools necessary for executive or even advisory forms of decision-making, planning and execution that pertain to development projects (Parasuraman 1999).

Most resettlement programs become extremely large bureaucratic technical organizations operating with specific models of development and progress. They have generally a clearly defined set of activities focused on quantifiable costs and benefits that are to be carried out under time and budgetary limits. Project goals customarily emphasize meeting practical (i.e. material) rather than strategic needs, instrumentality rather than empowerment (Cleaver 2000: 598). Furthermore, the goals of development/resettlement programs generally emphasize the creation of formalized community organizations that interface well with national bureaucratic structures. Such programs aim in many ways to remake the community along lines that are compatible with the larger system (Cleaver 2000: 602).

One of the persistent tensions in the relationship between GROs, NGOs and Social Movements is the degree to which grass-roots opinion is consulted and their participation factored into decisions taken at higher levels in the struggle. NGOs claim to represent the interests of the community, but the question of how representative and participatory they really are constitutes the core issue of one of the arguments leveled against them. Governments and MDBs suggest that NGOs have not been elected by anyone and are misrepresenting themselves if they claim to represent the interests of the people. Indeed, the articulation of all the diverse claims and interests of extremely heterogeneous populations in a way that is still coherent with the NGO's own agenda regarding approaches to development is a major challenge facing NGOs assisting communities facing DIDR. NGOs depend on their relationship and credibility with the grass-roots and generally must be careful not to misrepresent their interests. Nonetheless, the tension is a continuing issue.

Categorical Struggles

Since populations impacted by DIDR projects tend to be heterogeneous, one of the principal points of contention in DIDR resistance involves the categories established by project planners of people to be included as recipients of resettlement assistance. Projects, like states, categorize people as a means of control and containment (Kearney 1996; Scott 1998). In the case of DIDR affected people the categories bring with them bundles of rights that are attached to material and social benefits or costs. Consequently, how one is categorized by a project will frequently determine one's access to a set of entitlements. For this reason, to be formally defined as a PAP (project affected person or people), an oustee, an encroacher, a *displazado* (displaced), an *atingido* (victim), an *afectado* (affected) or other similar labels is to be scheduled for the receipt of compensations or benefits (Rapp, *forthcoming*). Consequently, many struggles are undertaken by local groups and their NGO allies to resist exclusion by category from resettlement benefits or compensation. The inclusion or exclusion of certain groups from beneficiary categories in DIDR has also been the source of internal disputes and conflicts. The struggle to expand the definition of the affected is also

a priority among many resistance movements. A frequent focus of this form of dispute has been the tendency for planners to define project-affected peoples solely in terms of holding legal title to property directly impacted by the project. For example, the Brazilian electrical subsidiary, ELETROSUL, and CRAB (Regional Committee of Dam Victims) challenged one another continuously over the meaning of the term “*atingido*” (victim). Ultimately, CRAB prevailed and increased the ELETROSUL estimate of 14,500 families to 40,000 families or 200,000 people (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 50).

Formal titles become particularly thorny when indigenous groups hold traditional use rights of land, but no formally recognized titles. Indeed, the social identity of “indigenous” may be the source of considerable dispute since such a category may be attached to specific benefits from the state or the project that are not provided to non-holders of that category. The cultural significance of indigenous identity has thus been heightened for both holders and non-holders of that identity by development projects. The lack of recognition of larger regional environmental impacts of projects has also led to the exclusion of people whose access to resources essential for livelihood are seriously affected by projects. Although populations living downstream from dams are often severely impacted by dam construction due to water pollution, species depletion, and other environmental damages, they have been excluded from receiving any form of compensation, thus inspiring protest. A great deal of protest and resistance is organized around the failure to include the downstream populations structurally displaced by dam-induced environmental damage (Magee 1989; Dwivedi 1999). Kinship categories and distance have also proved to be important in determining entitlement and distribution of resettlement benefits as well (Dwivedi 1998).

Resistance to DIDR and Social Change

When a community decides to resist a DIDR project, that decision engages a community with a process that, even if successful, entails significant changes for that community both internally and externally. It is through the conflict engaged by resistance that communities themselves initiate changes, regardless of how conservative their reasons for resistance may be. Conflict is an important organizing principle of human behavior. Allies and opponents, good and bad, may become clearer in conditions of conflict. Events may become easier to interpret within the frame of conflict. People may be able to articulate their sense of identity and their positions on issues more exactly (Marris 1975: 159). Resistance requires action and consciousness is generated in and changed by social action (Marshall 1983 as quoted in Fantasia 1988:8). The threat of resettlement constitutes a crisis of enormous proportions for many communities. Crises are periods of time when customary practices of daily life are suspended and new possibilities of action, alliances, and values are created (Fantasia 1988: 14). The changes in groups set in motion by the requirement of action in resistance often produce new kinds of alignments and coalitions with significant impacts on the structure and organization of local social relations.

Why People Resist

Since protest and resistance are mobilized on a number of fronts and at a number of levels to confront a variety of opposing parties, a multiplicity of discourses must be called on to represent the concerns of people resisting DIDR. The protest and resistance furthermore may encompass critiques of project implementation, state development programs and strategies, and the general global

political economy of development. This diversity of idioms and meanings has been characterized as “syncretic” language, and is seen as essential for resistance movements to articulate support at different levels and in different contexts. Indeed, development projects that are backed by interest groups embedded in local and global systems necessitate a syncretisation of idioms (Dwivedi 1998: 160). While consistently based on a foundational concept of the defense of human and civil rights, individuals and groups resisting DIDR construct at least seven fundamental themes from which they develop a wide variety of discourses, images, symbols and representations for the various allies and opponents they encounter at various levels. Depending on the characteristics of the project, the social and environmental context in which it is located and the risks and losses that affected people will be or are suffering, some themes may be emphasized over others. In other words, some DIDR resisters may argue on the basis of justice and human rights while others call on the spiritual values embodied in the environment to be destroyed and others still protest the lack of participation in project design and planning. Equally so, the discourses may change in the evolution of the struggle, beginning, for example, with an appeal to spiritual values, then changing to environmental destruction, economics and project participation. Different discourses may run simultaneously as well, activated by parties at different levels and contexts of the struggle. The seven themes through which the various discourses are developed are: 1) environment, 2) economics, 3) culture, 4) project risks, 5) governance and administration, 6) approaches to development, and 7) justice and human rights. Each of these discourses of resistance will be discussed in the following sections or subsections.

VII. ECOLOGICAL UPHEAVAL AND RESISTANCE

At one level, all DIDR resistance constitutes one side of an environmental conflict. Resistance is a rejection of an attempt by certain interests to transform an environment in some way that requires the displacement of people. As such, environmental conflict is at the center of grassroots and NGO resistance to DIDR. Both the state and private interests, in undertaking large-scale infrastructural development and conservation projects, base their decisions on culturally particular constructions of the environment.

Constructions of Nature and Society

Although the dominant Western constructions, also frequently adopted by post-colonial states and elites, of the relationship between human beings and nature have over time fluctuated between opposition and harmony, for most of the twentieth century, nature and society were seen in opposition to each other. Humans have been seen as ontologically distinct from nature. Indeed, nature provided a contrasting category against which human identity could be defined as cultural rather than natural. This ideological construction focuses on the opposition of nature and society and ultimately domination and control of nature by society. It is important to note here that a category of human beings was characterized by its association with the phrase, “in a state of nature.” Now, as then, certain people get relegated into the “nature” category as the need arises. People put in the nature category frequently become the objects of development strategies and projects. Indeed, a frequent subtext of development projects is the acculturation of such people to majority held culture by obligatory participation, whether through forced displacement and resettlement or some other

activity. In effect, the goal of such projects is often to “socialize” these “natural” people and bring them into the national fold.

In the West, nature has been constructed as a fund of resources into which human beings regardless of social context have not only a right to tap, but a right to alter and otherwise dominate in any way they deem fit. The enlightenment ideal of human emancipation and self-realization (read “development”) were closely linked to the idea of control and use of nature (Harvey 1996:121-22). The belief in social domination further specified that nature would also benefit from human action. Nature is basically seen as plastic, ultimately conquerable or malleable to the purposes of humankind. The “plasticity myth”, as Murphy has termed it, is based on the idea that the relationship between humans and their environments can be reconstructed at will by the application of human reason (Murphy 1994).

Confronting these images and accompanying norms for action toward nature are innumerable alternative constructions of nature held by the enormous variety of peoples around the world. Although there is no overall generalization regarding understandings of the relationship between nature and society, many local cultures do not accept the dichotomy between nature and society that has undergirded Western economic positions regarding nature. Many local models do not separate strictly the biophysical, human and supernatural worlds, but rather pose a continuity among the three that is established through ritual, symbol and is embedded in social relations. In general, local models of nature are complexes of meanings - usages that cannot be rendered intelligible through modern constructions nor understood without some reference to local culture and place (Escobar 2001: 151).

Environmental Conflict in DIDR

The unrestrained exploitation of nature as the cause for DIDR runs the gamut from mining to manufacturing waste, from deforestation to oil spills. However, perhaps no other instance so epitomizes the subjugation of disorderly nature to human rationality as the “taming” of rivers by channeling and dam construction. The environmental consequences of large dam construction have been the focus of intense campaigns of opposition by environmental groups for several decades. Dam construction stands accused of the destruction of entire environments, including flora, fauna, landscapes, river systems, water quality, and shorelines as well as the creation of mercury contamination, greenhouse gases, water quality deterioration, downriver hydrological change, reservoir sedimentation, transmission line impacts, quarries and borrow pits (Ledec, Quintero and Mejia 1997). In addition, other suggested ecological impacts of dam construction include increased seismicity, spread of stagnant water borne disease, dam failure, water loss through evapotranspiration, and salinization. Furthermore, the environmental destruction created by dams has deep spiritual repercussions for many peoples whose religions are based on the close relationship between the natural and supernatural worlds.

Although the anti-dam movement essentially began as an environmental movement, it quickly found common cause with human rights activists who quite correctly realized that all the negative environmental impacts were experienced first and most directly by local people. Indeed, environmental issues have become one of the foremost elements in resistance campaigns by local people as well as local, national, and international NGOs in DIDR resistance. There are specific

environmental issues that emerge from dam construction that displace people that enter powerfully into the discourse of resistance, both before displacement and after resettlement, including habitat alteration producing previously non-existent risks, such as insect plagues, and downstream water pollution that kills fish, spreads disease and destroys plant resources (Acsehrad and Da Silva 2000; Magee 1989).

Conservation Based Dislocation and Resettlement

Although the integrationist or conservationist perspective toward nature occupied a distinctly inferior position for much of the modern era, the late twentieth century, partly due to the extraordinary destruction and transformation of many natural features (air, water, soil) as well as entire environments, has seen a resurgence of environmentally sensitive positions regarding the society-nature relationship. This new conservationist trend holds serious implications for issues of displacement and resettlement.

In 1980 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature published the World Conservation Strategy, challenging the national park model and advocating the incorporation of local people into the conservation process. The World Bank followed this initiative with a program called Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), intended to integrate local people into projects to enable them to benefit economically. Although in the last several decades, the majority of conservationists have worked with a model that includes participation of the people living within parks and other protected areas, actual practice has fluctuated between generally uneven local participation and conservation by administrative fiat backed up by force.

More recently, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of such projects has generated a more exclusionary strain within the conservation movement, recently dubbed the “protectionist paradigm” (Brechin et al. in press). The uneven results of ICDP strategies have convinced the authors of several recent influential publications to explicitly militate for the resumption of top-down conservation, requiring a radical transformation of nature, namely the removal of all human inhabitants from environments deemed endangered (Terborgh 1999; Oates 1999). Referred to as “greenlining” or “ecological expropriation,” this strategy entails the forced removal of people from their homelands, often without notice or consultation, producing another variety of environmental refugee (Geisler and Da Sousa forthcoming; Albert 1992). Barring outright displacement, the “new protectionist paradigm” advocates radically restricting resource use practices employed by people resident in reserves and parks. Such restrictions constitute a form of structural displacement in that while people have not been geographically moved, the norms and practices with which they have engaged the environment in the process of social reproduction become so altered as to effectively change their environment from one that is known to one that must be newly encountered with new norms and new practices if social reproduction is to continue.

The issue of marginalized peoples and protected areas is one that most likely will continue to draw the attention of the conservation movement. Until more equitable forms of land distribution are developed, many protected areas will be seen as the solution to survival for those people marginalized by agribusiness and other economic interests (Wehner 2000). In turn, there will be attempts at forcibly relocating such communities because of their impact on the environment. Such people become double losers to the demands of commercial agriculture and the conservation movement.

VIII. ECONOMIC DEBATES: EVALUATING RISKS AND COMPENSATING LOSSES

If the decisions to displace and resettle people are fundamentally political, the purposes of development projects that displace people are most often economic. In economic terms DIDR resistance involves a conflict between the needs of a local society and the needs of a regional or national one. Infrastructure, facilities, services, and resources are determined to be essential to the economic development process and deemed to override the rights and needs of people who occupy the terrain necessary for a project.

Between a project that is justified on purely economic grounds and a community's multifaceted existence there is a fundamental analytical disjuncture. The data, rationale and basis for projects are generally unidimensionally quantitative and economic. Economic planners and their methods and tools cannot address the multidimensionality that is presented by DIDR. Characteristically, that which economics cannot address is dismissed as external to the problem, statistically insignificant or unimportant. This idea of multidimensionality, so fundamental to any clear understanding of resettlement, is therefore rarely factored into the planning process of projects that will displace people (Cernea 1999:21, 23). Thus, the format in which the vast majority of DIDR producing projects is conceived is almost inevitably inadequate from the perspective of the project affected people and equally inevitably provides the rationale for resistance. Indeed, such is the hegemony of economics in development that the only option left to DIDR affected people is protest and resistance (Cernea 1999; Chambers 1997).

Therefore, the rationale for projects is fundamentally economic and the decisions to move ahead with projects are made on economic grounds. Thus, even before the people to be displaced are aware of a project, the nature of the decisions that have been made and the plans that have been drawn up come from a perspective that in most cases has markedly different value orientations and rationalities from those of the people to be displaced and are almost inevitably going to provoke resistance. It is not just uprooting that sparks resistance, but, as Cernea (1999) notes, the disaster of resettlement is deeply embedded in both the rationale and the method by which the project is conceptualized and designed, making resistance virtually inevitable.

However, it is not only the value orientation or basis of those decisions and plans that evokes such immediate resistance. Cernea recently has severely criticized the form and method of economic analysis that have been employed in resettlement projects as responsible for the almost uninterrupted string of failures around the world (1999). As Chambers wryly notes, "Economists tend to take a Pavlovian view of human nature which sees people as subject to reflexes which respond to economic incentives. The danger is that assuming that other people are economic maximizers makes economic maximizers of those who make the assumptions" (1997:50). Moreover, much of the economic data on which such economic decisions are made can be seriously flawed by culture bound elite notions about peasants, farmers, women, Indians or other minorities or subgroups that may be threatened with resettlement. For example, the assumption about rural dwellers as a single set of farmers with a uniform set of needs and requirements completely elides the class and ethnic distinctions that will generate important differences in economic and social resources, forms of tenure, amounts and kinds of land farmed, crop choices, credit access, and common resource access, all of which will determine the effect of resettlement as well as the intensity of resistance.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Thus, many of the core disputes fueling resistance movements are economic in nature. Most proponents of large-scale development operate under primarily economically derived definitions of development. There is a close linking of the idea of economic quantification with rationality and science, allegedly allowing for precision and banishing the ambiguity that plagues decision-making through political discourse (Espeland 1999). The means by which such a position is derived is a calculus known as Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), often hailed as a means of clarifying and rationalizing societal choices and minimizing social conflict. Originating from economics, CBA provides policymakers and politicians with a method for making decisions that is purportedly objective, fair and democratic, the decisions and outcomes arrived at scientifically. The essence of CBA is expressed by its name. Basically, the analyst measures the costs and benefits associated with a project and then adds them up to see which is larger (Adams 1996: 2). If the value of the benefits outweighs the value of the costs, an objective basis for proceeding with a project has been provided the policymaker.

In order to carry out a Cost-Benefit Analysis, some common standard of measurement must be established for the appropriate calculation to yield the quantitative, objective result that will produce a decision unaffected and essentially impermeable to political interference to take place. That is, there has to be a single property possessed by all things, conditions or states of affairs that is considered to be the source of their value (O'Neill 1996: 98). This single property provides the strong commensuration that is required by Cost-Benefit Analysis (Layard and Glaister 1994 as quoted in Adams 1996). For Cost-Benefit Analysis to be carried out, the costs and benefits in all their diversity have to be expressed in some uniform, quantitative format, conveniently and preferably in money prices. Money values or prices are usually arrived at by the modified or unmodified intersection of supply and demand in a marketplace. Using prices thus presents a problem for arriving at the price of costs and benefits from a project that are not the result of the intersection of supply and demand in a market.

Therefore, a method must be devised to assess how people would monetarily value non-market items. Such a method is known as Contingent Valuation, and although, to be fair, its validity is still a much-debated issue among economists, it is integral to Cost-Benefit Analysis (Bishop, Champ, and Mullarkey 1995). In Contingent Valuation, people are asked how much they would be Willing To Pay (WTP) for the things the analyst is seeking to value if they were for sale (Adams 1996:2). WTP works best when people are asked about benefits. However, in cases of DIDR, the question for people who are being impacted is more frequently one of costs. In the case of costs, the question then revolves around how much money would a person be Willing to Pay to prevent losses or Willing To Accept (WTA) as compensation for losses. These questions are not simply inversions of each other. They elicit manifestly different responses. On the one hand, asking a person how much they would be willing to pay to prevent a loss is constrained by that person's ability to pay. On the other hand, asking a person how much they would be willing to accept as compensation for a loss elicits what economists have characterized as "unrealistically high answers" (Adams 1996). WTP is generally preferred, for reasons of sound economy.

Martin O'Connor has described CBA as driven by the political desire to escape politics (1999). As Cernea points out, Cost-Benefit Analysis justifies a project economically on the basis of

benefits that are greater than costs in terms of total sums. However, CBA does not account for either distribution of costs or benefits. It cannot ask who pays the costs, suffers the losses or reaps the benefits. Moreover, CBA establishes aggregate costs and benefits when it is individuals who incur the costs and absorb the losses (Cernea 1999: 20). CBA also is inadequate for assessing costs that are real, but difficult to quantify such as the losses experienced in the breakdown of community or the loss of cultural or spiritual resources. Other critics of CBA (Adams 1996; O'Neill 1999; Espeland 1998) contend that CBA distorts the values that people attach to both natural and cultural resources.

Natural Resource Valuation

One of the main points of dispute in DIDR resistance is the appropriate means to measure or account for costs and losses of natural resources. Traditionally, the standard by which people removed for projects by eminent domain were compensated was basically market value. However, a great deal of protest has emerged where this standard has been employed to compensate people for land because market value for land in the home context may be greater than the market value of land in the region of resettlement due to both availability and quality. Hence, many people engage in protest and resistance activities to militate for the use of replacement value as the standard for compensation in the case of land. In many cases, money may be entirely acceptable as a means of compensation, but the standard at which the price of land is established may be very contested.

However, rights in property are rarely completely clear-cut. In many contexts in which DIDR has taken place, formal titles to land are more the exception than the rule. People may have resided on and exploited land for generations without having formal titles for a variety of reasons. Some may exist as renters or tenants. Others may occupy land belonging to others informally as squatters. Moreover, they may also depend on resources that exist on land that is considered to be either government or common property. Thus, when people are displaced, the issue of whom to compensate as well as how to compensate is central in the demands resistance movements put forth. A frequent issue of contention between DIDR project authorities and resisters revolves around the requirements for compensation. Project authorities often restricted compensation to holders of formal titles, thus condemning sometimes the majority of the displaced to total loss. Where the idea of individual ownership of property in nature is essentially alien, access to resources becomes the crucial element in compensation. The pressure of resistance movements for the recognition of other forms of tenure and ownership has led in recent years to a modification of this position by many projects. However, even efforts to compensate for lost communal holdings, pressures to conform to dominant society constructions of legal, individually held land are strong.

Loss of Access to Resources

From an economic standpoint the basic motivation for resistance lies squarely in the fact that resettlement projects consistently impoverish people (Koenig 2001). While resistance may be seen superficially as a rejection of the loss of economic resources that only have to be enumerated for compensation, it is by no means a simple matter to ascertain where and in what aspect of their lives people lose resources and become materially impoverished to establish the economic bases for DIDR resistance. Indeed, a simplistic approach toward this issue is largely responsible for much of the economic injustice, impoverishment and resistance that DIDR projects generate. The loss of

access to resources that are fundamental to the maintenance of life, whether in the rural or urban context, can provide the basis for mobilization of resistance.

People generally are not compensated for less tangible assets than land such as access to markets, communal property resources and social networks (Fisher, W.F. 1995: 32). In urban contexts, resettled people frequently organize resistance movements over loss of accessibility of employment. Slum clearance and urban renewal have frequently resettled people far from sources and sites of employment, and often even distant from regular transportation routes and facilities (Perlman 1982). The costs of transportation to work, not to mention the time, are also seen as an economic hardship that is cause for resistance by urban resettlers. Resettlement can distance both rural and urban people from essential access to markets from which they either derive all or part of their livelihoods or the basic material necessities of life. Furthermore, loss of access to markets also deprives people of access to those sources of social, cultural and political capital that tend to accumulate in markets. Such losses may be actively resisted because they impoverish people in diverse ways.

For many people, the arrival of large-scale development projects represents the intrusion of a set of economic institutions and practices with which they have had little experience and the long-term outcome of such an intrusion eventually involves their increased integration in this institutional complex. The shift to a monetized economy from a use value, reciprocity-based economy has rarely been smooth (Moore 1966), but when those profound cultural changes are coupled with the threat and/or trauma of resettlement, social disarticulation, cultural disintegration and resistance become more likely.

Cultural Resources Valuation

Cultural resources become particularly problematic to CBA. Cultural resources are increasingly being addressed by projects through the methods of CBA and Contingent Valuation, but in order to work, the requirements of CBA oblige a form of commodification of everything. What is the consequence of asking someone what he or she would be willing to pay to prevent the inundation of the burial grounds of their ancestors? The outrage that frequently results from such a query represents an intractable problem known as Constitutive Incommensurability that increasingly confronts the discourse of Cost-Benefit Analysis (O'Neill 1999). Constitutive Incommensurability refers to an unresolvable plurality of values. That is, there are some objects, places, conditions or states of affairs that resist being reduced to a single uniform measure. They are essentially constituted by particular kinds of shared understandings that are incompatible with market relations on moral or ethical grounds. The right to practice one's religion in the appropriate shrine, the right to speak one's own language, or the right to bury one's dead and respect one's ancestors in sacred ground as well as the loyalties of kinship, custom or a way of life are generally constituted by the refusal to treat them as commodities to be bought and sold (O'Neill 1999). The suggestion that payment would be appropriate is insulting, even morally repugnant. Such a construction challenges even the most well-meaning efforts at compensation. Appropriate forms and levels of compensation clearly cannot be arrived at by outsiders employing some ostensibly "objective" method such as CBA, but only in consultation with the affected people (Fisher, W.F. 1995: 32).

Reparations Issues

Recent work carried out for the World Commission on Dams points to the overwhelming need for reparations for people displaced by dam construction whose losses have never been appropriately compensated (Johnston 2000). Both researchers and the displaced have urged that claims of past injustices be heard by national and international human rights commissions (McCully 1999). Reparations are defined as actions or processes that repair, make amends, or compensate damages. Legally, there are basically three forms of reparation: restitution, indemnity (or compensation) and satisfaction. Restitution is defined as a return of the offended state to its former condition prior to alteration. Such action might include restoration of a damaged eco-system or lost resources such as water or fisheries by removing dam structures. Indemnity, also referred to as compensation, involves the payment of money to the injured party for losses experienced by illegal acts, including property or opportunity lost (profit for example). In the case of community as opposed to individual losses, indemnity payments can be used to fund improved resettlement plans or develop projects that address community needs. Satisfaction addresses primarily non-material damage through formal apology for losses sustained or the discipline of responsible individuals. In terms of development projects that violate human rights in DIDR satisfaction might include public acknowledgements of wrongdoing and formal apologies to those who suffered as a result of those actions. Satisfaction might also include damage awards for hardships experienced as outcomes of long-term effects of the original violation (Johnston 2000).

Resistance and opposition movements have made payment of reparations to dam affected peoples a central issue in their campaigns. The 1994 Manibeli Declaration calls on the World Bank to establish a fund to provide reparations to the people displaced by bank-funded dams. This demand was reiterated at the first international meeting of dam-affected people in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997. Dam reparations call for a variety of remedies, including monetary and such non-monetary measures as dam decommissioning, official recognition of injustices committed and the restoration of eco-systems (IRN 2000b). For example, in the late 1970s the World Bank helped fund the Chixoy Dam in collaboration with the government of Guatemala, which at the time was engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign that became a virtual genocidal war on the indigenous highland Maya population. The Mayan village of Rio Negro, among others, refused to relocate to make way for the construction of the dam. In 1982 the Guatemalan army and paramilitary forces entered the villages and massacred approximately 400 people, mostly women and children. In effect, the DIDR resistance of Rio Negro provided the pretext for the military to continue its genocidal war against the indigenous population. An internal investigation by the World Bank eventually denied any culpability or responsibility for the crimes. However, the survivors of the massacre and their allies are demanding reparations for the 20 years of deprivation, fear, and the murder of their families. The reparation demands include replacement land of equal quality and quantity, the construction of a monument to commemorate the 400 victims and seeking out and initiating legal proceedings against those responsible for the massacre (IRN 2000b).

Private Sector Approaches to Resettlement

As indicated previously, private sector approaches to DIDR are in the vast majority of cases simply non-existent. However, some private sector interests, such as the Rio Tinto Corporation, have developed resettlement policies and attempt to work with the affected people to implement

them. Nevertheless, most private sector development relies on the market mechanism to assess adequate compensation for people displaced by its expansion. The expansion of private enterprises in urban areas, such as hotel and tourist facilities, shopping malls, stadiums, and other structures is enabled by straightforward purchase of property and the departure of residents. As indicated earlier, the market mechanism with its scenarios of choice and contracts freely entered into by autonomous and equal, economic actors provides the appearance of voluntary relocation by participants. Indeed, private sector driven DIDR often involving large numbers of people, often passes simply as “unrecognized” (Appa and Patel 1996). However, in some cases involving urban renewal in the developed world, resistance movements have developed to oppose dislocation by “gentrification,” the process in which real estate interests and/or private individuals surreptitiously purchase properties in urban neighborhoods to upgrade, thereby raising property values and by extension taxes, forcing long-term lower income residents to sell. Economic boom can also create the conditions for wholesale restructuring of neighborhoods. The symbolic importance of the neighborhoods encompassed by Harlem in New York City as a major site of African American cultural heritage has attracted many people from middle and upper income brackets, some of them African Americans, to acquire and improve properties in that sector of the city (Smith, N. 1996). The “gentrification” process by outsiders, albeit of the same ethnic or racial group, has sparked a resistance movement in which “dislocation free zones” have been declared in areas in Harlem (Jackson 2001).

In rural contexts, private sector expansion, particularly in the developing world has often adopted informal and frequently violent methods of expulsion. In Brazil the government sponsored colonization of 13,000 families and the incursion of roughly 400,000 squatters from the impoverished northeast and other areas in the 1970s in the Goias-Para-Maranhao nexus of the Amazon region produced conflicts with the expansion of cattle ranching and land speculation in the context of increasing land values. Despite legislated protection for squatters' rights, the new economic interests purchased land and began a period of land expulsions. The violence in the region became so intense and widespread that in 1975 the Catholic Church established the Pastoral Land Commission to assist the squatters in these conflicts (Sanders 1991: 5).

The expansion of the private sector tourist economy has seen the displacement of many traditional residents as well. The barrier islands of South Carolina and Georgia in the United States were traditionally the homes of African American populations who were only marginally integrated into mainstream economies and societies. Their economy focused primarily around social reproduction and did not produce much monetary income. In the late 1970s foreign capital began investing in tourism development on the islands, focusing on golf course and vacation housing complexes. The taxable value of the land increased, straining the capacities of local people to meet these new cash obligations and forcing them to sell their land to developers or forfeit it to the county for unpaid taxes (CBS 1991). Private sector tourism development, often with the complicity of governments, threatens communities around the world. Golf course development in Asia has evoked widespread resistance from threatened communities in several nations seeking to stimulate economic growth through tourism (Ling and Ferrari 1995; Schradie and De Vries 2000; Pleumarom 1994; www.geocities.com/kmp_ph/strug/looc/looc.html).

IX. CULTURAL DISCOURSES OF RESISTANCE

There are barely hidden cultural politics in many development projects that seek to further a general expansion of the control of the state over local territories and people. In expanding its physical control over territory, the state also strives to impose a process of standardization and simplification on inhabitants, including common measurement, language, codification, and mapping. In reducing local cultural, social and economic complexity to a format dictated by the state, control and rationalization of local systems in accordance with state priorities can be achieved (Scott 1998). Nation building involves the creation of a comprehensible unity out of an incomprehensible diversity (Anderson 1983). In many nations the goal of some development projects is the assimilation and absorption, if not the outright eradication, of tribal peoples or peasantries constituted of local identities into a mainstream of agricultural bourgeoisie and workers of national identities (Smith, C. 1996; Bartolomé and Barabas 1973). Indeed, completely eliding the entire issue of choice or rights, Vidut Joshi asks, “Why should anyone oppose when tribal cultures change? A culture based on lower level of technology and quality of life is bound to give way to a culture with superior technology and higher quality of life. This is what we call development” (1991: 68 as quoted in Fisher, W.F. 1995: 33).

While the reasons people resist DIDR are often assumed to be economic in nature, the concerns that people express in resistance movements are generally more complex, embracing economic, social and, particularly, cultural issues. Indeed, project planners frequently err in supposing that people have only economic motives in mind when they undertake resistance to DIDR. While violation of economic rights has proven to be a powerful motivator in resistance, a great deal of the moral content of resistance discourse derives its power from explicitly cultural issues pertaining to the rights to persist as cultural entities, of identity, of spiritual links to land and the environment, of loyalty to both mythological and historical ancestors. On the other hand, in their campaigns to raise funds and resist certain forms of development, many NGOs have tended to romanticize the bonds to land held by many indigenous and peasant groups facing DIDR, when their actual concerns focused more on just compensation (Aryal 1995). It is reductionist to attribute resistance solely to economics or for that matter, cultural concerns. Human motivations in general are complex and positions and actions in resistance to DIDR are adopted out of many interwoven concerns rather than one overriding issue. There is a great deal at stake socio-culturally and socio-psychologically in resettlement. What does it mean from a socio-cultural standpoint to be dislocated and resettled? How do we develop a language to speak of what is experienced socio-culturally and psychologically in DIDR? What is the impact on individual and cultural identity and integrity? Why has separation from a place so frequently resulted in cultural disintegration?

Place Attachment

There are two core concepts in resistance to DIDR. One is power and the other is place. One expression of political power is the ability to move people and things about the landscape in any way you see fit. The loss of a home territory constitutes not only the loss of a specific dwelling, but also the loss of a home ground, in some cases, the very ontological grounding of a culture. Place attachment refers to the bonding of people to places. Brown and Perkins consider place attachment to consist of bonds that provide a framework for both individual and communal aspects of identity and have both stabilizing and dynamic features (1992:284). Place attachment processes involve the

behavioral, cognitive and emotional embeddedness of individuals in the relationship between their socio-cultural and physical environments, providing a form of ontological stability. A place may become the matrix in which a repository of life experiences becomes embedded and therefore, becomes in some sense, inseparable from the feelings associated with them (Altman and Low 1992).

Attachment to places may transcend the unique experiences of individuals and involve the constellation of social relations, and the cultural values that inform them, of entire groups or communities. The feelings, memories, ideas, values and meanings associated with everyday life in some setting come to constitute a dimension of a person's or group's self identity. Places are essential to the encoding and contextualization of time and history and become identified with the genealogy and continuity of families and groups through history. Economic ties of individual or collective ownership, inheritance or other forms of appropriation are fundamental to many place attachments. Other cultural factors such as the intimate connections between environment and religion, cosmology and world view, especially as enacted through rituals and celebratory cultural events, as narrated in folklore, or expressed in place names play significant roles in the relationship of a society to its land base and general environment. Ultimately, such ties lie at the core of both individual and collective constructions of reality. As Rodman notes, "Place then is both context and content, enacted and material. It is the lived world in physical form" (1992: 650).

However, Liisa Malkki cautions against the application of what she refers to as a Western "sedentary metaphysics" that "incarcerates the native" in an ecological or territorial identity, presenting the rooting of peoples as "not only normal it is also perceived as a moral and spiritual need" (1992: 30-31). Her work with Hutu refugees in Tanzania reveals that the true Hutu nation was imagined as a deterritorialized moral community formed by the refugees while the land expanse called Burundi was merely a state (1992:35). Hansen's work with Angolan refugees in Zambia demonstrates a far greater sense of dislocation among refugees who were settled in camps than among those who self-settled among co-ethnics in villages (1993). Brown and Perkins, following a rational choice approach, contend that people also can be disengaged and objective observers of settings, carrying out rational economic analyses, specifying the costs and benefits of places, and willing to move from one place to another according to the perception of advantage (1992: 283).

However, there is much evidence that removing people from their known environments separates them from the material and cultural resource base upon which they have depended for life as individuals and as communities (Tilley 1994: 15). Resistance to resettlement reveals how important a sense of place is in the creation of an "environment of trust" in which space, kin relations, local communities, cosmology and tradition are linked (Giddens 1990:102 as cited in Rodman 1992: 648). Resettlement in a strange landscape can baffle and silence people in the same way a strange language can (Basso 1988 as cited in Rodman 1992: 647). The human need for "environments of trust" is fundamental to the sense of order and predictability implied by culture, and threats of removal from these physical and symbolic environments have generally elicited some form of resistance.

Identity and Resistance

Although always at risk in uprooting, the durability and flexibility of cultural identity throughout the extensive migratory history of humanity is impressive. The frequency with which

cultural identities are sustained, reinvented and mobilized after migration to new environments is testament to the adaptability of human beings to change. However, the same modern era has also seen the demise of hundreds, if not thousands, of ethnolinguistic groups who have virtually disappeared through disease, exploitation, and assimilation into dominant cultural groups. This is particularly the case for indigenous and minority cultural groups that are small in number and frequently isolated spatially. When private or public economic expansion into their territories takes place, the result has frequently been cultural extinction. However, for some of these endangered groups, local efforts, combined with allies in the indigenous rights, human rights, and environmental movements have developed new political stances, often in response to development projects that include DIDR (Bilharz 1998; Waldram 1980; Salisbury 1989; Turner 1991a,b; Schkilnyk 1985; Gray 1998).

In the conflict of resistance, particularly for small, relatively isolated groups, more precise definitions of cultural identity are often worked out and conceptions of the community in broader national and global contexts may be developed. Such small societies initially lack an awareness of the political meaning of their own culture in the larger context in which they are becoming subsumed (Turner 1991a). With the increasing presence of the state in development projects, this lack of awareness, particularly of their minority status and its implications for their subordinate status within the larger society, can lead to an erosion of identity and cultural collapse when confronted with dominant group power and exploitation.

DIDR projects carry with them the potential for a virtually total undermining of local identity. Resettlement imposes forces and conditions on people that may transform their lives, evoking profound changes, in environment, in productive activities, in social organization and interaction, in leadership and political structure, and in worldview and ideology. Resettlement not only relocates a people in space; it may also remake them. When a community is relocated, it is not reproduced whole in a new site. In most cases the community is reconfigured in specific ways. DIDR projects may directly or indirectly further two fundamental processes, the expansion of the state and integration into regional and national market systems. Neither of these processes of inclusion is particularly simple or straightforward, but, in most instances, they initiate a restructuring of social, economic, and political relationships toward resembling those of the larger society. In that sense, resettlement will not necessarily destroy “local cultures” but it will appropriate them and restructure them in terms of values and goals often originating from far beyond the local context. Such a process of development must involve the reduction of local culture, society and economy from all their variegated expressions to a narrow set of institutions and activities that make them compatible with the purposes of the larger society (Garcia Canclini 1993).

On the other hand, although many small societies face total assimilation and cultural disappearance, ethnocide as Bartolomé and Barabas (1973) have termed it, others have become conscious of their minority status and have constructed it in terms of active defense of cultural identity and concerted political action. Development projects through an inadvertent oppositional process can provide a context for developing forms of social consciousness that are more appropriate to the minority position of small communities within an inter-ethnic social system. In effect, development projects can catalyze a shift in cultural consciousness from an ahistorical and acultural sense of identity to that of an ethnic group with a culture and identity to protect in confrontation with a national society (Waldram 1980). The struggle to resist the Ralco Dam on the Bio Bio River in

Chile has reunited Mapuche Indians, who have come to the region to reconnect with their communities. People who had hidden their indigenous identity began to reclaim their cultural heritage with pride (Evans 2001: 6).

One such group is the Kayapo of the village of Gorotire in the Brazilian Amazon (Turner 1991a). In their confrontation with both public and private economic development initiatives, the Kayapo have come to define their very survival in terms of successful resistance to the destruction of their natural environment by the Brazilians. Basically, in their resistance to the incursions of Brazilian society, the Kayapo have made their culture a political issue. Moreover, they have found that their culture is important to others and have discovered the importance of having control over how their culture is represented to others. They recognize that control over the power of representation is a means of conferring value and meaning on themselves and on the continuity of their culture in the vision of the larger world (Turner 1991a).

Although the damage they inflict can threaten the existence of subaltern groups, development projects, even those that fail economically, given a degree of accountability, can sharpen local identities through the oppositional process and resistance and further the political development of subaltern groups. As such, development projects can produce inadvertent positive outcomes when they stimulate the development of civil organizations that are able to resist state excesses in its efforts to transform local systems (Smith, C. 1996: 47).

Cultural Heritage Resources

Cultural heritage refers to the historical memory of a community, to that which links people to others throughout time. Cultural heritage is constituted in objects, resources, and practices that locate a people in the universe, giving them a sense of identity through time. Places where events of historical or sacred importance have occurred; objects such as shrines, cemeteries, or ancient ruins that express local identity; resources such as rivers, springs, lakes, forests that not only provide material sustenance, but also express or nurture the spiritual life of the community, speaking one's native tongue, practicing one's religion, all constitute elements of cultural heritage. Such elements play a signal role in individual and collective identity formation, in the way that time and history are encoded and contextualized, and in interpersonal, community and intra-cultural relations.

Previous discussion of cost-benefit analysis emphasized the need to establish a discourse of commensurabilities among the various losses and gains for that approach to be applied. The discourse of people who are the objects of the policy and discourse of CBA, namely those who must respond to such questions and those who must be relocated by projects may respond to distinctly different cultural values. If CBA arrives at its conclusions through an objective calculation based on a constructed commensuration of values across a wide spectrum of costs and benefits, the cultural models or values that energize the discourse of those impacted come from different sources.

“You tell us to take compensation. What is the state compensating us for? For our land, for our fields, for the trees along our fields. But we don't live only by this.... Our gods, the support of those who are our kin—what price do you have for these? Our Adivasi (tribal) life—what price do you put on it?” (Brava Mahalia (1994) “Letter from a Tribal Village” Lokayan Bulletin 11/2/3, Sept.-Dec as cited in O'Neill 1999).

This is a letter written to the Chief Minister of Gujarat in India by a tribal person who was being displaced by the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam. Compensation is also clearly of concern to this individual, but in this case, he or she is incredulous that the government could conceive that compensation could begin to address their losses. This person clearly differentiates between a set of values in which price is seen as a neutral measuring rod and a set of values that are based in the socially constructed relationship between a community and its environment (O'Neill 1996: 99).

Some of the major points of contention voiced in the discourse of the displaced revolve around issues of property. Compensation suggests that environmental goods can be subsumed into a liberal conception of property rights with rights of exclusivity and alienability. In this understanding land is a commodity that can be exchanged in the market. Threatened with relocation by the proposed construction of a dam, a Yavapai Indian from Arizona suggested that...

“The Indian knows that his land and life is intertwined, that they are one unit. Without the land, the Indian cannot survive and without the Indian, the land cannot be land, because the land needs to be taken care of to survive life.” (Espeland 1998:201).

Essentially, land is an incommensurable entity. As another individual from the same group put it, “Land is like diamonds, money is like ice” (Mariella 1989). Land and money are being compared to two things that are similar in appearance, but different in substance. And it should be noted that land is like diamonds, not for their monetary worth, but for their lasting qualities. Diamonds and land are forever. Ice and money melt.

Clearly the necessity for strong commensuration in CBA and its equally strong rejection by dam impacted people, particularly regarding cultural heritage resources, present a thorny problem. But it is a problem of politics, not economics. Economics cannot resolve issues of value. It can only resolve issues of price. And prices do not in many instances reflect peoples' values. Government establishment of compensation levels for cultural heritage resources settles nothing. The attempt simply sharpens political dispute.

Time, Cultural Memory and Uprooting

The events and processes associated with DIDR, much like wars and natural disasters, have a way of cleaving time into before and after periods. A major challenge for the uprooted is to formulate a sense of meaning for their loss and its integration into some context consistent with the values and beliefs of their tradition, bridging “time before” with “time after.” Meaning can be imposed on suffering if it serves some purpose and if that purpose and the experience of suffering are recognized as significant by others (Lifton 1967; Oliver-Smith 1986). Resistance to uprooting, whatever the cause, provides individuals and communities a means of reaffirmation of both personal and cultural identity by demanding recognition of their losses, and a means to reassert control over lives that have been disempowered. It has been suggested that the process of individual and cultural recovery and re-empowerment is encoded in the reconstruction and repossession of objects of cultural significance (Parkin 1999).

Material compensation or reimbursement may be insufficient to enable people to reconstruct culture and lifestyle after resettlement. Central to the ontological basis of many cultures

are the notions of time and place. People are linked to places by residence in time as well as space. Long histories in a place in which family and community roots are deeply embedded, tie generations to each other in a “community of memory.” It is through such communities of memory that people come to know themselves “as members of a people, as inheritors of a history and a culture that we must nurture through memory and hope” (Bellah et al 1985: 138). The power of memory as a mobilizing force for resistance and protest long after resettlement frequently remains strong (Jing 1999; Gray 1996: 102; Conuel 1981; Greene 1985; Bilharz 1998; Jeffrey 2000).

Languages of Resistance

The languages of protest and resistance to DIDR develop a wide array of themes, images and symbols. Since resistance movements themselves exist on a multiplicity of levels and encounter development projects that are articulated with local and global interest groups as well, the discourses must be equally multivocal. Moreover, their discursive styles must fit the particular context, idiom and problem area they are addressing. The broad discursive styles associated with two domains, human rights and science, play key roles in the campaigns of resistance movements. For instance, if one is arguing that construction of a dam increases the seismic potential of an area, a scientific discourse and style based in geology and seismology and emphasizing canons of objectivity and evidence are appropriate. If one is arguing that DIDR is a violation of spiritual rights, another form of discourse and style based on values and cultural heritage, appealing to emotion and sensibility is called for. Weeks has recently argued that both these discursive strategies may be characterized as “Jeremiad discourses” (1999:20). Jeremiad discourses criticize the listener (or reader) for a particular failure, evoke appropriate sentiments or actions, indicate the way to redemption and resolve the tension between seeming opposites. Further, Jeremiad discourses rely on two possible strategies: evocative and implementational. Evocative strategies elicit emotions with a poetic and metaphoric language. Implementational strategies offer guides to action as opposed to sentiment (Weeks 1999: 20). DIDR resisters rely on both strategies to both draw support for their cause and to reject and refute the arguments of developers.

Since the discourse of developers relies heavily on a scientific approach and discursive style, resisters are extremely careful about the accuracy of both their data and the factual basis for their arguments. NGOs have developed their own cadres of scientific experts, who often volunteer their services, from a diverse array of scientific fields to research and generate both data and perspectives to confront the arguments displayed by developers and their funders. Consistently calling attention to the lack of adequate research, faulty methodology, the shoddiness of actual data collection, and the inconsistency and incompleteness of studies, the NGOs assume a position of scientific rigor as opposed to the politically compromised, biased and inferior science of the developers (McCully 1997).

The themes developed by local people and their allies in the area of human rights are based on fundamental concepts of sacrifice and justice to question the morality of development projects that displace people. The listener or reader is called upon to recognize the sacrifice that people are forced to make in the name of development, and the injustice inflicted in inadequate compensation and non-existent and faulty resettlement. The dishonesty and hypocrisy of governments that call upon the poorest to sacrifice for the benefit of the richest are themes that commonly appear in both the spoken and written discourse of resisters.

A leaflet distributed at a CRAB organized rally against the Tukurui Dam denounces the actions of the project authorities in simple yet powerful poetic style:

“On the first day they came, they spoke to us of progress...
They measured our lands and we said nothing...
On the second day they came, they invaded our houses...
They expelled our children and we said nothing...
On the third day the water covered everything...
And because we said nothing we will never be able to do anything...
Are we going to let this happen again?”

(Comissao Regional de Atingidos de Barragem, Leaflet: 12 October 1988).

Another key theme in the human rights discourse involves an evocation of fidelity to a cultural heritage. Abandoning one's land means separation from and the loss of the right to express one's identity and practice one's religion. Accepting resettlement is equated with betraying one's ancestors and everything that one stands for.

“This is where we were born and where we grew up....The roots of our grandparents are here. The land that is ours, the culture, the wisdom, the native earth - all this is sacred.” (Nicolasa Quintreman quoted in Evans 2001: 6).

Persecution, determination, martyrdom and finality are also themes that run through the human rights discourse. People consistently affirm their intentions to perish either by drowning in reservoirs, or at the hands of oppressive authorities before they abandon their homes. In project after project, from dams to pipelines to golf courses, martyrdom is a consistent theme evoked by the people to be resettled. In Manibeli, the first village in Maharashtra facing submergence from the Sardar Sarovar dam in 1991, fifty families who had rejected resettlement, activists and people from other affected villages awaited Jal samadhi (to drown in the reservoir's rising waters) in defiance of the government's decision to continue construction (Parasuraman 1999: 244). Hunger strikes by both people and leaders of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) represent another form of this discourse of martyrdom and finality.

X. THE POLITICS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

In the vast majority of cases, involuntary migration and resettlement are socio-cultural and/or economic processes that are inflicted upon people as the intended or unintended outcomes of particular economic goals and processes. In this sense, while the actual resettlement project may be defined in social or, more commonly, economic terms, the phenomenon of resettlement is fundamentally a political one, involving the use of power by one party to relocate another. These power relations are conditioned by the climate of the various political contexts in which they are engaged. As discussed earlier, DIDR resistance involves a form of “fractal” politics in which the different participants, as allies, opponents or mediators interact across various scales of space and time (Little 1999). This interaction among the transnationally allied activities of GROs, NGOs, social movements, lawyers, courts, corporations, and multilateral organizations both affects and is

affected by both global and national politics dealing with normative issues of human rights and the environment (Oliver-Smith 1996: 96).

Khagram has suggested that the transnational politics of NGOs directly or indirectly helps to form new arrays of norms that are propagated globally through conferences and other international events and publications (1999). International organizations and international epistemic communities also contribute to global norms by codifying, validating and conferring authority to norms as adopted in formal institutions and practices. The closer a state is connected into the global network of states that accept and validate these norms pertaining to human rights and the environment, as well as the international actors and organizations that contribute to their creation, the more likely it is that those norms will inform the institutions of that state. The assimilation of global norms by states can produce new political spaces for NGOs, GROs and social movements to further their goals by holding states accountable for conformity with their own normative principles and rules. On the other hand, state institutions and practices are also embedded in local structures and are susceptible to pressure from domestic actors such as dominant classes and class coalitions, particular local interest groups or the interests of political elites (Khagram 1999:29-31).

Khagram further suggests that a political climate that permits organized and sustained social mobilization in the context of democratic institutions is critical to the formation and success of both local and transnational collective action that further the acceptance of global norms in the political economy of development in the Third World. Local and transnational resistance to large-scale development projects will have the least success in states with authoritarian regimes and local actors with little or no capacity or political space to organize (Khagram 1999:32).

The free flow of information both nationally and internationally is absolutely essential for NGOs and their lobbying efforts for changing environmental and development policies (Khagram 1999:40). Under democratic regimes, NGOs, GROs and social movements are freer to gather and make public crucial information about projects in the attempt to alter public opinion. They are more able to lobby government and bureaucratic actors regarding their positions on development issues. Since leaders in a democracy are generally more responsive to public opinion, the existence of a free press, including other forms of media such as radio, television and the internet, have proven to be crucial for NGOs and GROs working in DIDR resistance for the acquisition and dissemination of information. In a democratic regime in which political parties vie for the votes of the electorate, DIDR resisters can take advantage of the competition among parties to further their agendas (Khagram 1999:40-41). However, by the same token, when resisters come from the traditionally marginalized in a society, their lack of political power may make them less appealing to politicians (Bilharz 1998). Nevertheless, in regard to dams, Khagram argues persuasively that transnational NGOs allied with grass-roots organizations and social movements have changed the terms of debate and significantly affect both policy and practice in the political economy of development in the third world.

Negotiation Between Unequals

Barring immediate outright and open conflict between people facing DIDR and the state and project authorities, most resistance at some point involves dialogue and negotiation among the various parties over such points as alternative sites, resource valuation methods, compensation levels

and quality, timetables and benefits eligibility, to name only a few key issues. DIDR resistance movements face considerable difficulty in their discussions with state or corporate authorities due to the great imbalances of power that are usually based in the structure of the national political economy and socio-cultural context (Davidheiser 2000). While there is little specific analysis of DIDR negotiations, the literature on negotiations and conflict resolution provides some useful perspectives for understanding the problems resisters face when they encounter state or corporate representatives across the table. Often as members of minority groups or the poor who live at the margins of national societies, people facing DIDR lack the economic, social and political capital necessary to affect decisions beyond the local level. Even where those threatened with resettlement are not minorities or the poor, as in the case of the Nimad Plains upper peasantry in the Sardar Sarovar Project (Dwivedi 1999), they enter negotiations with project authorities at a clear disadvantage, although by virtue of their status, their position may get a better hearing than that of the landless or the tribals. The cultural gaps among the parties entering into negotiations in which participants are not familiar with the cultures, values, norms, or conventions of ordinary behavior regarding issues of conflict and communication can reduce the possibility of fair and just outcomes.

The James Bay Cree, for example, contend that the negotiation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975 took place under the pressure of the ongoing destruction of their lands and the refusal by the courts and the Canadian government to recognize their aboriginal and constitutional rights. Referred to as “a forced purchase,” they cite articles in the agreement that were insisted upon by Hydro-Quebec at the time of negotiations that decree that the Crees forfeit their right to raise sociological impacts on their people as arguments against future hydroelectric projects in their territory (Colchester 1999: 35).

The balance of power and relative power status of the participants is a crucial variable in negotiations, seriously affecting the possibility of establishing fair and equitable interactions and outcomes among them (Berkovitch and Houston 1996). In some cases overcoming the power differential may be virtually impossible and weak parties should seek recourse in formal legal systems rather than modes of negotiation to achieve just and equitable solutions (Nader 1994; 1997). However, options may be limited there also since many marginalized groups have customarily been ignored or discriminated against by formal legal systems (Little 1999). Power disparities may actually reduce the likelihood of undertaking negotiations since there is little to be gained by the stronger party in compromises that substantively address the interests and needs of all participants (Ott 1972). Bercovitch and Houston's review of research demonstrates that power imbalances correlate highly with lower rates of success in negotiations (1996).

There has been some discussion of factors that can offset power imbalances. Fisher and Ury (1983) have argued that “principled negotiation” employing “objective criteria” in presenting one's position and arriving at group decisions can reduce the role of “raw power.” If some specific criteria can actually be agreed upon, they can support the position of the weaker party by bestowing the symbolic power of legitimacy and can increase the possibility of successful outcomes by establishing some clear measures for making decisions (Davidheiser 2000). The chance of successful negotiations for weaker parties can also be improved if decision-making is relegated from a central bureaucracy to regional or local institutions, thus possibly reducing the social distance between local communities and the state representatives (Pensich, Thomas and Wohlgenant 1994).

Another way to address the question of power imbalances in negotiations is the formation of alliances (Pendzich, Thomas and Wohlgenant 1994). Allies help to offset disparities in power, particularly if they occupy higher social and political status. Such allies provide a variety of significant resources including negotiating experience, material resources and, perhaps most importantly, information. Alliances with national and international NGOs have enabled local level DIDR resisters to achieve enough knowledge and enough leverage in these novel circumstances to engage the planners, administrators and funders of development projects in debate and negotiations. From these interactions, some development agents have realized, albeit reluctantly, that they cannot ignore the rights of those affected by their projects. For example, ELETROSUL in Brazil has admitted after the fact that had they sat down to discuss the project with protesters, outcomes would probably have been more positive for both parties in the long run (McDonald 1993:99).

DIDR resistance may start as a spontaneous, *ad hoc* response to the unexpected presence of development project advance personnel at the local level. This *ad hoc* kind of resistance, expressed in the form of passive obstruction or active harassment of project personnel and their activities, may last for considerable lengths of time. Indeed, local communities may gain some leverage in negotiations through threats or actual subversive activity. If the state or corporate interests refuse to negotiate and local communities feel that the dominant power structure does not serve their interests, they may see no alternative to violent or peaceful disruptive action at any point in the negotiation process. Generally, with greater and more constant project presence and action, resistance tends to become more formalized eventually, establishing features that are associated with local or grass-roots organizations or eventually social movements. The potential of these external parties to offset the great disparities in power in negotiations between local communities and the national or corporate forces that seek to relocate them offers resisters some opportunity for gain in such contexts.

Scales of Interaction and Conflict

When resistance movements develop, they tend to generate contacts and linkages with social actors that operate at four levels: the local community, the project, the national political context and the international or global context. Initial contacts, whatever their character, eventually may generate relationships with social actors in the three other levels: the project that requires their relocation (at both design and construction phases), the national political economic context and international political economy and political culture. These four levels, community, project, national and international, all contain or possess different features that are separate, and at times internally contradictory or opposing, but interacting also. That is, contradictions and inconsistencies are found both within levels as well as between them. In addition, actions are not discrete to one level; that is, they can occur simultaneously on multiple levels. In some contexts the project may provide a means through which local interests articulate with national institutions perhaps for the first time. The organizational capacity of the movement to operate effectively at both the local and national level will prove important as the movement develops (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988: 697). However, it is important to maintain the distinction between internal and external actors in a local DIDR. If the focus becomes too trained on external actors and their resources, it becomes easy to see local movements as only the outcome of external resources (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 43). Local activists are anything but passive recipients of external aid. The relationship between internal

conflict. However, mobilization for resistance at the local level may also provoke a hardening of some policies at the regional or state level.

Regional levels of social and institutional development in local contexts also affect the action and organization of DIDR resistance movements. Local leadership structure and organization and linkages to similar structures at the regional level are important. The degree to which local structures are articulated with state structures, procedures and goals will affect how DIDR resistance relates to external resources as well as strategic and tactical selection. For example, resisters aware of or affiliated with a national union may elect to establish a local chapter to tap into a larger resource pool for their struggle (Wali 1989:85). Local DIDR resistance movements, however risk becoming pawns of local and regional political parties if they tie their fortunes too closely to them (Baviskar 1992). Since resistance in effect constitutes a challenge to the state, the politics of state-local relations in all their complexity come to the fore.

Local and National Leadership

Established leaders of the community, if they favor resistance, are frequently chosen to lead local movements. However, if they prove unsatisfactory or unequal to the task, new leadership may emerge in the context of the conflict. For example, the James Bay Cree in response to the unfair negotiations with Hydro-Quebec voted out three chiefs who were enthusiastic advocates of discussions with Hydro-Quebec and replaced them with three who were opposed to the proposals (Colchester 1999: 37). In many instances, the government or the project has devoted considerable resources to co-optation of local leaders, affording them special rewards for their acceptance of the project (Parasuraman 1999). Success at leadership in resistance at the local level has led to important leadership roles at national and even international contexts. Kayapo leadership, for example, has been composed of both traditional authorities and younger members of communities with greater experience of the outside world who have been particularly astute in their understanding and use of local, national and international sources of power for resisting the Tucuruí Dam and other Brazilian government and private initiatives affecting their land (Fisher, W.H. 1994; Posey 1996: 125).

The leadership of other grass-roots resistance organizations has generally arisen from within the ranks of the membership. For example, the leadership of CRAB in southern Brazil largely came from the ranks of the farmers facing DIDR. So successful were some of these local leaders that they have subsequently assumed positions of responsibility in MAB (Dam Victims Movement) and in the evolution of the struggle at international levels (World River Review 1988). As has been mentioned, the role of “Gramscian organic intellectuals,” those individuals who have left the community for economic or educational purposes and then return to assist with the struggle have been key in movement leadership (Rothman and Oliver 1999). In one case, a trained anthropologist who is also a member of one of the Nahuatl communities that were threatened with DIDR by the San Juan Tetelcingo dam became a spokesperson, activist and an analyst of that resistance movement (Celestino 1999). Many DIDR resistance movements have profited by the presence of sympathetic outsiders who are knowledgeable both about the affected communities and of the larger administrative and political system. For example, a Mexican American neighbor helped the Yavapai resist the construction of the Orme Dam in reaching community consensus, in public information

efforts, in dealing with bureaucracies and in negotiations with the government (Khera and Mariella 1982: 171).

Women in Participation and Leadership

Women have played important roles in organizational leadership and in spearheading resistance movement activities. Often called upon to assume the high moral ground and question the morality of development, women have been in the forefront of voices condemning DIDR. The women of the Yavapai tribe in the southwestern United States, facing DIDR because of dam construction, effectively questioned the morality of a government that would disregard the basic rights of a community that had lost many men in World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. As spokespersons for particular movements, women have been eloquent orators, often dramatically making their points in debate with project authorities. The participation of Tuira, a Kayapo woman, who denounced Jose Lopes, a director of ELETRONORTE, at the great protest meeting at Altamira, as a liar, waving a machete in his face, left an indelible impression on the assembled crowd, including 200 journalists and 200 NGO representatives (World Rivers Review 1989: 3, 7). Women have also taken leadership roles in local level resistance movements. Just recently, the resistance of the Pehuenche against the construction of the Ralco Dam on the Bio Bio River in Chile has been led by a contingent of five women who head the organization Mapu Domuche Newen (Women with the Strength of the Earth) (Evans 2001: 6). In the struggle against the Maheshwar Dam in India, women have laid down on the access roads, in relays, over months to prevent construction materials from arriving at the dam site (Black 2001: 16). Women's participation and leadership in fighting the Kinzua dam relocation among the Seneca provided the necessary experience with local and national administrative systems for them to take more active leadership roles subsequently in local, state and national politics (Bilharz 1998: 131). Women who battled to save their neighborhood from redevelopment in Chicago in the 1960s began a trend in which a whole new generation of women moved into leadership roles in community organizations (Squires et al 1987:135).

Without question one of the most notable leaders of a resistance movement today is a woman. Mehda Patkar, the charismatic leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, has taken a major role along with the well-known champion of India's tribal peoples, Baba Amte, not only in the development of that organization, but in the transnational anti-dam movement and the evolution of the discourse on sustainable development as well. She has assumed the role of spokesperson and leader of the movement, launching marches, hunger strikes, drowning team vigils, and lawsuits, arguing tirelessly for the restoration of both rights and resources to the project affected peoples. She has militated for the withdrawal of funding for the project from international sources. She has also endured arrests and detainments at the hands of outraged authorities and had to go into hiding at one point when authorities attempted to interrupt one of the drowning team vigils. She has testified before numerous inquiries on the failures of the project to inform the people, to plan adequately for resettlement and its overall lack of sustainability. She also became a commissioner when the WCD was formed and in the final report made a final independent comment in which she continued to challenge the reigning model of development as leading to the marginalization of the majority despite any precautions that might be recommended by the commission (WCD 2000: 321-22). In many ways, even though she herself is not threatened with displacement and resettlement, through her commitment to the struggle, including her promise to drown in the rising reservoir if the dam is completed to its planned height, she has come to symbolize resistance to DIDR around the world.

The active roles taken by many women in DIDR resistance movement organization, leadership and action is both the result of and a contributing factor to increasing changes in the status and roles of women in societies all over the world. Much NGO activity has focused on empowering women and improving the economic conditions of women and children within their societies. Out of this general movement the participation of women, particularly as voices calling on the conscience of the developers to consider the impact of projects on the least powerful sectors of society, has been one of many social changes that DIDR resistance has both gained from and furthered.

The Project Scale of Action

The quality of the resettlement project itself may play a major role in the decision to accept or resist DIDR (Chambers 1970). DIDR projects are really about reconstructing communities after they have been materially destroyed and socially traumatized to varying degrees. Reconstructing community is an idea that needs to be approached with a certain humility and realism about the limits of our capacities. Such humility and realism have not characterized the planners of DIDR projects to any major extent to date. Communities do not construct or reconstruct themselves; they evolve. Reconstructing a community means attempting to replace through administrative routine an evolutionary process in which social, cultural, economic and environmental interactions arrived at through trial and error and deep experiential knowledge develop, enabling a population to achieve an imperfect but functioning mutually sustaining social coherence and material sustenance over time.

The idea that such a process could be the outcome of planning is ambitious, to say the least. Many DIDR resisters maintain that adequate and just resettlement is impossible from the outset, leaving total opposition to the project as the only strategic option. Other resisters do admit the possibility of adequate and just resettlement and commit themselves to achieving that goal. One of the best outcomes that might be imagined for DIDR projects is to work out a system in which people can materially sustain themselves while they themselves begin the process of social reconstruction. However, if the level of impoverishment experienced by most resettled peoples is any indicator, even adequate systems of material reproduction are beyond either the will or the capabilities of most contemporary policymakers and planners. Projects almost inevitably have generated high levels of impoverishment, dissatisfaction and often resistance, even after resettlement has taken place.

When national resettlement policy is inferior or non-existent, DIDR resistance at the project level may become a means to improve policies at a national level. The support of international allies will be crucial in such cases (Cernea 1993: 32). In a sense, the project constitutes the projection of state ambitions into the local context, restructuring it toward government priorities and goals. Moreover, people facing DIDR projects often consider the project as an expression of what their government thinks of them. The poor, the marginalized, and ethnic minorities harbor few illusions about their place in the scheme of things, but DIDR projects and the often disparaging attitudes of personnel toward the people to be resettled simply confirm to them the disdain in which they are held. An Adivasi villager protests the way the tribal peoples are being treated by Sardar Sarovar project:

“We cannot be treated like monkeys on trees, who will simply climb up to a high plane when the water rises.” (Patel 1995: 185).

After resettlement by the Bargi Dam on the Narmada River, Mrs. Ram Dai, an Adivasi woman who now lives in a slum spoke of the way she feels the authorities see her:

“Why didn’t they just poison us? Then we wouldn’t have to live in this shit-hole and the government could have survived alone with its precious dam all to itself” (as quoted by Roy 1999).

Although difficult to assess exactly, it is not farfetched to attribute a significant proportion of DIDR resistance to the appallingly bad baseline research, planning, and implementation of resettlement projects. Much of this social and environmental research has been purely pro forma, designed to validate decisions already taken at the political level to proceed with the project. Even where the research is sound, if design or implementation is faulty, resistance will probably result. In other cases, when local interests so dictate, the goal of resistance is more limited in scope, seeking to improve the terms and conditions of the project rather than halting the project or altering policies at the national level. Here DIDR resistance rejects a bad resettlement project and produces strategies of negotiation to improve the terms and conditions of resettlement, such as better replacement land, increased compensation for losses or increased housing allowances. However, where policy-makers are sensitive, DIDR project protest and resistance can lead to the improvement of poor policy. There is little question that protest over and resistance to specific projects is responsible for the increased attention to the deficiencies in resettlement policy by national authorities, and has contributed to the adoption of guidelines for resettlement projects at the World Bank and other multilateral organizations (Morse and Berger 1992; Gibson 1993; Cernea 1993; Serra 1993; Guggenheim 1993). However, resistance movements that produce policy and project improvements differ from conflicts that emerge during consultation with relocatees during implementation. For example, resistance to government plans to resettle communities for the Aguamilpa and Zimapan projects in Mexico did change national policies, partly because of international pressure, and created the conditions in which participatory planning of resettlement could develop (Guggenheim 1993).

Projects that do not provide relocatees with important roles in design and implementation, which increases their understanding and control over the process, tend either to reduce people to mere dependent pawns or ignite resistance. Vague or poorly organized resettlement plans that are not sensitive to local economic, social, political and cultural patterns will further fuel negative responses and resistance. Despite any authentic quality a resettlement plan may contain, bad implementation in DIDR clearly provokes resistance (Serra 1993). Sound policy and good planning are rare, but where they have occurred, they have often been undermined by poor implementation. In this context DIDR resistance serves as a fund of important information for a specific project and for resettlement policy in general. The record of broken promises, unfulfilled plans, destructive environmental impacts, inadequate or inappropriate compensation, inferior replacement land, or cultural violations in settlement or residential patterns constitutes a tragic litany of error and corruption that has produced profound misery and justifiable anger and resistance (Wali 1989; Serra 1993). Staunch resistance to DIDR will result after resettlement is underway if schemes oblige people to radically alter culturally important aspects of their lives. In the final analysis, resettlement projects must be well designed and communicated, affording resettlees with some control and understanding of their circumstances if they are to have any chance at effectively reducing the impacts of DIDR (Cernea 1988: 15). Some, in fact, argue very convincingly that positive, productive resettlement schemes are

extremely difficult to achieve, even under the best of circumstances, and inevitably promote cultural disintegration (Chernela 1988: 20). The record of resettlement projects offers little to contradict that argument and tends to vindicate the protests and resistance of resettles.

The National Scale of Action

The national scale of action involves the two major institutions that develop projects that require DIDR: the state and the private sector. In confronting each of these institutions, DIDR resistance movements that are project or locally specific have been known to evolve into national entities themselves. In the cases where the state initiates the project, and seeks political support and financing, it generally contracts with the private sector for actual construction. In the case of the large infrastructural projects that require DIDR, the corporations that undertake construction may be either national or multinational. These corporations generally have an important stake in seeing the continuation of policies that require such projects and may be relatively insensitive to arguments to the contrary.

Ethnic or class differences between state and project personnel and local people often complicate the relationship between local contexts and the state in resettlement contexts (Colson 1971; Zaman 1982; Wali 1989; Bartolomé and Barabas 1990; Oliver-Smith 1991). In some cases a secondary and somewhat covert goal of resettlement is actually the control and integration of ethnic minorities and resistance will be expressed in terms of defense of ethnicity as well as territory (Zaman 1982). However, the state is not a monolithic structure. It is composed of different agencies, departments, and ministries that may have competing agendas. Similarly, the personnel of those state entities are not always of uniform class, ethnic or regional origin. DIDR resisters may find sympathetic individuals and supportive entities within the apparatus of the state. For example, state governments in Brazil supported the resistance to dams to be constructed by ELETROSUL and the Environmental Ministry Working Group sided with the NBA against the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.

The availability of political rights, such as that of speech or assembly, condition the possibility and kind of political space for DIDR resistance (Magee 1989; Bartolomé 1992; Robinson 1992). Brazil in the 1960s had a repressive military regime that provided little opportunity for resistance during the construction of the Sobradinho and Itaipu projects. In the late 1970s and 1980s the Brazilian political system “opened” and with the return to electoral politics strong national level resistance movements were created and captured sufficient political power to negotiate with relocation authorities alternatives to or cancellations of projects requiring DIDR (Bartolomé 1992:21; Fisher, W.H. 1994). Brazilian DIDR resistance movements with national and international allies have broadened their agenda to include a critique of overall development policy, urging more sustainable alternatives (Turner 1991b; Fisher, W.H. 1995; Rothman and Oliver 1999).

DIDR resistance generally is part of a broad national front of human rights and environmental movements that exert pressure for change in civil and political rights policies, militating against expressions that the disappearance of “inferior” cultures is an expected outcome of the development process (Fisher, W.F. 1995). DIDR resistance movements among different groups facing resettlement in Mexico have openly confronted the national government and the Comision Federal de Electricidad with questions regarding inhumane long-held policies toward indigenous

peoples. DIDR resistance movements in various locations in Mexico are part of an array of interests that have produced an epochal change in national politics with the defeat of the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI) that ruled for more than 70 years.

Information and National Politics in DIDR Resistance

The importance of the media to movements resisting DIDR in documenting and publicizing the processes through which much DIDR is carried out and the impacts that it has on the lives of people cannot be understated. Accurate and timely information is essential to the struggles of people in resisting DIDR to formulate appropriate strategies and tactics, but also in communicating the challenges they face and the conditions they suffer to others. In this effort, the role of the print and visual media is indispensable.

Resistance movements have also made great use of the media in struggles against DIDR. The Kayapo became acquainted with visual media when the anthropologist Terry Turner in his long-term fieldwork with the Kayapo made a number of ethnographic films for the BBC in the 1970s (1991a). They further understood that if they had some control over how they were represented, their own power in dealing with the outside world would be greatly enhanced. Thus, Kayapo individuals have become skilled videographers of their own culture and of their interactions with Brazilians in resisting resettlement. Whether made by the people themselves or by others, film and video in particular have become important tools in the struggles against DIDR around the world, depicting the destruction visited upon people and their struggles to resist both projects and displacement and disseminating those images and facts widely. Films and videos documenting DIDR struggles and disasters have been made in Mexico (Robinson n.d.), the Philippines (Schradie and DeVries 2000), India (Singh Foundation n.d.), and Brazil, as well as several addressing multiple national situations (IRN n.d.) to name but a few examples.

Information technology, greatly facilitating the dissemination of both the printed word and still and moving images, has become an essential feature of the DIDR resistance. The increasing access of wider publics to the internet has made the websites of NGOs, social movements and GROs, as well as the networks formed among them and their constituents a key feature of struggles of those resisting DIDR. Websites offer visitors prepared information and visual packages about DIDR struggles in specific countries, around specific development forms or involving specific institutions. Visitors can find out how to contribute support for these struggles, influence policy, send letters to appropriate authorities, order more information and offer their own ideas through bulletin boards (Weeks 1999:20).

Moreover, the internet becomes not only a medium for the communication of information, but also a means for participation. One of the most significant aspects of information technology for “electronic politics” or cyberactivism is the speed with which it transmits information and consequently the speed and level of organization of response that the information elicits globally. Indeed, such is the speed with which information is now disseminated that central governments are sometimes among the last to learn of events and are forced into a reactive posture by national and international DIDR allies. Often the initiatives developed by these allies take the form of “cascades” that indicates a strategy in which an action taken by one member of a network is rapidly communicated to all others who reproduce it, initiating a virtual wave of events and messages that

can overwhelm the policy process (Kumar 1996:20). The linkages among websites and listservers representing many different interests enable a single individual or group to connect with and inform many thousands of people over the entire world with one message.

However, authoritarian regimes with diminished freedom of speech, the press and the internet generally reduce the amount of political space available for presenting resisters' causes to the public (Khagram 1999). National and regional authorities, usually appointed by the executive or, at best, rubber stamp legislatures, tend also to be less responsive to constituents' interests, particularly if they run counter to national agendas. Furthermore, the relatively unrestrained capability in the use of force in authoritarian regimes also reduces the strategic options of DIDR resistance groups. In the case of the authoritarian Marcos regime in the Philippines, violent methods and the alliance of resisters with a guerrilla movement became necessary because of the unresponsiveness and oppressive tactics of the government when local peoples protested the planned construction of a series of dams on the Chico River (Drucker 1985; Hilhorst 2000).

Increasingly today, national and state governments are giving way to private sector development interests in the planning, financing and construction of large infrastructural projects. Private sector development interests can be national, international or multinational. The very mobility and anonymity of private sector capital make it difficult to isolate as belonging to national or international levels of action. Furthermore, private sector driven DIDR presents a different set of challenges to resistance movements because corporations are not subject to the same restraints and guidelines imposed by multilateral lenders that states are. That is, resistance movements can challenge the state to live up to guidelines for resettlement agreed upon as terms of the loan. With private sector development, despite apparent attention to guidelines, there is generally little evidence that corporate compliance with international human rights standards and development policies and procedures is forthcoming, despite intense media campaigns pledging respect for environments and cultures (Feeney 2000). NGOs and DIDR resistance movements have undertaken selected campaigns to boycott the products of companies involved directly in DIDR projects or indirectly through funding guarantees (IRN 2000c).

The International Scale of Action

DIDR resistance movements have participated increasingly in global dialogues on development policy as well as changes in practice in specific institutions. DIDR resistance movements and their NGO allies were among those who pressured successfully for the establishment of the World Commission on Dams, the final report of which vindicated a great many of the claims made by resisters over the years. In this sense, DIDR resistance movements are important contributors to what many see as a fundamental transition in the terms of global development discourse.

For many years, in the World Bank and other development institutions financing large infrastructural projects involving resettlement, the costs of large-scale development projects were calculated in economic terms and the resettlement associated with the projects was generally underfunded, poorly-staffed and haphazardly planned in the borrower nations constructing the projects. Social impacts of such projects were deemed to be negligible or unavoidable. Greater interest in the Bank in projects addressing the alleviation of rural poverty emerged, shifting the emphasis toward

social impacts (Shihata 1993). This shift was due to the intensity of rural protest and resistance as well as the public embarrassment of the Bank at catastrophic consequences of resettlement by development projects it had funded. Large multilateral development banks are not monolithic structures. Like national governments, MDBs are complex, internally diverse organizations, composed of individuals and groups with particular specialties and interests. DIDR resisters at all levels can find sympathizers and allies in their struggles within MDBs. The results of the efforts of individuals within MDBs can be seen in the creation of guidelines for resettlement of such MDBs as the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Although these guidelines recommend that DIDR be avoided where possible, they are developed clearly within the framework of the model of development that necessitates such large-scale projects.

The exposure of project failures and their impacts in the media created pressure for the formulation of a set of resettlement policy guidelines within the Bank (c.f. Rich 1994). The result was Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement calling for minimizing resettlement, an improvement or restoration of living standards, earning capacity and production levels, resettlee participation in project activities, a resettlement plan, and valuation and compensation for assets lost (World Bank 1990:1-2). When problems with projects continued, the Bank advocated the formulation and implementation of resettlement legislation in borrower nations, producing policy changes in such nations as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, and other development agencies such as the OECD, and the IDB (Cernea 1993: 32; Shihata 1993). However, a number of nations have seen the O.D. 4.30 guidelines as an infringement on national sovereignty. Furthermore, adoption of formal policies, either by the World Bank or borrower nations, is no assurance of adequate implementation. Furthermore, the degree to which projects financed by private capital must adhere to these and now modified guidelines and procedures established by the bank is far from clear. The World Bank commissioned independent report on Narmada Sardar Sarovar project in India (Morse and Berger 1992) recommending cessation of the project pending major improvements in environmental and social monitoring and implementation, resulted in rejection of further World Bank funding of the project by the government of India. Recent efforts to alter the guidelines of O.D. 4.30, seen by human rights and environmental groups as attempts to weaken safeguards, particularly for indigenous peoples, were responded to with an internet and letter campaign of protest.

DIDR resistance has influenced change within the World Bank. Resisters and their allies in NGOs and social movements have succeeded in communicating their position, backed by solid documentation, through declarations at numerous international meetings and conferences for many years, including most recently the Manibeli declaration of 1994, the Curitiba declaration at the First International Meeting of Dam Affected Peoples in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997, and the Walker Creek Declaration at the International Seminar on Strategies for Dam Decommissioning in 1998. NGOs also continue with their Multilateral Development Bank Campaign, putting pressure on national donors of funds to banks to withhold funds for the dams and other projects that displace people against their will.

NGOs have severely criticized the performance of MDBs and other international agencies in DIDR projects with the aim of reforming their internal guidelines and policies to which they can then be held accountable. Activists and scholars keep close watch on policy formulation in these institutions to guard against the dilution or weakening of any policy relating to DIDR. Of particular concern is the fact that the International Financial Corporation and Multilateral Investment

Guarantee Agency guidelines for projects are less strict and comprehensive than the World Bank's Operational Directive (Khagram 1999: 307; Fox and Brown 1998).

Grass roots organizations, NGOs and social movements involved in resistance to DIDR have also acquired or developed legal personnel, expertise and general knowledge that enable them to sue projects for violation of national civil and human rights law as well as international accords. The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights to Development, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, the articles of the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples all provide articles and protocols that can be used to portray projects in violation of human rights on the international stage (Johnston 2000).

DIDR resistance movements have emerged in an era of extraordinary organized social action. The emergence of non-governmental organizations and electronic information technology have been two important vehicles by which DIDR resistance as well as many other social and environmental concerns have been able to make inroads into the development agenda. Through multiple organizational forms and operating at multiple levels from the local to the wider regions of global political discourse, DIDR resistance has been able to insert its concerns into more public venues, drawing of greater support and developing greater influence in wider contexts of power. The concerns that these organized forms of resistance address range from the defense of local rights to the rejection of development measured purely in economic terms to questions of global human rights and environmental sustainability. Each level may focus on particular concerns but is capable of action to address all concerns inclusively as well. The multiplicity of organizational forms and levels of action inevitably involve tensions and problems of coherence, consistency, and contradiction for all participants in the struggles against DIDR. However, thus far, the coherence between grass-roots communities, cooperating NGOs, national social movements and transnational networks has been sufficient to gain the rights to sit at the negotiating table for many projects of national scale and enough political and social power to influence the policies of multilateral development organizations

XI. THE RESULTS OF DIDR RESISTANCE

Since DIDR resistance movements frequently confront vastly more powerful forces, either the state or major concentrations of private capital, there may be considerable costs involved. At the most basic and most profound level, there can be serious personal risks in resisting. Regardless of the democratic or authoritarian character of governments, resisters risk bodily harm or death in certain circumstances. DIDR resistance leaders have been murdered by both agents of the state and private mercenaries. In Guatemala in 1982 about 400 Maya Achi men, women and children from communities resisting resettlement for the Chixoy Dam were killed by military and paramilitary forces (Colajacomo 1999:68). Beatings and detentions for indeterminate periods of time without due process are also among the risks of resistance. Ethnic, religious, caste or class prejudices may also buttress to the ideological justification for such abuse.

There may also be considerable economic costs to resistance. Resistance has opportunity costs. Economically, resistance requires the mobilization and expenditure of labor and other

resources in novel ways, diverting time, energy, and resources from other important tasks and stressing communities that may already be pressured to meet normal needs. Resistance requires human and economic resources for organization, communication, and mobilization, few of which may be actually present in sufficient surpluses in project-affected regions to underwrite the costs of resistance. Where resettlement is already underway, resisters may run the risk of exclusion from benefits that people who have accepted resettlement receive. Resisters can become scapegoats for inadequate state support.

Successful resistance may appear to have some political and economic costs in terms of long-term relationships with sectors that supported the development project. Resistance may create problematic relations with local and regional elements of local power and/or authority structures that might have benefited from the project's success. The defeat of a dam planned for the state of Guerrero in Mexico has assured the Nahuatl people of remaining on their land. However, it would appear that one of the costs of their victory is forgoing future state development assistance. Despite the fact that the resisting communities fall within a zone targeted for federal aid for the marginalized, they have received no federal assistance in ten years (Garcia 2000).

Failure to halt a development project does not always mean that positive outcomes are not forthcoming. Failed resistance efforts can be successful if they succeed in improving the terms and conditions of resettlement. When resistance escalates, it increases project costs, in direct outlays, in delays, in bad publicity and political credibility with donor agencies. If resistance activities threaten to increase the costs sufficiently, resisters can gain bargaining space to improve the terms and conditions of resettlement. In effect, mere participation in resistance movements can bring clear benefits. Particularly resistance movements that emerge from local responses and require the participation of local people provide invaluable experience in dealing with outside agencies and institutions. For groups that have historically been ignored or marginalized by the state and its agencies, resistance movements provide a form of political socialization in which local people become much more acquainted with state agencies and bureaucracies and their procedures. The acquisition of allies may make available other resource pools, injecting new skills, technology and access to specialized economic resources into the local context. These kinds of skills at the local level become very important for continued dealings with the state.

If resistance is successful in at least helping to stop a project, retaining control over land and remaining in one's home environment are major positive outcomes for the local group. However, the validation of the perspective and effort that project cancellation signifies for the resisting group takes on special significance as well. Successful resistance constitutes a form of self-affirmation that can serve as a stimulus leading to a florescence of local culture and greater local autonomy. The demands that resistance movements voice for greater citizen participation in decision-making, for access to information and for respect for civil and political liberties can also signify progress toward a more responsive and representative society.

From the perspective of NGOs, social movement allies and transnational networks, stopping the project is a major goal in itself, but not the end of the game. Stopping the project is just one battle in a war with many fronts against certain models or approaches to development and the institutions associated with them. Once a project is halted, local NGOs may continue to work with the communities, while international organizations may move on to engage the next battle. The

experience of the anti-dam movement over the last thirty years has proven instructive in the struggle to alter approaches to development. The milestone meetings of dam affected people from around the world and their declarations of Manibeli and Curitiba representing a global mobilization through networking and external support as well as the validation of many of its arguments and contentions by the Morse Report and the World Commission on Dams will serve as major examples for resistance to other forms of unsustainable and undemocratic development.

XII. CONCLUSION

Resistance to DIDR in most cases constitutes a clear expression of a sense of real or potential injury and loss of rights. In any given context, there may be individuals who attach themselves to resistance movements because they see the potential for personal gain, but most participants associate themselves with resistance movements for more complex motives. Regardless of the specific issues being contested in a given case, people resist because they recognize that certain basic rights that they consider legitimate are being abridged. Principal among these rights is the right of self-determination, the right, as defined and as it exists within local conditions, to control one's own life and future. The threat of DIDR amounts to the potential loss of the right of self-determination, in effect, the loss of relative control over self and community (Scudder and Colson 1982). Although the degree of control over conditions is always partial in the best of circumstances, DIDR creates a "...community which does not effectively control its own affairs...and in which a feeling of powerlessness is pervasive" or, as Kushner terms it, "an administered community"(1988: 29).

Resistance to DIDR then must be considered as a form of legitimate expression of the defense of the right of self-determination as well as a defense of land, religion or identity. People also reject the loss of autonomy and the extreme form of political domination that resettlement both signifies and enacts and their resistance questions whether resettlement can ever be development or empowering. Their resistance is, in some fundamental form, an act of self-empowerment, however permanent or temporary that may be. In that process of self-empowerment resisters at all levels speak directly to power holders and policymakers. The messages they seek to communicate are not difficult to understand, but do require a perspective that is capable of re-evaluating often deeply embedded suppositions about the nature, quality and scale of the development process, forms of governance and power sharing, and minority-majority relations.

- The legitimacy of the right of the state to relocate people and appropriate property with or without compensation, must be re-examined.
- Appropriate and just forms and levels of compensation must be determined in consultation with affected people. Outside standards employed to establish levels and forms of compensation will not be appropriate unless approved in full consultation with the people to be resettled.
- If development is to become a democratic process, local rights must be recognized. Development projects are felt first at the local level.
- Development must be defined qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Development defined qualitatively includes the freedom to define local priorities democratically. Development

projects must therefore include the authentic participation of local people in strategic planning and implementation.

- Resistance speaks of local needs and priorities.
- People with deep local knowledge are often better at predicting DIDR outcomes than external experts. Respect local knowledge as a source for viable, less destructive alternatives.
- Resistance speaks clearly about project deficiencies. Project problems do not originate with people and are not the resettled people's fault.
- The method and focus of decision-making must shift from purely economic criteria to more dialogic forms of participatory decision-making.
- Resistance is a rejection the dominant society's cultural construction of the poor, of ethnic minorities, of peasants as incapable, powerless and unworthy of consideration.
- Resisters join with others in seeking to democratize their societies.
- If national purpose is the justification for development projects, then national purpose has to be defined pluralistically and projects have to be demonstratively inclusive. A national purpose that requires only sacrifices from the least able to absorb them for the benefit of those who least need them is authoritarian, regardless of the supposed democratic character of the regime.
- Resistance in effect is a demand for accountability and responsibility from government, from development agencies, and from multilateral development banks for actions taken in the name of social policy and development.

The role DIDR resistance movements are now taking in the broader realms of global political discourse may start at local levels, but in many cases soon becomes part of a larger, movement for both redressing the human rights abuses that occur in DIDR as well as altering contemporary development policy and practice. There are obvious points of tension that can occur between a population threatened with resettlement that resists to gain a better negotiating position for better resettlement conditions and allies at other levels who may have more systemic goals, reaching beyond the local context to question the dominant models of development. For local communities involved in resistance, embracing such far-reaching goals requires the realization of a coincidence of interests and the construction of shared meanings, a common ideological basis for undertaking action in collaboration with others, often distant socio-culturally, economically, and geographically from them. Local resistance dramas "in the shadow land...at the outer edge of the realm of politics..." thus may become internationalized and participants in the changing arena of global political culture (Falk 1983: 25 as quoted in Wilmer 1993: 39; Fisher W.F.1995).

The major challenge within DIDR resistance is maintaining the coherence between the agendas, goals and discourses of the participants at all levels of the struggle. There will never be perfect coherence or perfect articulation, but enough political consistency has been achieved thus far

to significantly alter the terms of debate in the field of international development toward greater recognition of human rights and environmental sustainability. When the local dramas of resistance to resettlement are cast in national debates attracting the attention of national and international NGOs and multilateral and international institutions, they become active participants in a larger global dialogue. In effect, resistance to resettlement is helping to reframe the entire contemporary debate on development, the environment and human rights, a debate that shows considerable signs of expanding and of gaining increasing relevance to both national development and human rights policy as well as international standards.

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