Flowing into the state:
Returning refugee youth and citizenship in Angola

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Abstract

This paper considers citizenship in its non-legal sense, using Angola as a case study and focusing primarily on returning refugee youth and the manner in which reintegration programs are designed and implemented in light of the transition to democratic governance. Through interviews with United Nations and non-governmental organisation officials in Geneva, analysis of policy material and country reports and a review of both theoretical and country-specific literature, this paper suggests that outdated notions of childhood development still widely inform the manner in which youth are treated today. It explores education as a means through which this process is manifest, in both UN and Angolan domestic policy. It also questions the ability of education in and of itself to address the needs of young people in a post-conflict setting in which civil and social institutions have been widely ruptured. It calls for the engagement of refugee youth in the process of their repatriation at the earliest possible moment, and highlights the need for a reframing of young people such that their contributions to Angolan and international society are recognized and their ‘citizenship’ consequently validated at an experiential level.

Glossary

1951 Convention 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
AU African Union
CCF Christian Children’s Fund
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
DDR Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration
EU European Union
FNLA National Liberation Front of Angola
HRW Human Rights Watch
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IOM International Organisation of Migration
JRS Jesuit Refugee Trust
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF Médecins Sans Frontiers
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RET Refugee Education Trust
SADC Southern African Development Community
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank
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Introduction: a gap of citizens

This is a paper about citizenship, about international organisations and about returning refugee youth in Angola. In post-conflict states, populations are quickly divided, labelled, and responded to by international organisations according to their perceived vulnerabilities and needs (Ohanyan 2008, Zetter 1991). Refugees, by virtue of the 1951 Convention on the Protection of Refugees (hereafter 1951 Convention) fall under a legal regime that offers protection provided that the individuals concerned have crossed an international border and can demonstrate a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ (Shacknove 1985, Zetter 1991). After peace has returned to a given territory, however, international law encourages refugees to go ‘home’ – a process which Anders Stefansson (2004: 74) has warned can sometimes be as disruptive and traumatic as displacement itself. Though returning refugees are almost always ‘made’ citizens in the legal sense, this paper seeks to understand what else comprises citizenship. Approaching the subject with the lens of anthropological experience, it considers how – if at all – international organisations operating in Angola conceptualize citizenship with regards to those broadly circumscribed as ‘youth.’ It takes as an understanding of ‘citizen’ “a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of [this] membership” (SEP 2006, see also Kymlicka 1995, Gibney 2004).

Angola was chosen as a case study for three reasons. Firstly, the civil war that began with independence movements in 1961 but officially lasted between 1975 and 2002 was such that the majority of the Angolan population had up until 2002 never experienced a country ‘at peace.’ The literature existing on Angola is focused primarily on war, on humanitarian programming, and on the extraction of natural resources with an apparent ‘gap’ around Angolan people (Chabal and Vidal 2007). Secondly, since 2002, approximately half a million Angolans have returned to the state, many of them youth who were born or who spent the majority of their lives in neighboring countries (UNHCR 2008: 1) and large-scale return is likely to continue. Finally, the nature of the conflict in Angola and the presence of approximately fifteen million landmines as of 1998 (Ukabiala 1999) has hindered many attempts at field-based research. According to Justin Pearce, this, combined with damaged infrastructure and suspicion on the part of relevant authorities, meant that the country was effectively closed to researchers until very recently. This means there is now a need for careful empirical research to assist in the development and implementation of new policies and programs (HRW 2003). This paper hopes to lay the foundation for such work.

Nine interviews were conducted in Oxford and in Geneva in March 2010 to provide primary data, six with members of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and one each with

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1 This paper was originally a dissertation submitted as part of an MSc in Forced Migration completed through St. Antony’s College, Oxford. I wish to thank my supervisors, Drs. Jo Boyden and Oliver Bakewell, for their guidance and patience during that process, as well as the rest of the staff at the RSC. I am tremendously grateful to the nine people who agreed to be interviewed in Geneva and whose thoughts inform this paper at every level. Equally, this would not have been possible without funding and continual support from the Rhodes Trust and Rhodes community. Finally, I thank Justin Pearce for his willingness to share his abundant knowledge at every moment, and Nina Hall whose friendship and insight completely transformed the period in which this paper came into being.

2 Usually through the issuance of identity documents.

3 This figure is contested, however, and it is difficult to know how many landmines were really placed.
representatives of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) and the Refugee Education Trust (RET). These interviews have been used alongside an analysis of academic theories of youth and organizational policy to suggest that ‘stage theory,’ developed by the Swiss psychologist-philosopher Jean Piaget in the early twentieth century, still influences the approach that international organisations take towards youth today. Youth is a contested category (Eybar and Ager 2004, Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2005, Hart 2008) and in this paper I rely primarily on the definition of the United Nations as lasting from age 15 to 24 (UN 2010). However, I am also cognizant of the definition used by the African Youth Charter that therefore bears relevance in Angola and categorizes youth as those between 15 and 35 (Preamble, African Youth Charter).

In the first section, I look briefly at the history of Angola, paying particular attention to the role of youth within it. The second chapter considers theoretical constructions of youth over the last two centuries and demonstrates the tenacity of early 20th century psychology in influencing societal views of youth and young people in the present. It also considers the extent to which language alienates refugees in its semantic constructions, as explored by Liisa Malkki, and the effect of this ‘double discrimination’ on youth. It considers Mats Utas’ formulation of ‘abject heroes’ as an alternative lens through which to view young people in spaces of alterity that allows for recognition of their agency. The third chapter explores nationalism as an enactment of citizenship, focusing on the role that it has assumed as a tool of nation-building in post-colonial Africa and assessing its usefulness when invoked in situations of refugee return.

The fourth and final chapter focuses on international organisations and the extent to which they are involved in the production of citizens through their interventions within states. I address education as an overarching theme, demonstrating that this is an ongoing process occurring whether or not young people are enrolled in formal institutions. This exacerbates the need for programs focused as much in the present as they are on the future, as without such grounding, the risk is to allow for the continual postponement of liberal democratic reality. My conclusion is simple, yet it has significant implications for the formulation of return programs throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It is that youth must be engaged in the repatriation process from before they leave their country of asylum, that their skills must be recognized, incorporated and developed on arrival. They be listened to and above all, exposed to governance structures appropriate to liberal democracy. If this occurs, Angola’s ‘gap in citizens’ after three decades of war and five centuries of colonial rule revoked the possibility of democracy, may well be filled. Under such circumstances, youth may mature as competent, engaged members of society committed to the principles of liberal democracy on which much of the contemporary world is run. If it does not, it is unlikely that Angola, and other countries facing similar challenges, will change for the better in any significant way.

As it stands, rather than focusing on youth as present citizens in both time and space, I suggest that international organisations rely primarily on education to teach the norms of liberal-democracy in

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4 I attempted to interview representatives from UNDP and UNICEF, but unfortunately these did not prove possible.
5 This research focuses primarily on United Nations (UN) organizations; specifically, these are the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). However, I use the term broadly to include organisations outside of the UN system such as Save the Children, USAID and the Jesuit Refugee Services.
incremental phases. Though education of this kind is undeniably of great importance, I argue that this is a narrow view of what is needed in many cases. Rather, the current context in which young people operate must be acknowledged as the terrain in which citizenship is practiced on a daily basis. Were this simple awareness incorporated into the policy and programs that relevant organisations develop, I suggest that the integration of returnee refugee youth would occur far more quickly, with positive implications for the continuing development of the post-conflict Angolan state.

1 Youth in civil war

“*The Colonel talked to me about the women coming back to look for their husbands. What if a woman came back with a child fathered by someone from the other side, would they welcome her, I asked.*

*He gave me that non-smile.*

*‘To accept a woman who is carrying another man’s child – that’s all part of national reconciliation,’”* (Pearce 2005: 173).

This chapter provides a brief history of Angolans and Angola from the fifteenth century to the present, paying particular attention to the civil war of 1975-2002. It gives extra attention to the role played by young people during three decades of armed conflict. This historical context is necessary in order to understand the situation faced by returning refugees, ex-combatants, and civilians who stayed in Angola (stayees) throughout the war. History, of course, has shaped the manner in which international organisations have been able to operate within the state, which also informs their current programs. The acceptance of “another man’s child” described above is representative of the many acceptances that must be asked of post-war populations in attempts to recreate social fabrics after war.

Angola prior to the civil war

A comprehensive history of Angola is beyond the scope of this paper, but certain key moments need highlighting. For the seven centuries before the civil war, Angola was part of the BaKongo kingdom of South-Western Africa, trading extensively throughout the region (Fage 2001). In 1575, Luanda – now Angola’s capital – was demarcated formally by Paulo Dias di Novais (Bender 2004: 137) and in 1885 the Berlin Conference officially sanctioned what would amount to nearly five centuries of Portuguese colonial rule. Characterized largely by the ‘degradado’ ('degraded') system of penal colonial expansion (i.e. the removal of prisoners and societal delinquents to the outskirts of the empire), Portuguese rule was exceptionally harsh, often chaotic, and based almost exclusively on resource exploitation (Bender 1978).

Relations between the Portuguese and the Angolan populace were strained, unequal, and often violent, prompting Galvao de Melo to go as far as to conclude that “[w]e benefited little from Africa and Africa benefited little from us. The Portuguese people and the African people remain unknown to each other: foreigners” (in Bender 2004: 224). Portugal’s attitude towards its colonial subjects until the 1970s was such that non-Portuguese rarely received higher education. As a result, when the Portuguese left Angola in 1975, there were very few people with the skills required to run the national administration.

The civil war: 1975-2002
The first hints of Angolan independence came in 1961 but were rapidly quashed by the Portuguese state apparatus and did not have major ramifications either within Angola or elsewhere (Eyber and Ager 2004: 196). Three liberation movements existed: the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Each was associated with a particular territory but their leadership was either underground or in exile. A coup d’etat in Portugal on 24 April 1975, however, altered the situation radically with the colonial state deciding to withdraw from all of its overseas territories as quickly as possible (Chabal and Vidal 2007).

An original power-sharing agreement was created between the three liberation movements, but it broke down rapidly – primarily due to the FNLA and MPLA accusing one another of attempting to seize power outright. By August, the country was effectively divided by region and many civilians were caught up in the conflict, leading to the first movements of refugees. UNITA called on the assistance of the South Africans, and when Cuba began to aid the MPLA, the United States joined the fracas, thereby making the Angolan war an important Cold War proxy conflict (Gleijeses 2002, Bender 2004, Malaquias 2007, Chabal and Vidal 2007).

UNITA held the city of Huambo and it was there that the Portuguese flag was lowered in a football stadium and that of UNITA raised in its stead in a ceremony at midnight on 10 November 1975 in which no single Portuguese was present (Bridgland 1986: 123-133).

The United Nations in Angola
On 22 December 1988, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was established in order to facilitate the independence of Namibia. Comprising 70 military observers and 20 civilian officials, it had a 31-month mandate to supervise the withdrawal of approximately 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola (Malaquias 2007: 88). According to Daniel Spikes, this agreement was linked entirely to the collapse of Soviet Union and had little to do with Angola itself (Spikes 1993: 322). Subsequently, the mandate would be extended through UNAVEMs II and III to include the monitoring of the MPLA-UNITA ceasefire outlined in meetings in Bicesse, Portugal. On 31 May 1991, Savimbi and the leader of the MPLA, Eduardo dos Santos, met in Lisbon and signed the Bicesse Accord. Under the supervision of UNAVEM II, this accord paved the way for elections in 1992 and was intended to bring peace to Angola. The MPLA won the elections, but they were contested by UNITA and the country rapidly descended into an even more violent phase of civil war (Birmingham 2002: 173). This period was nominally resolved with the 1994 Lusaka Accord but in practice, continued until Savimbi was assassinated in 2002. The UN thus played "no more than a ceremonial role" (Pearce 2007: 3) in the process that eventually bought the conflict to an end.

Reflecting on the role of the United Nations during this time, Anstee observed that:

"The problem with the engagingly simple – and very possibly simplistic – approach is that when you try to follow the precepts, reality has the uncomfortable habit of getting in the way. […] Democracy cannot be created overnight, least of all in places with a long history of authoritarian rule or civil war" (1996: 127).

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6 Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola.
7 União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola.
8 Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola.
9 The United States had and continues to have significant interests in Angolan oil.
Anstee describes her sense that the international community wanted a ‘quick fix’ solution that did not entail engaging in long-term, complex negotiations, evinced by the under-funding of the program and the UN itself not having the foresight to refuse a mandate it could not fulfill (Pearce 2007: 22). From 1998 onwards, the UN played merely the role of commentator and observer in which its “muted criticism of Angolan government strategy had little effect” (Pearce 2007: 24).

**Youth in the Angolan war**

Demographic data relating to young people in Angola are not consistent, due in part to the destruction of most civil registries during the war and a lack of clarity regarding the term ‘youth’ itself. Little research has focused directly upon young people, meaning that there is a paucity of empirical sources that address their experiences during the conflict. Some of the ambiguities surrounding youth’s positionality during the conflict as both guilty and innocent aggressors and victims is explored in the following chapter; here I simply provide the context. In this section, I draw on three primary sources focusing directly on Angolan youth: Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) 2003 report on child soldiers, Carola Eyber and Alastair Ager’s 2004 study of discourses of trauma, and a Rapid Assessment conducted by USAID Angola in 2006.

USAID (2006: vii) notes that as of 2006, sixty percent of Angolans were under the age of 20, meaning that two thirds of the population had experienced only four years of peace in their lifetimes. The 14 to 24 year-old cohort were estimated at 2,944,000 or 19.3 % of the total population in 2001 (USAID 2006: 5). In traditional, pre-war society, rites of passage at puberty marked the onset of juventude (youth) – the end of which was contingent on marriage and social positioning and varied across regions (Eyber and Ager 2004: 197). Virtually all youth experienced extreme violence and uncertainty during the war, with most houses being razed and / or villages attacked leading to displacement (CCF 2005: 31). Many young people, particularly late adolescents but also children of all ages, were kidnapped and forced to serve (according to their gender) either as soldiers or sexual partners, and occasionally as carriers, cooks, and messengers (HRW 2003: 8-14, CCF 2005: 53, Pearce 2005: 142). Most youth had witnessed the death of at least one family member and multiple friends (HRW 2003: 9, CCF 2005: 23) and in Eyber and Ager’s study, conducted in year 2000, 71% exhibited symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result (2004: 202). It is impossible to determine precisely how many youth were displaced, but my interest lies in the post-conflict reintegration process, in which the effects of war on the total population should be taken into account.

During the conflict, religious institutions, particularly the Catholic Church, assumed responsibility for providing what little formal education was available. Frequently the scale of displacement was such that there was none (USAID 2006: 9). Eyber and Ager (2004: 199) describe growing up in Angola during the war as one in which the daily reality was of extreme uncertainty and the fear of death at any moment was a common experience. Those who were involved in military bodies learned to operate with regard to patronage and in command-leadership structures, which USAID claim have left a “lingering inertia […] in which youth are unprepared to build things” (USAID 2006: 25). I do not have evidence to either refute or support this claim, but it highlights the need to consider the ways in which socialization in periods of war might inform the manner in which young people engage with mechanisms of government and civic institutions (Eberly and Gal 2007: 77).

Eybar and Ager (2004), Stavrou (2005), and Porto et al. (2007) are notable exceptions.
Eyber and Ager write of tensions between youth and older generations based in part on frustration that adults had not been able to find solutions to the problems the country faced. They cite one informant, a displaced elder who said "[o]ur problem now is that we os mais velhos [the elders], here, are also struggling with life… The young people say that our traditions are outdated. But the reason why we don’t manage to resolve our problems is because of the war" (2004: 198). Eyber and Ager demonstrate that large-scale displacement has lead to shifts in the way that generations interact with one another, with youth often becoming the main income-generators in households though informal trading in urban areas and therefore demanding some say in how households are managed (ibid). They agree with the findings of the USAID’s report and Porto et al. in reporting that young people returning from combat sometimes found it difficult to communicate in the manner of civilians (Eybar and Ager 2004: 199). Yet they emphasize that far from being passive, youth “lived full, multi-dimensional lives that involved work and educational leisure activities as well as […] relationships within and outside of their household circles” (Eyber and Ager 2004: 203).

João Porto, Chris Alden and Imogen Parsons (2007) have written one of the few studies that explore the experiences of young Angolans who served as soldiers on both sides of the civil war in depth, though even their study is unable to ascertain exactly how many young people were active combatants. They write of the importance of societal demilitarization that must come from a commitment by all to resolve conflict using non-violent means. This study is the most comprehensive done on youth in Angola and considers some of what is required in reintegration between all young people, framed as the “emergence of a new social contract [to create] the institutions and culture of good governance” (2007: 1).

Porto’s book and recent work by Justin Pearce (2010) on the history of what took place in the Angolan war demonstrate that it is still difficult to gain an accurate sense of what happened in many of the small, guerrilla-battles of the conflict. Porto et al. focus on the Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR) of soldiers in areas they could access and that had reliable records as case studies (2007: 49). Disarming soldiers is a tangible manner of addressing recent history, but as with most conflicts, it may take many decades before “truth” comes to light and people are able to speak about the past. As one Baptist minister explained in a media interview:

“We need to disarm our minds first. We need agreement on what kind of life we want to live, what kind of society we want. What kind of nation we want to be… Many Angolans, especially the younger ones who were born in the 70s and 80s, know nothing else except the war… We have to make sure that people don’t think that that is the normal way of life, that there is a proper way of living without conflict” (in Porto et al. 2007: 33).

This chapter has provided a brief history of Angola, focused primarily on independence and the subsequent civil war. It has framed the UNAVEM missions that constituted unsuccessful attempts to bring peace to the region, and has highlighted the involvement of all young Angolans, and indeed all Angolans, in the conflict. It has acknowledged some of the generational tensions emergent from changing social roles post-displacement and has emphasized gaps in existing literature on young people in Angola, but also about Angola more generally. As I have demonstrated, violence and displacement occurred to such an extent post-conflict there has needed to be a process not of national reconstruction but of nation re-creation, based on understandings of democracy to which very few people have been exposed. In so doing, it has established the context in which the following analysis is written. Primarily, this thesis is an
attempt to understand how the bond between state and populace that has been said to break during displacement (Shacknove 1985) is recreated. Young Angolans, the citizens of what is now a liberal democracy, must acquire instantly the social capital required for ‘a proper way to live without conflict.’ This section has outlined why it may be challenging for them to do so given the historical context – the rest of the thesis looks forward to how it will be possible.

2 Praise and fear

“Citizen did not start like that. When they first brought him, it was Elizabeth, my big daughter, who went down there and brought him. When Mr. Moses see him, how the water fell from his eyes. He said, “Yes, yes, let the boy come.” But now I worry. It is too much for him. Most people will not let a child like Citizen near the house after what he’s done. They cannot stand the sight of them. They believe they are little devils. Bad bush” (Jarret-Macauly 2005: 19-20).

The quote with which I begin comes from a novel entitled Moses, Citizen and Me which traces the gradual re-integration into the family unit of Citizen, an eight-year-old boy who served as a child soldier in the Sierra Leonean civil war. As the title suggests, the allegorical imperative is hardly subtle, and speaks directly to popular discourses of childhood, nationhood and salvation. In this rubric, Citizen is precisely the antithesis of popular conceptions of childhood within contemporary Western society, conceptions emanating from the British Victorian era but now ubiquitous in much of the world. ‘Citizen’ is an eight-year-old who brutally murdered his grandmother, ‘Me’ is the narrator, an “ordinary British woman” and distant relative of the other characters (Jarret-Macauley 2005: 21), and Moses is Citizen’s grieving grandfather. By spending time with Citizen, the narrator restores to him his ‘citizenship’ as cast in Western norms of liberal democracy based on the nuclear family unit (Aries 1962). The novel successfully plays on tropes of innocence, potential and otherness that are pervasive in Western constructions of youth and adolescence, particularly so when relating to Africa.

In this section, I engage these tropes in order to demonstrate that significant tension exists between the ‘praise’ and the ‘fear’ of youth in sub-Saharan Africa in theory and in the manner in which they are perceived by governance structures and international organisations. Whilst they are understood to embody the ‘fate of nations,’ (Boyden 2008: 8) they are also feared due to their perceived lesser moral competencies (Piaget 1947), all-too-common marginalization, and at times exposure to violence (Argenti 2002: 124). Whilst youth themselves negotiate their allegiances and socio-political citizenship in complex and nuanced ways, they tend to be classified in dichotomizing structures that cast them, to borrow the titles of two recent volumes on youth, as ‘vanguards or vandals’ or ‘makers and breakers’ of the state (Abbink and Van Kessel 2005, Honwana and de Boeck 2005, respectively). Education is often used in rhetoric and in practice as a mechanism to ensure that youth become ‘vanguards’ of liberal democracy and acquire appropriate skills to ‘make’ and to participate both in the economic and political domain. Yet frequently this proves to be rhetoric that is used as a distraction from the core issues that underlie democratic practice in fragile post-conflict states, namely, accountable governance and the development of a sustainable labour market.
**Stage theory**

The work of the twentieth-century psychologist-philosopher Jean Piaget (1896-1980) has had a profound influence on the manner in which children are conceptualized in the contemporary world. He suggested that children came to maturity in chronological stages that culminated in their fulfilment as ‘adults’ in their late teens and early twenties (c.f. Hart 2006: 7, Evans 2009: 21). For him, a child should be ‘carefree’ – playing games that allowed for the development of both the physical body and moral judgment. Known as ‘stage theory,’ this model divides childhood into several distinct phases during which particular physical and intellectual skills are acquired (Beirens 2008: 145-6). It judges the level of a child’s development according to the notion of a “cognitively competent and rational adult” (Beirens 2008: 146). Notably, stage theory informed the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which emphasizes the benefit of schooling over work, despite the many pedagogical benefits that particular kinds of work entail (ibid., Temba and de Waal 2000, Bourdillon 2006). Piagetian thought has been enormously influential in subsequent policy relating to children and youth across the globe (Hammarburg 1997).

Piaget’s theories contributed to a sense of childhood and adulthood being “almost opposite each other” (Hendrik 1997: 153) and have informed a widespread perception of children as people who need to be guided towards adulthood in age-appropriate ways whilst simultaneously being ‘protected’ from negative external influences (c.f. Newman 2005: iii). Lev Vyotsky, however, critiqued Piaget, saying that “children’s development and experiences of childhood are shaped by understandings of child development, [available] routes to maturity as well as [what is entailed in] maturity itself” (Beirens 2008: 150). A Vyotskian theoretical framework, therefore, opens space for research on the actual experiences of children rather than their passage through proscribed phases of development. It also allows for recognition that actions undertaken by young people in many parts of the world entail a level of responsibility not typically ascribed to their age-contemporaries in many Western regions (Honwana and de Boeck 2005: 7). In most societies, children, as Michael Bourdillon suggests, are “repositories for sentiments such as altruism, care and long-term commitment” (2006: 1203). Though frequently still perceived as passive victims rather than engaged agents of their own futures (Galperin 2002: 105, Honwana 2006: 51), they nonetheless occupy a place in which forgiveness – as in the case of Citizen, described above – is generally possible.

**Youth in conflict as extenuated liminality**

The terrain of youth is more ambiguous. Youth know more than children yet not as much as adults, and consequently, the degree of responsibility ascribed to them for their own actions is frequently difficult to ascertain, particularly when long-standing social fabrics have been ruptured and the community-based or physical infrastructure needed to maintain them has been severely altered (Diouf 2003). Like childhood, youth is a contested category. Legal definitions vary across countries and regions but are always based primarily on age criteria. By contrast, social and cultural understandings are more diverse and frequently describe roles and responsibilities performed by individuals, and are usually gendered (Sommers 2001b, Zimba 2002, Mgqolozane 2009, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010). In almost all societies, however, childhood – though transient – is delineated clearly. Youth, in contrast, tends to be liminal in the anthropological sense of being ‘betwixt and between’ (Turner 1987) the experiences of being a child and being an adult.

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11 Children are understood as per the CRC as being those below the age of 18.

12 For example, the African Youth Charter conceives as ‘youth’ as between 15 and 35, the Indian National Youth Policy as between 13 and 35, the Canadian Youth and Child Advocacy Act, between 16 and 19.
Significantly, the beginning of youth (both in legal and usually in socio-cultural terms) overlaps with childhood as defined by the CRC so that some youth receive the protection of this instrument and others do not. In Newman’s words "[t]hey [youth] are not yet considered full social adults [which] means they are denied many of the rights and protections associated with adulthood" (2005: iv).

Most societies have markers that determine the end of youth, whether this be through voting, graduation, marriage, bearing children or other rites (Van Gennep 1960: 65). These markers make public the change in status between one life phase and another, such as from youth to adult – in Angola usually happening at the point of marriage (Eyber and Ager 2004: 194, Stavrou 2005: 66). However, during the civil war, social transitions including those of marriage were profoundly disrupted (Eyber and Ager 2004). Unable to establish households in the manner in which society was accustomed, youth therefore missed the opportunity for societal re-incorporation as full adults. Simultaneously, biological maturity meant that despite the lack of social rituals, several generations of children were born and raised, putting them in a position of extenuated liminality – extenuated due to the circumstances of war, but liminal nonetheless. When conflict ceases, finding alternative modes of ‘reincorporation’ is extremely important, as it is by so doing that people learn to live both with themselves and with one another once again (Ross 2002).

**The ‘youth bulge’ hypothesis and rootlessness as pathologies of young refugees**

Briefly, ‘youth bulge’ refers to a high number of young people “bulging” the population demographic curve in a given country or region. Introducing a paper in which he supports a link between youth bulges and violent conflict (the ‘hypothesis’), Henrik Urdal (2002: 2) quotes Robert Kaplan who wrote “In cities in six West African countries I saw […] young men everywhere – hordes of them. They were like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting” (1994: 46). Kaplan’s words and Urdal’s treatment of them align with a rhetoric in which youth – and young men most of all – are portrayed as dangerous threats to physical and social infrastructure. ‘Hoards’ is a word that speaks to the imagination and elicits a sense of overwhelm and anarchy; that these youth were in cities plays on fear of violence in urban spaces – the encroachment of otherness into the controlled spaces of modernity (Sassen 2010).

Another way in which youth are frequently perceived as ‘problems’ may be demonstrated through an analysis of Liisa Malkki’s (1992) argument of the power of metaphor with regard to imagery of rootedness applied to the nation-state. She shows how refugees embody a category “aberrant” to the “arborescent culture” of Western society that places tremendous value on identity fixed to particular locales (1992: 27) such that “national” and “natural” are conflated in everyday parlance. The nation, she observes, is commonly referred to in English and similarly in other languages as ‘the country, the land and the soil’ (1992: 26). Refugees and displaced people removed from the land to which they have an emotive claim by virtue of birth and/or extended life threaten the stability of the whole and the “national order of things” (1992: 36).

Through linguistic analysis of everyday speech, Malkki highlights the extent to which uprootedness (i.e. displacement) is cast as pathology. The same occurs when the youth bulge hypothesis is invoked. A youth bulge itself is purely a demographic phenomenon. The youth bulge hypothesis, however, when referenced by the media and politicians, suggests that large numbers of youth in post-conflict states increase the likelihood of continued violence, therefore that youth are violent, and therefore, that youth are also
amoral (Kagwanja 2005: 6, Simonse 2005: 243). If the history of the country concerned is one in which young people have frequently served in armed forces – like in Angola – then this is further ‘proof’ that they are not only likely, but have the technical know-how required to ‘ignite’ war once again (UNICEF 2009a: 9) thus threatening the polity, the nation and order itself. As such, they are caste as frightening indeed.

**Abject heroes**

The ideas about youth that I have outlined suggest a tendency to view youth as aberrant and demonstrate a broad discomfort with liminality and ‘outsiders’ on the part of Western theoreticians (Nyamnjoh 2006). At the core of broader academic literature on youth is a continual discomfort around *choice* – to what extent do those in their teens and early twenties choose their actions in times of war? How should they be judged on a moral level for decisions to kill, rape, prostitute themselves or betray their families in order either to survive or to advance in economic and social terms? How do they themselves negotiate ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ when those from both sides live in the same vicinity once again? And significantly, what choices will they make in the future?

In contrast with the chronological, incremental-moral-development approach to youth proffered by Piaget, Mats Utas’ recent conceptualization of ‘abject heroes’ to describe young women and men in Liberia provides a lens more fitting to the realities of the twenty-first century. Drawing upon local mythologies of heroes who also do wrong, Utas demonstrates “how complex emic ideas of modernity correspond with local concepts of abject heroes […]]. One and the same person can appear immoral in one setting just in order to reappear in a moral guise in another social setting and at another time” (Utas 2008: 130).

Through ethnography, Utas demonstrates the kinds of choices that young women and men made as they attempted to possess ‘moral power’ and experience inclusion in a ‘modernity’ from which they felt excluded. Modernity represented what was attainable on a material level, and democracy the right of all to have access to material wealth (ibid). Far from being passive subjects, his informants demonstrated a clear awareness of the moral implications of their actions when these were detrimental to others, yet also recognized within them a continuity with the challenges faced by local mythological heroes. Due to their role in the war, many youth were largely excluded from post-conflict society and sought refuge instead in a common ‘youth identity’ (Utas 2008: 114) by which they (unsuccessfully) attempted to reframe the moral prerogatives of the ‘new’ state (ibid). Utas’ research demonstrates that for young Liberians during the long civil war, conflict itself became “part and parcel of an African identity” (2008: 117) and that in order to survive within it, in the words of one of Utas’ informants, “there are times when you have to do good and times when you have to do bad” (2008: 129).

This approach is useful because it begins to shift the discourse away from one that dichotomizes to one that recognizes young men and women as complex agents negotiating a wide range of social, economic and ethical decisions. Rather than assuming young people will be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, moral or amoral, (vanguard or vandal, maker or breaker) the notion of abject heroes demands that a vast middle terrain be recognized, and that youth be seen to be constantly shifting their position within that space not out of fickleness or lack of personal purpose, but out of a desire to make the most out of opportunities when they arise according to their own moral and personal creeds and the practical requirements of survival.
Such an angle is important for research with all young people, but particularly with those who are marginalized. In these instances, overlooking the nuanced roles that youth assume within society dis-individuates and stereotypes them in ways that may hinder social change. Familiar with but rejecting Western-style tropes of childhood, young Liberians make a strong case for recognition of their current acts of citizenship. Without such recognition, which entails engaging them in dialogue as well as ensuring socio-economic opportunities of development and employment, youth continue to feel excluded from the modern world, bound by gerontocratic structures in which their own priorities are not attended to and in which the discrepancies between their lives and those of their peers elsewhere are increasingly stark (Stavrou 2005: 75). In the same vein, Utas’ writing on young female soldiers further challenges gender stereotypes that cast women as victims. He shows how women assume roles as soldiers, negotiate relationships with commanders, NGO staff and each other acting in turn as combatants and wives in efforts to ensure their own social mobility, and where even ‘victimcy’ as a verb becomes a conscious act of self-representation deployed strategically for social and economic gain (Utas 2005: 409).

Utas’ work is part of a corpus of writing increasingly calling for recognition of young people during and after conflict that acknowledges the complexity of their moral position that is far more layered than childhood psychologists such as Piaget would have us believe (c.f. Boyden 2003, Bray and Gooskens 2006, Weiss 2006). Rather than developing a sense of morality as they grow, current literature acknowledges the paradoxes that youth entails for many people who are conscious agents limited to some extent by circumstances (Hart 2008: 17). Even when these circumstances are extremely challenging, however, youth make difficult decisions based on rational analysis (Simose 2005: 245). Finding ways to begin dialogue with young refugees about the nature of these decisions is integral in the establishment of long-term, peace-related infrastructure.

Learning and education as soldiers and citizens

Working with rather than for youth is increasingly acknowledged as an essential component of the rebuilding of the nation-state (see for example Durham 2000, Sommers 2001, Boyden 2003, Turner 2004, Honwana and De Boeck 2005, Boyden and de Berry 2004, Vigh 2006, Loizos 2007, Hart 2006, 2008). Stage theory, the youth bulge hypothesis and notions of amorality, however, are hard to dislodge because they offer moral simplicity that leads to a vision of a clear path to ‘improvement’ or ‘solution.’ Given the lack of research that has been done in Angola, it is unsurprising perhaps that it is the latter rather than empirical evidence that appears to have informed policies and programs in Angola, though it is possible that this is now shifting.

Fears of the moral degeneration of young people during their exposure to and participation in conflict have lead to a particular focus on Demilitarization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) (Porto et al. 2007) which, though essential, has firstly not been comprehensive (Human Rights Watch 2003, 2005, Kaun 2008) and secondly, has focused far more on combatants than on those with whom they need to integrate (Porto et al. 2007: 32). DDR, as suggested earlier, has become a token mechanism through which youth escape their liminality and are reincorporated into society through a recognized ‘rite’ in which a commitment to peace is made Nsamemang (2002: 69). Stavrou (2005), Honwana (2006) and Kaun (2008) make reference to traditional rites of reincorporation that have taken place with some success in Angola and the benefits that ensue from re-immersion in traditional value systems. However, the context of
massive population displacement and ruptured communities has made such occasions more challenging and therefore less common. In Angola, communities have frequently not remained to go back to and ‘traditional’ leadership structures have had to be all but recreated.

The manner in which international organisations have adopted a somewhat anachronistic (Crisp pers. com.) approach to Angola is explored in more depth in chapter four, and a deeper consideration of the return process is entered into. Here, suffice it to say that a lopsided focus on ex-combatants, though understandable in the circumstances of the end of a 30-year war, focuses attention on those who have actively participated in battles rather than recognizing that all have been affected by the conflict. Working in a holistic and comprehensive way to begin what is in effect a process of state (re)creation is essential, and international organisations are significant actors in this process.

This chapter has drawn attention to the difficulties that face young citizens of post-conflict states. Whereas the child depicted at the chapter’s beginning was deemed innocent because of his age, youth are caste in a far more ambiguous light. Stage theory dictates that their moral development is incremental and that they should therefore bear some responsibility for actions committed in war. Not being full adults, however, makes gauging the level of responsibility attributed to them difficult, yet it also prevents the nuance and complexity of many decisions made from being appreciated by powerful external parties. Denied social recognition through the exigencies of war-time, youth may remain ‘trapped’ in a liminal position which is particularly vulnerable to exploitation from politicians and the media.

Youth are invoked as dangerous and amoral, and the ‘learning’ that they are seen to receive during conflict or time in armed forces only exacerbates the ‘problem’ that they pose to society. This mode of thinking finds resonance in everyday language that is particularly exclusionary and condemnatory towards forced migrants, which suggests an amorality entailed in ‘rootlessness’ or dis-place-ment and in so doing condemns young refugees twice: first for their age and secondly for being ‘out of place.’ However, there is another side to this discussion, and that is the responsibility that young people are simultaneously shown to hold for the future of liberal democracy in post-conflict states – the moments in which they are the ‘vanguards’ of democracy and the ‘makers’ of the state (Abbink and Van Kessel 2005, De Boeck and Honwana 2005). The following chapter looks closely at three core tropes that emerge within the broad literature on young people in contemporary Africa and have particular salience to the conceptualization and experience of youth citizenship in Angola, namely education, nationalism and the structure of liberal democracy.

3 Present citizens

“When a child picks up a gun, he becomes a man and inspires fear, if not respect. In my experience, African youth are forgotten except when politicians need them for battle. If African youth are given a better education and the means to influence their communities, then they will be less likely to be used as cannon-fodder, less likely to pick up a gun, and more likely to read a book.

Seventeen years ago, against the wishes of my father, I picked up a gun, hoping to change the world. I survived and learned. I learned the limits of the gun. Many of my comrades were robbed of that chance, for few remain alive. Of
those living, most hold senior posts in the Ugandan army; a few are in politics. Yet most died in combat or of AIDS. Young Africans should remember this when they look for ways to make their mark” (Rabwoni 2002a).

Okwir Rabwoni was once a child soldier in Yoweri Museveni’s rebel movement in Uganda. After Museveni assumed power, Rabwoni became a politician but has since shifted political allegiance and now lives in exile in London. His work provides a useful starting point when trying to understand why the trope of ‘child soldiers’ holds such powerful sway in discourses on youth and citizenship.

This extract demonstrates a profound reversal of social roles within community. Faced with a gun, adults must cede to the demands of young people, thereby relinquishing claims to authority (Honwana 2006: 53). Equally, it cites education as the tool through which youth might influence the same adults without recourse to violence, and alludes to the extreme loss of life that war entails. Many young people in Angola now involved in post-conflict reconstruction in various forms were once combatants, whether as ‘children’ or as ‘youth.’ Those who were clearly ‘children,’ I have suggested, are usually easier to forgive than those who, being older, are perceived as having some degree of responsibility for their actions. As such, it is necessary to engage peripherally with the literature on child soldiers in an attempt to place young Angolans in a broader context of peace and national reconstruction.

Rabwoni writes of young people needing to ‘make their mark’ in society, and it is this mark that is perhaps most feared. Training for combat requires a separation from emotion, rigid discipline, and a willingness to obey orders (Diouf 2003). Experience in armed units means that when the ‘battle’ shifts to one of democratization (Pearce 2005), ex-combatants either return to civilian life or assume roles within the army and civil service. Though all ex-combatants require demobilization, the process through which youth and children experience it is seen as both particularly important and particularly difficult (HRW 2003: 17). This is largely because young people are perceived to be extremely vulnerable to ideological indoctrination and a lingering acceptance of stage theory which suggests that youth will take on whatever they are taught, regardless of its ethnical implications (Durham 2000, Hart 2006, Lubkemann 2008). Unlike in peace-time situations where national curriculums are agreed upon and teaching, at least in theory, is monitored, youth are exposed to unknowns leaving them “malleable and vulnerable to manipulation” (Sommers 2006: 12).

Regulated national education is recognized to provide space in which critical thinking and comprehension of democratic principles is taught in school, thereby bolstering democracy – provided, of course, that the teachers conform to ethical codes and do not use the spaces as further sites of indoctrination (c.f. Fagerland and Saha 1989, Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003, Rose and Greeley 2006, Jeffrey et al. 2008, Crivello 2009, Meinert 2009, Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010). Though unquestionably extremely important, school-based education is increasingly being shown to be, in Jeffrey et al.’s words “a contradictory resource” that undermines established notions of power on one hand but also creates new tensions within society to do with expectation. It “open[s] up certain opportunities to

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13 HIV-AIDS, though beyond the scope of this dissertation, has also had a profound impact on combatants throughout sub-Saharan Africa as its spread through the sexual conquests of war has, some argue, been responsible for more deaths than combat itself (Elbe 2002).
undermine established structures of power while also often drawing young people more tightly into structures of ideologies and dominance” (2008: 210).

In order to achieve the status and mode of work that young people aspire to through education, migration is increasingly common in Angola, raising difficult questions as to the development of the (frequently rural) areas they leave behind (Nsamenang 2002, Education for All 2010: 152, c.f. Crivello 2009 23). In Angola, migration to urban centers has been largely involuntary, but its impacts have been the same – estimates today place at least half of the population in urban areas, one quarter in the capital city of Luanda and the other quarter in provincial capitals (Kaun 2008: 9). Furthermore, landmines on many major roads still prevent access to and therefore development of rural areas, and in both rural and urban spaces, jobs across the formal sector are hard to come by (UNDP 2009b: 2).

Further learning, too, is not easily available – at the beginning of 2006 there were 38,000 applications for 6,000 places in Angolan senior secondary education (USAID 2006 14). Given the negative social experiences associated with aspiration without achievement (Matsumoto 2010), it is worth considering how and why education remains so potent a symbol in much of the developing world. Equally, it is important to note that whether or not young people are being schooled, they are learning, and it is what they are learning that is usually of public concern. In schools, calculus and grammar might fill up afternoons – in the army, that time might be spent acquiring techniques in sabotage or long-range weaponry. Unsurprisingly, both state and civilians would prefer intelligent, energetic and motivated individuals to concentrate firmly on the former, yet the cost of such a preference is that vocational skills and locally-grounded knowledge is all-too-frequently overlooked as well (Nsamenang 2002). Newman highlights the importance of vocational training when he suggests that providing young people with these skills is an integral part of protection. He emphasizes the need to build on youth’s own perception of themselves as “competent social and economic actors with insight into their own problems and ideas about how to solve them” (Newman 2005: 30) and stresses that youth recognize the value of education and skills development and therefore request exposure wherever possible, an argument echoed by Nancy Farwell in her study of returning Eritrean refugees from the Sudan (2001: 45).

Why is it that Western models of education are so profoundly valued? The answer is two-fold. Firstly, education has long been seen to provide the social capital needed for employment in ‘modern’ labour markets, thereby providing financial security and access to the consumer economy (Weisbrod 1962: 106, Robinson and Sexton 1994: 142). Jason Hart (2006) offers a different but compelling analysis of the issue by tracing the founding and subsequent establishment of Save the Children by Eglantyne Jebb in 1919. Jebb, also the champion of the United Nations Declaration of Children’s Rights of 1924, felt that all minors should experience childhood as it was known in Britain at the time – drawing on dominant eighteenth and nineteenth century theories mentioned above, as a time of innocence, helplessness and controlled learning (Hart 2006: 6). Save The Children was one of the first international humanitarian organizations and remains a powerful force today (Walker and Maxwell 2009). Its institutional lobbying power is significant, and from 1924 onwards Jebb’s ‘vision’ has permeated international policy to the extent that attempting to provide children with Western-style education has been a crucial element of democratization in all post-colonial states. It is only recently that some questioning of such education has begun to emerge, which I will consider briefly in light of their implications for citizenship in the global era.
A. Bame Nsamenang (2002) is one such critic. Conscious of the Western bias of adolescent psychology, he attempts to provide a counter-narrative detailing adolescent reality in sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that there is a disconnect between what education purports to do and what education does in parts of the region. Given the reality of limited blue- and white-collar jobs, many students who do receive access to education are unable to find ‘appropriate’ employment on leaving school, thereby swelling the ranks of the unemployed. School, he suggests, is not suited to the life-trajectories of many young people in Africa, who should instead be focusing upon agriculture and the maintenance of their own cultures in the face of globalization (Nsamenang 2002: 62, 86, 91). This viewpoint would no doubt be met with considerable skepticism by most of the youth concerned, but promoting ‘indigenous knowledge’ in more subtle formulations is increasingly gaining resonance in mainstream policy-influencing arenas. For example, Peter Easton’s study on indigenous knowledge conducted for the World Bank cites indigenous knowledge as the “spark plug” through which solutions to contemporary socio-economic challenges can be found (Easton 2004: 12).

More prosaically, Mitsuko Matsumoto’s recent research (2010) on Sierra Leone and Lotte Meinert’s analysis of the introduction of Universal Primary Education in Uganda (2009) both note the gap that Nsamenang identifies between the expectations of and realities provided by schooling. Likewise, unless all the components of Jebb’s ‘ideal’ childhood are in place (nuclear family, economic stability, democracy etc.) education in the Western sense may well fail to address the particular needs of many African societies (see also Argenti 2002: 128-130). Here, the ‘youth bulge hypothesis’ gains popular resonance, as when the gap between what people expect of their lives and what they get widens, so too does it become “more rational that educated youth might take part in rebellion than uneducated youth” (Urdal 2002: 8).

When Rabwoni writes of a need to ‘make his mark,’ he speaks to an assertion of identity and involvement in the polity that is made by all young people through their current contributions to social and economic life. If these can be channelled for national benefit, so much the better.

I am not suggesting that western models of education are wrong – indeed, they are astonishingly effective – yet without simultaneous development of the formal economic sector, education may lead to some degree of frustration. This has been the experience of many returning Angolan refugees who received training and education during their displacement, yet have struggled to apply their new skills to daily life on return as a result of lack of supporting infrastructure, and in some cases, the refusal of the Angolan state to recognize foreign-issue certificates (Kaun 2008: 16).

Raised levels of formal education also raise levels of expectation – in many ways the purpose of schooling, as it equips the population with the tools of engagement with governance structures. Problems emerge when these structures exist but are corrupt and ineffective (as in Angola) as such corruption may place a proverbial glass ceiling over much of the population (Felicio and Serdar 2009: 21). Ensuring this does not happen should be inherently intertwined with pedagogical processes, as the two are mutually constitutive. Liberal democracy relies on a relationship existing between the individual and the state (Arendt 2004 [1948], Held 1995, Rawls 2005). Schools are one of the primary spaces in which this relationship is established through the experience of being part of a nation-wide education system, socialization, and the development of identity (Farwell 2001: 51, Clacherty 2006 62, Angolan National Curriculum 2006: 2). A deeper analysis of nationalism is therefore useful when considering citizenship in the post-conflict state.
When schooling has been disrupted, the trust between citizen and state ruptured by war and large-scale displacement experienced, youth still find themselves with a legal ascription of identity which informs where they can (and in the case of refugee cessation must) live, learn, and work.

**Citizenship, the role of nationalism and governmentality**

Citizenship, as I have defined it, comprises the membership, rights and responsibilities of belonging to a political community circumscribed within a nation-state (Habermas 1994, Haddad 2003, Gibney 2004,). Nationalism is the *enactment* of caring about or for one’s nationality (Soysal 2000) and governmentality, first described by Michel Foucault, is the enactment of a regime of power itself that is reliant on nexus of juridical practice and disciplinary power (Dillon 1995: 324). In this section, I consider how citizenship, nationality, and governmentality interconnect, and the implications of this connection for young Angolans.

International relations, politics, and philosophy have all developed extensive literatures on the topic of citizenship, as it is fundamental to post-Westphalian modes of governance and inter-state relations. However, as Alexander Betts drawing on Andrew Linklater observes, the internal contradictions of this system, which include tremendous financial inequality and differentiated power distribution between states, increasingly “allow opportunities for people to move beyond the communitarian logic of the nation-state and instead realize an international cosmopolitanism” (Betts 2009: 34). Such cosmopolitanism has been addressed in the work of Jurgens Habermas (1994), Yasemin Soysal (1996, 2001), Paul Gilroy (2002), and Will Kymlicka (1996, 2007, 2010) amongst others. Betts’ recent (2009) text on sovereignty, globalization and the state concludes with a short remark regarding ‘regionalism’- the increasing cooperation of multiple states within a broader territory such as the European Union (EU) (Betts 2009: 83). Regionalism lies between globalization and sovereignty, as through regional agreements, states may “bypass the global” (Betts: 2009: 84) while still ensuring the support of other states. Angola is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and as most refugees went to states that are also part of this group, regional belonging may well prove to be the marker of a cohesive life-narrative of many Angolan youth.

Michael Dillon’s development of the Foucault’s notions of governmentality is helpful when considering the manner in which young Angolans experience and influence the state. Governmentality, the enactment and enforcement of state control, is premised on a defining paradox of power, namely that to be subject to power is empowering (Dillon 1995: 324). In the real world, this translates as citizens who are subject to the state having the right to contribute and to shape the state itself through their engagement with its economic, social, and political domains. Such mechanisms of state control, now incorporated in the conventions of liberal democracy, relied for their inception on the development of political arithmetic – now known as statistics (1995: 329). Statistics allowed for the ordering of knowledge such that macro-level control could be operationalised and in governance was reliant on civil registries and census data.

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Statistics allowed for the labelling and definition of both other and self and rapidly became the foundation of government knowledge therefore lying at the heart of power. Depending on who is counting, and which database they fall into, refugees, IDPs, forced migrants and ‘the rest’ may have extremely different experiences. If power is empowering, it does depend whose – and a crucial challenge to Angolan state mechanisms is ensuring that the power of the Angolan government is empowering of its citizenry (Dillon 1995: 324). Crucially, decades of war have meant that the statistical databases on which governmentality (as described by Dillon) relies have been destroyed. In its enactment of power and empowerment through knowledge and discipline, therefore, the state needs first to constitute itself by finding out how many citizens have survived, who has been born, and where in the country they are.

Beginning with the independence movements of the 1950s, nationalism has emerged as an important countering tactic with regards to the energy and disenfranchisement of youth (Mkandawire 2005: 22). Writers such as Franz Fanon and Stephen Biko attempted to formulate new creeds that described and strengthened the role of Africa and Africans within the contemporary word. At independence, school curricula were reformed to reflect the changed reality. In states that have experienced post-independence conflict, such reforms have been re-instituted with a further emphasis on democratic values and human rights and a recognition – at least in policy – that young people need to become partners in the process of overcoming inequality and under-development (Amoako 2002: xi, Education for All 2010). Nationalist projects have attempted both to maintain traditional gerontocratic structures and utilize the energies of young people in economic development and national liberation (Diouf 2003: 3-4). Tension has often existed between the neo-liberal democratic values to which liberation rhetoric frequently refers and the reality of pervasive age-based power structures in many sub-Saharan states (Agbakoba and Nwauche 2006: 73). A further complication has been ethnic affiliations, which colonialism sought to smooth over and post-independence nationalism in much of Africa likewise denied (Mkandawire 2005: 12).

In Angola, ethnicity is less of an issue than where one originated before the civil war began, as each territory was associated with a particular political faction. Post-conflict, those associated with ‘UNITA areas’ have reported high levels of discrimination and distrust (Kaun 2008: 24). Importantly, those who have spent time as refugees will have developed emotional and intellectual ties with people in their country of asylum – whether nationals or other refugees – creating a further division of loyalties that is not spatially-defined in the country of origin. This has great implications for work with young people, as unlike for those who were already adults, youth’s formative relationships will have been forged in the context of displacement rather than in locally-circumscribed spaces.

This reality has been recognized by the Angolan government and is referenced in its post-war education policy (World Data on Education 2007). The curriculum is informed by the principles of national unity, dignity, plurality of expression and political affiliation, and the respect of human rights (ibid). It is currently in the fourth of five phases of revision following the end of the war – the implementation of initiatives aimed at increasing the number of schools and the quality of education being received in them. Article 79 of the Angolan constitution of 2010 commits to providing access to all for free and compulsory basic education, pursuing science and technology as areas of national educational priority and supporting academic partnerships with external agents in the provision of educational services (Constitution, Article 79 (1), (2), (3)). Furthermore, Article 81 explicitly addresses the needs of young people in light of education, jobs, housing, sport and leisure (Constitution Article 81 (1) and (2)). 81 (3) goes on to say that
“[t]he priority objectives of the youth policy shall be the development of young people’s personality, the creation of the conditions needed for their effective integration into working life, a love of free creativity and a sense of community service.”

This article is significant because it describes the kind of people that the Angolan state desires, the kind of citizens it would like youth to be. It implicitly acknowledges that youth have been outside the structures of ‘working life’ and therefore must be integrated, it recognizes the agency young people and it requests of them an engagement with their communities. In its original Portuguese the word ‘personality’ is perhaps better translated as ‘character,’ as character is something that can be ‘built’ whereas personality in English usage is generally read to be intrinsic. The process of ‘building characters’ appropriate to peacetime is one that has been largely assumed by international organisations in light of the Angolan war. Whilst no single rhetoric or discourse exists on this process, a group of ideas that coalesce around the phrase ‘active citizenship’ are currently dominant in policy and non-governmental spheres and bear resonance here. The following section explores the inculcation of ‘character’ on the part of NGOs operational in Angola – demonstrating the extent to which education is charged with the task of nation-building and the inculcation of values deemed appropriate to liberal democracy.

**Liberal democracy and active citizenship**

‘Active citizenship’ is one model that has been formulated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to “catch” those who are excluded from formal education but nonetheless have not acquired the social capital referred to above. Katrine Pederson defines ‘active citizenship’ as follows: “[i]t refers to the participation of citizens in the shaping of policies that impact their lives and demanding accountability from entities authorized to protect the public and serve the public good” (UNDP 2006: 9). For democracy to function, citizens must be competent in the mechanisms of governance in order to decide how they wish to be lead, and to hold those charged with doing so to account. They must also be able to avail themselves of the state’s protection and contribute to the economy through both work and taxes. After conflict has ended, the state itself needs to provide infrastructure and technologies to ensure on a practical level the ‘bond of trust’ is (literally) in-stated and a sense of belonging to a nation and being lead by a legitimate government is instilled. Through the engagement of the population, active citizenship becomes a tool with which to mobilize populations to begin the emotional and technical investment in the state that Shacknove (1985: 274) feels essential to the creation and maintenance of the ‘bond of trust’ described above.

Increasingly, active citizenship has been taken up by international organisations and NGOs (c.f. IDRC 2004, ACFID 2007, Clarke and Missingham 2009). Through the shaping of policy it is hoped that populations, and particularly the ‘youth’ within those populations, will develop an intellectual, behavioral, and emotional commitment to the state that ensures their energy is harnessed in constructive rather than destructive ways. Again, the fear of youth is implicit in this discourse as it plays on the assumption that unless they are taught to do otherwise, young people will behave degenerately. A noticeable gap exists in

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15 A política de juventude deve ter como objectivos prioritários o desenvolvimento da personalidade dos jovens, a criação de condições para a sua efectiva integração na vida activa, o gosto pela criação livre e o sentido de serviço à comunidade.
the literature concerning those who are simply not interested in becoming embroiled in state projects but would prefer a future of “security and domesticity” (Argenti 2002: 149). With regard to Angola, this may be attributable to their having been so little time to be ‘secure and domestic’ in, but elsewhere, the nuances of the everyday in which sociality takes place for many youth in sub-Saharan Africa have been largely neglected (Christiansen, Utas and Vigh 2006).

Individuals who choose not to be politically engaged in the rallying, exhibitionist sense that have characterized both independence and civil-war conflicts, do not fit easily into the rhetoric of nationalist projects, and indeed are sometimes seen as demonstrating the failure of such projects to ignite meaningful change (Diouf 2003: 4). Existing at the margins of the state and nation, they “deфин[e] new modalities of action and propos[e] new language in their musical, iconographic and military expressions” (Diouf 2002: 6). But these, being the minutia of the everyday, are usually given little attention (Mbembe 2002: 144). In its entirety, Diouf’s analysis of contemporary nationalism acknowledges the violence that has characterized the post-colonial period in many sub-Saharan states, and suggests that this violence is such that youth do not wish to be embedded in the memory of the collective nation-state. Instead, they seek to re-arrange (and restore) the past through their actions in order to delineate their own space within both traditional hierarchies and modernity (Mbembe 2002, Jeffrey et al. 2008, Utas 2008).

Ultimately, Diouf suggests, marginalized young women and men have only their bodies to work with – whether to labour or to fight or to construct– and their bodies “express longings and demands that are more creative than murderous” (Diouf 2003 10, see also Dillon 1995: 325). Here lies the ultimate irony of the nationalist project of the twenty-first century: unlike in the past, we are all visible to one another through contemporary technologies, yet precisely as in the past, tremendous inequality separates those who have material wealth with which to trade from those who have only their own bodies. The nationalist project asks that young people commit to states in which they recognize that their prospects are limited, yet Brad Weiss (2005), writing on the experiences of young men in Arusha, shows that even marginalization can be a mechanism of communicating belonging. By identifying closely with the hip-hop icon Tupac, who publically demonstrated his own feelings of pain and exclusion, Weiss suggests that “pain becomes more than just the negative feelings of oppression and more, even, than the foundation for a micropolitics of everyday encounters” (2005: 225). Under such circumstances, pain becomes “a way of situating the subject […] in a powerful global order of meanings and relations” (ibid) and micro- and macro-politics are connected, explored and represented in musical expression that both cites and develops Tupac’s words.

The point that is all too often missed is that young people in Africa are the modern world and already do participate in both the economic, social, and political domains of the nation-state (Bourdillon 2006: 1207, Weiss 2005). They are already role models for younger generations (Argenti 2002: 151), and make significant economic contributions to their households and engage with political structures as much as they are able. Most importantly, as recent ethnographic studies have demonstrated (Hart 2008, Jeffrey et. al. 2008, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010), young people throughout the world exercise choice in the formulation of both their identities and their actions, which often change according to the personal and socio-political context (Utas 2005).
In sub-Saharan Africa, entrenched gerontocratic systems of authority mean that young people may find it difficult to articulate their views in public domains, yet their actions demonstrate considerable competencies in evaluating both the restrictions and the possibilities open to them (Whyte 2006: 258). Though the tendency is for youth to be homogeneously classified as ‘vanguards’ or as ‘vandals,’ it is clear that the reality is far more nuanced. Slowly – as the new Angolan constitution demonstrates – the need to work alongside them is being recognized by both state and non-state actors.

In sum, this chapter has explored how youth are perceived when changing the world around them as the socio-political landscape in which they act is itself rapidly shifting. Depending on their actions, youth may be seen to have behaved in ways that were subversive to social norms, the remedy for which is education through formal schooling in which social capital appropriate to peacetime is acquired. In this process (in theory) youth learn what it means to be a ‘citizen’ of a ‘nation.’ In light of this, the Angolan constitution has been drafted to acknowledge the difficulties of integration and the need to build people’s very characters through education and youth participation in civic structures, as, by virtue of the act of governmentality, their citizenship both imposes and enables national power by which they must abide. For those unable to attend school, active citizenship has been promoted by UNDP to fulfil the same function.

The chapter draws attention to the reality that youth are the modern world already, and that their everyday actions shape both the current and future experiences of the rest of the population. Though there are certainly difficulties involved in the establishment of an effective state mechanism after civil war, modelling ‘citizens’ in the future tense prevents recognition of youth as citizens in the present. It also prevents an acknowledgement of the “marks” (Rabwoni, above) being made by youth, creating a sense of social invisibility. Both the state and the international community play a role in this process, with the region become an important intermediary. In the following section, I look at international organisations operational in Angola, at their assistance with processes of refugee return, and at the need for their insistence on financial accountability and good governance.

4 International organisations in Angola

“Maybe I am too negligent now, and I don’t even think about my culture. Maybe I have to find out. Because if I have to go back to Angola some day, they will ask where I am from, and I will not know…

Someday I would like to go back home” – Acacio, age 15, Johannesburg” (Clacherty 2005: 122).

International organisations, from global corporations to human rights bodies, play a significant role in the day to day functioning of fragile, post-conflict, and ‘failed’ states (Salih 2001: 41, see also Slaughter 2004, Bronner 2005, Ahmed and Potter 2006, Mathiason 2007). Angola has been no exception, though the abundance of oil and diamonds within its territory, and its positioning as a Cold War proxy conflict during the 1970s and 1980s meant that it has experienced far more international ‘trade’ via the appropriation of its oil resources than it has experienced ‘development’ (Taylor 2006). In this section I will focus on the United Nations (UN) presence in Angola, in order to examine the manner in which neoliberal citizenship norms are created in policy and practice, with particular attention to education
strategies aimed at inculcating the norms and values of liberal democracy. I will consider the mutually-enforcing emphasis on education between the African Youth Charter of 2009 and development-based initiatives, particularly the UNHCR’s recent development of ‘coexistence frameworks’ which, though not aimed exclusively at youth, acknowledge and practically address the complex social, economic, and environment-related needs of people (both returnees and stayees) in areas to which the displaced have returned.

Nayef Al-Rodhan has suggested that basic educational skills such as reading, writing and arithmetic are no longer sufficient in a globalized world (2007: 13). These should be supplemented by skills needed to obtain such objectives such as empowerment, awareness, cultural understanding and respect, universal moral values and social cohesion (ibid). Drawing on reports, policy documents, social theory, and interviews with UNHCR representatives, I consider the increasing trend in international organisations towards ‘participatory’ and ‘coexistence’ frameworks that attempt to inculcate the skills Al-Rodman describes. Liberal democracy, however, is nothing but a label unless the state itself assumes the responsibilities such a system of governance requires including transparency and the creation of communication channels with citizenry. When directed to young people, such channels make progress in reforming gerontocratic structures that have historically excluded youth from decision-making processes (Eyber and Ager 2004: 198).

By focusing primarily on ‘education’ as per the African Youth Charter and the programs of UNDP, UNICEF and even UNHCR, both international organisations and national governments demonstrate a conceptualization of citizenship that makes it possible to shift attention away from the present to ‘future generations.’ These generations, of people ‘in becoming’ (Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2006: 11) will, it is assumed, hold their leaders to account thereby lessening corruption and allowing the state to be empowering – demanding rights and exercising the responsibilities of citizens, yes, but only in the future. This demonstrates a profoundly Piagetian approach to education in which formal schooling is seen partly as a tactic of reincorporation but primarily as a training-ground for democracy in which the rights, responsibilities and duties of liberal democratic citizenship are taught in incremental phases. This section demonstrates, therefore, that the focus of international organisations on civic education risks becoming a panacea for demands for good governance.

**Refugee return, youth reintegration, and national development**

Currently, the UNHCR is in the process of establishing comprehensive strategies and “roadmaps” leading to the cessation of refugee status of four refugee groups in sub-Saharan Africa originating from countries where peace has been restored; Angola is one of them (Corliss pers. com.). After several years of stability, democratic elections and the development of state infrastructure in each that are conducive to refugees re-availing themselves of the protection of their state of origin as per the 1951 Convention. This has significant implications for the formulation of the post-conflict Angolan state, and consequently, the post-conflict citizen, as there are currently numerous Angolans throughout the region whose right to remain based on *prima facie* status will end (Albert 2010: 16). Future returns will add to a population of some 400,000 returnees at minimal estimate and four million IDPs settled in various locations (UNHCR 2008: 1).

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16 The others are Burundians, Liberians and Rwandans.
Youth have not received specific attention in the formulation of return policy, though it is possible that as cessation programs are concretized, there may be focus directed towards them, an eventuality I strongly support. In one of the very few studies of refugee return in Africa, Nancy Farwell followed the return and reintegration of youth who had been refugees in the Sudan but went ‘home’ to Eritrea (2001). She writes that whilst in exile, youth kept alive the idea of returning to Eritrea, yet the razing of villages (as in Angola) meant that it was difficult for them to imagine what ‘home’ might be and that anticipating return had to coexist with “the realities of literally forging a new existence in the homeland, and questions about resources and jobs” (Farwell 2001:65). To ease the transition, Farwell emphasizes the need to include refugee youth in planning for return in the country of asylum (*ibid*), allowing them to consider what they will need to overcome (and the opportunities that are provided with return) into their own visions for their futures as well as to prepare for some of the challenges of reintegration that may, pragmatically occur, such as difficulties with national and/or local languages. Cognizance of the need to include youth in early discussions may prove essential as the UNHCR develops its cessation strategies in the coming months.

The UNHCR has been strongly critical so far of its own role in the initial phases of refugee return to Angola (UNHCR 2008, Kaun 2008), described by Jeff Crisp as “a cooking pot and a handshake at the border” (Crisp, pers. com.). In part, this was because the UNHCR, like other international organisations, struggled to maintain operational infrastructure over the course of the war, given the ubiquitous presence of landmines and extremely high danger for both local and international staff. The UNHCR Angolan operation faced funding cuts, a limited pool of Portuguese-speaking staff to draw upon and inter-personal tension, but nonetheless established a functioning operation for refugee return. Unfortunately, this had to be significantly downsized before the project had reached a coherent conclusion, meaning that those involved felt they were withdrawing from areas where they were needed the most (Marquez pers. com.).

What differentiates Angola from other states in this regard is that international assistance of such kind is the only option available to many states whose economies simply cannot generate the funds required for return and reintegration programs.¹⁷ Angola, by contrast, produces 1.9 million barrels of oil per day, comprising 85% of a significant national income (CIA 2010). A recent article noted that if shared equally amongst the 18 million Angolans, 2009 oil revenues of US$ 15.7 billion would amount to about $870 per person – certainly enough to repair infrastructure and provide basic services (Almeida 2010). The government has the financial resources to take care of its own domestic and humanitarian needs, but is severely compromised by endemic corruption amongst governmental elites (Taylor 2006: 12, WB 2010).

Donors, unsurprisingly, express strong reservations when asked to fund projects in Angola, resulting in a situation in which developmental opportunities remain extremely limited despite recent and perhaps far-reaching economic agreements with China (Campos and Vines 2008). The implications of this for young people in the everyday is that many (particularly in urban areas) are exposed to tremendous wealth, the origins of which lie clearly below the ground rather than in sustained personal labour, yet few have access to this abundance (USAID 2006: 11). The capital city, Luanda, is one of the most expensive cities to live in the world by global standards (Mercer 2010) and the persistent exclusion of the majority of young people

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¹⁷ Afghanistan and Zimbabwe are contemporary examples.
from this wealth is a daily reminder of the failure of the state to distribute resources equitably amongst the population.

Given the UNHCR’s experience with displacement, it is unsurprising that they had to play an important role in the return of refugees. Primarily, they have focused on the provision of ‘cedula’ – the national identity documents that legitimize Angolans and allow them to access those national services that do exist. Working in partnership with UNICEF, they have ensured that 120,000 infants were provided with this document in the 2007-8 year (Marquez pers. com.). The provision of documents speaks to the legal focus of the organization, which has been instrumental in the negotiation of Angolan repatriation. A careful balance, however, has had to be kept between services to refugees as per the UNHCR mandate and services to others. Corliss noted, that in this context staff-members who have thought about citizenship beyond its purely legal formulation, recognize that simply providing ‘cedula’ is not enough to ensure the successful reintegration of young refugees. However, given the funding restrictions faced by the UNHCR and its need to focus on its core mandate of protection to those outside their country of origin, Corliss commented that addressing the complex social needs facing reintegrating communities might be better met by other agencies.

Interestingly, the UNHCR has indeed taken some steps to address the gaps of refugee return relevant to the Angolan context relating, in particular, to social cohesion through the development of a “Provisional Programme Guide on Coexistence Projects” (UNHCR 2010). This has been developed by the UNHCR’s Operational Solutions and Transition Section (OSTS), the operational support unit of the UNHCR which delivers strategic guidance on reintegration into field operations (UNHCR 2009). The idea of coexistence projects is to create spaces and forums for communication across socio-political lines – in Angola, primarily between ex-affiliates of UNITA and the MPLA. Without empirical research it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of the coexistence model, which draws largely on peace-education processes (Sommers 2001b). This model does not focus particular attention on ‘youth’ but it does represent a growing awareness that ‘durable solutions’ as per the UNHCR’s framework entail more than bringing people back to the country (UNHCR 2003b: 73). The extent of displacement in Angola is such that durable solutions for refugees are very similar to durable solutions for the Angolan population as a whole, and to address what is being done at national level, I now consider the UNHCR’s links with the UNDP and other NGOs.

How are they citizens?
Returning refugee youth in Angola have not been the subjects of specific attention in studies in Angola, other than through a recognition that those who have grown up in camps where Portuguese is not taught or spoken regularly may struggle to reintegrate due to linguistic difficulties at school and at home (Corliss pers. com.). Usually, however, they have received better education in camps outside of the country than their Angolan counterparts (Kaun 2008: 20). The paucity of jobs described in previous sections means that few will realistically find employment, raising questions as to the sustainability of return if youth had been able to generate income in their countries of asylum. In order for such individuals to stay, the Angolan government needs to ensure that the interest and energy of young people is utilized such that, like the oil that drives the economy, its profit flows into the state.
As suggested, returning refugees are a particularly significant group because having grown up elsewhere, many have emotional, intellectual, and social ties to countries beyond Angola. With the exception of one aspect of the UNDP’s ‘Program for Angola 2009 – 2013’ that focuses on deepening democratic governance (UNDP 2009a: 3-4), little emphasis has been placed on current initiatives aimed at utilizing what youth already know as part of the state-building project. It is essential that this knowledge is welled if young returnees are to feel there is a place for them in Angola, as to continuously place more education as a catch-all solution is to postpone analysis of current democracy in the hope that it will be better in the future. Education is essential, and continuing education perhaps more so as both refugees and stayees realize the need for new skills as they begin to re-establish community-based infrastructure and social systems (Farwell 2001: 63). It must not start, however, from the premise that youth are empty vessels awaiting knowledge, but rather that they are social and political beings who have knowledge, but may benefit from some guidance in how to develop it.

In From Soldiers to Citizens, Porto et al. write of “[t]he importance of identity and its relationship to citizenship, the latter being seen by some as an end point of the reintegration process” (2007: 3). I suggest that conceptualizing citizenship as an endpoint in such a manner is disempowering for young people, as it relies on them being ‘reintegrated’ which could take many years. During their integration, however, the reality is that Angolans within Angola are citizens of the state. The important question is therefore not ‘are they citizens?’ but ‘how are they citizens?’ How do young people engage with the state? How do they form relationships with one another? How do they negotiate their responsibilities with their aspirations? What do they envision for their futures? Where are their futures located?

The UNDP in Angola has formulated its 2009-2013 strategy for Angola around four themes: poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs (including education), deepening democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environmental and sustainable development (UNDP 2009b: 4-5). ‘Deepening democratic governance’ has the possibility of addressing some of the issues that I have raised in this section regarding the commitment of young people to the state in the present rather than in an undefined future. UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and even USAID, however, do not take on the role that the oil and diamond industries play within Angolan society, yet given their necessity in terms of the growth of the Angolan economy, it is clear that it is these organisations and not NGOs (whose mandate is emergency relief and development), who are and will remain responsible for the real “development” of the state – whether that be towards liberal democracy or not.

In order to survive the civil war, young men and women in Angola assumed a variety of roles and responsibilities far beyond what Eglantyne Jebb imagined as appropriate for ‘childhood’ in the beginning of the twentieth century. They have fought, cared for siblings, traded, studied, built and rebuilt homes, engaged in emergency medical care and travelled both voluntarily and involuntarily throughout the region in attempts to find safety, to reunite with family or simply to begin elsewhere afresh (MSF 2002, HRW 2003, Eyber and Ager 2004, Stavrou 2005, Kaun 2008, UNHCR 2009). If the questions raised above, therefore, are answered solely within the framework of education, young people are seen only as shadows of what is to come. But if they are recognized as citizens who already participate in the affairs of community, state and region, governments, NGOs and their peers need to take them more seriously.

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18 That is, assuming for argument’s sake, that the appropriate legal documentation has been issued.
Almost ironically, by considering youth in this way, social and bureaucratic infrastructure to which youth are intrinsically committed can be developed, and it is this infrastructure that is needed in order to make educational interventions effective and far-reaching. Rather than considering that, in the words of one recent social commentator “[a]nother generation is being mass-produced […] presenting a demographic time bomb that threatens to detonate everything that has gone before them” (Wiwa 2010), recognizing young people as citizens in their own right places them firmly in the present tense.

To reiterate, the African Youth Charter came into effect in 2009. Angola has signed it but has not yet ratified it. As it is so recent, this document has not directly influenced the policies and strategies of the NGO sector. Instead, I suggest that the inverse has occurred. The 47 NGOs operational in Angola in 2002 were faced with a tremendously difficult programmatic context. Invariably, they were forced to perform some kind of triage, and with regard to youth, education is an obvious project that young people desire, yields measurable results, and is seen to have long-term effects. For example, UNDP ran a Civic Education program which ran from 2006-2009 and claims to have reached in excess of 5 million people through community-radio broadcasting (UNDP 2008: 36), UNICEF committed to training 8750 new primary school teachers in 2009 (UNICEF 2009b) and education-support remains a priority for NGOs including the Development Workshop and the Christian Children’s Fund. Education is fundamental to human rights (UDHR Article 26) and is the second Millennium Development Goal defined by the international community as an urgent priority for address across the world. It is therefore hardly surprising that education has come to form the bedrock of the African Youth Charter, a document that will need to be considered when planning future initiatives with young people in Angola and elsewhere, to the extent that it is mentioned 110 times in the course of 31 Articles. Accountability and good governance do not appear at all.

In this section, I have suggested that international organisations in Angola have found themselves in a challenging environment that has compelled them to focus primarily on the provision of base-line services including immunization and the provision of identification documents. I have demonstrated a growing realization within the UNHCR, manifest in the recently-developed coexistence framework, that such provisions, though important, are only one aspect of the multi-faceted strategy required in the consolidation of liberal democracy. UNDP has acknowledged the need for supporting good governance and its current policies reflect and institutionalize this (UNDP 2009b).

Simultaneously, international organisations have focused on the provision of education as ‘triage’ when faced with low literacy, weak skills and massive under-employment, with the anticipation that these skills will allow young people to demand and exercise their rights as citizens in the future. Though undoubtedly such skills will help youth in the future, if the economy does not develop such that there are jobs, institutions and structures in which these can be applied, reintegration and indeed development is significantly compromised. Insistence on accountable governance and legitimate dialogue with youth in the present, therefore, is one of the primary roles that international organisations should be playing in

19 Churches have assumed critical roles because they remained within Angola for most of the war (Gallagher). Only 47 NGOs functioned within Angola as of 2001, compared to 150 in Ethiopia and 4028 in Nigeria (Salih 2002: 53). These included Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the UNHCR, the UNDP and UNICEF.
Angola. The quote with which the section began, from 15-year-old Acacio, emphasized the need to 'think about culture' (Clacherty 2005: 122). Culture, to Acacio, was the mechanism through which he would 'know where he was from.' In attempting to build a new, national culture of liberal democracy, youth must first be carefully listened to in order to ascertain where – ideologically and experientially rather than geographically – they come from in the present. By so doing, it becomes possible for democracy to take root in the collective imagination, and through the simultaneous establishment of institutions to support it, democracy shifts from ideology to lived experience.

5 Building characters for peace

Each of the preceding sections began with a vignette: first, the Colonel accepting another man’s child; second, Citizen, ‘little devil, bad bush;' third, the soldier who inspires fear but no respect; finally, Acacio – a young man whose home is Angola, a country he does not know at all. These vignettes serve to humanize the broader themes of a displacement, violence and (re)making of the state that this paper has addressed, focusing attention on the complex issues around partnership, judgment, power and belonging that face returning refugee and displaced youth. International organisations have been challenged by a country that is financially rich, but statistically poor – both in the sense of governmentality as the nexus of knowledge and power, and in the profoundly low income, life expectancy and health of the majority of Angolan citizens. As a result, they have focused on the provision of basic services such as immunization and the provision of identity documents. These, it is hoped, form the basis on which liberal democracy can be constructed, the responsibility for which will ultimately lie with the Angolan government.

Were the process of national (re)construction to rely only on the very young and the very old, this approach might be sufficient to capture and rebuild the social institutions that, in a distant past, facilitated the cohesion of Angolan society. But the reality is that a great many people were displaced in childhood, and grew up in war, and many more were born during the conflict. These individuals comprise sixty percent of the Angolan population, and those who were refugees have been returning in large numbers, a scenario that is set to continue at an even greater rate in the near future. Whilst outside Angola, refugees were exposed to diverse influences, acquired new skills, new expectations and new visions. “Going back home” is therefore a phrase that, without appropriate consultation and discussion, may well ring empty for many.

In attempts to address the tremendous needs of both returning refugees and the Angolan population as a whole, international organisations have placed a great emphasis on education. Education, I have suggested, is one of the most important methods of instilling national identity and developing the skills required for active, liberal democratic citizenship. However, as Jeffrey, Jeffrey and Jeffrey (2008: 210) have described, it is also a contradictory resource as it allows for the continual postponement of democratic accountability. Without simultaneous growth in the economy to create jobs, providing education can become a panacea for addressing the needs of good governance, particularly in Angola where the economy is growing steadily due to oil revenue but corruption prevents profit from reaching the majority of citizens.
As UN representative Margaret Anstee suggested (1996: 201), democracy does not come over night and peace itself is not the sole solution in relieving the suffering of people – though it may well be a precondition. Rather, there needs to be a shift in the way that people communicate with one another so as to allow a multiplicity of perspectives that includes the thoughts, opinions, and desires of Angolan youth. These youth are neither innocent nor guilty of the events in which they were caught during thirty years of civil war, but rather, as suggested by Utas in his formulation of the term ‘abject heroes.’ they have come into being in time of insecurity that has compelled them to negotiate in creative ways the exigencies of daily survival – for those who stayed, for IDPs and for refugees alike.

Many of the skills youth have acquired in this process of war and displacement are skills nonetheless, and will be of tremendous value to Angola in the future. It is imperative that the international organisations who work with them see them not as citizens-in-becoming but as present citizens, in both body and in political practice. By developing programs based on this conceptualization, they will facilitate the flow of youth’s energy, innovation, and intelligence towards the betterment of all Angolans rather than allowing it to remain hidden – much like the oil – and identifiable only in small spaces. Here it is worth reiterating Article 81 (3) of the Angolan Constitution of January 2010. It states that “[t]he priority objectives of the youth policy shall be the development of young people’s personality, the creation of the conditions needed for their effective integration into working life, a love of free creativity and a sense of community service.” This vision speaks to the ideals of liberal democracy, and in recognizing youth as present citizens, international organisations may well be able to play a part in its realization in the Angolan state.

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