Politics resettled:  
The case of the Palestinian diaspora in Chile

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List of abbreviations

CAS Centre for Arab Studies (University of Chile)
GUPS General Union of Palestinian Students in Chile
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Glossary

Federación Palestina: Chilean-Palestinian organisation involved in the political and cultural representation of the Palestinian community.

Fundación Belén 2000: Chilean-Palestinian charity focused on improving the lives of Palestinian people through humanitarian aid for the most unprivileged families.

Intifada: Arabic word for ‘uprising’, used in the Palestinian context to describe moments of intensified collective contestation against the Israeli occupation.

Kuffiyeh: Traditional Palestinian scarf associated with the resistance movement.

Mestizaje: Spanish term used to describe the mixing of European and American ancestries that defines the history of Latin America.

Nakba: Arabic word for ‘catastrophe’, used to describe the events of 1948 where thousands of Palestinians were expelled or fled from their homes preceding and following the creation of the State of Israel.

Paisanos: Spanish word for ‘compatriots’, used by Chilean-Palestinians to refer to others from the community and to Palestinians more generally.

Turcos: Spanish word used in a pejorative sense by ‘native’ Chileans to refer to those who had migrated from the Ottoman Empire (including Palestinians).

Vicaría: Catholic organisation known for its support in relief, collaborating as an implementing partner during the resettlement project.
1 Introduction

Resettlement needs to be better understood as a political event and process. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines it as the “transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection to a third State that agreed to admit them” (UNHCR 2011: 9). Along with repatriation and local integration, it is considered one of three traditional ‘durable solutions’ for refugees globally. In other words, it is a top-down logistical endeavour, where ‘success’ is typically assessed by whether resettled refugees are provided with the tools they need to achieve ‘integration’ in their new ‘host-state’. Yet, how much do we understand resettlement beyond these policy-oriented categories?

It is no secret that resettlement is an inherently political tool at the national and international level. Indeed, Chimni (1999) traces how it was the favoured solution until the 1980s, particularly for Western States who looked to fill gaps in labour markets and delegitimise rival states during the Cold War. However, these acts of ‘calculated kindness’ (Loescher and Scanlan 1986) have decreased starkly due to increasingly stricter immigration policies in the West – in 2018, it is estimated that only around 100,000 places were available for 1.2 million persons in need (UNHCR 2017). As a result, attention has shifted to emerging resettlement actors to fill these protection gaps. For example, Latin American countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, have all resettled refugees as part of regional agreements and their own national objectives (Ruiz 2015). Still, although states are essentially in full control over who they admit through these schemes, they are not the only actors with distinct (political) interests in relation to being engaged and involved in resettlement processes.

The gradual withdrawal of states from resettlement has also been followed by the creation and research of alternative roles for civil society. For example, migrant(refugee) communities provide assistance to others from that group to adapt in their new host countries and are essentially portrayed as resources for integration akin to any non-governmental organisation (NGO)2. Still, this image reproduces a technocratic approach in both policy and academic circles, while uncritically assuming the relationship between resettled refugees and ‘co-nationals’ as inevitable due to ‘shared identity markers’, reinforcing essentialist ideas about ‘the nation’ (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). Overall, there is a lack of understanding about what this ‘co-national resettlement support’ represents for refugees and their communities alike. In light of these shortcomings, an important question arises: what is the (political) significance that they are providing solidarity and resources for resettlement?

In 2008, 117 Palestinian refugees were resettled to Chile from Iraq. In parallel to the ‘formal’ implementation of the project by the Chilean Government, UNHCR and their NGO partner the Vicaría, the long-settled Palestinian community supported their ‘compatriots’ by providing material and cultural resources. Nonetheless, to merely focus on the relation of these practices to integration would obscure the fact that this participation was also, in itself, highly politicised. Rather than positing the engagement of the ‘Chilean-Palestinian’ community as static and essentialised, this paper aims to delve deeper into the motivations, worries and political repercussions that characterised their involvement in resettlement. As such, I build on Vera Espinoza’s (2018) argument that, “refugee resettlement is a process of constant and multiple negotiations, happening

1 “Process by which … refugees engage with, and become part of their resettlement society” (Valtonen 1998: 41).
2 See Beiser 2006; Ager and Strang 2010; Lewis 2010; Piacentini 2015.
at different levels and times”, and focus on how this project was negotiated, framed and performed at both macro and micro levels by various actors within and peripheral to the Palestinian community in Chile.

By conceptualising Chilean-Palestinians as a ‘diaspora’, a transnational imagined community, I argue that the arrival of Palestinian refugees was an event where different (re-)formulations of (Chilean-)Palestinian identity and politics were centre stage. Support for the project and the idea of a common national identity, rather than being presumed, had to be debated by different actors within the community. Beyond a simply humanitarian endeavour, resettlement also existed as an opportunity to make (political) claims and contestations regarding the ongoing occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Thus, although it has always been seen as a political tool for states, it can also become an opportunity for diaspora groups to politicise their own causes. By using this project as a case study and applying diaspora theory as a framework, it becomes possible to elucidate the politics of resettlement and move beyond mere policy and state-centric considerations3.

Fieldwork

The findings presented in this paper originate mainly from three weeks of fieldwork in Chile during the month of December 2017. Semi-structured interviews were carried out (in Spanish and English) with 20 individuals4 who were involved within the remit of the resettlement project, including individuals who arrived as refugees, politicians, volunteers, as well as past and current representatives of Chilean-Palestinian organisations, the Palestinian Embassy, the Government, the UNHCR and the Vicaría. Documents, both official and unofficial, were also obtained and examined in order to better piece together a chronology of events which was as comprehensive as possible.

Diaspora theory and (re-)politicising resettlement

For the purpose of this research, the concept of diaspora provides a suitable analytical framework to understand negotiations and mobilisation related to Chilean-Palestinian identity politics. This term was also actively used by interviewees as an emic definition to describe their own experience as descendants of Palestinian migrants in Chile. As a result, diaspora represents both a category of analysis and of practice (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), at the individual and collective level.

‘Diasporic identity’ serves to explain how migrants retain a connection to their ‘homeland’ in their own understandings of the ‘self’. The ‘homeland’, whether real or imagined, provides an important source of belonging (Cohen 2008). This transnational attachment, however, is rooted in personal circumstances and motivations and is far from homogeneous across particular migrant populations. Accordingly, rather than a natural consequence of migration, “diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference” (Hall 1990: 235). As was the case with the arrival of resettled co-nationals, they are actively negotiated at the individual level, while also being constructed and mobilised at the collective level.

I define ‘diasporic mobilisation’ as purposive action tied to a particular identity in a specific context related to the ‘homeland’ (Brinkerhoff 2008: 68; Adamson 2012). To explain this process, Sökefeld

3 In this way, I also aim to follow Bakewell (2008: 432) in “breaking away from policy relevance” in order “to challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin much practice”.

4 Written consent was reaffirmed in preparation for the publication of this paper, which included permission to use participants’ names and organisational affiliations (I anonymise those interviewees who are not public figures). I also had approval from the Central University Research Ethics Committee to conduct these interviews.
(2006) proposes a framework which lays out the four different components that characterise how migrant communities mobilise in this manner:

- **Framing** is a tool to appeal to the “ideas that transform certain conditions into an issue, that help to define grievances and claims, and that legitimise and mobilise action” (Sökefeld 2006: 270). For example, national identity can be described as a ‘master frame’, while circumstances in the ‘homeland’ such as authoritarianism, or issues related to conflict and occupation in the case of Palestine, may also motivate purposive action;

- **Opportunity structures** represent the context that the particular community exists and operates in, both in the host state and ‘homeland’ (Chaudhary and Moss 2016). This includes factors such as relations between host-state institutions and diaspora groups, as well as any other “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political environment” (Tarrow 1998: 85) that allow for collective action;

- In turn, they enable the building of important **mobilising structures**, “networks of people that are bound to the same issue or formal organisations that are established for the purpose of making particular claims” (Sökefeld 2006: 269). Here, ‘diaspora elites’ express and construct frames in order to actively organise a sense of transnational imagined community;

- These actors play a key role in fashioning **mobilisation practices**, which include protests, lobbying, development projects, or even the funding of armed groups (Koinova 2013; Moss 2016; Van Hear and Cohen 2016). In addition, I contend that direct community support to resettled refugees in the context of resettlement can also be added to the list.

This theoretical framework is particularly useful in explaining the significance of diaspora involvement in, and support for, the resettlement of co-nationals. Particularly, it provides insight into how identity and politics are negotiated during resettlement, while particular frames are mobilised in the host state (Chile) in relation to the ‘homeland’ (Palestine). Through a historical analysis of the community and its politicisation, it becomes apparent that these components have been integral to diasporic mobilisation in Chile generally, and in the context of the resettlement project in 2008 specifically.

**Structure**

The paper is organised into four core parts, retracing the events before, during and after the resettlement project. This story begins in the 19th Century, as Part 2 sets out the context of the long-settled Palestinian community, charting the history of migration to Chile and its continued cultural, social and especially political relationship to the ‘homeland’. Here the focus is on how, over generations, Chilean-Palestinians have become and remained influential in the Chilean political landscape, a position which provided them with the platform and resources to engage in diaspora politics, especially in the setting of the resettlement project in 2008.

Parts 3 and 4 analyse how, even prior to arrival, the project itself was publically debated by elites in relation to diaspora politics. These sections explore how resettlement was contemplated through two separate, but also connected, diasporic frames which shaped and motivated the involvement of the community – a common Palestinian identity and the Right of Return. First, after public deliberations regarding the viability of the project, the involvement of the long-standing community in 2008 was

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5 Also known as ‘entrepreneurs’ (Koinova 2018a) or ‘animators’ (Betts and Jones 2016).
motivated by ideas of a shared Palestinianness rooted in a common (national) identity between the settled community and the group of resettled refugees. Secondly, the perceived ‘clash’ between third-country resettlement and repatriation, due to the critical importance of the Right of Return, also proved to be a key feature in the negotiation of the arrival of Palestinian refugees. Ultimately, a constructed frame of ‘political-humanitarianism’ ensured that the relationship between resettlement and return was not to be seen as mutually exclusive.

Lastly, Part 5 looks at how these frames were performed in practice during the resettlement project. In this way, arrival ceremonies and service provision were organised as different forms of mobilisation practices. Rather than simple acts of charity, they served as opportunities to actively express Palestinian culture and presence, in addition to symbolically contributing to the Palestinian struggle by supporting compatriots in need. Nonetheless, it also becomes clear that certain parallels with regards to the irregularity of diaspora mobilisation were also exhibited and remind us to keep a nuanced perspective on the merits of community support for the adaptation of resettled refugees.

2 The making of a Palestinian diaspora in Chile

The resettlement of Palestinian refugees in 2008 cannot be separated from the historical context of two centuries of Palestinian presence in Chilean society. The existence of this long-settled community should be contextualised, charting the history of migration to Chile and its continued cultural, social and especially political relationship to the ‘homeland’ as a diaspora, creating a distinct idea of Palestinianness rooted in the realities of the Chilean context. All in all, I focus on the historical trajectory of Chilean-Palestinian diasporic mobilisation and the role that elites, both from the community and peripheral to it, have played in creating the enabling environment for the politicisation of resettlement.

Migration, adaptation and ‘success’

Today, the Palestinian community in Chile is the largest outside of the Middle East. It is estimated that around 400,000 Palestinian descendants currently live in the country, embodying a connection between the Middle East and Latin America which is defined by migration flows going back to the end of the 19th Century (Baeza 2014). Illustrating this historical fact, Palestinian author Jabra Ibrahim Jabra describes his experience growing up in Bethlehem: “at the beginning of the 1920s, the effect of emigration was clearly visible in the many vacant houses and buildings whose owners had left and in the state of disrepair and neglect” (Jabra 1995: 47). This trend had even begun years earlier as “some 1.2 million Ottoman citizens migrated to the Americas between 1860 and 1914” (Baeza 2014: 60). Large communities from the ‘Bilad al-Sham’ (present-day Lebanon, Syria and Palestine) established themselves throughout the continent, from Chile to Honduras to the United States. In the case of Palestinians and Chile, migrations almost always began from the same three villages of Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour as the majority of inhabitants of these communities had relatives who had previously left for Chile and settled there (Tsimhoni 1993: 18; Saffie and Agar 2012: 65). As such, today it is often said that in places like Beit Jala there are no families which do not have relatives in Chile. These processes of ‘chain migration’ continued throughout the 20th and into the 21st Century, the initial drivers of which are often debated.

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6 Palestinian identity in the subjective and objective sense (Sayigh 2013: 13).
Eugenio Chahuán, professor and member of the Palestinian community, maintains that the initial movement to Chile was practically a mere coincidence: “a few Palestinian families sold religious artefacts during fairs in Italy. While there, Jorge Hirmas from Bethlehem met with the brother of the President of Chile, who suggested these religious objects would be highly valued in Chile. He accepted his invitation, accompanied by my ancestor Jorge Chahuán and Jorge Mansour – considered the founding patriarchs of the Palestinian Community in Chile”. The story of the ‘Three Jorges’ is indicative of the particular characteristics of those who undertook this long journey – often young single men from Christian middle-class families who had funds to finance it and a more ‘open view to the world’ thanks to being educated in missionary schools. On the other hand, “many Muslim families would have done likewise, but lacked the … social networks overseas and sometimes the economic resources to do so” (Baeza 2014: 60). As such, the large majority of migrants from the Middle East to the Americas were Christian, a trend which is also tied to the difficult environment affecting their communities.

This ‘Christian exodus’, as described in Jabra’s work, is also a phenomenon rooted in the socio-political context of Palestine in the 20th Century. Although previously exempted, conscription was made mandatory for Arab Christians in the Ottoman Empire in 1909 (Saffie and Agar 2012: 63). This policy, compounded by the deteriorating economic situation during the First World War, seems to have accelerated the number of departures to Chile, as the majority of ancestors of Chilean-Palestinians arrived around this period and in the years following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 (Baeza 2005; Saffie and Agar 2012). Nonetheless, arrivals also continued before, during and after the 1947 Partition of Palestine and the subsequent creation of the Israeli state (known as the Nakba, or ‘catastrophe’), which was defined by forced expulsion and displacement related to the capturing, evacuating, and ‘cleansing’ of Arab villages, neighbourhoods, and towns (Pappé 2006; Chatty 2010: 202). Other waves occurred during and after the ‘Six-Day War’ in 1967, as well as the Intifadas (‘uprisings’) of 1987 and 2000 (Tsimhoni 1993: 19). The main routes remained through family reunification and marriage, but the numbers were much less significant than in the period between 1900 and 1930 (Baeza 2005). Such ‘mixed migration’ to Chile continues until today, although in drastically different circumstances in terms of ‘acceptance’.

The search for a better life in the ‘New World’ was initially met with exclusion. Of those individuals who had the resources and associated networks, “the vast majority ended up settling for good in the country” (Saffie and Agar 2012: 67). Throughout my interviews, this experience of Arab migration and adaptation to Chile is portrayed in a positive light, principally due to similar religious beliefs with Chileans. However, this narrative can sometimes overlook the racism and prejudice initially experienced by those who were labelled as Turcos owing to their Ottoman passports (Rebolleda Hernandez 1994: 250). Following prevalent ‘white’ immigration policies around Latin America, Elsey (2011: 162-163) argues that Arab-Chileans were seen as “permanently foreign”, unable to fully incorporate themselves into the national imaginary of “Chilean mestizaje”. Local press “depicted Arab Chileans as parasitic”, while Arab business leaders were caricatured as “voracious social climbers who built empires by exploiting Chilean workers and consumers” (Elsey 2011: 156). Clearly, these prejudiced attitudes were also due to the fact that, as Arab businesses flourished, they began to constitute an important competition to ‘native’ elites.

Thanks to the favourable economic context, many Arab migrants established themselves as successful traders and entrepreneurs in Chile during the early periods of the 20th Century, while retaining an important connection with their ancestral homeland. Indeed, today it is well known that

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7 Interview, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
8 See Acosta (2018) for an overview of the historically racial nature of migration laws in South America.
“Palestinian surnames are among the wealthiest in the country” (Saffie and Agar 2012: 70). The names Yarur, Said and Hirmas became symbols of the textile industry and fortunes (Winn 1986; Baeza 2005). According to Baeza (2014: 60) “they filled a void in Latin America where the retail trade was quite underdeveloped”, contributing massively to the development of these newly industrialised states and venturing into almost all areas of the national economy and geography. With time, it seems that this important involvement in the economy eventually supported the integration of the Palestinian community, which stopped being seen as Turcos and started to be appreciated and respected (Klich and Lesser 1996). Although, Baeza (2014: 63) rightly warns that to brand this success as the Palestinian experience in Chile risks overlooking that “there is too much socio-economic diversity … for Chileans of Palestinian descent to be associated with only one social class”. Moreover, a focus on ‘assimilation’ may additionally overshadow the ways many have retained a distinct Palestinian identity and political attachment. All in all, historical rootedness in both Chilean and Palestinian contexts has proved instrumental in the creation of a distinctive Palestinian space in Chile with considerable influence in transnational diaspora politics and mobilisation.

A Palestinian diaspora in Chile: (re-)framing and mobilising Palestinianess

This tale of migration and successful adaptation places the community as one with ‘two anchors’: Palestinian and Chilean (Saffie and Agar 2012: 81). Such simultaneous incorporation is especially indicative of the experience of a diaspora – an ‘imagined community’ existing across state borders, that manages to (politically) sustain a collective identity through some ‘internal cohesion’ and connection to the ‘homeland’ (Sökefeld 2006; Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 497; Cohen 2008). A privileged standing in society enables to ‘build’ important mobilising structures – “networks of people that are bound to the same issue or formal organisations that are established for the purpose of making particular claims” (Sökefeld 2006: 269). Crucially, as Brubaker (2005: 12, emphasis added) points out, political change is an important objective for diaspora groups, who do “not so much describe the world as seek to remake it”. In this way, the Palestinian community in Chile is characterised by its consistent (and diverse) diasporic mobilisation with regards to the Palestinian Cause.

Chileans of Palestinian heritage experience and negotiate this part of their identity in a multitude of ways. Identifying as ‘Palestinian’, when today the large majority (and their parents) were actually born in Chile, is far from a natural or obvious step. Indeed, as Brubaker (2004: 4) argues, attachment “is a variable, not a constant; it cannot be presupposed”. Therefore, demarcating the boundaries of the ‘community’ can be quite difficult as some are exclusively Palestinian on ‘both sides’, while others might just have a single (distant) relative of Palestinian origin. However, while most do not speak Arabic, many often retain a connection to the ‘homeland’ in other ways such as through music, food and dance, whether at home or at cultural events in specific Palestinian spaces such as the Club Palestino. For Kamal Cumsille, academic at the University of Chile’s Centre for Arab Studies (CAS), they represent “remnants of model archetypes of how cultural forms are in Palestine”, implying that a sort of spatial and temporal distance is still inescapable for many. Conversely, others have the opportunity to communicate directly with family members living in the Occupied Territories or even to travel there frequently. All in all, the claim to Palestinianess as a Chilean citizen is fundamental in sustaining a collective national and cultural identity, one that is also inherently tied to a particular political passion for the liberation of Palestine.

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9 Social club in Santiago where only those with Palestinian heritage can be members.
10 Interview with Kamal Cumsille, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
Palestinianness in Chile, more than a mere cultural marker, represents an important frame for transnational politics of resistance. To recall, framing is to appeal to the “ideas that transform certain conditions into an issue, that help to define grievances and claims” (Sökefeld 2006: 270). In this case, the creation of the Israeli state in 1948 and the subsequent occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967 have been the main drivers of diasporic projects constituting Palestinian identity and resistance. For Chilean-Palestinians, “the maintaining of the ‘open wound’ of Palestine has ensured that the community continues to be vigilant and active for the rights of the Palestinian people in their land, even after many generations”\(^1\). The continued settler-colonial and apartheid policies of the Israeli state, as well as unresolved issues related to the lack of a sovereign state for the Palestinian people, sustained violence in the region and disagreements around the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees “constitute the main aspects which serve to unify and connect Palestinians in diaspora” (Mavroudi 2018: 1313). The ‘ongoing Nakba’ in the ‘homeland’ ferments attachment to Palestinianness even further, where identifying as Palestinian serves as implicit solidarity with those suffering Palestinians around the world and maintaining an identity that has been constantly suppressed, restricted and erased by Zionist policies (Pappé 2006; Hanafi 2012). Crucially, it also legitimises and mobilises explicit action, providing important incentives to utilise favourable opportunity structures in order to push for change in the ‘homeland’.

Chilean-Palestinian elites have historically played a central role in shaping Chilean foreign policy towards Palestine. Advantageous opportunity structures resulting from successful adaptation have allowed diaspora elites to be influential at all levels of the Chilean state, utilising it as a vehicle for contesting the situation in Palestine. Mayors, deputies and senators\(^2\) of Palestinian origin consistently bring the Palestinian Cause to the front of the agenda. Regardless of differences on the majority of other political issues, on Palestine they have “consistently cooperated” (Baeza 2014: 67). Indeed, the Chilean delegation abstained in the 1947 United Nations vote on the partition of Palestine after pressure by the Palestinian community (Glick 1959: 218; Lekanda 2008: 153). Additionally, in 2011, the Chilean government officially recognised the Palestinian State, acknowledging the historical contributions of the Palestinian community in its declaration (MINREL 2011). More recently, the parliament voted to denounce the imprisonment of Ahed Tamimi and other Palestinian children in Israel (Federación Palestina 2018). There is clearly a solid inclination in policy circles towards supporting the rights of Palestinians, one which also provided a favourable context for the 2008 resettlement of Palestinian refugees from Iraq.

Additional resources for mobilisation in the Chilean context have also been provided by a resurgence of Chilean-Palestinian organisations, especially in the context of the ‘transformative event’ of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s. During that period, diaspora organisations were formed (or became more active) and have since served as ‘diasporic actors’ “to articulate that such events require new forms of action” (Sökefeld 2006: 275). Organisations such as the Fundación Belén 2000 have adopted an approach linked to charity and commercial objectives, funding development projects around the Bethlehem area and promoting business links between Chilean-Palestinian entrepreneurs and Palestine (Baeza and Brun 2012: 65). Although not exclusively Palestinian, the CAS has also disseminated critical academic work related to the Middle East as well as offering Arab language classes and courses on Palestine Studies. In parallel, the Federación Palestina and the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) have been (more politically) active in organising events and campaigns aimed at educating Chilean society at large about the situation in the

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\(^{1}\) Interview with Eugenio Chahuán, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.

\(^{2}\) The Chilean-Palestinian parliamentary group is the “largest of the binational groups in the Chilean congress” (Baeza 2014: 68).
‘homeland’ through cinema cycles, talks at universities and other political events. Interestingly, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) also forms an important element of this trend as the UN-recognised ‘sole representative of the Palestinian people’ – an official embassy opened in 1991, with the function of representing both the PLO and the Chilean-Palestinian community\textsuperscript{13}. All in all, Palestinian organisations in Chile have been involved through different mobilisation practices as loci of and platforms for diasporic claims.

Through their involvement in the ‘professional’ diaspora, leaders of these organisations (including the Palestinian Ambassador) often access privileged platforms in the Chilean press as ‘legitimate voices’ of the Palestinian community. Similar to politicians of Palestinian origin, they are also frequently asked to comment on the situation in Palestine and their involvement with regards to it. Even so, it becomes evident that both between and within these organisations, individuals “profess to widely differing perspectives on politics in the broadest sense of the term” (Schwabe 2016: 60). As such, these diaspora entrepreneurs belonging to Palestinian organisations can mirror those political divisions mentioned earlier, disagreements which also played out in the case of resettlement in 2008. Although shaped by these ‘animators’, mobilising structures are not exclusively reserved to those with high diasporic capital\textsuperscript{14}.

Chilean-Palestinian organisations play a key role in providing a vehicle for Palestinian descendants (and other Chileans) to get involved in transnational politics. Protests, particularly in the case of Chile, best represent how members of the diaspora mobilise around ‘critical events’ (Sökefeld 2006; Chaudhary and Moss 2016). These actions are a result of diaspora organisations encouraging those with Palestinian origins to “promote the defence and respect of human rights and international law in all parts of the world and, most especially, in Palestine”\textsuperscript{15}. Participation in such a political space, in the case of protesting Israel’s continued aggressions in Gaza or Trump’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, elucidates how collective claims are made and voiced in practice. Schwabe (2017) also discusses how protesting for Palestine on Chilean streets is intimately connected to a ‘politics of presence’ central to the struggle for land and existence of ‘Palestinianness’ in defiance of coercive occupation in the homeland. Resistance from abroad, then, is what defines the political actions of Chilean-Palestinians. Of course, as with identifying as ‘Palestinian’, it cannot be said that all Chileans with Palestinian ancestry are active with the Cause in this way – those who consistently adopt a diasporic stance are often only a small minority of the population, which can expand in times of crisis (Shain and Barth 2003: 452). The 2008 resettlement project represents such an example.

**Contextualising the politics of resettlement**

Faced with the possible arrival of 117 Palestinian refugees to Chile, a series of reactions, declarations, and negotiations arose and developed within the Palestinian community. In this way, the resettlement can be situated as an event, an opportunity to negotiate wider political stances, as well as divisions, that characterise the Palestinian diaspora in Chile. The events surrounding the resettlement and its politicisation need to be seen in the context of the structures and resources available to the Palestinian diaspora in Chile for the purpose of making transnational political claims. Access to political capital, whether through the Chilean parliament or civil society in the case of different diasporic organisations, has granted Palestinians in Chile greater faculty to engage in diasporic mobilisation. As has been charted, mobilising frames are related to Palestinianness and the

\textsuperscript{13} Skype interview with Ambassador Mai Alkaila, 10 January 2018.

\textsuperscript{14} “Combination of economic, cultural and social capital forms accumulated in or referring to the diaspora” (Hansen 2007: 144).

\textsuperscript{15} Interview with Anuar Majluf, 13 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
situation in the ‘homeland’, while mobilisation practices include protests, development practices and lobbying.

Rather than being inevitable, support for the project was inherently political – it was debated by elites in relation to diasporic politics. Indeed, “diaspora entrepreneurs agree, contest, and negotiate with others” in non-tangible arenas (Koinova 2018a: 1258). In this case, the media attention surrounding the project allowed diaspora elites to make claims and arguments linking the project to particular diasporic frames, (re-)politicising resettlement in the process. Specifically, these frames were themselves debated in two main ways, first related to a shared idea of Palestinian identity and second, to the Palestinian Right of Return.

3 Negotiating resettlement and framing a ‘shared Palestinianness’

In mid-April 2007, Miguel Diaz Cumsille, President of the Federación Palestina at the time, was quoted in Chile’s largest newspaper El Mercurio saying that the resettlement would pose an important challenge for the Palestinian community and Chilean society (Zeballos 2007). He argued that the arrival of resettled Palestinian refugees differed greatly from past migration processes in terms of social circumstances and he was thus doubtful of the potential success of the project. A statement which effectively challenged the assumed ‘resettlement-friendly’ attitude of co-national communities. In response, Ambassador Mai Alkaila challenged these divisions, appealing to a ‘shared Palestinianness’ to legitimise and mobilise action. Identity was negotiated in the context of resettlement, where the (political) expression of solidarity to aid their ‘Palestinian brothers and sisters’ is particularly powerful because it transcends difference.

A tale of two Palestines

The experience of ‘being Palestinian’ for those 117 refugees resettled from the Iraqi-Syrian border is drastically different from that of the long-settled community in Chile. As Schwabe (2016: 45) summarises, “rather than relatively resourceful Christian migrants from the West Bank, these newcomers were Muslim refugees who, by the time of arrival, had already lived in exile for years”. In 1948, after being expelled by Zionist militias in Haifa, “an estimated 5,000 Palestinian refugees followed the retreating Iraqi army back to Iraq” (Chatty 2010: 204). In the aftermath of the Anglo-American invasion in 2003, “Palestinian refugees in Iraq became targets of sectarian violence both due to their perceived ties to Saddam Hussein and, once again, simply for being Palestinian (Chatty 2010: 209). A large proportion were rejected at the border when attempting to seek protection in Syria, subsequently setting up a camp in the middle of the desert where they remained for two years until one portion were resettled to Chile (Vera Espinoza 2017). Their story is one of continuous exclusion, forced displacement and encampment in the Middle East, strikingly distinctive from those (‘successful’) Chilean-Palestinians whose ancestors were able to emigrate and start new lives in the ‘New World’.

For Diaz Cumsille, then, this distinction in trajectories presented a dilemma due to an incompatibility based on divergences in both migration experience (as well as class) and religion. First, he warned that Palestinian and Chilean institutions alike had little experience in helping poor refugees in this way, lacking the “plans and management to face such responsibility” (Zeballos 2007). Through this statement, Diaz Cumsille seems to contrast ‘traditional’ Palestinian migrations to Chile (easily
‘absorbed’ because of family links and economic capital) with the atypical ‘top-down’ resettlement of Palestinian refugees (lacking any concrete social networks and coming from multiple episodes of trauma and dispossession). By focusing on the heterogeneity of these experiences, his statement distinguishes ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, the ‘successful migrants’ and the ‘poor refugees’. Relatedly, others interpreted this stance as being underpinned by a fear that the arrival of poor Palestinian refugees would affect the ‘prestige’ of the Palestinian community within Chilean society. Indeed, the fact that they were destitute and would need to adapt to a completely new setting, in the context of weak support structures, presented a massive challenge. The worry was also that “they could end up begging for money in the street, which has nothing to do with the Palestinians in Chile who live comfortable lives”\(^{16}\). Specifically, they could not afford a repeat of the perceived failed resettlement of refugees from Yugoslavia in the 1990s\(^{17}\) as it would affect the Chilean-Palestinian ‘image of success’ which many, including Diaz Cumsille and leaders of the Fundación Belén, have worked so hard to cultivate.

Secondly, Diaz Cumsille further distanced those soon-to-be resettled refugees from the long-settled community by highlighting the religious differences between the two groups. While past migrations from Palestine were deemed as ‘compatible’ with Chilean culture, he argued that it will not be easy for these refugees to adapt as Muslims (Zeballos 2007). To recall, 99% of the community are Christian, or, as Kamal Cumsille put it – *secular of Christian origin* – where, for example, “teens from the community go out, drink, go to parties, which is more typically Chilean, not Palestinian”\(^{18}\). In this sense, the label ‘Chilean-Palestinian’ is associated with more ‘liberal’ (and ‘Chilean’) values, while on the other hand, Miguel Diaz Cumsille emphasised that those from Iraq come from the ‘oriental culture’, with a very different kind of life from the Chilean one (Zeballos and Torrealba 2007). Such discourse of ‘clash of cultures’ essentially posited that a shared ‘Palestinian identity’ would not be enough to support cultural adaptation, once again challenging the assumed natural expression of perceived similarities related to nationality. All in all, he framed the project fairly negatively, as a meeting of drastically different experiences of what it means to be ‘Palestinian’. Yet, this also provided the opportunity to challenge this discourse in favour of ideas related to a ‘shared Palestinianness’.

**Rejecting divisions, mobilising shared Palestinianness**

Seven months before the arrival of the first group of refugees, Ambassador Mai Alkaila rebuked the position of Diaz Cumsille through an open letter, (re-)framing the resettlement as a challenge that would be surmounted by the mobilisation of a shared Palestinian identity. In her position as diaspora entrepreneur, she criticised his “very negative statements” and “negative attitude” that would “deeply harm the relations between the Federación Palestina and the PLO”\(^{19}\). In line with secular PLO rhetoric, she specifically cautioned against “mixing the Palestinian issue with the religious one”. From this, she announced: “we are Palestinian, regardless of religion or the nationality that we have, including those in Chile and those from Iraq”. This claim to a collective Palestinianness, beyond religion, class, legal status or language, is inherently political – providing a “common framework of interpretation and representation” (Sökefeld 2006: 270). As such, the resettlement project represented an occasion to frame and express a shared Palestinianness both *between* the refugees and settled community, as well as *within* the community itself. Following Brubaker (2004: 14), “certain dramatic events, in particular, can galvanise group feeling, and ratchet up pre-existing

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16 Interview with Kamal Cumsille, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
17 In a project run by the Government and the Vicaría, 26 Serb refugees were resettled to Chile in 1999 but left shortly after struggling to adapt due to a lack of opportunities.
18 Interview with Kamal Cumsille, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
19 Skype interview with Ambassador Mai Alkaila, 10 January 2018.
levels of groupness”. Though these diasporic frames were constantly challenged and (re-)negotiated in practice after arrival, this stance managed to galvanise much needed support beforehand.

Framing the resettlement as a task to assist Palestinian refugees as Palestinians was fundamental in order to encourage backing. Ambassador Alkaila’s words, through the explicit phrasing of a particular frame of shared nationality, effectively served to “legitimise and mobilise action” (Sökefeld 2006: 270). This contrasts with the declaration by Diaz Cumsille, who effectively discouraged involvement and legitimised inaction by highlighting distinctions, negating this imagined common identity. For those supporting the stance laid out by the Ambassador, the resettlement, rather than potentially ‘tarnishing their reputation’, symbolised a situation where they had an obligation to utilise their privileged position to support their co-nationals. This view was reiterated in my interviews with those Chilean-Palestinians who were involved in the project. For Maria, who volunteered extensively, “it was the obligation of any Palestinian here, who is doing well, to help those who are not”20. In addition, this argument was also common with others connected to the Federación Palestina, such as Fuad Chahin, Vice-President at the time, and Jaime Abedrapo, current spokesperson, who both argued that the lack of tradition of refugee reception in Chile (pointed out by Diaz Cumsille) had to be tackled by a greater involvement of the Palestinian community21. Thus, the frame of shared Palestinianness was crucial in recruiting Palestinian descendants to this cause, while these testimonies also exemplify the divisions within the Federación Palestina itself. Similar disagreements regarding the project continued, this time arguing that resettlement would jeopardise the Right of Return.

4 (Political–)Humanitarianism and compromising on the Right of Return?

Resettlement was further politicised through resistance to it, particularly due to the importance of the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees. In fact, in the Palestinian context “resettlement was … never seen as a purely humanitarian solution but was always politically tainted” (Irfan 2017: 69). By retracing the discussions between, as well as actions of, elites and activists regarding this issue, I argue that the project effectively managed to maintain both sides, balancing political and humanitarian concerns and constructing a ‘political-humanitarian’ frame in the process. This ‘compromise’ resulted, once again, from a debate between different elements of the Chilean-Palestinian organisational landscape, mainly led by the Fundación Belén and the CAS.

A political choice between Palestinian resettlement and return

When Palestinians were expelled in 1948, many “left their homes believing that they would return shortly” (Irfan 2017: 68). Because of this, repatriation, rather than local integration or resettlement, is perceived as the preferred ‘durable solution’ – a “return to dignity, freedom, personhood where the latter is signified by being … the original land owners and inhabitants” (Salih 2013: 71). This right to repatriate is protected by international law, especially by United Nations Resolution 194, which “resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so” (Chatty 2010: 208). Nevertheless, as Masalha (2001: 52)

20 Interview with Maria, 15 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
21 Interview with Fuad Chahin, 19 December 2017, Santiago, Chile; Email interview with Jaime Abedrapo, 1 March 2018.
explains, although this right is legally enshrined, “Israel has consistently rejected the return of the refugees to their homes and villages” in order to maintain a Jewish majority. These restrictions are consistent with the ongoing denial of the rights of Palestinians by the Israeli leadership and also applied to the group of Palestinians being resettled to Chile.

The relationship between resettlement and repatriation is fundamentally political for Palestinians. First, the plight of Palestinian refugee populations in the Middle East is essentially a constant reminder of the unresolved consequences of Israeli policies of expulsion and rejection (Chatty 2010: 210). Moreover, the presence of Palestinian refugees in the region has important political implications because the resistance movement has been consistently organised from refugee camps (Sayigh 2007). In parallel, Masalha (2001: 51) finds that, “from early 1949 onwards, … senior Israeli officials spent a great deal of efforts promoting Israeli resettlement schemes”. Indeed, it has been documented that, in part due to the history of migration from the Middle East to Latin America, Israel has consistently looked into transferring Palestinians to the region (Klich 1996; Carroll 2011; Karam 2013). Resettlement, however, is seen as ‘dissolving the refugee issue’ and, subsequently, deemed ‘mutually exclusive with return’ due to the fact that it represents an implicit acceptance of its renunciation (Shiblak 2005: 8; Irfan 2017: 69). Generally, then, resettling Palestinian refugees to the other side of the world may be seen as a step backwards, further distancing them from their ‘homeland’, physically, legally and politically. In this context, it is unsurprising that the resettlement of 117 Palestinian refugees from Iraq to Chile could be seen as effectively playing into the hands of Israel.

Debating the Right of Return

In a *Mercurio* article entitled ‘Palestinian Community Rejects the Decision of the Government to Welcome Refugees’, Jamil Nazzal, spokesperson of the *Fundación Belén*, laid out the stance of his organisation: “one of the inalienable rights of the human being is the right to live in their own homeland” (*El Mercurio* 2007). Citing Resolution 194, he argued that the only solution for the Palestinian refugees in Al-Tanf is to exercise their legitimate return to their homes in Palestine, adding that relocation to Chile would violate this. In the same text and through a separate letter to the Interior Minister, he “asked the {Chilean} Executive to continue negotiating with the Israeli authorities and the international community” for repatriation, rather than going forward with the resettlement. By positioning themselves against the arrival of Palestinian refugees in this way, the *Fundación Belén* explicitly framed the resettlement as contrary to the Palestinian Cause. In other words, by taking advantage of their favourable position with regards to both Chilean media and state representatives, these diaspora entrepreneurs attempted to utilise the ‘resettlement debate’ in order to shift responsibility to Israel, as the state currently occupying the ‘homeland’ and continuously denying any accountability for the creation of the ‘refugee problem’ or for the (legal) return of Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, this approach seems disconnected from the reality faced by the inhabitants of Al-Tanf.

In my interview with Kamal Cumsille\(^\text{22}\), he recounted how he and other academics authored an ‘alternative letter’, in opposition to that of the *Fundación Belén*:

> I am not for solving issues of the dead but those of the living. Are rights frozen and claimed in history independent of circumstance and historical period? The Palestinian people are dying, this particular sub-group of Palestinians was dying. They have a right to return but, in that moment, they were dying – that was the contingency.

\(^{22}\) Interview with Kamal Cumsille, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
They collected more than 400 signatures from Chilean-Palestinians and sent it to the Interior Minister in order to manifest the support of the Palestinian community in Chile. Although the Right of Return has been coined as ‘inalienable’, this alternative framing undervalued political rhetoric in favour of life, which could only be realistically fostered through resettling these Palestinian families from the depths of the desert. As such, in addition to the frame of shared Palestinianness, this frame of humanitarianism further mobilised support to, as Maria put it, “convince the community to accept them”\textsuperscript{23}. Moreover, it defied the hegemony of elite diaspora discourses.

The signatories of this ‘grassroots letter’ challenged who should be seen as the representatives of Palestine in Chile. Maria was also involved in the petitioning: “we are many Palestinians who want to bring them, the Fundación Belén does not represent us”\textsuperscript{24}. Though difficult to gauge how much influence they directly had on government policy towards the resettlement, the petition by the CAS also served a political role of delegitimising the organisations and contesting the often “hegemonic geographic project” (McKittrick 2007: 20) of elite-led diaspora politics. By working to reach a wider portion of the community, they looked to express the interests of Chilean-Palestinians in a more democratic manner, against the portrayal by El Mercurio of Fundación Belén as ‘the voice of the community’ on the matter of resettling refugees. In effect, this exemplifies the variability of the ‘representativeness’ of diaspora organisations – “the degree to which [they] can justifiably claim to represent the will [and] express the interests … of [their] constituents” (Brubaker 2004: 16).

Although it should not be assumed that 400 individuals can also be seen as expressive of the entire ‘Palestinian collective’, this action formed an important vehicle for the sensitisation to the plight of the refugees who would arrive a few months later. Then, although resettlement became primarily about this ‘humanitarian imperative’, the Right of Return continued to play a key role in the politicisation of the project.

Reconciling resettlement with the Right of Return?

In the end, the approach taken during the project indicates that, in practice, resettlement and the Right of Return are not inherently mutually exclusive. The role of Ambassador Alkaila, representative of the PLO, is central to this search for a ‘middle ground’. For some context, “this hope {of return} has historically been nurtured by PLO politics and its tireless repetition of the ‘Right of Return’”\textsuperscript{25} in its rhetoric (Lindholm Schulz 2003: 3). The Ambassador actually reiterated this position in El Mercurio: “these people, as refugees, have the Right of Return to Palestine according to UN Resolution 194” (Zeballos and Torrealba 2007). Nonetheless, contrary to the zero-sum view purported by the Fundación Belén, she also appealed to the humanitarian frame: “we couldn’t say no to them coming to Chile because they were living between the snakes and the sun”\textsuperscript{25}.

She noted that she had to receive ‘political clearance’ from the PLO leadership on this issue, who, after assessing the situation, agreed that they “did not have any other option than bringing them and maintaining the Right of Return”\textsuperscript{26}. As a dialogue in itself, it typifies the influence of the PLO on the politics of the community. This testimony is equally indicative of the fact that “the PLO has reportedly softened its stance on individual resettlement, acknowledging that it is not necessarily incompatible with collective repatriation rights” (Irfan 2017: 70, emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with Maria, 15 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid
\textsuperscript{25} Skype interview with Ambassador Mai Alkaila, 10 January 2018.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid
Upholding the claim to return in practice was not a given however, as various actions undertaken by different actors and the Ambassador generally ensured that this political claim remained relevant in combination with resettlement. Irfan (2017: 71) argues that “if resettlement can be devised and fashioned so as not to undermine the possibility of eventual return, it may prove more palatable”. On arrival at the airport in Santiago, the Ambassador ensured that none of the refugees had signed any papers renouncing their Right of Return. Furthermore, a ‘Committee on the Right of Return’ was set up in order to follow up on these issues, while naturalisation, in line with international law (Masri 2015), did not in fact negate the ability to return to Palestine as some were able to travel (back) there after receiving their Chilean passports. Overall, the position of Ambassador Alkaila exemplified how the approach of the community was rooted in a humanitarianism that retained an important political dimension. A stance which eventually created a clash with the ‘neutral’ humanitarianism of the Tripartite, shaping the ‘informal’ role of the community in the implementation of the project.

5 Performing resettlement through diasporic frames

Shortly after the public arguments between elites (and ‘non-elites’) had been settled, Chilean-Palestinians from all sectors began preparing for the arrival of their compatriots from the Middle East. This direct support was particularly illustrated through arrival ceremonies and service provision, two specific phases of mobilisation practices which exemplify the performance and ‘micro-politics’ of resettlement. The constructed frames of shared Palestinianness and political-humanitarianism were exhibited, negotiated, and even negated, at the individual and collective level throughout the implementation of the project. These debates also created friction in the partnerships between the community and the authorities, proving detrimental to the formal role of the community in these processes.

(Political-)Humanitarianism and the Tripartite-led project

Contrary to the approach of certain actors within the Palestinian community, the Tripartite (i.e. the Government, UNHCR and the Vicaría) sought a depoliticised, ‘neutral’ structure around the resettlement. Indeed, although this is obviously not the case for all of their operations, the UNHCR’s Statute specifies that their work “shall be of an entirely non-political character” (cited in Betts et al 2012: 83). This stance is also consistent with the Cartagena Declaration, the founding document of the (modern) Latin American refugee regime, which emphasises the “non-political … nature of the grant of asylum” (Regional Refugee Instruments & Related 1984). As a result, the political-humanitarianism that emerged from discussions within the community inevitably clashed with these constraints. Ambassador Alkaila recalled her interactions with UNHCR: “they would always tell me ‘please do not talk about politics’”. Nadia Garib, current President of the Federación Palestina, had a similar testimony: “there were 3 things they did not want us to talk about – expulsion, occupation and the Right of Return”. In addition, there were suspicions that the government did not want to provoke the Chilean Jewish community by allowing ‘anti-Israel’ discourses to be in the spotlight. As such, in joint Tripartite press releases (Tripartite 2008), there is a stark lack of reference to ‘Israel’, or the reasons why these refugees could not be resettled to Palestine. Lastly, it was also pointed out that “the original rejection by some in the community created a view of overall

27 Ibid; see Karam (2013) for a case of this happening to Palestinian refugees in Paraguay.
28 Skype interview with Ambassador Mai Alkaila, 10 January 2018.
29 Interview with Nadia Garib, 19 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
rejection”\(^{30}\), which also contributed to the reluctance of the Tripartite to cooperate with diaspora organisations.

Due to this conflict, Chilean-Palestinian organisations, as the loci of political stances, were effectively side-lined from the formal resettlement programme. Multiple interviewees mentioned how, although individuals and networks of Chilean-Palestinians were part of the informal elements of the project generally, the more substantive questions, such as resolutions or policies, were the responsibility of the Tripartite. UNHCR and Government reports refrain from crediting the community for their contribution (Stefoni et al 2008: 22; del Río Court 2011: 19-20), overlooking the widespread role they played in directly welcoming and supporting resettled refugees.

**Arrival ceremonies as mobilisation practices in resettlement**

On 6 April 2008, the first group of resettled refugees were welcomed at Santiago airport (Barria and Rovano 2008). Although it is common that those resettled are “met on arrival by those organisations … who will assist them in their first weeks or months” (Van Selm 2014: 518), this group of refugees was not simply greeted by co-national NGOs in an administrative capacity, but by hundreds of Palestinian descendants waving Palestinian flags and chanting political slogans related to the Palestinian Cause. By mobilising in this way, Chilean-Palestinians utilised this event as an opportunity to come together and express their Palestininess while celebrating the arrival of their ‘compatriots’. As the first encounter between the two groups, it was also a particularly powerful moment for those refugees who were, as some told me in interviews, unaware of the existence of the Palestinian presence in Chile.

Later, reception events served to emphasise the (old and new) Palestinian presence in Chile – the President of Chile hosted all 117 Palestinian refugees at the Presidential Palace, an event where the Palestinian elite, wearing *kuffiyeh*, had front row seats. As such, despite not being formally involved in the project, Chilean-Palestinians were visible in these widely mediatised events, occurring on the most recognisable political stage in the country. Paula, who worked for the UNHCR during the project, pointed out that other refugee groups, such as Colombians, were “never invited in this way”. This privilege showcases the visible power and influence of the Palestinian community in the Chilean socio-political landscape, allowing them to be involved and present publically.

More than just staking claims about unity, the creation of ‘Palestinian spaces’ in the context of the resettlement underlined the (symbolic) importance of expressing Palestinianness in opposition to its historical and current erasure in the ‘homeland’. Indeed, the oppression of the Palestinians has been characterised by a systematic dispossession of their land and identity\(^{31}\). Underpinned by the Zionist motto of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’, the Israeli (colonial) state has strived to “appropriate land while ignoring the people on it” with the aim of destroying what is ‘Palestinian’ in favour of a “‘Judaization’ of the area” (Hanafi 2012: 190; 194). ‘Being present’, then, is at the core of the Palestinian struggle\(^{32}\), aiming to challenge “the institutionalised invisibility of the Palestinian people” (Hanafi 2012: 190) and the coercive apparatus of the Zionist project in the ‘homeland’.

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\(^{30}\) *Ibid*

\(^{31}\) Historic and current policies of ethnic cleansing such as the destruction and depopulation of homes and villages, the continued construction of illegal Jewish settlements, population transfer through resettlement, as well as the negation of the Right of Return, have prolonged a loss and denial of Palestinian existence on Palestinian soil (Masalha 2001; Khalidi 2006; Pappé 2006).

\(^{32}\) Edward Said (2000: 184) argues that “the greatest battle Palestinians have waged as a people has been over the right to a remembered presence”. 
In this sense, celebrating a shared Palestinianess through these arrival ceremonies also served to emphasise the presence of Palestinians in Chile, whether they arrived in 1908 or 2008, re-contextualising and re-politicising the discourse of the project in the process. Indeed, Schwabe (2017: 52; 57-58) underlines that this “refusal to go away… at both the physical and metaphorical level” is also “pivotal to the social dynamics surrounding diasporic Palestinianess”, especially in the “manifestation of a distinct Palestinian presence” in Chile. It is through this frame of shared Palestinian identity, negotiated in the months before, that Chilean-Palestinians mobilised to directly support these newly arrived families of paisanos.

Supporting resettled paisanos in Chile

Following their arrival, the group of 117 refugees was distributed among four different municipalities, which, according to Alfredo del Río Court33 (head of the Government’s resettlement office), were chosen in part due to “the presence of Palestinian collectives and mayors”34. In these neighbourhoods, the grassroots involvement of Chilean-Palestinians (as well as other members of these communities) was instrumental in accompanying their adaptation35 and ‘filling gaps’ in resource (and service) provision. Community networks were mobilised and donation campaigns organised (by the GUPS and others) to provide more (material) comfort – for example providing a fan, a fridge, a TV. Being involved in this manner allowed individuals to both support Palestinians in need and to provide a ‘culturally sensitive’ approach while doing so.

For some volunteers, the opportunity to directly aid fellow paisanos was seen as an opportunity to contribute to the Palestinian Cause. In her work on the diasporic mobilisation of Palestinians in Greece, Mavroudi (2018: 1316) finds that there is often “uncertainty over how to mobilise and help fellow Palestinians, and over whether what they are doing is actually making a difference”. Similarly, due to the thousands of kilometres separating Chile from the ‘homeland’, some interviewees pointed out how this distance affects their connection with the Cause and the daily sufferings of Palestinians living in the region. The arrival of resettled Palestinian refugees offered, as Jaime Abedrapo underlined, “a way to reconnect with their Palestinian identity, not through gastronomy or traditional dances, but through supporting a brother {or sister}”36. Maria, who confessed to regularly attending Palestinian protests in Santiago, shared these motivations: “when I felt for the first time that I could really do something with some Palestinians who were suffering, I had to do it”37. Although diaspora mobilisation is usually seen as an activity, political and/or material, which crosses (multiple) borders (Müller-Funk 2016; Mavroudi 2018), here it represents actions aimed at supporting refugees ‘over here’.

Secondly, the frame of shared Palestinianess was also used as the explanation for being able to deliver a ‘more suited’ and culturally sensitive approach. If there was no tradition of refugee reception in Chile, as Díaz Cumsille had argued, then the migration history of the Palestinian community could be seen as a suitable alternative. Indeed, as Fuad Chahin captured in our interview38, this was explicitly argued by recalling the personal experiences of their ancestors who initially settled in Chile: “when our parents and grandparents arrived, there was always somebody

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33 Interview with Alfredo del Río Court, 22 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
34 The communes of Ñuñoa, La Calera and San Felipe each had mayors of Palestinian origin at the time, while Recoleta is home to Patronato – the historical neighbourhood of the Palestinian community in Chile.
35 The process of overcoming the different obstacles faced when settling in a new country.
36 Email interview with Jaime Abedrapo, 1 March 2018.
37 Interview with Maria, 15 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
38 Interview with Fuad Chahin, 19 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
from the community to help and receive them”. This additional layer related to the claim of shared identity is rooted in the long history of chain migration from Palestine (see Part 1) which meant that the community had experience related to “adapting to the cultural shock of arriving in an unknown country”39. Once again, this was also juxtaposed with the ‘inexperienced’ Tripartite who insisted that women should find employment, remove their hijab to take their ID photo, while also requiring them to undertake a compulsory gynaecologist test with a male doctor40. Accordingly, academics from the Centre of Arab Studies gave a training to Vicaría workers about Palestinian and Muslim culture in order to mitigate these questions of cultural insensitivity – exemplifying the perceived expertise of the community on this matter.

The limits to diaspora involvement in resettlement

This ‘cultural mediation’ (Nawyn 2010) also had its limits with regards to religious differences. In the shadow of Diaz Cumsille’s heavily criticised statement, Maria summarised this experience: “we are first Palestinian and then Christian, but we learned that they are first Muslims and then Palestinians”41. An assertion highlighting the “several overlapping senses of identity” that characterise the diverse and complex reality of how “Palestinians have come to define themselves as a people” (Khalidi 2010: 19). The label of ‘Chilean-Palestinian’ is one rooted in a Chilean context where the Muslim culture is still relatively unknown, even within the Palestinian community. Consequently, there was a consensus among those interviewed that the role of the Mosque proved crucial in their adaptation. Yet, for a large number of the (secular) Christian Chilean-Palestinians who volunteered, “there was always a certain degree of incomprehension of the codes they had”42, particularly as the language barrier and trauma from displacement created important difficulties in communication. These testimonies reveal ‘cracks’ within the politically constructed frame of shared Palestinianness and the assumed natural understanding between refugees and co-national support networks. Thus, although they might have been more considerate than the ‘culturally insensitive’ programme overall, it did not mean that the interactions between Palestinians from Chile and Iraq were not also characterised by a meeting of very different subjectivities related to a distinctive experience of, and relation to, Palestinianness. For most Chilean-Palestinians, this proved too big of an obstacle in the long-run.

Throughout my interviews, it also became evident that this high-level of community involvement was only sustained in the first few months (while the Tripartite project extended for 3 years). Mobilisation practices, whether remittance sending or supporting refugees, are unstable and constantly negotiated within people’s everyday lives (Page and Mercer 2012). In fact, members of a diaspora can be (roughly) classified according to their levels of engagement, as some might contribute consistently, occasionally (in times of crisis) or not at all (Shain and Barth 2003; Pasura 2014). Similarly, rather than idealising community solidarity43 in this particular case, it is important to emphasise that the frame of shared Palestinianness acted as a political tool that appealed to and mobilised certain Chilean-Palestinians over a limited amount of time. Those with high diasporic capital are more likely to be involved in the long-run, particularly as they are both more involved in

38 Interview with Anuar Majluf, 13 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
39 Interview with Nadia Garib, 19 December 2017, Santiago, Chile
40 Interview with Maria, 15 December 2017, Santiago Chile.
41 Interview with Andrés, 15 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
42 Such inconsistent and unstructured long-term support confirms that, for refugees, “it is important not to see diasporas as a … sufficient alternative to egalitarian welfare states” (Wahlbeck 1996: 3).
the Cause generally and also more likely to be able to create meaningful change in the situation of resettled refugees.

6 Conclusion – Towards a better understanding of the politics of resettlement

In an interview with a Member of Parliament, he underplayed the significance of the 2008 resettlement project: “it does not affect anything, they are 117 refugees and 400,000 descendants.”

In this paper, however, I have laid out the various ways in which the arrival of resettled Palestinian refugees to Chile represented an important political event for Chilean-Palestinians and their history of engagement in diasporic mobilisation.

The involvement of the Palestinian community in resettlement was an opportunity for both explicit and implicit expression, as well as negotiation, of (Chilean-)Palestinian identity and politics. As Sökefeld (2006: 276) has argued, “imaginations of transnational communities are not established once and for all but have to be reproduced time and again in order to continue”. Collective ideas of a shared imagined identity were framed and mobilised despite divisions and differences, while those diaspora actors and organisations usually involved in transnational politics were instrumental in debating and ‘performing’ resettlement as mobilising structures. This was done by both framing and linking the project to key issues such as the Right of Return and engaging in mobilisation practices in the case of resource provision. By retracing the involvement of the Palestinian diaspora throughout the resettlement of Palestinian refugees to Chile, I have explored the political significance of co-national support at both different levels and times. Although I have investigated this politics of resettlement through a particularly specific and vibrant case, it is still possible to pick out some more general observations on these processes.

To start, although resettlement has often been considered as a political event at the state level and a humanitarian or technocratic affair at the local level, my aim was to move beyond these characterisations to examine how communities negotiate having to support refugees from the same nationality as them, even if it is the sole commonality they share. Interestingly, the Chilean government has recently resettled 60 Syrian refugees (Reuters 2017), yet, contrary to the Palestinian example, “there is very little Syrian community help because the ‘Chilean-Syrian’ community is more ‘pro-Assad’” and thus politically at odds with those who have fled the Syrian regime. The fact that these political considerations can shape support (or lack of) in this way showcases that more needs to be done to better understand what ‘co-national support’ means for both refugees themselves and for individuals from those settled-communities. These questions are particularly pertinent in a global policy context that is increasingly moving towards private and community sponsorship models (Hyndman et al 2017), where co-nationals could be seen as better placed to sponsor refugees due to their perceived ‘cultural expertise’. In addition, this is also true with regards to ‘Refugee Community Organisations’ and ‘Mutual Assistance Associations’ who, as co-national groups, play

44 For example, thanks to his position as congressman, Fuad Chahin was instrumental in passing “a law (Ley 20.888 (4/1/16)) which replaced previous restrictions and established that, independently from their age, refugees could accede to the nationality at the same time as their parents. By a year later, the entirety of the ‘2008 group’ had finally received Chilean citizenship (El Mercurio 2015).
45 Interview with Jorge Tarud, 12 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
46 Interview with Kamal Cumsille, 14 December 2017, Santiago, Chile.
key roles in resettlement support around the world. Overall the relation between these socially constructed identity markers and refugee support merits further inquiry, as does its relationship to diaspora politics.

In the case of diaspora groups relating refugee resettlement to the political situation in the ‘homeland’, certain conditions would need to be met for it to occur or be possible. As with Chilean-Palestinians in 2008, a history of diasporic mobilisation and activism within the community itself, or by organisations involved in refugee support, would increase the propensity to explicitly link the arrival of refugees to a particular issue in the ‘homeland’. Moreover, other relevant opportunity structures include the mediatisation of a particular resettlement project and the availability of a platform for diaspora entrepreneurs to make public claims. Although the example of Chilean-Palestinians is particularly suited to these practices, organisations such as ‘Advocacy for Oromia’\(^{47}\) in Australia and the ‘Scottish Afghan Society’\(^{48}\) in Glasgow also describe their engagement as combining refugee service provision with advocacy and the promotion of human rights in the ‘homeland’. Thinking of these communities as diasporas allows us to better understand how resettlement is an important political event and process, where, in addition to supporting refugees to adapt in a new and daunting situation, efforts are also made to raise awareness and positively change the situation that caused their plight in the first place. Ultimately, having these interesting academic discussions should not refrain us from highlighting the potential of these actions to uphold the rights of refugees ‘here’, while continuing work to improve and challenge the structures that continue to oppress, exclude and displace Palestinians and other marginalised people around the world today.

\(^{47}\) Founded in 2014, its role is “to provide assistance, to improve the settlement process and advance the wellbeing of Australian-Oromos in a number of ways”, while also engaging in advocacy for Oromian interests and rights in Ethiopia. For more information: https://advocacy4oromia.org/home/.

\(^{48}\) Founded in 2001, they “encourage and help the integration of … fellow Afghans” and also advocate for the rights of Afghan interpreters at risk of persecution in their home country. For more information: https://www.facebook.com/Scottish-Afghan-Society-544578632233208/.
7 References


