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**Toward local development and mitigating impoverishment in
development-induced displacement and resettlement**

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BACKGROUND

This paper is an abridged version of a desk study completed in September 2001. This study was produced as part of a wider research programme on Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement organized by the Refugee Studies Centre and coordinated by Prof. Chris de Wet, Department of Anthropology, Rhodes University, South Africa. The coordinators are grateful to the United Kingdom Department for International Development for their generous support of these projects.

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Toward Local Development and Mitigating Impoverishment in Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement

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INTRODUCTION

The number of people displaced by programs promoting national, regional and local development is substantial. The most commonly cited number is approximately 10 million people per year (Cernea 2000:11). Numbers are significant in large countries like China or India, but impact can also be great when fewer are resettled. In many African countries, although the numbers displaced are lower, the proportion of the population affected by development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) can be high (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:14).

Development projects leading to involuntary displacement include urban relocation and renovation, and water and transport infrastructure. In rural areas, forestry projects, mining, biosphere reserves, and national parks can displace people. Road and other infrastructure may require urban, suburban, peri-urban, or rural relocation. Perhaps the best studied examples of DIDR are dams, which displace people from the reservoir and disrupt social systems and ecosystems upstream and downstream. Large dams have been increasingly called into question by environmentalists, human rights advocates, and other development practitioners. In the future, it is likely that the numbers of people relocated by dams will constitute a diminishing proportion of the displaced, while the proportion required to resettle by other kinds of initiatives, especially urban ones, will increase. It is unclear whether our understanding of DIDR, drawn disproportionately from the dam experience, is relevant for other types of resettlement.

For a long time, it has been clear that those displaced by DIDR have usually not benefitted. Instead, they are more often impoverished, losing economic, social, and cultural resources. National governments typically have justified DIDR by invoking the larger goals of national growth and development. The belief that the greater good could justify loss has been questioned by development practitioners, human rights advocates, and funders. Some have questioned whether large-scale development projects ever offer just development, while others have argued that impoverishment can be mitigated or avoided by careful planning that includes development initiatives for the affected.

This study is situated in this problematic. We already know a great deal about the impoverishment caused by DIDR. The effects of resettlement have been documented and studied systematically for at least 30 years as analysts have looked for regularities in order to improve future resettlement initiatives (Chambers 1969; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Scudder 1981). The most recent and formalized approach to improving resettlement is Cernea's (2000) risks and reconstruction model, which delineates eight major risks leading to impoverishment and pinpoints actions to avoid or mitigate them, creating development opportunities.

Knowledge about avoiding impoverishment has been codified in guidelines. Here

the World Bank led the way, promulgating an initial policy in 1980. Versions of its guidelines were later adopted by the OECD, other international organizations, and some countries (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000). Although guidelines have been instrumental in improving outcomes, displacement and resettlement continue to be problematic.

Why, indeed, have guidelines failed to transform resettlement experiences? To answer this question, this study has used published sources, grey literature, and my own first-hand experience of resettlement at Manantali (Mali).¹ The literature reflects the perspectives of many stakeholders: donors, national governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academic analysts, and suggests reasons why DIDR continues to cause problems. The first section looks at some of the early approaches to analysis. It then presents the most recent formulation of Cernea's risks and reconstruction model and the World Bank guidelines.

The second section addresses gaps in existing policy and theory. Existing approaches tend to concentrate on economic and social aspects of resettlement, overlooking the distribution of societal power and ignoring crucial conflicts of interest among different stakeholders. The first step in 'doing resettlement as development' is to define development to take into account distribution of power as well as resources. Secondly, much of existing policy and theory was generated in the context of large dams; much less attention has been given to non-hydropower resettlement. In particular, urban resettlement, also quite extensive, poses distinctive issues. A third major gap flows from an emphasis on public-sector projects; resettlement theory and policy have not addressed to any significant degree the problems posed by private-sector DIDR. Although as governments cut back, many activities that involve DIDR use private companies in some way.

The third section looks at the ability of resettlement programs to address economic and power issues. It first identifies places where improvements have occurred: social welfare, growing recognition of the importance of social capital as well as secure land access, attempts to make compensation more equitable and useful, and avoiding unnecessary resettlement. The second part identifies areas where risks are known but resettlement practice remains problematic. Economic resources such as jobs and common property continue to be insufficiently addressed as does the use of multiple economic resources. Urban resettlement and its distinctive aspects need to be assessed. More attention needs to be given to conflicting interests within resettled populations; these may arise from gender, age, class positions, ethnic identification, educational level, occupation, etc. Finally, although the impacts on those not physically displaced have been recognized, they are rarely taken systematically into account.

The fourth section looks at how to improve theory, policy, and practice so that resettlement ensures greater equity and growth. After considering ways to broaden access to economic resources, the section concentrates on the implications of including power issues and understanding the larger political-economic environment that frames DIDR. Of

¹I was a member of the design team for this project (USAID 1984), served as senior social-science advisor during implementation, participated in an end-of-project evaluation (Diarra et al. 1994), and carried out research on later effects (Diarra et al. 1995, Koenig and Diarra 1998a, 1998b).

practical import are giving resettled communities some kind of 'official' status, integrating resettlers into ongoing development and social welfare initiatives, and finding strategies to deal with socio-cultural diversity and potential conflicts of interest. Practical and theoretical rationales favor a more democratic approach to planning and resettlement.

A final concluding section discusses the potential problems involved in moving from an economic approach to a more explicitly political-economic one. These include the move to a more participatory, incremental style of planning and project implementation, the need to create options for resettlers, the personnel needed for projects, ways to meet increased costs of enhanced resettlement programs, and further research needs.

1. THE IMPACTS OF INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT

This section looks at the growth of social science understanding about the impacts of involuntary resettlement. Early piecemeal attempts to improve results were followed by more systematic analyses. It ends with recent attempts to codify these understandings in a theory of practice (Cernea's risks and reconstruction model) and in policy (the World Bank guidelines).

1.1 The negative consequences of DIDR

Planners soon discovered that simply moving people out of areas of infrastructure projects caused problems unless something was done for those relocated. Many early projects had plans to make economic resources available to the resettled and social scientists to look after their welfare. Some countries introduced legislation on displacement and relocation.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, United States) approached relocation with the goal of avoiding damage to the economic status and social environment of communities (Satterfield 1937). Agricultural extension agents helped families locate farms for sale, appraised their value, and advised on appropriate farm strategies in the new sites. Supplemental services were available to those with mental or physical disabilities. Developing countries tried to improve resettlement as well. In Mexico, the Papaloapan Dam Resettlement (1949-52) was headed by an anthropologist, who tried to resettle communities as units to retain social and political cohesion. Although cash compensation was the norm, the resettlement agency worked with communities to find land (Partridge, Brown, and Nugent 1982:249). In India, the Hirakud Land Organisation was set up to rehabilitate those displaced by the Hirakud dam (1956). Its goal was to replace land and housing with resettlement colonies well ahead of actual submergence (Baboo 1996:210-212). Compensation was intended to be generous and included community infrastructure. In hindsight, the amount of compensation appears grossly underestimated, but by 1962, the government had paid more than it had planned. When Panama began construction of the Bayano hydroelectric complex, resettlement in 1973-75 was based on recommendations of anthropologists who had studied the Kuna and Embera Indians to be displaced. The resettlement team included an anthropologist and social worker (Wali 1989:55,56).

Resettlement planning was complemented by laws and policies. In 1970, the United States Congress passed the Uniform Relocation Act, which required that every family displaced be re-housed in a comparable dwelling and a comparable, if not more desirable, location (Rubinstein 1988:185). Orissa state (India) created a policy in 1973 to benefit those displaced by the Rengali dam; this was later extended to other projects and improved (Pandey 1998:15).

Despite planning and the participation of social scientists in attempts to improve resettlement, results remained problematic. For example, at Papaloapan, the failure to provide infrastructure, housing, health, and educational resources undermined the efforts to reconstitute livelihoods (Partridge, Brown, and Nugent 1982:250). At Hirakud, only 11% of the displaced chose to live in the resettlement colonies. Planners seemed to have little knowledge of rural life and did not pay sufficient attention to social issues (Baboo 1996:223). At Bayano, there were no plans for the Panamanian colonists, about half the resettled population; since Indians and non-Indians were treated differently, ethnicity became a powerful political force (Wali 1989:150).

Moreover, unanticipated problems arose. At Kariba (Zambia), people lost economic resources. Some had to give up wage work when they were required to work on new housing; many lost stock because the move was done hastily (Colson 1971:46). Many household heads spent for their personal use compensation they had received on behalf of wives and children (Colson 1971:106-11). The people of Chemawawin, relocated to Easterville, Manitoba (Canada) in conjunction with the Grand Rapids dam, faced multiple predicaments: economic suffering, loss of resources, social stress, and disintegration (WalDRAM 1988).

Those already poor were most vulnerable to impoverishment by DIDR. In Orissa (India), the displaced were disproportionately from the 'weaker' sections of society: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other 'backward classes.' Problems linked to poverty included exploitation by landowners, money lenders, bank officials, and lawyers; questionable practices by government officials, petty businessmen, middlemen; and undervaluation of assets (Pandey 1998:65). Cash compensation often led to 'wastage' by the displaced, who spent money on living expenses, to clear their debts, and for marriage and religious ceremonies. The end result was often near destitution.

Early work also pointed to the particular problems of urban resettlement. Perlman's (1982:233) classic work on *favela* removal in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) showed the economic deterioration of urban relocatees. Relocation far from the city center meant more time and expense to get to work and lessened the availability of informal work. Jobs available for women, often in the informal sector, decreased. Yet people needed more income as they now had mortgages. The very announcement of the potential move created stress among potential displacees at the Yacyretá dam (Argentina, Paraguay) as store owners stopped offering credit to customers and landlords evicted tenants in the hope of getting their relocation benefits (Bartolomé 1984:189). Settler organization and state response affected DIDR; relocation in some Rio *favelas* did not occur until the leaders of resistance groups had been arrested (Perlman 1982:231).

DIDR also affected people not actually displaced. Since the 1940s, Montagnais Indians (Canada) lost hunting territories as plants and hydroelectric reservoirs flooded animal habitats or rendered them useless by changes in river flow (Charest 1982:416). Industrialization also led to the growth of urban centers and pressure to develop forests as recreation areas (Charest 1982:423). Sedentarized and proletarianized Montagnais found their traditional livelihoods no longer viable.

Those attempting to understand the continuing problems of DIDR saw that they needed to develop syntheses based on understandings of development and resettlement. Drawing on involuntary (Chambers 1970) and voluntary resettlement (Chambers and Moris 1973), Chambers (1969) proposed a three-stage model (Cernea 2000:14). Drawing again on both voluntary and involuntary resettlement, Scudder (1981) and Scudder and Colson (1982) elaborated a four-stage model. This model emphasized the phases of resettlement: 1) recruitment and settler selection; 2) transition, the initial years of adaptation; 3) potential development, when settlers begin to form communities and invest in economic activities; and 4) handing over and incorporation, the integration of settlers into more effective political units (Scudder and Colson 1982). While the first two phases were virtually always part of the resettlement experience, the latter two were more problematic. Phases 3 and 4 were not inevitable and could occur in any order, but Scudder seemed to find phase 4 more problematic than phase 3, especially in situations closely supervised by government authorities. This model drew on general development theory as well as on resettlement experiences, e.g., the importance of forward and backward linkages for successful farm production. It stressed the importance of regional growth and drew on contemporary models of integrated rural development.

Other approaches to improving resettlement also drew from contemporary thinking about development. This was particularly evident in the attempts to improve outcomes for the James Bay Cree (Canada). When social scientists working in Cree villages in 1971 heard rumors about the James Bay project, they helped the Cree to get funds for a general meeting and they persuaded Richard Salisbury to protest to the Quebec government about the absence of environmental and social impact studies (Salisbury 1986:152-3). When the McGill University department of anthropology was asked to do the social impact work, they drew on concerns for indigenous autonomy. They insisted on a partnership between themselves and the Cree, which provided a framework for the Cree to organize and reconstitute their livelihoods (Salisbury 1986). Salisbury (1986) considered the James Bay resettlement a success, but unanticipated problems did appear. One Cree chief claimed that they had wanted the best of both worlds, but got the worst (McCutcheon 1991:122).

The 1980s saw attempts to delineate the particularities of DIDR. One of the first volumes on resettlement brought together information on refugees, those suffering from natural disasters, and relocatees (Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). Synthesis continued; Scudder and Colson's model was criticized for being insufficiently comprehensive and confounding involuntary and voluntary resettlement. Some argued for a model focused uniquely on involuntary resettlement which would outline processes and also predict impacts and provide a guide to action. Within this context, Cernea (2000) proposed the risks and reconstruction model to predict and diagnose the major problems of involuntary resettlement and offer suggestions for problem resolution and further research.

Cernea was simultaneously influential in crafting the World Bank guidelines for involuntary resettlement. The first policy was created in 1980; it was reformulated in 1986 and again in 1990. By codifying existing knowledge, these guidelines have made the problems of DIDR more visible and shown ways to mitigate them. The World Bank's response to the problems of DIDR and Cernea's more theoretical work galvanized further academic research (Cernea and Guggenheim 1993; McDowell 1996a; Mathur and Marsden 1998; Cernea and McDowell 2000).

The next section looks at Cernea's risks and reconstruction model, now the major framework for understanding DIDR impacts; it then turns to the World Bank guidelines. Because of Cernea's (1991) involvement in creating these guidelines, the two are linked.

1.2 The risks and reconstruction model

Cernea has developed a theoretical model that explains the causes of impoverishment (risks) and the ways these risks can be addressed to reconstitute livelihoods (reconstruction). Eight primary risks are linked in three separate ways. First, as causes of impoverishment, they influence one another. For example, health problems caused by resettlement can exacerbate economic problems. Second, the risks and the actions to address them are linked; if landlessness is a problem, this can be addressed by providing land. Third, mitigating the different risks can work synergistically to reconstitute more sustainable future livelihoods (Cernea 2000). The eight risks group into three: economic, socio-cultural, and social-welfare risks.

1.2.1 Economic issues

The economic risk is the loss of resources to earn a viable living and reproduce the next generation. Cernea discussed three major economic resources: land, common property, and jobs. Land for production is most crucial when people have land-based production systems. Loss of common property is important where people gain a significant part of their production from a common or an open-access resource. The poor are especially likely to depend on common property resources. Joblessness will be confronted by those who lose employment. Commutes may become too long or firms may fold because of DIDR. The self-employed may lose sources of raw materials or clientele.

Tenure issues affect people's ability to reconstitute livelihoods. Many long-term land users do not have legal titles. In rural areas, this may include those with customary tenure, as well as 'squatters' or 'encroachers.' In urban areas, rapid urban growth has often led to spontaneous neighborhoods where residents are deemed squatters. While it is now generally recognized that long-term 'squatters' should receive compensation, it is often difficult to discriminate between them and free-riders who enter the area to get rights to new land. Common property is often of ambiguous tenure status and governments are often reluctant to allot land to groups rather than individuals.

People often face multiple economic risks. The poor in particular often use multiple productive resources to make ends meet. Therefore, many displaced face two or all three economic risks simultaneously. Resettlement initiatives need to consider complex combinations of resource replacement.

Replacement of economic resources needs to focus on replacing assets, not just incomes. A displaced farmer loses not only the income from a crop at the time of displacement, but the asset (land) that will allow production in the future. Compensation for asset loss needs to be at replacement cost, not market value (Cernea 1996a:26).

Since loss of productive capacity is a major cause of impoverishment, the reconstitution of productive resources has been the heart of livelihood reconstitution strategies. However, reconstituting productive resources does not directly lead to meaningful lives.

1.2.2 Socio-cultural issues

Human beings are part of social and cultural systems that give meaning to their lives. When displacement weakens or dismantles social networks and life-support mechanisms, local authority systems collapse and groups lose their capacity for self-management (Downing 1996:34). This can cause social disarticulation, the dispersion and fragmentation of existing communities, and loss of reciprocity networks, increasing powerlessness, dependence, and vulnerability (Cernea 2000:30). Social disarticulation is especially common when existing social groups cannot resettle together, but may also occur when existing groups lose their ability to act effectively in a new context.

Marginalization is an individualized process that occurs when families or individuals experience downward mobility, primarily because resettlement may bring a loss of control over physical space, and new environments where existing knowledge and skills are less useful (Oliver-Smith 1996:78; Downing 1996:36). Economic marginality can lead to social or psychological marginality (Cernea 2000:26). Entire ethnic groups may lose status if they become incorporated at the bottom of national stratification systems. Both social disarticulation and marginalization can be mitigated by resettlement strategies that emphasize the reconstruction of communities and social networks and deliberately pursue strategies of social cohesion (Cernea 2000:40). The building of education and skills that allow people to use new resources is needed to combat marginalization (Mahapatra 1999a).

DIDR introduces the possibility for some groups to increase power and access to resources. At the national level, powerful national groups may pursue strategies that allow them to increase control. Power struggles between immigrants and local residents may arise when DIDR provides an elite with the opportunity to realize political goals. Scudder (1996:65,66) cited the struggles between Mauritanian black and white Moors downstream of the Manantali dam (Mali), land grabs on the Juba River in Somalia, and attempts to use the Mahaweli irrigation project to divide Sri-Lankan Tamil speakers. The ability of local groups to use resettlement to increase their control has been much more problematic. Unable to maintain control, existing local leaders often lose credibility (Scudder and Colson 1982).

DIDR also offers possibilities to change the distribution of power within the displaced community. Some groups of displaced may not want to reconstruct units and types of social cohesion that disfavored them. In India, lower castes sometimes chose to

resettle apart from upper-caste neighbors (Mahapatra 1999a:96) and at Manantali (Mali), hamlets (politically inferior to officially recognized villages) chose to regroup and compete for status and power. Divergent interests between men and women and youth and elders are also common. Downing (1996:44) suggested that because children have not yet completely developed their cultural frameworks, displacement affects them less than adults. Youth, especially young men, may see opportunities for new jobs and favor resettlement.

Internal divisions among relocatees facilitate implicit or explicit divide-and-conquer strategies of the powerful and affect the ability of the displaced to determine and act in group interests. Participatory strategies that assume homogeneity of interests are not likely to work. Strategies to reconstitute cohesive social units and to avoid marginalization need to recognize the diverse interests among resettlers.

The loss of social and cultural resources is significant in and of itself. Individuals create and make meaningful a common identity through their relationships to place and the artifacts they use to define space (Earle 1997). Resettlement disturbs the order created through relationships to space (Downing 1996:35). Tangible evidence of group identity may include social artifacts, such as burial grounds, community and religious shrines and centers. It may also include economic infrastructure that creates a local identity, e.g., a periodic marketplace, bus station, crossroads.

1.2.3 Social-welfare issues

The final three risks are social-welfare risks: homelessness and lack of shelter, food insecurity, and increased morbidity and mortality caused by stress and environmental change. Over the short-term, these humanitarian issues can be dealt with using existing approaches similar to the aftermath of natural disasters. They require the mobilization of significant resources over a relatively short time.

Homelessness can be dealt with by housing construction or provision of construction materials. Food insecurity can be dealt with through food-aid programs. Physical morbidity can be addressed by vaccination and disease prevention programs and the assignment of appropriate medical and mental-health personnel. Many resettlement programs have met the challenges of short-term homelessness, food insecurity, and increased morbidity and mortality successfully. However, because these risks are highly visible and relatively easy to mitigate, many resettlement projects stop after addressing them and do not deal with other risks.

Food insecurity, homelessness, and increased morbidity and mortality may continue over the long-term. Mahapatra (1999b:207) attributed the lack of food 12 years after resettlement at Rengali (India) to the scarcity of wage work, the poverty of the land, the lack of forest produce and lack of access to common property resources. If social welfare risks persist, it is usually because other categories of risk have not been effectively addressed.²

²DIDR can, however, introduce new health problems, e.g., malaria and schistosomiasis in river-basin areas, health risks from pollution in mines or factories (Ault 1989).

1.3 The World Bank guidelines

The World Bank guidelines attempted to put into practice what analysts understood about avoiding impoverishment caused by DIDR. Since their inception some 20 years ago, they have become the standard used to judge the adequacy of resettlement initiatives (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; Gray 1996; Feeney 1998). Having become the policy of a major international organization, the guidelines gained status and force beyond the suggestions of individuals. Social scientists in the World Bank not only understood how DIDR might be improved, but they also understood the Bank's internal organization sufficiently that they had the bureaucratic means to put understanding into practice (Cernea 1991).

The World Bank policy includes the following main points (World Bank 1990). First, avoid or minimize involuntary resettlement through appropriate technical choices. Second, if displacement cannot be avoided, resettlement ought to be conceived and executed as a development program, for which a plan should be prepared. Community participation in planning and implementation ought to be encouraged. Hosts ought to be consulted to encourage integration. Compensation (including land, housing, and infrastructure) ought to be provided to the adversely affected, here customary rights should be taken into account. Assets should be valued at replacement cost. There should be a timely transfer of responsibilities from agencies to settlers to avoid dependency.

Although there has been debate over the guidelines and their utility, many have found them to be of value. When the World Bank reformatted the policy in the late 1990s, the NGO community and other interested parties feared that important safeguards would be lost. At the time this study was written, Operational Policy/Bank Procedure 4.12 had been posted on the World Bank's external web site, was redrafted, and had been forwarded to the Executive Directors for approval (World Bank web site July 2000).

1.4 Conclusion

The simultaneous work by analysts to understand resettlement and by organizations to formulate policies has led to a more constructive framework for avoiding impoverishment in DIDR. Yet there are still serious problems.

Involuntary resettlement is impoverishing because it takes away economic, social, and cultural resources all at the same time. People find it very difficult to plan on their own for this eventuality. Information is often not available, since implementing organizations fear resistance if people know about the impending move. Even when information is available, people often find it difficult to believe.

Involuntary resettlement is also impoverishing because it takes away political power, most dramatically the power to make a decision about where and how to live. It tends to render more powerless those with the fewest economic and political resources. The resettled are often from groups already integrated into national structures on unequal terms, who receive few state services or get them only with difficulty. Those with more political resources are often more able to resist displacement, and the new infrastructure is built in a poorer neighborhood. When wealthier people are displaced, they are more likely to have formal title to lost resources; hence they are more likely to be adequately

compensated. This study argues that resettlement programs have not improved outcomes as much as they could because they have focused on the economic aspects of resettlement while neglecting the political.

Political aspects are not ignored entirely. Cernea (2000:30) has specifically noted that social disarticulation can worsen powerlessness, dependency, and vulnerability. The issue of power relationships is more explicit in Scudder and Colson's (1982) work. The last stage of resettlement, handing over and incorporation, addresses the relationship of the new community to larger political-economic structures, yet the analysis of this stage appears less developed. The McGill University anthropologists did focus on issues of local autonomy and aboriginal rights, but their work has not been significantly used outside of Canada. Understanding the political aspects of societal change and integrating them into planning might improve DIDR.

Questions about the distribution of power, its impact on resource allocation, and the implications for the poor have been central to development debates. While DIDR creates particular problems and issues, some of these may be addressed in reference to more general propositions about economic and social development. DIDR does have unique characteristics, and approaches to mitigating its negative consequences must keep these in mind, but it also has commonalities with other development problematics. Strategies to re-establish livelihoods and viable socio-cultural systems can draw upon general development theory and practice. Work stressing the unique characteristics of DIDR has made issues related to resettlement more visible, but it has limited the ability of DIDR mitigation efforts to draw upon other development knowledge.

2. COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES

DIDR means development-induced displacement and resettlement. Yet are all displacement-inducing activities necessarily 'development'? The World Bank guidelines say that programs for the displaced should be carried out as 'development projects.' By what criteria might a project be construed as development? The most important gap in the literature is lack of explicit consideration of the meaning of development in the context of DIDR.

A second problem is the bias of the literature to river-basin development and dam resettlement. The stress on fragile ecological systems (deWet 2000:8) is particularly linked to river-basin development. The foremost case of those affected but not necessarily displaced by DIDR is "downstreamers," those living downstream from a dam (Scudder 1996:49).

A third is a bias toward publicly planned and implemented development initiatives. Many major resettlement initiatives were and still are state-funded or executed infrastructure projects. However, private-sector projects are done, sometimes in partnership with governments. In urban renewal projects, the state may move people out and provide basic infrastructure like roads, water, and power transmission lines, but economic development may depend on the private sector. In recent years, both the left and right have become more critical of the failures of centralized planning, and many countries

have moved toward more private-sector driven development initiatives. Yet much of the DIDR literature does not explicitly recognize this.³

2.1 Understanding ‘development’

An important contribution of the World Bank guidelines has been to state explicitly that all involuntary resettlement be conceived and executed as development programs to improve the quality of life of those affected (OD 4.30, 3b). Yet much of the DIDR literature does not clearly define development. For example, the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000:2) described development as “sustainable improvement of human welfare ... that is economically viable, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable.” This definition, probably acceptable to many development practitioners, is vague and does not address background issues and controversies. If the goal of resettlement is development, we need discussion of the concept of development, the ways that improvements in human welfare might be discerned, and the controversies and the debates surrounding these issues. These are enormous topics, each with an extensive literature of its own, but they merit discussion.

One of the earliest debates in the development literature concerned the question of who benefits from development initiatives. Many early development projects were planned in the belief that benefits would ‘trickle down’ from those targeted to the rest of the population. This approach was roundly criticized as it became clear that the wealthier often benefitted more (Rapley 1996). Equity of benefits across society came to be an important goal and led to approaches targeting those with greater needs. The concern of many donors in eradicating poverty and targeting development to the least well-off reflects the concern for equity.⁴

The concern for equity is clearly evident in the DIDR literature, e.g. foregrounding the contradiction between increasing ‘national’ welfare and the impoverishment that occurs when the welfare of the displaced is ‘sacrificed’ to this end. While some saw national welfare as a priority in the past, this is no longer considered acceptable.

A second debate is about the relationship between economic growth and other development goals such as environmental sustainability, human and social development, equitable distribution of political power, and protection of basic human rights. Human and social development have been integrated into the models, e.g., the emphasis on reversing social disintegration, marginalization, and increased morbidity and mortality, and the value of education and training. Issues around environmental sustainability have also been important; the World Bank guidelines mandate environmental assessment (OD 4.30, 20). Concerns about host-resettler relations discussed explicitly resource competition with

³Another bias is the lack of comparative analysis of displacement and resettlement in developed and developing countries. This is so despite important literature on urban renewal and refugee resettlement in the United States (Gans 1968; Squires et al. 1987; Nann 1982). Since developing countries are the focus here, this paper will not address this directly.

⁴Some emphasized that equity increased efficiency (e.g., led to greater productivity). Contemporary emphasis on eradicating poverty, human development, basic-needs thresholds, and human rights suggest that equity is now seen as an end in itself.

possible negative environmental consequences. Environmentalists have allied with resettlers to protest against large infrastructure projects.⁵

Human rights issues have been raised by NGOs and analysts. They became important to some international organizations, e.g., the Fourth Lomé Convention, the framework for European Community (EC) aid to developing countries (Barutciski 2000:18). Oxfam (1996a; 1996b) has been particularly active in arguing that EC projects need to respect human rights. A human rights approach is complementary to an equity approach and suggests that the dignity of human life needs to be respected in all projects; basic human rights should not be compromised.

Political perspectives on development are present only at the margins of the DIDR literature (Gibson 1993), although they clearly inform some of those against it (Patkar 2000). As discussed above, the work of Scudder and Colson and that among the Cree was framed by a political-economic perspective. Asch (1982:354), working with Canadian Natives, proposed that true development meant not only an adequate resource base, but also continuity with the past and local political control. A key aspect of development is the ability of locals to control the reproduction of their own institutions. Involuntary resettlement by its very nature disrupts this control.

Political differences exist not only between the displaced and others, but also among different groups of the displaced. Women could be considered better off after resettlement not only if they were better off materially, but also if they were less subordinate to men, had greater control over their own lives, and were more able to act autonomously (Jacobs 1989:161). Resettlement programs need to take into account the divergent interests among those affected by DIDR and the conflicts they may generate.

The different groups affected by DIDR need to develop the capacity to negotiate with one another to resolve conflicts and create development strategies that respect basic human rights and lead to broad improvements in human welfare. This necessarily involves the empowerment of relatively powerless groups so that they can participate effectively. Empowerment has become an explicit goal of development; it is an end in itself, but also a means to increase equity and efficiency.

The inclusion of empowerment as a major goal by the World Bank signals that it has entered the mainstream. The World Bank (2001:33) has found three major strategies to combat poverty: promoting opportunity, enhancing security, and facilitating empowerment. The latter includes “making state institutions more accountable and responsive to poor people, strengthening the participation of poor people in political processes and local decision-making, and removing the social barriers that result from distinctions of gender, ethnicity, race, and social status.” Empowerment thus includes the ability of individuals and local groups to make choices about their own lives and to participate in directing their societies. The growth of interest in decentralization and the role of civil society is linked to the concern for empowerment. Development for displaced

⁵See Oliver-Smith (2001). In contrast, environmentalists and resettlers may have divergent interests concerning relocation from environmental conservation areas. There is little literature on the relationship of environmentalists and those displaced by urban infrastructure to improve environmental quality.

peoples needs to include not only increased access to economic and social resources, but also more local autonomy and control and improving people's ability to affect their own national institutions.

Understanding the ways to empower vulnerable groups has become a major theme of recent development literature. Contemporary critiques of development targeted three obstacles to empowerment: big development; the role of the state and national integration; and planning. Some of these are alluded to the DIDR literature, but rarely are they explicit.

One debate concerns whether large infrastructure projects can have equitable outcomes. While some believe they cannot, the WCD (2000) has argued that changing the decision-making process can distribute benefits more equitably. In Mali, those displaced by the Manantali dam suffered from DIDR, but working-class urban residents, in particular those who owned small enterprises, faced substantial economic loss when the capital had no electricity. Neither big nor small is intrinsically good, but any option needs to be scrutinized in terms of the kinds and distribution of economic and non-economic benefits and costs. The World Bank guideline to avoid or minimize involuntary resettlement by exploring all alternative project designs is important (OD 4.30, 3a). The dam-and-reservoir bias of the resettlement literature has led to the neglect of smaller projects that still displace people, especially in urban areas with dense populations. Clean water or sewage disposal are highly valued, but these projects often generate controversy about the placement of particular infrastructure.

The political left and right have both critiqued the role of the state. While the left focused on the inequity of state actions that favor the powerful, the right focused on economic inefficiency and inferiority to the market (Rapley 1996). If the state has done much damage in the name of the common good (Waldram 1988:172), the literature does not indicate other organizations that regularly act for the public good either. Only the firmest believers in the invisible hand of the market believe that the aggregate self-interest of individuals results in the common good. Political scientists have argued that states, however compromised, will work in the interests of multiple constituencies if pressured to do so. This makes the empowerment of local groups essential for development; by organizing and increasing their capacity to pressure the state, they should constrain it to act in their interest. A part of avoiding long-term impoverishment from DIDR is building the capacity of local groups to become pressure groups. International organizations (both donors and NGOs) can aid this process over the short term (Feeney 1998), but long-term development means increasing the ability of local groups to influence their governments directly.

The debate about the state is linked to views about the value of national integration, considered problematic when formerly isolated groups are integrated at the bottom of national class systems. States do appear to emphasize cultural homogeneity and show difficulties in integrating groups that remain culturally distinct (Gibson 1993; Paine 1994). However, many of those resettled are already integrated, especially in urban areas. For them, DIDR disrupts integration into markets and national social service systems that brought some, if not always optimal, benefits (Mahapatra 1999b; Perlman 1982). Impoverishment involves being cut off from those systems.

Critiques of the state often treat it as a monolithic entity, where the interests of all government personnel are assumed to be the same. Yet different pieces of the government have different interests, capabilities, and roles (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; Koenig 1997). Local groups may be able to forge useful alliances with parts of the government that have common interests.

A third critique is a critique of planning, especially state planning (Escobar 1995). This is linked to the critique of the state; a state that does not act in the public interest cannot be expected to plan equitably. A second criticism of planning is that it relies on experts, specialists assumed to have more knowledge than other people involved. Yet the knowledge of experts is always limited (Escobar 1995; Lohmann 1998). Resettlement plans may pay little attention to the daily lives of affected people, or boiler-plate plans may undergo *ad hoc* modification in practice to meet local conditions, leading to inconsistent implementation (Meikle and Walker 1998). Because the alternative, resettlement without planning, led to the disasters that encouraged planning, the critique of planning within DIDR has been nearly absent. Yet if states have a new role to play, planning may need to be done differently (Rapley 1996). For DIDR, planning needs to be done in a more democratic, more inclusive way that takes into account unequal power distribution.

For the purposes of this paper, development can be operationalized as follows:

- 1) increasing the availability and utility of economic resources;
- 2) environmental sustainability (implying equitable access across generations);
- 3) respect for basic human rights;
- 4) increasing equity between affected groups and other national groups as well as among the different groups within affected populations;
- 5) increasing local autonomy and control;
- 6) improving people's ability to influence national institutions

This definition of development includes considerations about the distribution of power as well as economic resources. Groups who have been "sacrificed for" other people's development projects enter the process as relatively powerless. They are impoverished because they lack the economic, social, cultural, or political capital to make their claims to resources and rights heard as effectively as do more favored parts of the population. In DIDR, they often lose more. DIDR projects need to consider the existing distribution of power and integrate empowerment as a goal.

This study focuses on the local development of those affected by DIDR. However, the DIDR literature also addresses development in another sense, that of the initiative inducing development, which is assumed to improve welfare at a national or regional level. An equally important question is whether the projects that induce involuntary displacement are 'development,' since it is questionable whether some of them improve even national or regional welfare. Activities such as politically-mandated mass relocation (Brain 1976; Cohen and Isaksson 1987; deWet 1993) and the sedentarization of pastoralists (Merryman 1982) are questionable, even from conventional development perspectives. In some cases, authors have suggested that projects have covert anti-development purposes. Scudder (1996:62) came to believe that the main purpose of the Okavango delta project (Botswana) was to provide water for diamond mines rather than an urban area. Oliver-Smith (1996:91)

believed that control of minority ethnic groups was an important goal of many South American initiatives. Data on these covert purposes is rarely available.

This paper focuses on those projects that offer some potential for broad welfare, even if the displaced risk impoverishment. Yet the effects of other more problematic projects are discussed as well. Whether they fulfill the criteria for being development or not, people are being resettled and impoverished because of them.

2.2 Non-hydropower displacement and resettlement

Due to the bureaucratic boundaries between sectors, the knowledge generated about DIDR in the river-basin development and hydropower sectors has been used mostly by them. The lessons learned have not been readily transferred to other contexts of DIDR.

Forest conservation projects appear to have been slow to use DIDR knowledge or guidelines. In the Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor (Uganda), residents of twenty or more years were defined as “squatters” and evicted, some forcibly. When people were compensated, it was typically done in an arbitrary fashion (Feeney 1998). This project was funded by the EC with World Bank participation. By the time of the evictions (1992), the EC had adopted OECD guidelines on involuntary resettlement, the World Bank failed to follow its own operational directives, and the resettlement issue appears not to have been raised at donor coordination meetings (Feeney 1998:97,98; Oxfam 1996a:9,10). The Ugandan government ultimately carried out an inquiry, which documented human rights violations. Some activities were then undertaken to mitigate the negative effects and help victims, but these were not sufficient to counteract impoverishment and thousands of the displaced ended up squatting elsewhere (Oxfam 1996a). The conservation community has increasingly recognized that local residents need to be involved in conservation projects (Bonner 1993; Kottak and Rakotoarisoa 1990), yet the focus of many projects remains forests or animals, not people. In contrast to river-basin situations, where environment and human rights concerns often overlap, conservation projects offer fewer obvious areas of common interest.

Other kinds of infrastructure development also involve displacements. In Zambia, the World Bank encouraged the government to privatize copper mines in the belief that private owners would use more technologically advanced, productive mining (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:12).⁶ Increasing productivity would displace workers, and the government also evidently believed that mines would be more attractive if they included land for new exploration, so they had to deal with “squatters” living on this land (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:41). There were no adequate resettlement programs and almost no assistance to evicted families (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:29), despite the fact that World Bank policy recognized mining as a sector with potential displacement. It was as if the two sections of the World Bank (privatization and DIDR) were not aware of one another.

⁶Mine or plant closures can also displace communities and workers. The experiences of developed countries, particularly in small towns dominated by a single industry, may offer useful insights.

In these examples, lenders were involved in some way, so that recourse could have been made to their policy guidelines. Yet people are also affected by locally or nationally-funded infrastructure development. The construction of the North Gujarat University campus (India) in 1988 displaced people from fertile land even though an alternative nearby site would have avoided or decreased displacement. The Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation (India), which needed water for its copper plant, drew water from horizontal wells that locals believed would lower their water table (Appa and Patel 1996:141). Industrial plants may also cause air and water pollution (Pandey 1998).

2.3 Privatization of DIDR

The involvement of the private sector in DIDR is growing alongside needs for irrigation, electricity, and other infrastructure (McDowell 1996b:3). Both government policies and national legal systems constrain private-sector activities (through zoning and environmental regulations, compensation laws, taxing regimes, etc.) and offer opportunities to citizens to respond (through public comment periods, court access, incentives for or constraints against organizing). Because of the planning bias of the DIDR literature, it has paid less attention to legal frameworks than to government policy.

The role of the state in DIDR is substantially different where funding is private. When government agencies are directly involved, they can ordain, plan, and carry out action; with private funding, they sanction actions, serving in a watchdog role or as referee. However, the government may offer incentives to some private initiatives, retaining a role as a player. Political scientists have suggested that post-structural adjustment states may need to enhance their regulatory, taxing, and licensing activities (Rapley 1996). There is insufficient data for a systematic study of private-sector DIDR, but this section addresses a few of the issues.

Many private sector organizations are quite entrepreneurial, following multiple strategies to achieve goals. Depending on the situation and the laws, they may get land before or after making their plans public. Private-sector companies may deal in different ways with groups who have claims over the land, trying to gain their cooperation. On the Zambian Copperbelt, Cyprus Amax negotiated with chiefs for land under traditional authority and with local authorities for Council land. It also negotiated a plan with the Council to hand over surplus houses (that it needed initially but not later), apparently to gain its support (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:63-67). The Ambuja Cement Company (India) made private agreements to purchase a part of required land from individuals who needed cash (Appa and Patel 1996:143). In the Philippines as well, a private developer negotiated directly with resisting residents (Meikle and Walker 1998). Private companies often use multiple legal ways to get land.

Private organizations can also make use of the fact that governments have different levels and departments, each with its own interests. Cyprus Amax and the local Copperbelt Council created an alliance with an outcome that benefitted both, but with potentially problematic results for others. Presumably, there are cases where national or local governments are willing to waive environmental or social regulations to encourage private investment.

Private companies are subject to investigation and pressure by outside groups, with varying results. When Cyprus Amax moved into the Zambian Copperbelt, declaring workers redundant without plans for the future, Oxfam was called in to offer support. This proved difficult because it was not clear what aspects of Zambian law, e.g., labor law provisions for termination, were relevant and how they were used. The team could not get information about compensation given to the miners, who had previously been housed and had access to other company services (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:63-67). In contrast, NGO assistance to local organizations seems to have made a difference in one Philippine case. The private developer gave much higher compensation to the organizations with whom it negotiated directly (Meikle and Walker 1998). Many publicly-held private companies have developed policies in response to shareholder concerns about environmental or social issues, but Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer (1998:64) noted that Cyprus Amax's plans may not have been in accord with its own environmental policies. Moreover, not all private companies that cause displacement are either large or publicly held. The approximately 700 mines in Orissa (India), mostly operated by private parties on a lease basis, got needed land by satisfying owners with *ad hoc* compensation. Many transactions were never legally registered (Pandey 1998:36).

In private-sector DIDR, the safeguards and compensation offered by a working legal system are important. Both individuals and groups can use the law to bring pressure upon developers. Appa and Patel (1996) recounted several Indian cases where locals brought firms to court. Although court cases were very frequent in India, they were problematic because legal solutions were individual and did not extend to others in the same situation (Pandey 1998), but those who could afford to go to court often got far higher settlements. Canadian Indians also went to court and successful outcomes were in part due to favorable legal decisions (Salisbury 1986; Waldram 1988).

Usefulness of courts is limited by existing laws. National laws do not necessarily follow international guidelines. The Indian Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (amended 1984) mandates monetary compensation at market value (Pandey 1998; Mahapatra 1999a). While some projects have engineered land-for-land replacement by building resettlement colonies, monetary compensation remains officially at market value. Legal standing is also an issue. Indian law did not allow the testimony of locals who wanted to advocate alternative approaches to development that did not involve involuntary relocation. This made it difficult to challenge land acquisition on the basis of equally efficacious or more economical development alternatives (Appa and Patel 1996).

Access to courts is also important. Oxfam (1996b) noted that prohibitive court costs meant that most of the legal cases from damages sustained by road construction in Kenya were settled out of court. Pandey (1998) noted that only the better-off tended to bring cases to court because of the expense involved. Although lawyers were often willing to take cases of poorer people, they sometimes charged exploitative fees. Despite the difficulties, many nevertheless went to court to fight for rights and compensation. Government programs that defrayed legal costs for the displaced increased their ability to bring effective cases, as did the work of legally oriented NGOs.

A final aspect of the role of the private sector concerns its potential role in the development projects for the resettled. There is little if any consideration of the role that

independent private enterprises might play in meeting the needs of persons displaced by DIDR projects. The state-planning-bias of this literature sees the state as the main actor with NGOs as a complement. Yet many governments do not have either the means or capacity to create jobs in areas with high joblessness, and expectations are that people will find private sector employment. Are there ways that DIDR projects can encourage private businesses to locate in resettlement areas and hire local people?

We need further research on non-river-basin and privatized DIDR. The information that does exist is scattered and not well synthesized (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; NRCR 1999; Pandey 1998; Meikle and Walker 1998). While the risks appear to be quite similar, the strategies for mitigating risks, reestablishing effective livelihoods, and creating development may be quite different.

3. THE IMPACT OF POLICY CHANGE

This section looks at how improved understandings and better policies have led to better outcomes. It looks first at areas that have seen substantial improvement and then turns to areas where improvements have been limited. Cernea's risk and reconstruction model frames the discussion.

3.1 Positive impacts of policy guidelines

Data suggest that the existence of accumulated knowledge, the development of theoretical models, and the propagation of guidelines have created an environment where at least some DIDR is done with the goal of avoiding impoverishment and reconstituting the livelihoods of the displaced. The World Bank review of resettlement projects showed that projects following the guidelines performed better than those that bypassed them (Rew 1996:205). The establishment of general principles in Chinese resettlement law led to the definition of clear institutional responsibilities at national, provincial, and local levels. The Chinese experience shows how resettlement planning and regulations can protect the living standards of the displaced (Rew 1996:205,206).

Guidelines have not always been followed. Many problems arise from bad practice, not bad policy (Pearce 1999:53). Moreover, there is often a substantial time lag between the use of guidelines and when the outcomes are known to a larger public. Positive outcomes do tend to become public more slowly than negative ones. Among the areas that have shown considerable improvement are: avoiding displacement, social welfare issues, replacement of land, socio-cultural reconstruction, and an appreciation of the complexities of compensation.

3.1.1 Avoiding displacement

The first strategy to avoid the problems of displacement is to look for alternative technical choices that avoid or lessen it. Some organizations and government agencies have begun to do this. The Danxian-Wanxian railway (China) was laid out to minimize acquisition of cultivated and fertile land (NRCR 1999:16). In Uganda, public consultation with local communities led to changes for canal sites in a hydropower project, minimizing displacement (WCD 2000:109). This strategy could be used more often however. A legal

framework that allows the potentially affected to comment on the initial plan is important (Appa and Patel 1996). Alternative possibilities are often available, but they need to be negotiated before activity starts.

3.1.2 Addressing social welfare risks

The social welfare risks of DIDR have shown improvement in light of lessons learned. Homelessness has been addressed in a variety of ways. Mejía's (1999:161) review of Latin American urban DIDR projects found many different strategies for housing replacement, including partly subsidized housing, fully subsidized housing, single-family housing in a shared social area, apartments, the use of letters of credit, renting with an option to buy, financed lots with services, and lots with services and building supplies. Over time, consultation with affected urban populations has begun at earlier stages of project planning (Mejía 1999:165).

Issues remain. One is whether people will use compensation meant for housing to provide it. When people were given construction money in one lump sum, they often used it for consumption (Thangaraj 1996:228). Some projects began to give housing compensation in a series of payments, with subsequent payments linked to earlier construction; this too led to problems, e.g., corruption by bank officials (Pandey 1998). While diversion of housing compensation led to poor quality new housing, others have described improvements to housing after resettlement.

A second issue is what part of housing costs people should pay, especially when housing is upgraded substantially. Some argue that people should not be required to pay anything because they did not choose to move; they often had no say in the quality of new housing. However, some civil servants believe that paying a part of housing costs makes resettled families feel more rooted and increases their sense of ownership and capacity for self-management (Mejía 1999:157,158). The involuntarily displaced have repeatedly rejected paying for new housing. In the Philippines, people often were behind on payments (Meikle and Walker 1998); in Latin American projects, *de facto* housing subsidies ranged from 65% to 95% of the costs (Mejía 1999:158). It is unclear whether people were evicted for non-payment or whether this became a hidden cost to the development project.

Construction of individual housing is often complemented by social infrastructure, such as schools, health clinics, and administrative offices, giving many of the displaced better access to a variety of social services. The generally greater access to health and social infrastructure post-DIDR may bring benefits to most (WCD 2000). However, services are sometimes dependent on a regularized administrative status; in India, unless resettlement colonies became officially recognized villages, residents did not have access to many existing social programs (Mahapatra 1996b).

The short-term risk of food insecurity has been addressed by national or international food aid organizations such as the World Food Programme. There needs to be adequate forward planning to make sure that food arrives in a timely manner. Standard food aid can be supplemented by food-for-work or feeding programs for the particularly vulnerable.

Short-term health risks can be met through temporary clinics and vaccination programs. There also needs to be planning for the long-term potential disease problems of the new environment. Indigenous peoples who have lived relatively isolated lives may suffer from diseases when they enter into contact with more diverse populations. The short-term risks have proved easier to deal with than the long-term ones.

The successful action against social welfare risks is both an indicator of better resettlement and a sign that some of the longer-term risks are still ignored. Sometimes project implementation staff seem to think that once food, housing, and health are addressed, the essential is done and the economic can take care of itself. DIDR projects tended to emphasize social infrastructure such as schools, health, community centers over more clearly economic infrastructure, like markets, roads, and agricultural extension (Eriksen 1999:115). Reconstituting economic, socio-cultural, and political resources is important because over the long-term, people meet long-term social welfare needs through viable income-earning strategies and the ability to influence government provision of entitlements.

3.1.3 Land replacement

When rural people are mostly farmers, land is needed to reconstitute livelihoods. Most agree that land-for-land replacement is the most appropriate way to reconstitute land assets in rural, agriculturally based resettlement, where there is often insufficient land for sale, speculation and price inflation, and lack of monetarized land markets.⁷ If this is not possible, compensation needs to be based on replacement cost rather than market value. Even though Indian law requires market-value compensation, some projects have managed to move toward replacement value and Orissa's 1994 Water Resources Policy makes land-for-land the preference (Pandey 1998:20).⁸

Understanding the complexities of agricultural land ownership has led to general acceptance of the idea that long-term users without title (e.g., those with customary tenure, "squatters," and "encroachers") ought to get replacement land. Recognition of extended families has given non-household heads rights to replacement land. Orissa (India) state policy steadily increased the categories with rights to replacement land, adding first the landless, then sons age 21 or older (and then 18 and older), widows, and unmarried daughters age 30 or older (Pandey 1998).

Tenure issues remain; often neither communities nor individuals get full title (Eriksen 1999:114; Lassailly-Jacob 1996:195). In African projects, people often remained tenants, considering themselves employees of the agricultural agency. In India,

⁷Although scholars are virtually unanimous in favoring land-for-land, the displaced themselves are not. In India, some 80% chose cash compensation over resettlement colonies in a study of 29 projects (Pandey 1998:117). In one Ugandan project, many farmers preferred cash because they owned other plots of land or earned income from other sources (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:33).

⁸Indian social scientists have worked hard to get national law to recognize the principal of replacement value (Mahapatra 1999a:154-159).

promised titles may take a long time to come (Pandey 1998). Community land used by hunters, herders, and for bush resources needs clearly defined tenure as well (Lassailly-Jacob 1996:197). Non-title options can create secure tenure for individuals or groups, e.g. demarcation of Indian reserves in South America. It is also possible to give formal tenure to groups rather than individuals, e.g., Indian and Native communities in the United States and Canada, group ranches in Africa, agricultural villages in China, and limited liability corporations in many places.

A second issue is the appropriate size of landholdings. Rarely, in either voluntary or involuntary resettlement was the size of landholdings tailored to the labor or capital endowments of households (Erickson 1999:113), although some projects have become aware of this issue. At Manantali (Mali), land was allocated according to the number of adults in a household; China had a policy to allocate land commensurate with capacity (Erickson 1999:113). Otherwise, decreased average size of landholdings was common. Middle-income farm households often declined in status to smallholders; shopkeepers and craftspeople lost as their major clientele became poorer (Pandey 1998:108).

Finally, in areas of high population density, there may not be enough land, or it may be difficult to provide land-for-land replacement and meet the objective of moving people as social units. In some countries, land may be made available through land reform or redistribution; in China, land is sometimes redistributed to new settlers from farmers with more than a certain amount (NRCR 1999). But this strategy can be politically unpopular; India did not implement the recommendation of a 1982 Ministerial Committee that large landholders be compelled to allot some of their land to resettlers (Pandey 1998:11). Opening new land for cultivation can also be problematic; declassifying forest lands for farmers has led to struggles between environmentalists and resettlement experts. Yet sometimes lands taken by development organizations are not used. At the Karjan dam (India), villagers wanted unsubmerged land returned to them, but the government retained it for afforestation (Appa and Patel 1996:145).

Lack of sufficient land has exacerbated the decline in land ownership among resettled farmers. In fact, India has decreased the size of land allocations as its population has grown, from a recommended 6 acres of unirrigated or 3 acres of irrigated land in the 1970s to 2.5 acres of unirrigated or 1.25 acres of irrigated land by 1990 (Pandey 1998:15,17). Yet if resettled farmers cannot get viable plots, they will not be able to reconstitute their livelihoods. If land is insufficient, the project should consider combining land-based and job-based economic reconstruction.

3.1.4 Socio-cultural reconstruction

The importance of maintaining functional units of social organization is reflected in strategies that move people as groups. Chinese policies focus on restoring and preserving social units (Erickson 1999:104,105), and at Manantali (Mali), villages were reconstructed. This preserved people's ability to use social networks. This strategy is easier when social and geographic units coincide, but it can also be undertaken where social units are less visible.

While moving as units does help preserve social cohesion, there are trade-offs. In urban resettlement, it can be difficult to find sufficient land in central locations for large groups. If people remain together, they often must move some distance from the central city, with negative economic repercussions. Little literature discusses this trade-off directly.

There is also a trade-off between individual choice and moving as units. Lower caste and younger people who wished to take advantage of new opportunities sometimes wanted to change social networks. The range of compensation options offered in the Lesotho Highlands project may have negatively affected social solidarity (DeWet personal communication). Moreover, physical proximity does not always mean a single social network or group. Many resettlement areas had more than one ethnic group, leading to tension, e.g., between Inuit and Cree at James Bay (Canada) (McCutcheon 1991:154), between Kuna and Embera at Bayano (Panama) (Wali 1989), and between Cree and Métis at Easterville (Canada) (Waldram 1980).

People do what they can to reconstruct meaningful socio-cultural units. Many used compensation money for marriages. Pandey (1998:73) considered this a problem, since people were not investing in tangible economic resources. Yet, in social situations where kin networks provide the primary social insurance and where family labor is important for economic success, using compensation money for marriages can be a practical way to meet both economic and social needs.

Maintaining social cohesion can have unanticipated consequences. The social solidarity consciously built by the Cree in response to the James Bay (Canada) dam brought them new economic resources, leading to a boom in Chisasibi town, where government services and private enterprises were located. McCutcheon (1991:122) believed that Chisasibi showed the most severe social stress of all Native communities of northern Quebec, because it was the most affected by hydroelectric development. At Manantali (Mali), a group of small hamlets that decided to relocate together created a village which confronted the jealousy of older, more established villages when it began to rival their socio-cultural dominance.

Authors have paid less attention to individual marginalization and the relevance of human capital formation, although Pandey (1998) noted cases where children deserted parents and husbands deserted wives. Older people and women, who often lost informal economic activities, became dependent on other family members with post-resettlement jobs. Hayes (1999) systematically included human capital loss and reconstruction in her model, which could facilitate better approaches to mitigating individual marginalization.

3.1.5 Understanding the complexities of compensation

Where monetary compensation is appropriate, implementation is nonetheless complex and involves a host of practical problems. The problem of calculating land values when there is no active land market is clear. In China, a multiple of the value of crops produced has been used, and some have argued for adapting this strategy elsewhere (Meikle and Walker 1998; Mahapatra 1996a). Even where there is a land market, it may be in the best interests of all to underestimate land values (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000).

The Indian government has recognized that lump-sum payments can cause problems and implemented schemes for payouts over time, although these too have been criticized (Pandey 1998). Sometimes people who received compensation too far ahead spent it on consumption rather than investment because they had existing homes and resources. More commonly, compensation has been paid too late. Implementing agencies often face bureaucratic and administrative hurdles that delay payments (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000). Hosts need to be considered for compensation (Pearce 1999:59).

The ideal format for compensation depends on the local situation, including local and government institutions. More participation of resettlers in determining the modalities of compensation and its payment would help adapt standard formulas to local conditions.

3.2 Known risks that remain problematic

In contrast to areas with significant progress, other areas of known risk have shown little systematic improvement. These include economic risks other than land, urban resettlement, differentiation in the resettled population, and the non-displaced affected by DIDR.

3.2.1 *Economic issues*

Although there are outstanding issues in land replacement, the general principles are understood and accepted. Addressing other economic risks (joblessness and common property resources) has proved to be more problematic. People often mix different economic resources, creating strategies that use multiple resources; resettlement programs have not been good at countering multiple economic risks.

3.2.1.1 Jobs

Most developing countries find it difficult to generate sufficient employment. DIDR exacerbates the problem, since it disrupts access to productive resources and to social networks that assure clientele.

People need jobs in both urban and rural areas, yet many urban projects seem to consider the reconstitution of jobs unproblematic (Meikle and Walker 1998). World Bank-funded resettlement projects in urban Latin America were based primarily on housing (Mejía 1999:156). Yet the proportion of unemployed averaged about 15%; about 25% of the displaced were underemployed (Mejía 1999:162). The reliance of the poor on an informal economy that depends on the surrounding environment has not been sufficiently taken into account (Perlman 1982). Site selection is crucial in restoring employment, income, and social networks (Mejía 1999:153).

In rural areas, the importance of reconstituting long-term jobs is rarely recognized, even though many rural residents hold jobs. Displaced people tend to be defined by the region's major occupation, this leads to a limited recognition other primary occupations and of individual's additional or secondary occupations.

In job-based compensation, a major issue is which enterprises will provide the jobs. Many characteristics of enterprises affect the kinds of employees they hire. Large-scale enterprises offer more jobs, while micro-enterprises may have only an owner-worker or a few employees. Technical modernization affects dependence on labor. Highly modernized enterprises use more machinery and hire fewer, generally more highly qualified, individuals. Less modernized enterprises may use more workers at a variety of skill levels. Public and private enterprises may have different hiring criteria. Some enterprises produce goods (e.g., factories, artisans) and others offer services (e.g., commercial activities, repair, social services). Some jobs, often including those associated with the infrastructure itself, are temporary, and others are permanent. The DIDR literature treats these issues but not systematically.

A few countries have expected large-scale industries to offer jobs to the displaced. This sometimes was an explicit part of rehabilitation strategies, e.g., in some Indian states. In China when the state was the universal employer, state-owned enterprises would take on the displaced; the city labor bureau found jobs for rural residents moving to urban areas as part of DIDR (Meikle and Zhu 2000:134). Facing international criticism of the inefficiency of government-owned economic institutions, India, China, and other countries have moved toward more market-driven economies. Now in China, jobs for the displaced must be found through the private job market (Meikle and Zhu 2000). In India, the 1994 Orissa water resources policy dropped provisions for mandatory or even preferential employment, which Pandey (1998:20) considered “completely out of tune” with otherwise progressive changes.

Offering preferential employment to the displaced did not always work, because they often did not qualify for the jobs offered. At the Talcher National Thermal Power Corporation (India), employment opportunities were limited because the plant used the latest capital intensive technology; most of the resettled had low educational preparation and did not even qualify for technical and vocational courses (Pandey 1998). Some mines did offer substantial employment, but opportunities for advancement were few. The employment preference was usually limited to one member per family, which was often insufficient to support the household (Pandey 1998:53).

To deal with some of these problems, projects have turned to micro-enterprises in production or trade to solve the jobs crisis. This has a certain logic in that many of the jobs held by the displaced before resettlement were of this type (Mejía 2000; Perlman 1982). Micro-enterprises have also been considered an important option for creating jobs in non-DIDR contexts (Spring and McDade 1998). At the National Aluminum Company Limited (India), the rehabilitation scheme offered financial help to those who wanted to start businesses. A resettlement colony close to the plant offered a ready clientele. Those displaced by this project saw their average annual income increase substantially (Pandey 1998:60). In a similar vein, a Cree Income Security Program (Canada) allowed hunters to reconstitute an important part of their pre-resettlement life (Salisbury 1986).

Building successful micro-enterprises requires substantial planning, including an analysis of the existing regional economy, the goods and services it needs, and the kinds of changes likely to occur post-DIDR. It needs a good understanding of the resources needed for particular micro-enterprises and good market analyses. Plans need to be complemented

with training programs that build the needed skills. Credit is also crucial. Of particular importance are possibilities for new activities that take advantage of resources created by the resettlement. In river-basin development, resettlers can be allocated fishing rights in the new reservoir and reservoirs can be stocked to make fishing more productive. People can be trained to do aquaculture and to provide road and water transport.

A DIDR development strategy that depends heavily on micro-enterprises is subject to the same criticisms faced by micro-enterprises in non-DIDR contexts. Small-scale entrepreneurs cannot take advantages of certain economies of scale and are subject to economic fluctuations. Employment benefits such as pensions and health insurance are often limited, especially if micro-enterprises remain part of the informal economy.

Consideration of the actual or potential role of small and medium-scale enterprises is almost absent from the DIDR literature. In China, town and village enterprises, many of them medium-scale, are credited with providing employment for some relocatees (Meikle and Walker 1998). What kinds of incentives might encourage small and medium-scale businesses to locate in resettlement zones? Should parts of resettlement colonies be zoned for artisanal production or light industry? The literature often illustrates a bias against working for someone else; Pandey (1998:111) seemed to consider it a problem that some resettlers had become daily wage earners. While it is true that the transition to wage labor may reflect asset loss, many urban resettlers already have jobs and find themselves moved to areas where commutes are more expensive. They have often looked for new employment possibilities.

Planners need to consider the mix between public and private-sector jobs, between jobs making goods and those offering services. Free-market capitalism has led to increased private-sector production, but the public-sector still often provides health, education, and other social services. Service provision often increases with DIDR programs, and projects can look for ways to integrate the displaced into these jobs. At James Bay (Canada), some Cree trained to become teachers, and older Cree were hired to teach language and traditional knowledge (Salisbury 1986). The growth of a Cree regional authority after resettlement provided jobs for almost every high school graduate (Salisbury 1986:127). Training programs are needed if local people are to qualify for these jobs.

The displaced often get short-term benefits from temporary jobs (e.g., construction and site preparation) created by the resettlement. This work offers income during a vulnerable period and settler involvement may help ensure that new sites reflect their preferences. Sometimes these project-related jobs may last a relatively long time, yet “temporary employment is not a substitute for complete, long-term reconstruction of livelihoods” (VanWicklin 1999:247). Strategies for job-based rehabilitation need to consider long-term sustainability.

A growing, vibrant regional economy makes it easier for relocatees to get good jobs. Scudder’s (1981) emphasis on regional economic growth in the resettlement zone is important. Planners need to look at the diverse ways in which the zone is likely to grow and look for ways to integrate relocatees into the diverse possibilities. As suggested by World Bank Operational Directive 4.30, paragraph 19: “The resettlement plan should, where feasible, exploit new economic activities made possible by the main investment

requiring the displacement. Vocational training, employment counseling, transportation to jobs, employment in the main investment project or in resettlement activities, establishment of industries, incentives for firms to locate in the area, credit and extension for small businesses or reservoir aquaculture, and preference in public sector employment should all be considered where appropriate.” Simultaneously attacking the jobs problem in multiple ways seems necessary; coupling a policy of preferential employment with skill generation can lead to long-term economic diversification (Pandey 1998:6).

Training programs, broadly conceived, are necessary to increase the skill levels of resettlers. After resettlement, the Cree Indians of James Bay had access to adult education courses targeting new skills like snowshoe manufacture, economic development, and office support (Salisbury 1986:123). River-basin development projects offer jobs for power plant operators, transmission line workers, pumping station staff, and reservoir maintenance (VanWicklin 1999). Other businesses may involve wastewater treatment, agroprocessing, mining, or thermal power stations. Job creation is complex because all jobs in a capitalist economy have a certain degree of fragility, and few developing countries can afford to offer guaranteed employment. The failure rate of small enterprises is high even in developed countries and it should not be surprising that the new enterprises promoted by resettlement often have high failure rates.⁹ The unemployed may be pushed into seasonal and permanent migration, bonded or child labor, and unsustainable use of their natural resources (Mahapatra 1999b:204). Increasing the skill levels of people and their options for employment can mitigate the problem.

3.2.1.2 Common property

Many governments are uneasy about those who use common property or open-access resources. Boundaries are not always clearly demarcated and there is no single owner to approach for taxes or compensation. These resources are often used by people who central governments find problematic: pastoralists or fisherfolk, ethnic minorities, etc.

Common property is property where group management can restrict access and grant use rights to some and exclude others. Open-access resources allow use to anyone who can get to the resource. Since use is not regulated, there are problems in excluding users leading to potential resource competition (Berkes and Farvar 1989). Centralizing governments have often turned locally managed common property into open-access resources as they claim authority. Other constituencies may pressure governments for access. In Norway, a powerful political lobby wanted to open the tundra to uses other than reindeer herding, including recreational areas, military purposes, national parks, and industry (Paine 1994:149). Similar constraints operated in the Canadian north (Charest 1982; Waldram 1988). Canadian federal and provincial governments have tended to see the interests of Native resource users as subsidiary to that of Canadian society as a whole. For example, waterways are considered national or provincial resources whose development should be undertaken in the interest of the public as a whole; government strategy has often been to convince Natives to surrender rights to valuable resources for the common good (Waldram 1988).

⁹Under normal conditions, approximately 20% of small businesses in the United States dissolve in each of the first and second years after start-up (US Government 1999:30).

Reconstituting common property or open-access resources raises many issues. In some cases, these resources form the main or only resources used by the population, e.g., pastoralists, fisherfolk, foragers (hunters and gatherers), and some farmers. In other cases, the use of common property resources complements income from privately owned farms or wage work. The poorest and women often depend most on these resources (Cernea 1996b).

Governments have different stances on the use of common property resources. In some cases, use is accepted or at least tolerated, e.g., among nomadic pastoralists, aboriginal foragers, and in the many parts of Africa where farmers have collective customary tenure. There is also collective ownership of village farmland in China. These uses are considered fundamentally licit. In other cases, the use of these resources is considered illegal. This is often reflected in language; the use of the term squatter or encroacher implies another putative or “real” owner. Indian social scientists have argued for the recognition of customary tenure among “tribals” living in government forests (Mahapatra 1999a), but have not yet been successful. In many parts of the developing world, urban residents of spontaneous neighborhoods lack title and are considered squatters. Sometimes, they have the right to compensation; other times, they do not (Meikle and Walker 1998).

Governments appear on the whole more ready to reconstitute a resource where the users are considered legal or licit. Nevertheless, there is often confusion over whether users should be recognized. The residents of Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor (Uganda), considered to be squatters by one government, had been encouraged to settle there by a preceding one (Oxfam 1996a). While the national government of Zambia considered mine workers farming on gazetted forests to be encroachers, these farmers had been given advice and support by agents of the Ministry of Agriculture (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:37,38).

The status of common property or open-access resources may also be in flux. In many African countries, customary tenure is being incrementally converted to other forms of tenure, often creating a patchwork of land law that recognizes multiple categories of ownership. Different laws may overlap or contradict one another. Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer’s (1998:22) discussion of the complexities of Zambian law showed a bewildering array of titles with different degrees of security. The distinctions were not always clearly understood by either government representatives or residents.

How to manage post-resettlement common property is also problematic. Most common property is used individually even though managed collectively. Management groups have different capacities for collective action post-resettlement. Groups that have managed but not used a resource collectively cannot necessarily transfer their organizational skills to new kinds of collective resources or organize collective production.

The experiences of the James Bay Cree (Canada) illustrate the problems of trying to reconstitute livelihoods based on foraging. The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement with Quebec Province offered them the possibility to maintain hunting and other bush activities, as well as control over local development. Nevertheless, the Cree lost effective control over their land since some 80% of it was handed over to the James Bay Development Corporation (Scudder 1996:56). With the loss of range, hunting, and trapping lands, competition with other hunters and loggers grew (McCutcheon 1991:119). Both tourist and other facilities came to be run and staffed almost exclusively by outsiders; increased timber extraction, hunting pressure, and mercury contamination of reservoir fish led to environmental degradation (Scudder 1996:58). The Canadian federal government and the Quebec provincial government disregarded some of their promises to the Cree, and the James Bay Development Corporation largely ignored the Cree in planning for this land.

Planning for the issues facing resettled pastoralists is almost absent in the literature. There is some work on the resettlement of Bedouin in Israel (Marx 1988) and on Navajo-Hopi relocation (Aberle 1993; Scudder 1982). The Navajo-Hopi Joint-use area was subject to major livestock reductions (on the order of 95%) preparatory to resettlement; Navajos who moved to areas other than Navajo Partitioned Land lost livestock permits (Aberle 1993:176). At New Halfa (Sudan), relocated Nubian farmers got planned villages with pumped water, while Shukriya herder hosts had unplanned, emergency, and pre-scheme villages with few services (Salem-Murdock 1989:19).

Transhumant pastoralists who pass through a displacement or resettlement zone may be absent from consideration altogether, as at Manantali (Mali). Here, the negative attitudes of both resettlers and hosts to herders only worsened after resettlement. Before dam construction, herders could cross the river at multiple places and had spread out through the bush on both banks. After dam construction, the only feasible crossing was the bridge downstream from the dam, which put larger groups of pastoralists and their animals in closer contact with farmers, causing increased conflict.

The problematic attitude toward pastoralists in relocation appears linked to pre-DIDR tensions between pastoralists and others. Saami reindeer pastoralists and Norwegian conservationists had allied against hydroelectric development in the early 1980s, but after the publication of the Brundtland Commission report at the end of the 1980s, conservationists drew away from the pastoralists and closer to the government. Conservationists tended to see the tundra as wilderness; they were critical of Saami use of new technology such as landing-craft ferries, field telephones, all-terrain vehicles, and snowmobiles. Conservationists claimed that Saami could claim a special relationship to nature and a distinctive ethnic status only if they used traditional techniques. Moreover, mechanization could create ecological damage (Paine 1994:153,154).

The attention paid by DIDR projects to common property resources is insufficient. Mahapatra (1999b:208) suggested that loss of access to common property is probably the most ignored aspect in Indian resettlement projects. While World Bank policy has been to treat those with customary property rights the same as those with full legal rights, in practice, they are often treated less well. Pearce (1999:57), an environmental economist, has argued that resettlement initiatives would better protect land and resources as well as people's rights by fully recognizing customary tenure. However, the free-rider problem,

where people claim rights simply to get resettlement benefits, appears to be worse where people depend on common property or open-access resources (Pearce 1999:58). Projects do need to distinguish short-term opportunistic encroachers from long-term settlers with customary rights or implicit recognition (Feeney 1998:146).

3.2.1.3 Diversification in economic strategies

Until now, the displaced have been fortunate when a resettlement project reconstituted their major resource. Yet this approach ignores multiple activities undertaken individually or by groups more commonly heterogeneous than homogeneous. In much of the world, rural residents who define themselves primarily as “farmers” cannot live by farming alone. Lassailly-Jacob (1996:188) noted that when resettlers became self-sustaining in rural African settlement schemes, it was often due to activities other than farming. The urban poor also undertake multiple activities to make ends meet. The mix of different activities changes after DIDR as the mix of options expands or contracts; new options may be quite different to the old. Yet new opportunities brought by DIDR have not been open to everyone. The variety as well as the quantity of post-DIDR resources needs to be increased.

Planners have not paid attention to resource diversity in rural areas. In Orissa (India), programs planned for viable agricultural fields but ignored homestead plots, leading to a substantial decline in income-earning possibilities for women and variety in the family diet (Pandey 1998). At New Halfa (Sudan), officials believed that animals were competition for space and the attention of farmer-resettlers. Yet the settlers themselves began to integrate livestock and crops (Salem-Murdock 1989); both Nubian farmers and Shukriya pastoralists followed economic strategies that accentuated satisfaction of their animals (Lassailly-Jacob 1992:28). Here, as elsewhere, both affluent and poor followed a combination of economic strategies; the affluent tried to increase their holdings and optimize economic opportunities, while the poor were trying simply to survive (Salem-Murdock 1989:84,87).

Viable social systems usually include people with a variety of occupations. While the majority of rural residents may be farmers, there are artisans, traders, and other specialized service providers (e.g., health or religious practitioners), often ignored in DIDR programs. Indian resettlement policies often did not recognize residents who did not live from the land as displaced. Craft or service providers who lost their occupations due to displacement were not eligible for rehabilitation and resettlement (Pandey 1998:111). In addition to recognizing the diverse livelihoods present before resettlement, it may be useful to conceptualize the resettlement zone as a site for regional development, with linkages between specialists within it as well as with organizations and individuals outside. Scudder (1981:360++) suggested planning for the resettlement region as a whole, hosts and relocatees together, with possibilities for small business, industry, tourism, and/or mining. Planning for heterogeneous rather than homogeneous production systems may offer greater opportunities for future development, reconstituting livelihoods in a more viable fashion.

3.2.2 *Urban resettlement*

The knowledge gained from dam-related, rural resettlement is not always transferable to urban projects of other types. The concern for indigenous peoples is also of little relevance. Rarely do urban areas include indigenous territories, although they may include ethnic minorities. Although urban residents can and do resist resettlement, the notions of resistance to cultural domination or economic integration are less important (Oliver-Smith 1996). People often migrate to urban areas precisely to increase their access to the national economy and culture. Nor are urban populations necessarily antithetical to moving in and of itself; many people have moved recently and/or several times. Even poor urban residents are rarely tradition bound; their very survival depends upon being able to see and take advantage of new resources quickly (Bartolomé 1993:128). Yet there is still an important difference between a voluntary and an involuntary move, and urbanites risk impoverishment from DIDR.

Urban projects are diverse and include urban renewal, transport, water supply, and industrial development. Because of high urban population densities, many initiatives involve at least some involuntary displacement (Mejía 1999:150). High population densities also mean that even when small areas are affected, the numbers of people displaced may be large.

Urban land costs tend to be high, even though the displaced need land primarily for housing. Because it is often difficult to find suitable land for rehousing the displaced close to their old homes, many are moved far from social networks and markets. This may create new financial burdens, such as electricity and water bills and increased transport costs. If social ties are ruptured, people may have to pay for services that previously were free, e.g., child care or security. There may be insufficient education or health facilities (Bartolomé 1993; Perlman 1982; Mejía 1999). Land in more central locations may be available only in small parcels, breaking the resettled population into smaller units and compromising social cohesion. There may be trade-offs between reconstituting economic and social systems.

Urban land use poses particular problems. In the semiperiphery of urban zones, people may complement jobs with activities like gardening, livestock, or garbage recycling (Mejía 1999:177), running into competition with hosts who already use the land for these purposes. Because land is already commercialized, land speculation may be a greater problem (Mejía 1999:152). Moreover, many poor families in urban areas do not have legal titles (Mejía 1999:154). Despite World Bank policy, not all Latin American countries compensate regardless of legal title (Mejía 1999:156). In China, inhabitants without residence permits are not compensated (Meikle and Walker 1998). Urban populations are usually more transient and often include many recent arrivals, exacerbating the problem of keeping out people who move into zones to get project entitlements (Mejía 1999:152-155).

Urban resettled populations are usually quite heterogeneous. Incomes vary in amount and structure; houses vary in quality of construction and size. Family size as well as the nature of community organization are highly diverse. These features are poorly reflected in resettlement policies and plans (Mejía 1999:163). Yet the greatest problem facing urban resettlement is that most projects continue to be conceived of as housing

projects rather than projects to meet economic needs. This is reflected in the lead institutions, e.g., the National Housing Authority in the Philippines. It has often been naively assumed that people will simply keep existing jobs (Meikle and Walker 1998), even though the economic context changes.

DIDR projects often saw rural and urban as mutually exclusive categories. Yet, many who live in rural areas are not farmers or even natural resource users. In urban areas, some people farm. A more useful approach to reconstituting livelihoods might be to assume that displaced families follow diversified income strategies aimed at ensuring family survival (Ericksen 1999:110,111). The goal may be better phrased as reconstituting viable economic systems rather than individual or household livelihoods. More research is needed to understand how to reconstitute urban jobs and mixed-resource economic systems.

3.2.3 Conflicting interests within resettled populations

Moving people in units was done in part to counter inequities between affected groups and a relatively undefined larger society. Yet this strategy discounts another important factor: socio-cultural differentiation among affected persons. Even if they seem relatively homogeneous to outsiders, affected individuals have different needs and interests. Given these different, often conflicting, interests, individuals may use DIDR to advance specific agendas (Oliver-Smith 1996:84). Populations also usually include some dissatisfied with aspects of their culture. Downing (1996:46) suggested identifying the intragroup differences likely to be affected by DIDR and finding the areas of dissatisfaction. One important difference concerns those who had the most vested in the old system and those who can get access to 'development' in the new. In patriarchal and gerontocratic social systems, older men could lose the most from resettlement. In contrast, women and younger men could take advantage of new opportunities, many acceptable only to those with less status in the old system (Koenig and Diarra 1998a). The cohesion needed for organized action is not automatic, but needs to be built.

If heterogeneity of interests is not recognized, people may have limited ability to organize effectively to respond to resettlement. At Cerro de Oro dam (Mexico), locals organized around mediatory leaders, each of whom aimed to retain privileges for his own clientele, creating factions. Each faction, linked to different political parties and peasant organizations, created a group that represented its own opportunistic interests. Divisions among groups divided even kin. Persistent conflicts among factions blunted the ability to negotiate effectively; intrafamily and intergenerational conflict led to social disarticulation (Barabas and Bartolomé 1996:157-160).

Clearly it is hazardous to treat displaced populations as homogeneous. Yet some small-scale projects to compensate for the negative impacts of displacement treat communities as wholes (Feeney 1998:129, 130). These community-level solutions may not address or correct residual harm suffered by particular individuals or households. For example, schools might be good but will not necessarily benefit elderly widows. Without better data, identifying those who have suffered the greatest losses is difficult. Four major axes of social differentiation are relevant to DIDR: gender, age, class, and ethnicity.

3.2.3.1 Gender

Gender has been most discussed (Indra 1999; Colson 1999; Koenig 1995). Just as in other development arenas, women in DIDR usually received fewer benefits than men. When women displaced from the Kibale reserve (Uganda) were finally resettled, they still reported increased stress because they no longer had individual gardens to provide food for their families. Ultimately they were granted land, but the task of clearing it was enormous. Female household heads not only had to clear land but also built their own homes (Feeney 1998:103). In the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric Project (India), women's ability to produce food was reduced, which affected them and their children. The fertility rate of tribal women decreased after displacement (Thangaraj 1996:230). Because compensation payments went to male heads, collective assets of the family became cash owned by male household heads. Greater dependence on their husbands reduced women's power within the family. Less involvement in decision-making could lead to conflict (sometimes violent) (Pandey 1998:104). Because women's access to resources was often mediated by men, they faced problems in getting pre-resettlement resources counted and in receiving allocations afterwards. On the Zambian Copperbelt, men got housing through their status as workers, and widows had no claim to housing in their own right (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:22). Men tended to pass heritable resources to sons or brothers; when retrenched workers did get houses or land, these belonged to men.

Women were more likely to depend on secondary or informal resources that disappeared following DIDR. In Zambia, when men lost employment and turned to the informal sector, women were displaced from more lucrative informal activities (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:30). Indian women faced increasing drudgery after DIDR in getting fuel, fodder, and water; they lost earnings from forest, agriculture, common property, and non-farm activities (Pandey 1998:93). Indian projects that offered employment as compensation gave few jobs to women. The tendency to ignore the diverse productive resources of resettling populations had particularly negative impacts on women.

Women may also suffer more from the social changes of DIDR. Women who have lived mostly in urban areas often found it difficult to resettle in rural areas; they preferred to stay in town and support themselves through trade. Although life in towns was challenging, women often felt that it offered a bit more autonomy; they could escape customs like widow inheritance in Zambia (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:32). Participating in DIDR programs was also difficult for women, for their obligations in both domestic and productive work gave them less time. In India, when women lost earning opportunities, they sometimes found it difficult to find marriage partners (Pandey 1998).

Yet, women may also be more open to new opportunities since they do not have the same interest in maintaining existing patriarchal traditions. When male household heads at Manantali (Mali) wanted more land, they hesitated borrowing from host-neighbors, since this would indicate political inferiority. In contrast, women had no official authority to lose; their groups easily borrowed land (Koenig and Diarra 1998a). Angolan refugee women assimilated more easily into Zambian society, since they were perceived as less threatening; they undertook new activities as traditional healers and midwives and married into Zambian households (Spring 1982). Women at New Halfa (Sudan) eagerly took up new opportunities like selling milk and appreciated the greater access to water and health

services, shops, and education (Salem-Murdock 1989:14).

There has been some movement toward respecting entitlements for women. At Kibale (Uganda), both male-headed and female-headed households ultimately got some compensation (Oxfam 1996a:22). Indian projects have begun including women in some cases, e.g., single women over the age of 30.

We need to understand better which aspects of DIDR programs create opportunities for women as well as men. Both women and men need to increase production assets and income sources, to have access to training and credit (Thangaraj 1996). Gender impacts need to be understood in the context of regional traditions. For example, in much of Africa, men and women own and use different assets, with little household pooling; in contrast, Asian households may pool more resources and members may work together more.

3.2.3.2 Age

Younger and older people often have different interests in resettlement. While the elderly are often most affected by placelessness, the young may greet resettlement as a chance to escape the control of elders. Elders may see this as an attack on their position, as at Kariba (Zambia), where tensions between fathers and sons became very high (Colson 1971:140).

Youth were often well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities from DIDR projects. Resistance to a thermal power project in Orissa (India) broke down in one village because youth wanted the project and the jobs it offered (Pandey 1998:80). The expanded organization and bureaucracy that accompanied Cree resettlement meant jobs for every high school graduate (Salisbury 1986:127). Taking up new opportunities may also offer youth ways to address social inequities beyond their own village. In India, displacement offered some young people an escape from the constraints of caste (Mahapatra 1999b:211). In Manantali (Mali), the youth who created a new community and market center were in effect fighting a traditional social system that devalued their lineages.

Sometimes, the ease of youth's adaptation to change led to dependency among elders and splits within households. Mahapatra (1999b:210) noted that compensation payments to the father as household head led to problems between fathers and married sons and between married brothers. In other Indian projects, the emotional bonds holding families together were compromised, as the need for money became greater (Thangaraj 1996:231). Pandey (1998) recounted cases of widows abandoned by their children. Yet other evidence suggests that the challenges of resettlement encouraged families to stay together to meet them better; Pandey (1998) found that the number of joint families increased in Orissa (India) after resettlement.

3.2.3.3 Class

Class differences occur when some groups have greater structured access to resources. Simple wealth differences arise when most have access to the same kinds of resources but some have more than others. Elites, with access to more political power, can be found in either situation. None of these differences have been well studied within DIDR.

Wealthier people appear to face resettlement with greater ease. In the TVA (United States), the compensation for larger land owners usually allowed them to buy new farms. Among small farmers, the deduction of back debts and mortgages from appraised value often meant that new farms were insufficient (Satterfield 1937:259,260). In India, larger farmers were more likely to have titles to their farms, qualifying more easily for compensation. They were also better served by strictly monetary compensation schemes. Scudder and Colson (1982: 268) noted that both the rich and self-relocated had a better chance to exert control over their new social and physical environment. Local elites often were able to manipulate project benefits to their advantage because they had better political access and resources. They were more likely to follow entrepreneurial strategies and to use project spin-offs and scheme benefits (deWet 2000:16). Bartolomé (1993:127) found that while the poor were among the best payers of mortgage loans at Yacyretá (Argentina), the largest debtors were some of the better off.

Yet existing elites could be compromised by resettlement. If they became too closely identified with DIDR administration, they could lose position and status. If they resisted too strongly, they showed their weakness. At the Papaloapan dam (Mexico), a new elite, using resources brought by resettlement conditions to reward allies, rapidly replaced traditional leaders (Partridge, Brown, and Nugent 1982:256).

DIDR projects sometimes redistribute resources more equitably. In rural Chinese resettlement, land was found for some resettlers by reallocating plots within villages. Elsewhere, resettlement schemes tried to limit the land available to any one household, in part to discourage absentee landlords. In India, many lower caste resettlers chose not to live with upper caste groups. In Manantali (Mali), many budding entrepreneurs entered commercial activities earlier monopolized by a few traders, spreading the benefits. Existing socio-cultural traditions could make it difficult to invest wealth for individual profit. At Kariba (Zambia), primary investments continued to be wives, livestock, and medicines, since the prospect of sorcery against those who displayed their wealth put a premium on investment in social alliances (Colson 1971). However, if greater equality occurs after resettlement but without planning, it commonly means everyone has become poorer.

Stratification can change quickly with new conditions, as at Bayano (Panama), an isolated frontier that became more integrated into the national system (Wali 1993). Phenomenal population growth in the late 1980s led to a new elite of large landowners and entrepreneurs. Many locals, both colonists and Indians, lost their assets and became proletarian laborers. The integration of groups into national stratification systems after resettlement often puts them at the bottom (deWet 2000; Charest 1982; Pandey 1998). They may also fall behind other locals who used to be their peers. Kin may stop offering

aid if the displaced are too impoverished to reciprocate (Mahapatra 1999b:210). At Rengali (India), people were given the derogatory name ‘people of submerged areas’ which made it more difficult for them to find marriage partners outside the group of resettlers (Mahapatra 1999a:63).

Scudder (1991) argued against including ‘middle-class’ settlers in voluntary settlement schemes, because they were likely to monopolize positions of authority and influence. However, this advice cannot apply to involuntary resettlement. Although many elite neighborhoods and individuals are able to avoid DIDR, many displaced communities do contain people with more power and influence and greater links to national systems. They also include more of the very poor, who are often ineligible for voluntary settlement schemes. Therefore, involuntary settlement projects usually include more differentiated and heterogeneous populations than do voluntary schemes.

Resettled communities typically contain a local class system whose elites have more contact with outsiders and more status within the national system. We need a greater understanding of the workings of local class systems and how local elites can be encouraged to work in the interest of the local community and not uniquely for their own ends. Insofar as resettlement activities can encourage elites to see themselves as integral members of the community, they are likely to increase the ability of the community to put pressure on their governments. Involving local elites is an extension of the common strategy of calling upon emigrants with greater knowledge. Strategies for change that encourage the cohesion of entire resettled communities, across classes, might offer more opportunities for reconstituting livelihoods than those that concentrate on more vulnerable segments. While local elites and lower classes do not have the same interests, they may have common interests *vis-à-vis* other classes or groups on the national scene, particularly in the context of DIDR. Resettlement strategies need to encourage groups to deal constructively with internal differentiation.

3.2.3.4 Ethnicity

Resettled groups are not necessarily ‘communities.’ In fact, the displaced of different ethnic groups may consider themselves distinctive. At Bayano (Panama), the resettlement project treated different ethnic groups differently. The Kuna were allowed to resettle close to the reservoir, but both the Embera and Panamanian colonists were considered destructive of the forest and were resettled farther away. In turn, the Kuna, who had lived in the area a long time and had a reserve, exhibited greater cohesiveness than the Embera (Wali 1989).

Ethnic differentiation played a role in other situations as well. In Manitoba (Canada), the 280 residents of Easterville had difficulty in cooperating on a DIDR legal case because of the different resources and obligations of reserve and non-reserve Indians (Waldrum 1980:178). Pandey’s (1998) study of resettlement projects in Orissa (India) showed that most resettled tribals perceived a more serious deterioration in living conditions after resettlement, in contrast to scheduled or general castes.¹⁰ This was due to

¹⁰While the distinction between general castes and scheduled castes is perhaps best seen as class, that between castes and scheduled tribes can be considered in ethnic terms. Indian anthropologists (Fernandes 1996; Pandey 1998) note the single socio-cultural field linking general and scheduled castes in contrast to the

loss of earnings from forest products, changes in socio-cultural life, unemployment, a growing dependence on the cash economy, and a perception of being cheated by those more knowledgeable about the new environment (Pandey 1998).

Gender, age, class, and ethnicity are not the only lines that divide resettlers. In urban areas, resettled groups may be from different neighborhoods. In metropolitan Manila, different neighborhood groups worked with different NGOs and negotiated varying compensation (Meikle and Walker 1998). Those undertaking DIDR ought to understand the differentiation within groups and the potential conflicts of interest.

3.2.4 Other project-affected persons

Scudder (1996:49) noted four categories of people affected by DIDR: the displaced, the hosts among whom they settle, other river-basin residents, and immigrants. While immigrants usually benefit, the other groups risk negative impacts. Attention has been paid to relocatees and more recently to hosts, but the majority of the adversely affected may be in the third category; sometimes at a great distance from the project site, they are rarely included in projects. Spread over wide areas, they are also less likely to mount effective resistance. The category of other river-basin residents is obviously applicable only to river-basin resettlement. However, all displacement situations contain people not physically displaced but subject to negative consequences.

The non-displaced are affected in many ways. At Sardar Sarovar (India), downstream fisherfolk from Bihar were concerned about the indirect displacement of families dependent on fishing (Appa and Patel 1996:145). The Manantali Resettlement Project (Mali) did a fairly good job of resettling the people in the reservoir area, yet no initiative aided the downstreamers hundreds of miles away when their agricultural systems were affected by the changing river regime (Salem-Murdock et al. 1994). In Canada, Métis communities 97 km downstream from the Squaw Rapids Dam suffered from low and fluctuating water levels, yet the implementation agency claimed publicly that there were no negative downstream impacts (Waldram 1988:62-65). In Kenya, the quarry created for a road project caused property damage from blasting, air and water pollution, and a crater 30 meters deep. Blasting led to permanent damage to the water table, draining wells, boreholes, and the communal cattle-dip. The construction company agreed to restore uncontaminated water to a central well, but independent tests a year later declared the water unsatisfactory for human consumption unless treated (Oxfam 1996b). Pandey (1998) noted the hazards facing those living close to mines and industrial colonies (lowered water tables, lack of potable water, coal dust). Safe drinking water was not available at some river-basin projects (Pandey 1998:103). Local merchants or artisans may lose raw materials, supplies, labor, or clientele. All who use resources in areas affected by DIDR face potentially negative impacts (DeWet 2000:12).

Hosts have gained more attention in recent years but it is important to remember them. Their interests may be in direct conflict with those of resettlers, even though they have agreed to accept displaced groups. Competition arises because of the added pressure

on natural resources, common property, and social services (Pandey 1998; Koenig and Diarra 1998a). To the hosts, displaced people might seem prosperous because of the cash compensation they have received, while the displaced often realize that this cash cannot replace lost assets that hosts still have (Pandey 1998:90). Hosts also complained of lack of consultation by authorities and lack of infrastructure found in resettlement colonies, e.g., wells, schools (Pandey 1998; Diarra et al. 1995).

Displacement disrupts regional economic systems and as such, it interferes with the livelihoods of many different groups, far more people than those immediately and directly displaced. Projects need to establish which of multiple losses merit intervention and reconstitution.

4. FURTHER MEASURES TO DECREASE POVERTY AND ENHANCE DEVELOPMENT

The risks and reconstruction model was especially effective at pointing out ways to increase the availability and utility of economic resources. It addressed the issue of equity between affected groups and others and has been linked to efforts to increase environmental sustainability. It has been less effective at addressing the political aspects of DIDR, including: human rights issues, increasing local autonomy and control, and improving people's ability to influence national institutions. This section first addresses economic areas where improvement is still needed. It then looks at how political aspects of development might be enhanced. The final part looks at a more democratic approach to planning DIDR.

4.1 Economic aspects of livelihood restoration

In 1982, Scudder and Colson (1982:270) noted that governments failed to pay proper attention to how people would make a living in resettlement zones. Cernea's (2000) risks and reconstruction model gave economic resources a key role in reconstituting livelihoods, but, with the exception of land, economic risks continue to be neglected. Cernea (1999) attributed this to the lack of involvement of economists.

Viable economic systems would become more likely with certain technical changes, including the internalization within project budgets of all resettlement costs. Environmental economics provides a model for including full social costs (psychological damage and loss of nonpriced environmental and cultural assets, social cohesion, and market access) (Cernea 1999:14; Pearce 1999:52,53). It is essential to go beyond conventional cost-benefit analysis, which does not take into account distribution of benefits and has some principles inconsistent with sustainable development. Risk analysis needs to be broadened beyond the risk to financial and implementing institutions to recognize risks to all project actors and their distribution (Cernea 1999:16). Introducing a standard format would help planners enumerate full costs and potential benefits (Ericksen 1999:119).

Economic sustainability, including intergenerational equity, needs to be foregrounded so that stocks of capital assets do not decrease. Consideration of these assets

needs to include the stock of skills and knowledge (human capital) and environmental assets (Pearce 1999:59). Hayes (1999) suggested looking explicitly at physical, human, social, and natural capital.

Better data is needed for better planning. Baseline information needs to be gathered on many aspects of the economy and environment. Baseline surveys should include the size and composition of the affected population and analysis of existing levels and sources of household and individual incomes (Ericksen 1999:96). Studies have been particularly deficient on levels and sources of household income and valuing fixed assets. Efforts should be made to analyze and project family and individual income from all sources (Ericksen 1999:111).

DIDR initiatives need to collect contemporaneous data and avoid estimates. Latin American urban resettlement often used unreliable social and economic information from secondary sources (Mejía 1999:166). At Sobradinho (Brazil), existing data undercounted even the size of population (Ericksen 1999:97). At Manantali (Mali), existing data used to estimate land use proved to be serious underestimates. Moreover, African DIDR programs often did not understand how existing production systems worked (Lassailly-Jacob 1996:194). Underestimates of lost resources led to poor projection of resources needed for reconstitution. On-the-ground, in-depth data gathering techniques should be emphasized.

When resettlement occurs in a new area, in-depth knowledge of the receiving environment is needed. For agricultural projects, personnel need to know what agricultural and livestock enterprises to promote, the types and levels of inputs necessary, the time needed to establish new enterprises, and the levels of potential income and risks involved in reaching them. In frontier areas or areas on marginal soils, it is important to assess climatic and biological factors (Ericksen 1999). Assessments of the social and political environment are also needed.

Better data is also needed on potential sources of economic recovery, including greater understanding of the regional economy and existing economic development policies and initiatives (Cernea 1999:13). Studies of multiple packages and new possibilities for more remunerative income-earning activities would be useful. Adding value to existing local products can provide economic opportunities, e.g. soap nuts in the western Ghats of India (Feeney 1998) or fur and fish industries in the Canadian north (Asch 1982:360). Projects would benefit from innovative ideas about income generation and better analysis of their income-earning potential. Doing the economic groundwork well will require more time for forward planning and more resources for local studies.

4.2 Resettlement is carried out in an existing political-economic context

Displacement and resettlement are carried out in the context of national development strategies and within administrative structures with other concerns besides DIDR. Countries have national stratification systems that distribute more resources to some and give some groups more voice in decisions about the future. By being involuntary, DIDR stresses the relatively powerless position of those affected. Development includes facilitating greater autonomy in local affairs and more influence on national priorities and strategies.

The political aspects of development are not addressed in existing resettlement guidelines. Barutciski (2000) attributed this to the fact that the World Bank, required to be 'non-political,' played a lead role in guideline formulation. Yet even the World Bank (2001) has recognized that empowerment is necessary to reduce poverty.

A first step toward a more political-economic approach to DIDR involves understanding existing national development strategies that could influence it. For example, developing countries often had distorted energy and water pricing policies that encouraged large DIDR infrastructure projects; large dams might have been built less often if people had to pay the full price of energy (Pearce 1999:72). On the other hand, some policies may favor displaced groups. The Cree (Canada) were able to be more effective because a new prime minister (Trudeau) worked to create a just society with participatory democracy (Salisbury 1986:32). International concerns also form a context. Indian social scientists arguing for better treatment for displaced tribal peoples referred to ILO conventions adopted by the Indian government (Mahapatra 1999a). Recourse to international agreements has provided a means for displaced people to assert their rights (Barutciski 2000).

Governments also carry out other development initiatives in resettlement zones. Urban resettlement often becomes intertwined with public housing programs (Mejía 1999:154). At Manantali (Mali), DIDR outcomes were affected by the simultaneous implementation of structural adjustment (Koenig and Diarra 1998b). In Indian resettlement colonies, resettler access to existing social welfare and credit programs was enhanced when they became recognized administrative villages (Mahapatra 1999a:99,122). Many Asian, African, and Latin American countries have existing schemes for area development, rural and urban housing, agricultural intensification, etc.

Resettlement agencies should attempt to understand how existing development initiatives may impact resettlement possibilities. In some cases, existing programs may interfere with resettlement strategies, as when the Manantali (Mali) resettlement project planned to use agricultural extension services being phased out by structural adjustment initiatives (Koenig and Diarra 1998b). In other cases, however, cooperation with existing programs and organizations may offer real synergies for restoring livelihoods. Involving existing agencies without co-opting them may help attenuate the resentment of other, often inadequately funded, organizations who work alongside better funded DIDR projects. Analysis of administrative capabilities of different organizations ought to consider explicitly the potential problems of coordination (Rew 1996).

Resettled areas need to be officially incorporated into national administrative structures to increase their ability to participate in political affairs. These structures also provide a forum for hosts and resettlers to work together. In India, resettlement colonies need to become recognized administrative villages to facilitate their inclusion in forms of local self-government (Mahapatra 1999a:94). At Bayano (Panama), the official recognition of the Kuna, with their own reserve, led to better treatment by the resettlement (Wali 1989). Scudder and Colson's (1982) concept of incorporation and the integration offers a useful way to conceptualize the issues.

The resettlement zone is part of a regional economic system that needs to be understood better to anticipate problems and create meaningful job generation programs. Larger political and economic development trends affect resettlement. Karelians benefitted from the post-World War II expansion of the Finnish economy (Mustanoja and Mustanoja 1993). DeWet attributed the viability of some African settlement schemes to the availability of regional administrative and economic capital; “these are essentially serendipitous factors which are in a sense independent of resettlement schemes, although clearly exercising an influence upon them” (deWet 2000:16). Where agriculture and other services are poor, one should expect emigration from resettlement areas. Better analysis of the regional economy and non-resettlement activities may increase the options offered resettlers and broaden possibilities for appropriate implementing agencies (Rew 1996).

4.3 Toward more equitable integration of the powerless

Some analysts consider the integration of people into national economy and society by DIDR as problems, since the powerless and poor are usually integrated at the bottom of a national socio-economic structure. Is it possible to integrate them in ways that offer more relative autonomy and a greater possibility to affect their national system?

Many displaced people want some aspects of integration. Many invested in greater education for their children and made great efforts to get them to school (Scudder and Colson 1982:281; Mahapatra 1999a). Relocates often have seen education as a strategy to avoid marginalization of the next generation. Resettlement jobs have also proved attractive.

Even when people resist economic integration and changing relationships to the state, the expression of resistance may alter how the community interacts with policy makers, creating new relationships and forms of integration, that, if successful, will be on less dominated terms (Oliver-Smith 1996). The Cree (Canada) experience illustrates this seeming paradox. In 1981, the Cree had more autonomy and they felt they had more control over their lives, but they were also more integrated into Canadian society. Literacy improved and cash income increased; they came to think of themselves as Cree more than as individual band members (Salisbury 1986:6,7). Urban resistance movements may also change forms of social and economic integration. Italian-American women who fought urban renewal in 1960s Chicago paved the way for the entry of women into community leadership roles (Squires et al. 1987).

Since resettled groups are internally differentiated, community reconstruction and the creation of effective pressure groups depend upon creating cohesion among persons with disparate needs and interests. A practical strategy may be to start by promoting small homogeneous self-help groups (Feeney 1998:70). Successful cases need to move beyond small groups to three other levels: intracommunity organization, links among different displaced communities, and organizations that join hosts and the displaced (Mahapatra 1999a). Creating cohesion is easier where old structures have been transplanted, but it also needs to be done where there are no previous linkages between residents or between them and hosts. In these cases, tensions, mistrust, and estrangement may result from different ethnic traditions or resource competition, exacerbating the difficulties (Lassailly-Jacob 1996; Mahapatra 1999b), but also making the creation of effective social solidarity and

interdependence more important for long-term development.

4.4 Addressing problematic resettlement administration through democratization

The emphasis on policies and planning has given many resettlement initiatives a top-down character. Rew, Fisher, and Pandey's (2000) report has shown that even if policies are right, good implementation will not necessarily follow. The critique of planning is relevant here; even with the best intentions, planners cannot foresee every eventuality. They usually lack sufficient knowledge about local conditions, they cannot anticipate all the consequences of particular implementation choices, and they cannot foresee independent policy and political changes at the national level. Moreover, the state cannot be treated as a well-meaning, paternalist, or monolithic organization (Marx 1988:22); it needs to be pressured to work in the interests of all its citizens.

"Development as a process of change is basically an assault on the unknown and a creative adaptation of similar experiences from elsewhere, rather than a playing out of conventional procedures" (Ingersoll 1988). More democratic approaches to planning may be the best way to address successfully the constraints of administrative failure and resistance in DIDR initiatives. This section discusses some of the perceived problems in implementing resettlement programs and the potential of democratic approaches to address them and to advance local development.

4.4.1 The "problems"

Planners and analysts have argued that administrative weakness, resistance, and complexity are factors in the weak outcomes of DIDR development programs.

4.4.1.1 Administrative weakness

Policy practice inevitably differs from policy intentions (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; deWet 2000; Koenig 1997). Cernea (1996a:24) noted two linked issues in DIDR implementation: weak implementing institutions and "authoritarianism." Weak institutions lack policy mandates, organizational capacity, and professional social engineering skills. Authoritarian institutions occur where displaced and host populations are not empowered to participate adequately or pressure institutions to work in their interest; affected peoples let themselves be directed or resist through apathy or flight. Effective legal mechanisms may either be absent or simply subverted.

Administrative weakness can appear at any level. Middle management in selected Asian DIDR projects suffered from a lack of direction, legitimacy, and an appropriate range of skills. They needed more preparation in conflict resolution and participatory planning. The multifaceted, highly emotional, and politicized nature of resettlement required flexibility and high commitment, yet administrators became especially risk-averse in light of the high public scrutiny given to DIDR. It was easy to lose sight of the many possible responses and trade-offs and hard to coordinate the many and varied administrative demands and procedural links between organizations (Rew 1996:207-211).

Sometimes, administrative agencies have a history of rent seeking or corruption;

they may lack legitimacy. In DIDR projects in Orissa (India), people accused officials of favoring village leaders and influential resettlers. In some projects, resettlers said they had to pay “under the counter” to get official signatures, and bank officials allegedly charged people to fill out standard forms. Elsewhere, lawyers charged high fees for legal recognition of compensation certificates (Pandey 1998:70, 71). In many cases, people believed that they were not given what they expected or were promised (Pandey 1998). At best, administrative organizations did not do all that was planned; at worst, they lied.

Oxfam faulted lenders for not following their own policy guidelines. At the Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor (Uganda), the EC used bureaucratic rationales to deny responsibility in a project that contravened OECD guidelines (Oxfam 1996a:16-19). The EC also put little effort into action in favor of those evicted from the reserve, contradicting some of the objectives of its aid program (Oxfam 1996a:16). Rew (1996) suggested that organizations do not easily accept responsibility for resettlement; doing good DIDR rarely brings benefits to administrators, but bad DIDR can lead to bad press, even internationally, and seriously affect career prospects.

In public resettlement projects, the state is both the initiator of resettlement and the source of laws and regulations (deWet 2000:10). Laws can be used to pressure resettlement institutions, yet they may be contradictory, leading to arbitrariness in implementation (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998). Both unregulated land regimes and highly centralized ones have directly and negatively impacted on the interests of women, the institutionally weaker, and resource-poor groups (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:76).

Some have suggested that resettlement activities should be decentralized and independent since local officials generally have better knowledge and are often more sympathetic to the displaced (Ericksen 1999:107). In principle, decentralization should be more efficient because decision-makers know more about local conditions, allowing them to match resources and needs more precisely. Decision-makers who live locally should be exposed to more scrutiny and under greater pressure for accountability. There should also be more opportunities for local participation. But empirical data suggest that devolving control will not necessarily improve accountability or efficiency. Local governments do not necessarily give greater priority to human development, and local elites may seize power. In any case, central governments have been reluctant to devolve the funds or decision-making power to permit truly effective local control. Many local governments suffer from insufficient budgets, weak planning and control systems, and lack of administrative competence (Feeney 1998:19; Meikle and Walker 1998). Lack of strong control from above may also open more opportunities for abuse or rent-seeking by local agencies.

Administrative strengthening is needed to help DIDR personnel better meet the challenges of mitigating impoverishment and reconstituting livelihoods. It needs to be accompanied by more democratic approaches to planning, so that institutional strengthening does not come at the cost of improved consultation and participation.

4.4.1.2 Resistance

When people foresee few benefits to displacement, they search for ways to top it or create benefits. People often turn to organized resistance when they do not have political and legal arenas in which to defend, bargain for, and promote their interests, or where policy and legal vacuums give few alternatives to political struggle (Cernea 1996a:28,29).

Resistance appears at various points in DIDR initiatives and has various goals (Oliver-Smith 2001). Some resistance movements aim to stop the development activity requiring resettlement, e.g., the Narmada Bachao Andolan. Other times, people use resistance to obtain better outcomes (Oliver-Smith 1996:89). Resistance may also serve as a protest against a government not considered to be working in the public interest; a poorly designed project may produce rejection of the nation's right to define local agendas. Organized resistance at the beginning may lead to policy and project improvements. Resistance during implementation can correct broken promises, unfulfilled plans, or unanticipated negative consequences (Oliver-Smith 1996:90).

Resistance movements begun locally may create a climate for more thorough-going policy changes. Local resistance movements often develop allies with those outside the community who can make struggles more visible and successful. While communities may envisage issues primarily in local terms, their allies may see a struggle for competing models of development (Oliver-Smith 1996:94). DIDR resistance movements have questioned the development potential of large infrastructure.

Not all resettlement initiatives incite significant resistance. Pandey (1998) found little active resistance to 40 years of DIDR in Orissa (India). Moreover the displaced are not always united in their goals. Resisters at Banharpali (India) failed to get their demands for adequate compensation, resettlement colonies, jobs, and pollution control, in part because of conflicts between older residents and youth who wanted the project and its jobs (Pandey 1998:80). In the Mackenzie Valley (Canada), most Dene were against a natural gas pipeline, but some of the younger generation were attracted by potential jobs (Asch 1982: 351).

Poor people often find it difficult to create effective resistance movements on their own; they need support from NGOs or political parties to be successful (Pandey 1998). The involvement of well-to-do residents also gave resistance movements a greater chance of success; resistance by middle and upper caste groups at Rengali forced the authorities to formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation policy for Orissa state (India). Movements of middle-caste groups received more support from external sources than those spearheaded by scheduled tribes or scheduled castes (Pandey 1998:80). Wealthier residents may have more to lose from resettlement and become effective local protestors when their interests are threatened.

Using the media to convey information is important. During the inquiry on the McKenzie Valley pipeline, Berger persuaded the Canadian Broadcasting Company to broadcast highlights of each day's deliberation in six languages (Funk 1985:124). In Bamako (Mali), civil servant social scientists were among those losing houses when the government destroyed two spontaneous neighborhoods in the mid-1990s. They, with

others, used their contacts to facilitate production of a radio program about this event; retransmission continued over several years until the displaced received compensation.

Sometimes, people organize to manipulate contradictions between administrative structures. Since different pieces of the state have different interests, resisters can play one set of actors against another to achieve immediate gains and long-term policy changes (Oliver-Smith 1996:86-7; Koenig 1997).

People have also used legal systems to combat aspects of the resettlement. Going to court or threat of going to court can bring substantial improvements. In one Indian case, those who went to court got compensation ten times that fixed by the project (Pandey 1998:xviii). In Canada, many Indian groups brought suits; the Cree were eventually awarded \$90 million in compensation (Salisbury 1986:56-60).

People resist resettlement because they recognize the potential for impoverishment. Continued resistance to DIDR should help end projects with little development potential. When DIDR does create benefits, resistance can bring greater development to affected groups.

4.4.1.3 Complexity

Resettlement programs that involve many actors in different activities must be undertaken in a timely fashion and in particular sequence. DeWet (2000) raised the question of whether involuntary resettlement is beyond the control of rational development procedures. Its inherent complexity may create problems not readily amenable to operational and rational planning, predisposing projects to failure. A formal linear view of policy, from formulation to implementation, obscures an understanding of DIDR complexities (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:55).

The combined problems of administrative weakness, justifiable resistance, and complexity require a different approach to resettlement. While planning and guidelines are necessary, they need to be complemented by a democratization of planning and implementation.

4.4.2 Democratization of planning

Democratization is closely linked to participation, but lest participation seem to be a technocratic exercise, the term democratization introduces a political element. Top-down planning alone can never be successful in protecting the interests of the people below, in this case the displaced. At best, it is limited in its perspectives; at worst it is mired in corruption and administrative inefficiency. Planners will work consistently in the local interest only if locals keep consistent pressure on them to do so. Depending on the socio-cultural and political context, pressure may be polite and nuanced, or it can be raucous and confrontational. But if affected people believe they can have a positive impact on the actions of government administrators, private-sector actors, and political operatives, they are less likely to resort to resistance that delays projects over long periods or stops them. The actions needed to democratize DIDR include: increased understanding of democratization and participation, greater transparency in planning, capacity building

among local and administrative organizations, creating coalitions, and increasing choice.

4.4.2.1 Democratizing resettlement through greater participation

Participation has been invoked as a remedy for past failures due to top-down approaches, and as such, has been enthusiastically endorsed by many governments, financial institutions, and bilateral donors. However, there are different levels of practical commitment and different meanings of the term (Feeney 1998). Not all who endorse participation actually implement it. How to make participation more effective is a key issue.

Experience suggests that effective participation means influencing decisions, not simply involvement in implementation; it is an essential component of political life (Feeney 1998:10,15). Practically, participation helps increase the responsiveness and accountability of development initiatives. It needs to go beyond simple 'consultation.' It is most effective when strategies to democratize DIDR build on growing understandings about democratizing in a larger sense and the many contemporaneous experiments in decentralization, deconcentration, and empowerment.

Some agencies feared that participation will lead to cost overruns and delays (Mejía 1999; Meikle and Walker 1998). DIDR planners have also expressed concern that sharing information and consulting affected people will create unrealistic expectations and attract free-riders. Participatory approaches do usually require more time and funds at the beginning to secure the involvement of all affected parties and to work out major disagreements (Bagadion and Korten 1991). Participation requires effort and commitment from donors, governments, and NGOs. It also needs good initial planning, training to increase local capacity, extra efforts to get the input of the especially vulnerable, a clear process for action, open lines of communication, and time to explore alternatives (Feeney 1998). The extra time and effort involved should discourage unjustified DIDR.

Experience shows that up-front effort is not wasted. Genuine participation helps secure local consensus and reduces conflicts, negative social impacts, and later delays. It improves planning and monitoring (Feeney 1998). It builds trust and collaboration, and communities gain a sense of ownership. Despite agency concerns, building community support in this way may actually inhibit free-riders since the community as well as project personnel gain an interest in keeping them out.

Some have argued that participatory approaches to DIDR will complicate implementation further, given the multiple groups, each heterogeneous and including people with multiple interests. Yet Shas (1995:321) has suggested that addressing conflicts of interest in a public forum can avoid the bad decisions of a closed process and the almost inevitable resistance that follows. The presence of all potential stakeholders leads to broader ownership of the implementation process. Public accountability is more likely to lead to competence, caution, and humility among officials than if they work without public pressure (Shas 1995).

Participation cannot simply mean involving locals in actions whose lines have already been dictated by higher levels. Although DIDR may be driven by activities

initiated elsewhere, if people can see that their involvement will lead to tangible benefits and a chance to control resettlement outcomes, the involuntary nature of DIDR may be mitigated. This can occur only if people can actually affect outcomes through a more democratic approach to planning and implementation. Outcomes will not be known in advance and compromises will surely be made.

The process brings the potential for abuse if the more knowledgeable or the more organized can dominate it. “Placing different stakeholders on centre stage as if they are on a level playing field belies a situation in which power relations are extremely unequal, particularly for local people” (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:37). Yet others have argued that participation can change the relationship between locals and other groups. Salisbury (1986:147) suggested that the stress induced by DIDR and the need to organize in response was important in enabling the Cree to rise above factionalism and create a regional organization, which gave them a degree of control over their own destiny after a previous history of powerlessness. Remaining culturally distinct, they restructured the relationship between themselves and larger societal institutions, taking over local administration and service delivery (Salisbury 1986; Feit 1982:404). Participation created local institutions with long-term positive impacts.

Certain conditions need to be met so that affected persons may participate more effectively and equitably in democratized planning. There are also practical consequences for planning, in particular, adopting a learning-process approach.

4.2.2.2 Toward transparency

One of the first conditions of democratic participation is that all interested parties have access to the knowledge necessary to make inferences about potential consequences. The fact that many government agencies decide in secret often forces people to participate by opposition and resistance rather than by bargaining and cooperation (Cernea 1996a:29). The first step in increasing access to knowledge is transparency (Sen 1999). This includes informing people in time about resettlement, legal entitlements and eligibility, due process, and grievance mechanisms (Cernea 1996a:30). It also includes openness about budgets and public expenditures (Feeney 1998).

A second step is instituting clear operating rules that apply to all involved parties. There need to be mechanisms for conflict resolution, arbitration, and redress. The entitlement to a fair hearing and just remedy is a necessary corollary to participation (Feeney 1998). Participation usually works better in societies with democratic space and open debate (Gray 1996:117).

Third, knowledge needs to be disseminated throughout the resettlement, not just at the beginning. Feeney (1998:138) suggested involving the media to convey relevant information on progress and to maintain momentum.

Under pressure from stakeholders, there has been some progress toward transparency. The WCD (2000:176-8) noted that information disclosure has increased from the 1950s through the 1990s, and that transparency linked with public participation has led to improved outcomes. UNICEF has supported local initiatives to demystify

budgets (Feeney 1998:136), and since 1994, the World Bank has mandated that borrowers make resettlement plans available in draft to the public (Cernea 1996a:30). By the early 1990s, Brazil had begun a widely accessible information system on the power sector. Agencies began to show greater openness in decision-making in response to several disastrous resettlement initiatives and concerted resistance to DIDR. Many in the power sector appear to have realized the high economic, social and political costs of corrective actions (Serra 1993).

4.4.2.3 Building capacity

Knowledge by itself is insufficient to create effective participation. People need skills that allow them to participate effectively in a process whose outcomes result from negotiation. Participatory approaches require efforts to build capacity at all levels, including NGOs (increasingly involved in DIDR) and private-sector organizations with a potential role. Much capacity building can use techniques already developed for participatory development.

Administrative authorities need to improve certain skills. Administrative planning is a prerequisite for effective policy advice; in the case of DIDR, this requires that administrators have a clear idea of what they would like to achieve and the ability to consider new solutions (Rew 1996). The administrative organization also needs to understand its particular strengths and weaknesses, those linked to structural constraints as well as contingent features linked to such aspects as the capabilities and personalities of individual personnel. Local administrators also need the ability to collect necessary information (Rew 1996) including details of existing and potential options and areas of cleavage or conflict. Local administration also needs enhanced management skills such as conflict resolution and facilitation in encouraging residents to voice their needs (Rew 1996).

The displaced need training to build their organizational skills so that they can participate more equitably in negotiations. It is rare that existing organizations can simply be transferred to the DIDR situation. Small or isolated populations may find it difficult to create effective organizations. They can often enhance effectiveness by building coalitions with others and developing local umbrella organizations that include multiple local groups. A particularly effective example was the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec; created in the context of James Bay development, it became the political arm of the Cree in 1974. It developed strong internal leadership and created coalitions with outside groups such as the International Rivers Network and the Environmental Defense Fund (Scudder 1996:68-9). Yet building this capacity took time and experience; leaders had to learn to negotiate with fellow politicians and cope with the administration (Salisbury 1986). Among smaller groups, local coalitions could resist more effectively the “divide and conquer” strategies often used by development agencies, for example, persuading a few communities to sign agreements so that it became more difficult for others to refuse (Waldram 1988:175). Over time, an indirect result of Canadian hydroelectric development has been a politically sophisticated Native elite (McCutcheon 1991:128).

Capacity building needs to begin with existing organizations. Feeney’s (1998:50) discussion of Brazilian development initiatives illustrated the problems related to creating

new associations rather than working with existing organizations. Yet, existing organizations may need capacity building programs to build skills to deal effectively with DIDR. Given the conflicts of interest between the displaced and outside organizations as well as among the displaced, capacity building should include skills in negotiation and conflict resolution.

Other groups may benefit from capacity building as well. NGOs have taken on a growing role in development and DIDR, as well as being an essential part of civil society and democratization. Many are committed to participatory approaches, yet there is often a gap between ideology and practice (Feeney 1998:24-27). A small, over-stretched NGO community may not be able to carry out the multiple roles demanded, which have come to include planning, implementation, and monitoring. Small NGOs working in remote areas and with limited experience of democratic process need some basic technical training (Feeney 1998).

Capacity building takes commitment, up-front money at the beginning, time, and appropriate personnel. Some DIDR organizations may not want to fund local organizations that will make them modify existing plans. In this context, international organizations need to foreground the importance of development as a process of increasing local autonomy and political effectiveness. They also need to emphasize the practical aspects of enhanced local organization: greater efficiency, local ownership, potential for local management and sustainability. Many DIDR organizations will not change of their own volition, but will do so under pressure from other interested parties.

To show the immediate value of democratized approaches, involved organizations should try to deliver some tangible benefits promptly. Cernea (1996a:26) suggested that when a project can deliver good resettlement packages quickly, losses and project costs were reduced. Yet spending large sums in a compressed timeframe may sacrifice quality (Feeney 1998:140). A better strategy may be to deliver a few specific, mutually-agreed-upon outcomes, which illustrate not only potential benefits, but also show that democratic, consultative processes can be effective.

4.4.2.4 Coalition building

Even when the capacities of their own organizations are enhanced, often the displaced still have less power to put forward their agendas. They may need to form coalitions with other groups to increase their ability to pressure more powerful groups and organizations. Forging relationships with international organizations has allowed local groups to gain visibility and clout; Gray (1996:117) suggested that strong international backing of local resistance groups was a necessary condition for putting effective pressure on governments and donors. In the case of DIDR, alliances have been primarily with environmental and human rights groups (Oliver-Smith 1996).

Locals can also create coalitions with neighbors and co-ethnics who have left the local area and have complementary knowledge and/or social relationships. In the case of the proposed San Juan Tetelcingo dam (Mexico), local Nahuas called upon emigrants with greater national and international experience to help (Barabas and Bartolomé 1996). In the early twentieth century, the Yavapai Indians of Arizona (United States) called upon a

Yavapai raised as a white, Chicago physician Carlos Montezuma, to advise and lead their resistance to removal (Chamberlain 1975:32). More cosmopolitan co-ethnics have social links to the protestors but more experience with government bureaucracies.

Groups may also create coalitions with other individuals or groups who work in their zone. Anthropologists working with the Cree played a important role (Salisbury 1986:155). At Itá (Brazil), the local resistance organization was supported by the Catholic church and the Rural Workers' Union (Serra 1993:76). Many local NGOs have been active in India (Patel 1995; Das, Das, and Das 1996).

Project administrators, at any level, may become allies. In World Bank funded projects, Gray (1996:117) found that opposition (and alliance) from an influential sector inside the Bank was a condition for effective resistance. At Manantali (Mali), displaced villagers allied with different parts of government (Koenig 1997). In Canadian projects, key individuals in local administrative positions sometimes played important roles. At Easterville, a community development officer became a community advocate. At South Indian Lake, the federal Indian Affairs development officer showed active support for the people and helped community lawyers, risking a reprimand from his superiors (Waldrum 1988). The work of McGill University anthropologists with the Cree was facilitated by anthropologists working for Indian and Native Affairs and the Privy Council office (Salisbury 1986).

Looking beyond international alliances is important because the agendas of large outside organizations have sometimes threatened to overtake those of the displaced. Local organizations within Narmada were split about the priority problem: the immediate resettlement or the larger issue of dam-based development. International organizations seemed more interested in the latter (Koenig and Diarra 2000). Coalitions between environmentalists and local resources users may face problems when the locals want to continue hunting, fishing, or nomadic pastoralism (McCutcheon 1991; Paine 1994). Developing coalitions between national actors helps keep the focus on local concerns.

Social scientists have been somewhat divided on the appropriate role for outsiders. Pandey (1998) looked to NGOs to initiate collective thinking and action at the community level. In contrast, Mahapatra (1999a:116) has stressed the role of People's Organizations; as he said, "the people's institutions are verily, of, by, and for the people, and are fully and directly accountable to the local people." In many cases, outsiders can offer important complementary pressure on agencies that do not want to change how they do business; they also can help build local capacity. The long-term goal of development implies moving toward more reliance on people's own organizations and building their capacity to decide their own affairs.

4.4.2.5 Increasing choice

The goal of democratizing planning and implementation is to increase choice and autonomy; development should expand the freedoms that people enjoy (Sen 1999:3) and reinforce their control over their lives. Sometimes people will choose greater control over more tangible benefits. In the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric Project (India), people refused irrigated land offered by the administration. They chose to move near relatives and

forests. Resettling in clusters close to the forest not only gave them continued access to resources but also allowed them to preserve social networks (Thangaraj 1996:226,227).

Trade-offs between optimal economic and socio-cultural benefits are likely. At Manantali, the project administration set up certain criteria of land and water availability for resettlement sites, but was also committed to resettler choice. When one village insisted on settling close to the dam in a site that met only minimal criteria, project personnel tried to convince them to choose a site with more land. Based on their commitment to site self-selection, administrators allowed them to move to their choice, but the head sociologist believed even years later that the village had made the ‘wrong’ decision. While the village indeed had land problems several years later, many youth had non-farm jobs. The village had evidently believed, in a way that ‘experts’ had not, that jobs were more important, and this village was not in any obvious way ‘worse off’ than its neighbors. All choices are liable to unanticipated consequences, both positive and negative. If people have the freedom to choose, they are likely to cope better with the adverse impacts they will undoubtedly encounter.

The participation of the displaced, organized themselves and allied with others to bring pressure upon implementing agencies, is necessary for successful DIDR. Negotiated and democratic project strategies will undoubtedly lead to less predictable outcomes for DIDR and associated development projects. This is nonetheless needed to move toward situations of real development for the displaced.

5. WHEN DIDR OCCURS: TOWARD BETTER DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

To improve DIDR outcomes, plans for infrastructure development need to be more public, with opportunities for the affected to have input into goals and alternative strategies to achieve them. When displacement-inducing activities are decided, the nature and form of the development programs to improve the lives of the affected need to be decided democratically. Some infrastructure projects are likely to be deferred or canceled because the costs will become too high. Other projects will still occur. This section turns to specific suggestions for structuring DIDR projects to reach the multiple goals of development outlined earlier.

5.1 Moving from a blueprint to a learning-process approach

The postulated benefits to participation have encouraged at least one donor (DfID) to require it. Emphasizing participation meant that most projects promoted a more flexible (i.e., learning-process) approach to implementation, with potential adaptation midstream that recognized the time and unpredictability involved in changing behavior and institutions (Feeney 1998:17). Some are skeptical that this approach can work in DIDR. DeWet (2000:18,19) has questioned whether national authorities and project funders will devolve the necessary control. Because the approach is open-ended and requires more negotiation, project costs are not necessarily clear at the beginning.

Yet projects already change course in mid-stream and adapt policies in an *ad hoc* way. Latin American urban projects frequently changed as they faced unanticipated

consequences, often due to inadequate attention to social context (Mejía 1999:167). Chinese projects were some of the best-planned in a technical sense, but local officials adapted interventions to specific circumstances (Meikle and Walker 1998). The incremental changes of the learning-process approach occurred but without the intention of conscious adaptation.

The planning critique suggests that it is impossible to plan for all contingencies in advance. Top-down planning usually falsely assumes no significant changes in socio-cultural, political-economic, or physical context during the project. A plan created without the participation of local residents devalues their local knowledge. It is better to recognize the contingent nature of social change and envision a framework for action that will be adapted as circumstances change. Given the complexity of DIDR, unanticipated consequences will be the rule. A learning-process approach seems the only way to address systematically unanticipated consequences, to integrate those who suffer negative impacts along the way, and to include those who offer unanticipated solutions.

5.2 Creating resettlement options

Increasing people's options will increase their sense of well-being and control (deWet 2000:4). Options also offer a response to the diverse needs and interests of affected populations. Yet Erickson (1999) found that DIDR projects in rural areas generally offered a single option, a sharp contrast to voluntary resettlement where most projects evaluated two or more economic packages. DIDR options tended either to involve major changes (e.g., from lowland riverbank agriculture to hillside systems, from dryland to irrigated agriculture) (Erickson 1999:112,113), or, in contrast, to assume that people would continue to farm as they had been. Yet incremental improvements offer some of the best prospects for positive change (Kottak 1991). Without capacity-building, people may not have the skills to make radical changes in economic activity. Even with training, they may try new activities experimentally and incrementally.

Projects should consider a wide range of compensation and resettlement options keyed to specific needs (Erickson 1999:119). Cash payments should always be one option. Rural programs should include non-farm activities (e.g., crop processing, marketing, transport, input supply) (Erickson 1999:120). Participation criteria should be developed so that people can be guided to options with a greater likelihood of success. Among the options should be a safety-net for people with compromised prospects for rebuilding livelihoods, e.g., retirement homes for elderly with little social support (NRCR 1999:25).

Projects also need to reconsider how to facilitate options that encourage more affluent people to stay in resettlement areas and use their skills for the benefit of their communities. It is questionable whether the common prohibition against absentee landlords on irrigated perimeters meant to increase equity has done so (Sissoko et al. 1986; Salem-Murdock 1989). Some planners would not like the proletarianization of resettlers in China, where hosts with labor shortages for their factories welcomed resettlers into their villages because they needed workers (Meikle and Walker 1998).¹¹ The issue of what new

¹¹Chinese hosts were also keen on accepting resettlers when they could change residence status from rural to urban, a tangible benefit since urban residence status gave superior benefits (Meikle and Walker 1998).

stratification systems might or should look like in resettled communities has not been sufficiently addressed. While moving toward more equitable social systems is an integral part of development, it is nonetheless unrealistic to expect that resettled communities would be egalitarian when few if any of the surrounding communities are (cf. Scudder 1981).

Projects should borrow and adopt appropriate ideas from other projects or countries. Indian social scientists have argued for adopting the Chinese strategies for negotiating simultaneously with individuals and groups and compensating for community resources (Mahapatra 1999a:95). Chinese collective land ownership might be a model for areas trying to change informal customary tenure to something more formalized, e.g., West Africa. It is risky simply to borrow institutions and insert them into a different socio-cultural context, but they can be used to help think through new alternatives and options.

At its best a learning-process approach can integrate new possibilities even in midstream. New human, financial, or environmental resources can be capitalized upon as they appear. New small or medium-scale enterprises that wish to locate in the resettlement zone might be offered incentives if they train and hire the displaced. Options should allow people to mix different activities to create economic strategies using individual and family constellations of capacities and knowledge. A learning process approach is likely to improve overall success by building on the sense of ownership of affected persons, if they can change projects to adapt to their needs.

5.3 Personnel requirements

Most of the DIDR projects studied by Ericksen (1999:105,106) had primary implementing agencies with mandates oriented almost exclusively to infrastructure installation. In recent years, the involvement of social scientists specializing in resettlement has grown. Yet DIDR projects still need a broader base of personnel. DIDR should be based on knowledge of a wide range of approaches to achieving economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable development. Resettlement implementation teams should include not only specialized Resettlement Officers (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000), but also experienced rural or urban development specialists. Erickson (1999) and Feeney (1998) offer two examples of the insights brought to bear on DIDR by those with wider experience. Ericksen's comparison of voluntary and involuntary resettlement drew upon extensive experience in agricultural development and pointed to new ways of thinking about rural development within DIDR. Feeney's work on human rights coupled with deep knowledge of foreign assistance bureaucracies provided a basis for recommendations on ways to improve participation.

The question of personnel needs to be complemented by consideration of optional organizational structure. Rew (1996) analyzed the benefits and costs of a variety of organizational frameworks. Most commonly more than one agency is involved, although the relationships between the agencies and the mix between conventional public administration and specialized resettlement agencies can vary widely. The involvement of NGOs is growing and private-sector agencies may also be involved. The particular mix appropriate for a given DIDR initiative will depend on the socio-cultural, administrative and political context.

5.4 The costs of enhanced resettlement projects

Resettlement projects oriented to development are expensive. Costs include replacement of assets, income compensation during transition, added investment to secure accelerated development, moving costs, and administrative and transaction costs (Pearce 1999:63,64). There may also be costs associated with consultation and participation, field studies, housing design, land acquisition, transactions with hosts, social assistance, and land titling (Mejía 1999:171).

The enhancements recommended in this paper will likely render DIDR more expensive through more and better technical assistance, longer development initiatives, and greater training. Nevertheless, there do seem to be payoffs. The World Bank review showed DIDR projects with high financial allocations to be free of major difficulties while virtually all projects with low financing faced serious problems (Cernea 1999:23).

Enhancing DIDR through greater democratization means greater costs at the beginning, but the possibility of fewer costs over time as people take ownership. Greater democratization should decrease grievances due to lack of participation, which can lead to delays and higher costs. Reconstituting lives promptly should also mean a shorter transition, reducing losses and lowering long-term costs.

Increased and unanticipated costs in DIDR are not a new issue. Mejía (1999:170, 171) noted that actual costs were often 300 to 400% higher than initial estimates in conventionally designed Latin American urban projects. It is indeed difficult to assess appropriate compensation for host communities and other affected persons not actually displaced. Some categories of costs can be anticipated but the ultimate amount needed is uncertain (Pearce 1999). Only with experience will agencies be able to estimate what, if any, additional costs are incurred by a learning-process approach.

There are other questions as well. Should all costs be carried up-front by the national government in the case of public projects or by the private investor in the case of private ones? Should international donors be expected to pick up costs that cannot be met locally? It would seem reasonable to look for ways to supplement funding from other sources.

Benefit-sharing, where people benefit directly from revenues generated by the DIDR initiative requiring displacement, offers some promise. A percentage of sales revenues in the energy sector has been allocated to resettlers and the local administration in China, Colombia, and the Philippines (Van Wicklin 1999:237). Those who benefit directly from DIDR can be required to pay for resettlement and development through charges on output, e.g., higher electricity or irrigation fees (Pearce 1999:72). These revenues come post-project, but they can be used to repay loans used for resettlement activities. Foundations can also be established to benefit relocatees (Feeney 1998:121).

Funds can be generated for new development initiatives developed midstream to address unanticipated consequences. Should an administration provide services first or instead create employment so that people can demand and pay for services? Salisbury

(1986:141) suggested that this is a false problem; an enabling regional society that hires local people can provide employment and services. Salisbury (1986:140) noted that the subsidies to the Cree to provide their own services were not noticeably greater than the cost to the taxpayers of services previously provided by transient whites.

If DIDR development programs want to increase local autonomy, they might allocate local communities the rights to levy taxes or procure rents and royalties. This approach links national programs of decentralization to resettlement projects. In China, local units with human and financial resources undertook resettlement activities in line with national guidelines but adapted to local circumstances (Meikle and Walker 1998). Where decentralized institutions already exist, e.g., American Indian reservations, experience shows that locals can earn from their resources. The Navajo Nation (United States) acquired Paragon Ranch for coal mining and electricity generation, the income from which they planned to use to aid relocatees (Aberle 1993:185). To be sure, decentralization programs need more elaboration in many countries. In the Philippines, local governments were given new responsibilities without sufficient capacity or resources, and they performed poorly in regard to the resettlement. Decentralizing countries need to solve the problem of local financing and build local administrative capacity.

Some of the financial problems of DIDR may be addressed by a more participatory, learning-process approach. While some have argued that resettlers should not have to bear any costs because they are being involuntarily moved, others argue that this creates a spirit of dependency. In particular, some have argued that participation in housing reconstruction gives people a sense of ownership over new residences. Empirical evidence shows that simply giving people a house can create problems when the house is very different from the previous one. Real participation and real control over resettlement so that people can adapt benefits to individual needs may make people willing to bear some time and money costs. While this should not become an excuse for outside organizations to lower financial commitments, autonomy and control can substitute for some economic benefits.

5.5 Further research needs

While existing literature is substantial, more still needs to be done to decrease impoverishment and reconstitute livelihoods. Major outstanding research questions include:

- 1) how to create jobs for the displaced, including the role of small and medium-size private-sector firms in job reconstruction;
- 2) how to reconstitute urban economic and social systems, including better strategies for income-generation;
- 3) the particular characteristics of private-sector infrastructure development and resettlement; how the private sector uses legal structures and a better understanding of the use of courts in resistance;
- 4) the conflicts of interest and lines of differentiation among resettled populations. Of special concern is finding ways to encourage local elites to work in the interests of their communities.

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